James Miles
Well, welcome, everyone, to our Chatham House discussion today. We’re just two days away now from the start of an event that China has been gearing up for, for months, getting ready for it and ensuring that this goes smoothly, not just in Beijing, but everywhere around the country. This has been a priority for millions of officials for months. That means if you’re a local official, ensuring that there are no major workplace accidents in your area, no protests and, of course, no outbreaks of COVID-19. And, in recent weeks, we’ve seen the extraordinary lengths that officials have been going to, to keep this disease at bay in their areas. That’s, in part, of course, because of the longstanding zero COVID policy, but also because of this congress. There must be no blemishes. The event is about making the party and its leadership look good and woe betide any official whose locality becomes an embarrassment.
The relentless emphasis on the need for stability at every level of government in China that we’ve seen in recent months is something, of course, that we see in the build-up to every congress, but this one is unusual, exceptional even, because this congress is about the power of one man, Xi Jinping. Normally, we might be expecting him to set – to step down. He’s served two five-year terms. Many had once believed that was the norm for a General Secretary. At this point he should be handing over to a successor whose identity we would’ve been pretty sure about for at least the past five years, but this is not going to happen. Xi Jinping is about to be anointed for a third term.
So, on top of all the usual anxiety that has gripped officialdom for months and months as preparations for this have picked up, there’s been another layer of anxiety. A desire to prove loyalty to the man they’re calling “the Helmