The 2021 election: Germany after Merkel

Hans Kundnani

Good afternoon, everyone, and welcome to this Chatham House members’ event on Germany after Merkel and the German election, which took place on Sunday. My name’s Hans Kundnani. I’m the Head of the Europe Programme at Chatham House, and it’s great to see so many people here for this. I can remember a time when almost nobody was interested in German elections, a decade or two ago, and that’s clearly changed. Although I did see some chat on Twitter this morning complaining about how on the BBC the German election story now seems to have dropped behind the story of the conviction of R. Kelly.

We aren’t going to be talking about R. Kelly today, we are going to be getting into a discussion about the German elections, and I have a great panel here to help me, kind of, make sense of it. We have Kai Arzheimer from the University of Mainz, Robin Alexander from Die Welt, Sudha David-Wilp from GMF, and Sophia Becker from the German Council on Foreign Relations.

The way we’re going to do this is that we’re going to start with Kai and Robin talking about what’s going on in Berlin, the election results and the possible coalition permutations. And I should say that Robin, who is literally following this minute-by-minute, and there is quite a lot going on, and so he may, at some point, have to disappear to respond to breaking news. We’re hoping that he’ll still be able to at least be here for part of the discussion. And then what we’ll do is move onto Sudha and Sophia to talk about the foreign policy implications for Europe, for the transatlantic relationship, for the rest of the world, and then think in a little bit more detail about what some of the different possible coalitions might mean in foreign policy terms.

This discussion is on the record, and I’m hoping that we’ll have a little bit of time towards the end to have some questions. If you do want to ask a question, the way to do that is to put it in the Q&A function, which I and my colleagues will be looking at, and then we’ll put those questions to the panel.

Okay, and let’s start with Kai. Maybe you could just give us a, sort of, an overview of what happened on Sunday, what the different, sort of, possibilities are, and the probabilities, perhaps, and how you, sort of, see Sunday’s election in the, sort of, longer, kind of, history of German politics. What’s going on in German politics?

Kai Arzheimer

Well, that’s a big ask. Thank you, Hans, that’s hard to start with the discussion. The story of this election is, I think, inevitably about Merkel’s departure. She’s leaving a very big gap in German politics, she’s been a towering figure for one and a half decades now, and she’s leaving office, without having dealt with the issue of succession. So it wasn’t quite clear what would happen after Merkel. And this has really shaped the campaign, with very volatile polls, with an early lead for the Greens, followed by a lead for the Christian Democrats, that then disappeared and all that, and so we end up, on Sunday evening, with a result that is very much in line with the last two weeks of polling.

We have the two formerly Volksparteien, the big centre parties, the centre left SPD and the centre right Christian Democrats CDU/CSU, more or less tied for first place. Not exactly tied, and the SPD staged an amazing comeback over the summer, and ended up with just under 26% of the vote, the Christian Democrats with just over 24% of the vote, their worst result ever, but the SPD result is not great by historical standards too. It’s great compared to the last couple of elections for the SPD, but this is a party that used to come close to 40% plus or minus something, so that time is gone.

What we see here is the ongoing fragmentation of the German party system, and Sunday night’s result leaves us with, I think, three possibilities at the moment. The first and probably the least likely outcome is the so-called ‘traffic light coalition’, the SPD governing together with the Liberal Democrats and the Greens. Another possible outcome that looks increasingly unlikely, at least that’s my take, is the so-called Jamaica coalition, where the Social Democrats are replaced by the Christian Democrats governing together with the Greens and the FDP. And then, there is the fallback position, which would be a renewed but flipped grand coalition, so the Social Democrats would get the Chancellorship, the Christian Democrats would become the junior partner in this grand coalition.

We can talk about why I think this is an unlikely outcome, but it is something that’s still on the table and that could get back on the table, although none of the parties, I think, not many of the voters are inclined towards this solution for Germany’s dilemma. At the moment, it’s like those old Western movies where people are playing cards and everyone has pointed a gun under the table at everyone else. Because the Liberal Democrats could walk away, but that might lead to a grand coalition, and so on and so forth. I don’t have to make this explicit.

One thing, and I would like to conclude my remarks with that, that did not happen, is a further increase in the vote share of the AfD. They came out at more or less the same result than four years ago, they had slight losses. But the presence of the AfD and the presence of the left party in Parliament just go to show how fragmented the German party system has become, and how difficult it is to form coalitions. Until very recently, it was quite clear. The two former major parties would have the ability to continue at a grand coalition, because they were polling round about 20% each, so it could have been impossible for them to have even this fallback option. And I would like to end my initial remarks with that.

Hans Kundnani

That’s great, Kai, a fantastic, sort of, introduction. So, sort of, fragmentation, it looks increasingly – I mean, it looks very likely that we’ll have a three party coalition, I think for the first time since, is it 1957?

Kai Arzheimer

I think so, yeah. Well, technically, it’s always been three party coalitions at least, but you’re right, it’s back to the 1950s, in many ways.

Hans Kundnani

Yes, so, and then as you say, there is a possibility of the grand coalition, still at least arithmetically. Maybe we can return to that. I’d love also to return to the question of the AfD, perhaps a little later on, ‘cause you are a – you know, you are the expert, actually, on the AfD.

Kai Arzheimer

Oh, thank you.

Hans Kundnani

But more broadly, before I turn to Robin just to tell us what’s been happening in the last, sort of, 48 hours, what’s your sense though, Kai, of this, sort of, overall question around, does Germany want change or not? Right, because the election was very much framed as a moment of change, because of the end of Merkel, but then the two candidates, you know, in a way were, you know, trying to both present themselves as a continuity – a continuation of Merkel, and now we have this inconclusive result, and you know, in some ways it seems as if Germans don’t really want change at all. But what’s your take on the, sort of, you know – is Germany changing or not?

Kai Arzheimer

I don’t have any hard data on this, but I think people want change, but not too much. So you get round about 50% for the two mainstream parties with two candidates, which very much stand for moderation, for minor changes to the course that has already been set in motion. And even the Greens toned down their message to, “We are ready because you are.” That implies that people are ready, and they get – well, they get 15%, which is not too bad, it’s the best result in the history of the party, but it’s not that resounding impetus for change, I think. So, yeah, probably some change, but not too much, we’re Germans.

Hans Kundnani

Great, okay, so Robin, you’re in the thick of it, in Berlin, and my impression from just watching this was that, you know, on Sunday night, you know, very quickly these two coalition permutations, kind of, emerged as the most likely. Jamaica, a sort of, I guess, a sort of, centre right, Christian Democrat led coalition with the Greens and the FDP. And then a, sort of, centre left traffic light coalition, Ampelkoalition, led by the Social Democrats with the same two parties. So they seem very likely to be in government, the FDP and the Greens. But in the last, sort of, 24 hours in particular, it seems as if everybody now things that Ampel, the Ampelkoalition led by the Social Democrats is, you know, very much – is very likely, and Jamaica seems to now be a little bit on the back burner. Is that your sense too? And what’s been, sort of, what’s been moving in the last 24 hours or so in Berlin?

Robin Alexander

Yeah, that is exactly my reading of the situation. The probability for the Ampelkoalition is rising, because the Christian Democrats are seen to fall apart in these hours. What’s happening just now while we are talking, is that they have to decide to vote a new Chairman for their parliamentary group, and that is a key position, because, as you know, the Christian Democrats are, in Germany, two parties, and they have two party leaders and the leader of the parliamentary group is the only person responsible for both parties. And, I mean, Laschet, the candidate of the CDU, who’s in real trouble now, is still trying to prevent this vote. So, he wants to stop the vote for a new leader of the parliamentary group, and right now it seems that he’s not successful, and that means that there will be a vote about the new Chairman of the parliamentary group, and there will be more than one candidate, and that sounds like something normal in a democracy, but it’s not according to the Christian Democratic tradition.

So – and if we have that vote, who leads the centre right parliamentary group, this might be a vote in which direction the whole party goes in the next years. For example, it could be Norbert Röttgen, that is an expert on foreign policy, I guess you all know him, and he wanted to become Party Chairman some months ago, and what he said was, “We have to change, and the direction of this change is dictated by society.” And that is easy to translate. It means more zeitgeist, more Merkelism, transforming the old Conservative Party into a Liberal Party. So that would be one possibility.

The other possibility would be Jens Spahn, and Spahn is a young man, but a very experienced Politician, and he has an idea of that party to be modern and conservative at the same time. So he, personally, is gay, he’s a very modern guy, but he is critical on migration, and he has a reputation of not shying away about tough language, so it would be really different to the Merkel style. And there’s a third option, which is Friedrich Merz. He was the leader of the parliamentary group before Merkel replaced him 20 years ago, and that would be a very classic approach, like very caring about flat taxes and about the economy, and that would be like a big back to the future in a way. So – and other candidates might appear too. So, this afternoon or this evening, if Laschet fails to stop it, the direction in which Europe’s most important party, at least in their own perception, might develop, and it’s a completely open field now. Nobody dares to predict the outcome. And that is a very un-German situation, because we are used to very stable procedures, and now it looks like those times are over.

Hans Kundnani

So, the leadership question of the CDU is open again, it sounds like. You work, Robin, for a newspaper that’s, I guess, historically been associated with the centre right, with the Christian Democrats. You personally, though, have been quite critical of Merkel in the last few years in the two books you’ve written, one about her handling of the refugee crisis, and the other more recently about the, sort of, end of the Merkel era, I suppose. So, it seems as if in the last 24/48 hours, have been a, sort of, debate increasingly about whether the, sort of, crisis of the Christian Democrats. I mean, is there? What’s going on within the – apart from the leadership question, what’s going on within the Christian Democratic Union?

Robin Alexander

Yeah, obviously, there’s a question. I mean, they lost the election. They are – they have never – they lost a lot of appeal to society, and what happened is, what some people predicted, that the minute Merkel steps down, or it’s better to put it that way, the minute people realise that Merkel will step down, they will leave her party, they will look for others to represent them. And that exactly has happened, and the party is realising this, but the debate or better the fight about how to answer it, is completely open, because the new parliamentary group will consist of roughly three camps.

One camp is old Politicians, old parliamentary – old guys who say, “It’s Merkel’s fault. She has put us in this position, and we have to reinvent us back to the Kohl era.” And the second group is Merkel followers, who say, “We have been successful, as long as we followed Angela Merkel, and we should have done more of that,” and they owe their careers to her as well. And only the third group in the parliamentary group is looking for something new, and it’s absolute unpredictable which group will get the upper hand.

What Armin Laschet is trying to do, who still is the Party Chairman, is to stop this fight and to say, “Okay, let’s postpone it and let’s stay focused, because we still can form a government.” If the Ampelkoalition is not emerging, and there’s a lot of contradictions, especially between the Liberals and the Greens, we have to present ourselves as an alternative. And I mean, Olaf Scholz got 25%, I mean, Laschet got 24%. That’s really a small margin. So, I mean, Laschet wants to postpone the process, but I think Pandora’s box is open, so, my guess is you can’t stop it any longer. Perhaps I should have debated where they want to go years ago.

Hans Kundnani

So, the Jamaica coalition is still a possibility, you’re suggesting. Can you give us a sense of, sort of, who’s talking to who at the moment? Because, you know, on Sunday night, immediately after the results came in, you know, there was these discussions that you have on German television between the candidates and other leading figures in the parties, and one of the things that emerged was this, kind of, idea that actually, given that the situation here apparently is that, you know, you have either a Social Democrat led government or a Christian Democrat led government, but in any case, with both the FDP and the Greens, but actually, they’re in a quite a strong position of power, and they should talk to each other first, and kind of, basically come up with a deal between them, and then choose to go to one of these two other parties. So there’s this complicated mixture of, you know, conversations happening. What’s your sense of initially, who’s talking to who and therefore how this is going to develop?

Robin Alexander

Yeah, so first, everybody is talking to everybody off the record. That is happening a lot now, and the thing is, which formal talks will start first. And traditional German style would be the winner of the election invites a smaller party and forms a government. And Christian Lindner, the Leader of the FDP, and Robert Habeck, the Leader of the Greens, took that out of his hand, of Olaf Scholz’ hand, because they said, “There is no clear winner, and we two, we talk first, and we develop a programme for the future, we develop” – they call it a ‘progressive core’ of the next government. And there is an historical example in Germany, that was in the last regional elections in Schleswig-Holstein, where Habeck did that too. Habeck was there the Leader of the local – of the regional Green Party, and he talked first to the Liberals and then they chose Jamaica.

So that is exactly the way the very first Jamaican coalition in German politics develop. And that was a, in my view, a very intelligent way to get – to design this process from Robert Habeck’s point of view, but I think they will end up with Scholz and they will talk with Scholz, and I guess that will start this week, at the end of the week, because we all have this traumatic experience of the last Jamaica – it was not even a coalition talk, we called it a [mother tongue – 19:50], so talks if you should start talking. And that took weeks, and it was a horrible procedure. It was that they produced, like, tons of material and they couldn’t agree on anything. And so everybody knows you cannot, like, do it for months now, you should do it in weeks, yeah? And that is why, I guess, they will start talking with Olaf Scholz on perhaps Friday.

Hans Kundnani

Right, so they start – the first coalition that gets negotiated or gets discussed is traffic light coalition. Are you saying, though, Robin, that you think that is the most likely, or do you think that it could fall apart and then we get Jamaica or even a grand coalition?

Robin Alexander

It is the most likely, definitely. It could theoretically fall apart, but I don’t see that the leading Politicians can afford it, because Christian Lindner, the Leader of the Liberals, he stopped the last Jamaica coalition four years ago. He forced the Social Democrats to join the last grand coalition, and the German audience really didn’t like it. He cannot do this another time. So he is in a weak position to leave the table. And Robert Habeck, the Leader of the Greens, is a Politician who wants to govern, he has this idea that governing now makes sense, is an object in itself, because the Greens have that talk that climate change is so urgent, we have to act now. And if you’re telling this, your voters, a whole campaign, you have to deliver. You cannot say, “We are not joining the government,” you have to deliver, and Olaf Scholz wants that government for obvious reasons. So I think they will manage.

Hans Kundnani

Great, okay, so let’s move on to, sort of, the policy implications, what the new government’s policy might look like, and perhaps we can, sort of, discuss it on that basis, that, you know, Ampelkoalition is most likely, perhaps also Jamaica and then, you know, as a third fallback option, the grand coalition. I guess, in domestic terms, it looks reasonably familiar, and it’s a, sort of, centre left coalition versus a centre right coalition, and my impression from those discussions that took place on Sunday was that a lot of the fault lines there look quite familiar around how are you going to pay for infrastructure spending and climate – you know, spending to – on the climate transition and so on. That, to me, looks like a fairly conventional, sort of, left-right, kind of, fault line.

But Sophia, I mean, feel free to add anything on that, but obviously, we’re particularly interested to hear from you about the, sort of, foreign policy implications. So, what would the foreign policy of an Ampelkoalition in particular look like? How would that be different, both from the current government, the Merkel government, but also how would it – you know, would that be radically different from a Jamaica coalition’s foreign policy?

Sophia Becker

Yeah, thanks for that question. I’m very sceptical that we will see fundamental change, even though change was the word of the night on Sunday. A lot of people were talking about change and everyone was trying to convince the Greens and the FDP that they are in fact the ones that will provide that change in either coalition. But I think, particularly when it comes to foreign and security policy, change is very much a relative term. Continuity has been the name of the game in German foreign policy for decades, even though we have always seen some nuanced shifts sometimes, but I think, in general, German foreign policy is very firmly based on two pillars. It’s anti-militarism, in my opinion, and the other one is multilateralism. And these two pillars remain, and they will also define the foreign policy of the next government.

What is interesting, and it has been interesting for a couple of years, but I think this might actually come to the fore even more under a Jamaica coalition, is that these two pillars have come into contradiction, and they have done so for a number of years now. So, Germany continues to be very sceptical of the use of military force, but at the same time, their partners are demanding them to be more assertive on the international scene. The US is asking them constantly to increase their military spending within NATO, for example, but Germany has been reluctant to do so and has, sort of, been muddling through this whole contradiction for a number of years now.

And I think what is interesting now with the change in government, and we have seen this in the last couple of months, that there is a pretty strong wing in the Social Democrats, on the left wing side, that has – is even a little bit more anti-militaristic than the German Government is now, and they have, sort of, challenged some of the government policies that the last government had promised that they would put through. And one of the examples is the replacement of the Tornado fleet, which is Germany’s dual capable aircraft that can carry nuclear weapons and is an essential part of Germany’s nuclear sharing agreement with NATO. And basically, the SDP has stopped the replacement process of these aircraft, because they have fundamentally called into question whether Germany should, in fact, remain part of the nuclear sharing agreement. And there you can see, that is just one of the examples.

Another example was the debate around armed drones, whether Germany should buy those, and then, you know, the SDP, and as well as the Greens, for that matter, always are very sceptical of arms controls, which, sort of, is a contradiction to the CDU, even though I think, in reality, that the contradictions are much more marginal than they make it appear to be.

But anyway, so I think that this contradiction between Germany’s multilateral responsibilities and what partners are asking of them, and the anti-militarist nature of this country, is, sort of, going to become increasingly difficult to manage under this new coalition, and they will have to find a way to, sort of, yeah, to navigate that. I think I will leave it at that and we can talk more.

Hans Kundnani

Yeah, that’s great. So, Sudha, some of the issues that Sophia was just talking around – about – around use of military force, NATO and so on, obviously, you know, very relevant to the transatlantic relationship too. How do you look at this, in terms of, you know, the – as I say, the consequences of the new government for the transatlantic relationship, and in particular China, because that’s obviously becoming an increasingly central issue in the relationship between Europeans and the United States. We had just had the Aucas announcement a couple of weeks ago. And it seems to me that the, sort of, Berlin, sort of, foreign policy establishment, the Berlin blob, if I can call it that, you know, is quite – and they’re quite, sort of, keen on the Greens because they see the Greens as having a more hawkish approach on China than the other parties in Germany. So I, sort of, felt as if there, a lot of the Berlin foreign policy think tankers were, sort of, really wanting the Greens to have quite an impact on this government. At the same time, as Sophia mentioned, there is this slight, sort of, worry about some of these questions around defence spending and nuclear sharing and so on. So, will any of this really matter in the end or not?

Sudha David-Wilp

That’s a good question, and you know, it’s – I’d love to hear more from Robin, actually, as well about what’s going on with the CDU. But as Sophia mentioned, the transatlantic relationship is also a pillar. She mentioned anti-militarism and multilateralism. I would add that the other fundamental pillars are the transatlantic relationship, Europe, and of course the relationship with Israel as well. So, thinking about the big picture, Hans, you know, I don’t think much is really going to change, in terms of the transatlantic relationship. Joe Biden would see a good partner in Germany, regardless if it’s Armin Laschet that leads the coalition or Olaf Scholz. There are differences though, and Sophia mentioned some of them. I think of course with the CDU in charge, there would be a little bit more ambition to strive for the 2% goal for NATO, and I think that would be much more difficult with a traffic light coalition, led by Olaf Scholz, because certainly the Greens and SPD are not keen to necessarily reach that goal of 2%. They think it’s an arbitrary figure and don’t see the commitment as necessary to be a good partner in the transatlantic relationship.

But I think, you know, the more important point is that in Washington, there are a lot of returnees from the Obama administration in Washington now, and clearly, they see Germany as the go-to partner on the continent. And I think you can see that also because Joe Biden, sort of, turned the other way when it came to Nord Stream 2. It’s up, it’s operational, but you know, he got a lot of flak from Republicans and probably even some Democrats about allowing Nord Stream 2 to go forward, without issuing sanctions on our German corporate leaders for the pipeline. And – but I guess the bigger prize, as you mentioned, Hans, is China. I think the reason that was done was because Joe Biden wants to make sure that Germany is on the same team with the United States when it comes to confronting China as the biggest threat to the global order.

And so I think that that’s, you know, where there is continuity, as Sophia mentioned, I think there is also a limit to that continuity, because over 16 years, Angela Merkel was very able to be an effective crisis manager, but there were never real choices made. Right, sort of, the can had been continuously kicked down the road, and I think now Germany is, kind of, come to that crossroad where they need to decide between, you know, yes, exports are important, but what about our democratic values, and also siding with the United States when it comes to China, especially in light of this Aucas deal that you mentioned, right? I mean, it sort of, shows that the United States is not going to necessarily wait for Europe, and was probably also upset at the end of last year with the China-EU deal, right?

So I think those are all things that are now going to define the transatlantic relationship, and there’s also, as Sophia mentioned, the nuclear umbrella is also going to be a little difficult if the Greens and the SPD really, you know, press forward with trying to get rid of nuclear weapons on German soil. I think that’s going to be the, sort of, the sticking points. But all-in-all, I think the transatlantic relationship, the rhetoric will remain, that it’s an important partnership, especially as we see this divide between democracy and authoritarianism in the world.

Hans Kundnani

So, but Sudha, are you saying that you think under an Ampelkoalition led by the SPD there might be a shift on China policy? And if so, how? Because I can’t quite see it. I don’t see the SPD as being, you know, more hawkish than the CDU. I mean, it’s, kind of, complicated, ‘cause you have to look across different areas of policy, but…

Sudha David-Wilp

Right.

Hans Kundnani

But overall, it doesn’t seem to me that they’re particularly hawkish. So, as I say, the only way that that seems to me to be possible that you have a more hawkish approach is if the Greens really, sort of, push this. Some of this depends on who gets which ministries, and I’d love to hear Kai on some of this later on. But I don’t quite see how you get a shift on German…

Sudha David-Wilp

Well, Hans, you should also keep in mind that I think the FDP as well, in its, you know, strong commitment to human rights, also is very hawkish on China. So together, you know, the two parties could be, sort of, like, you know, exert pressure on Olaf Scholz, but at the same time, you’re right, there’s a lot of contradictions, because both parties are also very strong when it comes to non-nuclear proliferation, and that doesn’t help when, you know, confronting China requires hard security.

Hans Kundnani

Yeah, and we also know, don’t we, that going back to Schröder, China has been what the Germans call Chefsache, in other words, it’s run out of the Chancellory. So even if the Greens were to have the Foreign Ministry, it’s not clear to me that they have that much influence over the German-China policy. But Kai, do you have any thoughts on this, on sort of, the different ministries and how this gets, kind of, negotiated?

Kai Arzheimer

I think this is really too early. I mean, everyone seems to agree that Lindner wants Finance and everyone seems to agree that this might be reasonable, but there will be a price for the FDP to pay. And having said that, going back to China, although this is not really my area of expertise, I think it’s important to see how important and relevant China is for the German economy. So I think any future German Government will have to tread a very fine line on the one hand, to keep the United States sweet and to fulfil obligations to the liberal world order. But on the other hand, and that leads us back to the FDP, that it will be real money that is lost if German-China relations sour, and that would be difficult with Jamaica, but it would also be difficult for the traffic light coalition. I know that the Greens are very outspoken about human rights violations in China. I know that there’s some Green MEPs who are persona non grata in China. And this is all good and well, and I think they might get the Foreign Office, but at the end of the day, all these trade arrangements are in place, and future trade arrangements are in the pipeline, and it will be difficult for a traffic light coalition to tell leaders of the German economy that this is all going away or not going to materialise, in the case of future arrangements.

So, I don’t know really what the fallout will be, and well, I would like to hear something about Russia, actually, from my two colleagues here, because that’s the next obvious problem, I think, that we need to discuss, in terms of future German relations with the outside world.

Hans Kundnani

We should discuss Russia. We also haven’t talked about the EU so far, and there’s a couple of questions that relate to that, particularly around the, sort of, the relationship with France. But Robin, I don’t know if you had any thoughts on, sort of, what changes might take place in German foreign policy from your slightly different perspective, which is looking at it from the political end, as it were, rather than, sort of, foreign policy end? Because I think sometimes we have the tendency, in the foreign policy world, there’s a bit of wishful thinking and we’re, sort of, looking at, you know, what’s the best policy, but we sometimes neglect, you know, the way that Politicians are thinking about this often in political terms, you know, the political reality. So, do you have a sense that anything much would change in German foreign policy with an Ampelkoalition or with a Jamaica coalition compared to the Merkel approach on China and everything else?

Robin Alexander

My feeling is that on the level of what spokespersons will say, that will not change a lot. But if you look behind the scenes, they might change something quite substantial, because German foreign policy was done by Angela Merkel the last years. She absorbed it, it was – everything was done in the Chancellory. The Foreign Office was sidelined. That will definitely change because we, before the election, two weeks before the election, we did an interview with Olaf Scholz, and we told him we want to talk about foreign policy, because that wasn’t touched in the election before, and whatever we asked, the answer was ‘Europe’. So he wants to concentrate on the reform of the Eurozone, of the EU, he wants to get rid of majority votes and he wants to impose this mechanism which was invented, in the EU, recovery funds, which he negotiated. He called it the ‘Hamilton moment of German politics’, and he’s talking about the United States of Europe. So he wants to concentrate on Europe.

On the other hand, he might have a Vice Chancellor, Robert Habeck, who went during the election campaign to Ukraine, visited the frontline, took photos of him in the frontline with a helmet and military gear, and said, “We should discuss arming the Ukrainian Army.” And he had to eat his words two days later, but that is a very extraordinary thing, yeah? And now a third person comes in, that is Rolf Mützenich. You might not have heard of him, but he is the Leader of the Social Democratic Parliamentary Group. So, he will be a very influential person in an Ampelkoalition. And Rolf Mützenich, years ago, did his doctoral thesis about nuclear sharing, and he doesn’t – he wants it to stop. So you have a Social Democrat who comes from the Friedensbewegung, the peace movement of the 80s, whose identity is shaped around it, as a person even, and you have Greens who are very hawkish. And you have a Chancellor who is not really interested in that subject and that is a very unpredictable constellation, whatever, what they will do.

Hans Kundnani

Yes, I’ve always thought that there’s at least a certain type of – a certain current within the Green Party, that is the closest thing there is in Germany to the neocons, and they…

Robin Alexander

Yeah, but that is – you have these guys, think about Marieluise Beck, think of Ralf Fücks, think about Bütikofer in the European Parliament, and they are highly influential. And they talk to Habeck, they talk to Berbock, but in the rank and file, you still have a lot of them who say, “We are the party who were demonstrating against Pershings.” And so until now, in the opposition, foreign politics was only statements and it’s really unpredictable what might come out of that. Interesting enough, they all talk to Joschka Fischer, and they all respect him, so, he might have a lot of good influence on them.

Hans Kundnani

So, in other words, in an Ampelkoalition, actually foreign policy is potentially one of the issues that they’re really going to have differences over. I guess you’re not saying, though, you think it might be a dealbreaker that could prevent…?

Robin Alexander

No, it might not, but, I mean, take Olaf Scholz is a Social Democrat, and he comes from the old Gerhard Schröder gang. He was Generalsekretär when Gerhard Schröder was Chancellor. So what really is due in German politics is to break the bonds between the Social Democratic Party and the Russian state, which are not structural, but personal. Will he do that? I don’t know.

On the other hand, the Greens can paint against Nord Stream Zwei, Nord Stream 2. So they have to push for a change, yeah? And now comes – the FDP comes in, and the FDP have a very bad reputation in the past to be very on the side of singular business interests, to put it that way. On the other hand, Christian Lindner, their leader, is tweeting about Navalny all the time, so he always says, “We should not forget these 100 days of prison, 150 days of prison.” So, that is really – we knew what we had with Angela Merkel. By the way, sometimes it was difficult enough to predict what she would do next, but she was doing it. And now a lot of persons are doing it, will be doing it, and it will be very interesting what they can agree on.

Hans Kundnani

Sophia, do you want to add anything on that – on the, sort of, the tensions on foreign policy within a potential Ampelkoalition, Russia, that Kai brought up and that Robin was just touching on, and/or this question of the EU, which I think we probably should get into, you know, what – I mean, Robin’s touched on it a bit, but this question of Eurozone reform and how likely that is? Again, my impression is that, you know, although, you know, the SPD are more open to this than the Christian Democrats were, as Robin, you know, was suggesting, Scholz talking about the Hamiltonian moment and so on, if you have the FDP, particularly if they have the Chancellory, I can’t see that that leaves much space for any, kind of, meaningful reform of the EU’s fiscal rules, for example. But Sophia, what’s your perspective on some of those foreign policy tensions in the potential coalition?

Sophia Becker

I think that Robin’s analysis is really spot on. I think it’s going to be extremely interesting, I – on the Russia issue, I wanted to add that I believe that the FDP also campaigned against Nord Stream 2, and so, we might see an interesting, sort of, coalition between the Greens and the FDP in there. So I think there’s actually, between the Greens and the FDP, there’s actually a lot of convergence that might push the SPD in a different direction. I could see that if, as Robin said, they are able to, sort of, rid themselves of the Russian spectre of the past, then we might be seeing that, and if, you know, some of the analysis is right, that Scholz is not really interested in those, sort of, issues, then, you know, there might be a chance for that.

On the EU front, it’s not really my area of expertise, but I do see that strong contradiction between the FDP’s position and the Social Democrats and the Greens, who seem to be more on the same line there. I think what is important to point out is that all – virtually all of these parties that we are talking about want more Europe. All of them have that written in their party programmes, “We want more Europe”. They just mean different things by it. So, you know, for example, the FDP in their party programme calls for a European Army, but doesn’t want the fiscal union. And the SPD and the Greens want a proper European budget that is – that comes from carbon taxation, for example, and other things. So, it is going to be quite interesting what European agenda comes out of those coalition talks, because at the moment it’s – they all want more Europe, but it’s still a little bit disjointed.

Hans Kundnani

Yeah, I think that’s spot on. So, Kai, we’re getting lots of questions about the AfD, perhaps because you’re on the panel. I mean, you know, what happened on Sunday was, having got 13% four years ago, they dropped down to around 10%. Some people have seen that as a, you know, as a good sign, but how do you understand that? You know, they’re still a significant force, and how do you, sort of, see the, sort of, relationship between the, sort of, rise of the AfD and the Christian Democrats? Because, you know, if the Christian Democrats were now to go into opposition, and Robin, kind of, hinted at this earlier on, you know, what some people, kind of, think might happen is that the CDU, sort of, lurches back to the right, and you know, perhaps partly in an attempt to win back some of those voters that they’d lost to the AfD. So, what’s your sense of this?

Kai Arzheimer

Right, so the AfD has lost around about 2 percentage points, 2.5 points perhaps, and that’s actually not a bad result, because in 2017 it was, sort of, the perfect storm for them. They had a lot of momentum coming out of those state elections, the refugee issue was still on the agenda. Four years on, they are in a much worse situation. They didn’t really come through with their ideas and policies over the last two years at least, because of the pandemic. No-one really cares too much about immigration at the moment. It didn’t play any significant role during the campaign, not even in the context of the developments in Afghanistan and still, they got more or less the same result. So, you could say they have stabilised, they have become more or less a fixture of the German party system, and at the same time they are completely isolated and ostracised and might come under observation by the Secret Service next year or so. And still, they have more than 10% of the vote.

What this means for the Christian Democrats is, on the one hand, I think it would be very difficult to win back voters from the AfD, because if you vote for the AfD these days, when 80% of Germans think this is by and large a right wing extremist party, when the authorities have their eyes on them, it seems unlikely to me that you would move back to a centre right party just because that centre right party goes back to the 1990s.

What I could have imagined, or what I could imagine for the future, and this is a slightly crazy idea, is that the Christian Democrats try to reinvent themselves along the lines of the Austrian People’s Parties, that is, become slightly more populist, copy some of the policies, modernise. That is something that I could imagine, but even then, I’m not quite sure that they would win back many voters from the AfD.

On the other hand, they have lost massively in the centre, with a candidate who pursues more or less Merkelian policies. Laschet didn’t promise a break, he didn’t say, “Let’s go back to how we were in Helmut Kohl’s days.” And still, the moment that Merkel is gone, people move, voters move, we believe in those transitions. Data is slightly dodgy on that, but if we believe for a moment that the exit polls were right, people moved to the Social Democrats and to the Greens, even with such a centrist figure as Laschet as the nominal Leader of the CDU. So, I don’t see this as a promising strategy, to copy the AfD.

Hans Kundnani

Yeah, so, I mean, it’s interesting, and you and I have talked about this before, the way the AfD has radicalised over time rather than moderating, as some other far right parties in Europe have done. And as you say, that puts a bit of distance between them and the Christian Democrats. On the other hand, and this has been, you know, discussed during the election campaign and afterwards, you have these figures within the Christian Democrats, like Hans-Georg Maassen, who actually seemed to be quite close to that, sort of, far right scene. I mean, I’d love to get Robin’s take on this from his perspective as well. But how does that, sort of, add up?

Kai Arzheimer

Well, Maassen failed, but Robin mentioned the camps within the CDU, so that was one idea, and I think Maassen was a pretty extreme exponent of this very traditionalist camp. I don’t think he was really speaking for that camp, but he did manage to win his district, and he – if it had any fact at all, it prevented the AfD guy from winning, which was an interesting outcome, in my view. So, I don’t really see that as a strategy for the CDU as a whole, but there is a temptation, I think, in some of the eastern state chapters, to further develop that strategy and to argue that what is untenable for the party at a national level might work at the regional level, perhaps at the local level. I think at the local level, there are some talks between people within the CDU and the AfD, and the idea that they could co-operate on non-political issues like a new football pitch or stuff like that, and at the moment the official party line is to rule out any sort of co-operation, but whether this is tenable in the East is a different question.

Hans Kundnani

What do you think, Robin? It strikes me that there’s a bit of a parallel, and it makes me think of what the, sort of, dilemma that the Republicans in the United States faced after 2008, right? And they chose a strategy with Trump that also didn’t seem to be very promising, but then it turned out that you could win an election that way. What’s your sense of – you talked about this a little bit at the beginning, but what’s your sense of what the CDU will be like in opposition, if it does go into opposition?

Robin Alexander

In the direction that the CDU will develop is completely open now, but what is for sure is that they won’t develop in the direction of the AfD, and it is because of three reasons. When the AfD started, there was the idea, this is flesh from our flesh and we have to get back voters who left us for the becoming more wide. And this idea is absolutely dead in the Christian Democrats because of three reasons. First reason, they lost this election, and the AfD didn’t gain, so they lost to the centre and not to the right. That is obviously in the numbers. Second thing is, the AfD is radicalising itself, at a very quick, fast pace, and they are – they started with a programme, which was anti-Euro, anti-immigrant, and the rest was more or less copy and paste from the Helmut Kohl years. Now, they changed completely. In their new manifesto they have – they want to leave the EU, and that is obviously nothing the Christian Democrats ever wanted, and by the way, obviously not.

And third thing is, there was a murder of a Christian Democratic Politician called Walter Lübcke two years ago. So, a Christian Democratic local Politician whom they all knew what he – who he was – a super classical, I’d say, local Politician, was murdered by a right winger in cold blood. And to everybody in that city, ooh, this was like, “They’re coming after us.” To them it’s not foreigners, it’s not antifa or left wing guys, they’re coming after us in the end. And for those who read history books, they know that this has a history in the Weimar Republic where Catholic Politicians were murdered by right wingers. And so, there’s this combination of reading the numbers, development of the AfD, and the personal reception of this as a completely different tribe, it’s not flesh from our flesh, yeah? And so I predict even in East Germany, where the situation is super difficult for the Christian Democrats, because the AfD is so strong there, there will be no coalition talks, there will be no agreements, and they will not even buy themselves a coffee in the breaks of the parliamentary sessions.

Hans Kundnani

Great, I’m glad you mentioned East Germany as well, the former East Germany, because I want to come back to that, maybe with Kai, in a second. But we are, sort of, slightly running out of time. I’m going to take a few more quick questions from the audience, one of which I think is probably for you, Robin, about Markus Söder. He was more popular than Laschet among CDU voters. Is there any chance that he could be the next Chancellor if a traffic lights coalition can’t be formed?

Robin Alexander

Funny enough, this is the rumour of the hour, that if Armin Laschet loses this meeting of his parliamentary group, that Armin – that Markus Söder will try to form a Jamaica government. I personally don’t believe it, for – I mean, you cannot, like, have a Chancellor candidate after the election. This is hard to sell. But in four years, if we have an Ampelkoalition now, and the Ampelkoalition will have a rough ride, because times are getting tough in Germany and everywhere, and then he will be perhaps the Chancellor candidate in four years.

Hans Kundnani

Yeah, so the person who asked the question was very well plugged in to the Berlin rumour mill. It’s very up-to-date. So yes, let’s return to this question of East Germany, because Kai, I mean, we discussed how the AfD did quite well. The map now, you know, of the different colours, you know, different regions of Germany, looks very striking, and there is this, kind of, sense, I’ve heard some people talk about this in the last, sort of, day or so, there is this sense that this would be a very, sort of, West German Government, an Ampelkoalition with very little, kind of, representation in the East, and this could, sort of, exacerbate this feeling that some Germans have that they’re not, sort of, represented by any of that parties that really matter, there’s a representation gap. Is that something you’re worried about?

Kai Arzheimer

Not particularly, because the East is not just the AfD. They polled 22/24% perhaps, but that still means 75% voting for other parties, and these parties not necessarily being the left. What I find interesting about the electoral map is the comeback of the SPD in Eastern Germany. That reminds me, actually, of the first Schröder election, at the late – in the late 1990s, when the Christian Democrats had been doing very well in 1990, and 1994 it looked like a solidified base for the Christian Democrats, and then the Social Democrats just swept it up. I’m not sure if it’s the same dimension. We would have to have a closer look. It’s certainly happening on a lower level, but I would argue that Eastern Germany is in fact well represented in any future government. I mean, if Scholz becomes Chancellor, he was standing in Potsdam. It’s a suburb of Berlin, but it’s still in Pantenburg, and Analina Berbock is standing in Potsdam and many other of those elected come from the East, but at the end of the day, it’s just 20% of the population, and it’s slightly less of the electorate, and I think they would be adequately represented.

Hans Kundnani

Great. Sophia and Sudha, do you have anything you want to add at the end? In particular, we’ve got lots of questions about France and the EU, and I feel that we haven’t quite, sort of, adequately answered them. Do you have any sense of, you know, how the new government and the different coalitions might, sort of, reach out to France? We talked a little bit about Eurozone reform, but any more thoughts on that are welcome. And then, somebody asked the question, “Do you think Merkel will become EU President or a European Commissioner?” And any other thoughts on where this leaves, sort of, Germany and its role in Europe and the world? Sudha, let me…

Sudha David-Wilp

I just, like, maybe I can just offer two quick points. One is on Russia, that came up before. I think it’s going to be very hard for the SPD to position itself as, sort of, the Russia fresh air, given the climate right now, considering Navalny and also, what’s going on in Belarus. And something that wasn’t necessarily picked up a lot in this election campaign, but there has been a considerable amount of disinformation from Russian state backed media, and recently, last week, I guess, the Interior Ministry put out an alert about possible packing before the election. So I think there is definitely a better or, sort of, clear-eyed view of Putin and Russia. And I’ll just end with regard to France, I think there is a – we had a poll with our transatlantic trends that said that 60% of Germans and a considerable amount of Europeans want to see more defence capability because they realise they can’t always rely on the United States. So I guess the question is what happens after the election in France and will Europe finally be able to come together and boost its defence capability?

Hans Kundnani

Great, thanks. Sophia?

Sophia Becker

Yeah, to the question of bilateral relationships with France, and I think there was also a question with the UK. I don’t really see that much change there. I think both, like, if it would be Scholz or if it would be Laschet or anyone else, I think they all seem to be, you know, committed Europeans, very close to Paris. I think both of them even went to Paris during the campaign, so I cannot imagine that there would be any changes. As I said, there have been some talks, coming back to Sudha’s point for the defence, more defence, a better defence union, there have been some talks within the FDP of a European Army, which is obviously a very far away, difficult to achieve goal, but, you know, there could be some more initiatives in that realm, I think. Specifically, because of the scepticism of defence spending at least, like, just purely German defence spending, and I think the European, they would, sort of, be a way of, sort of, getting around this, so getting around the anti-militarism with more multilateralism, basically.

Hans Kundnani

Great. So I think lots of unanswered questions about the next German Government and the future of Germany and its role in Europe and the world. We’ll continue to discuss this, in various events at Chatham House, in particular tomorrow, and the issue of Russia came up several times, and there’s an event that our Russia Programme is organising tomorrow on Germany’s Russia Policy in the post-Merkel Era, which is, kind of, based on a book by our Associate Fellow, John Lough, about the Germany-Russia relationship, which has just come out. So if you’re particularly interested in the Russia issue, I think my colleagues are going to put the link to that in the chat, do come along to that.

In the meantime, and thank you all for coming, for your questions, and thank you to our panel, in particular, Robin, we’re glad you could join for the whole hour in the end, apart from a short phone call in the middle. Thank you so much, I think it’s been a really good discussion, and we look forward to continuing sometime soon. Thanks, bye, bye.

Sudha David-Wilp

Thank you.

Sophia Becker

Thank you too, bye.

Sudha David-Wilp

Bye.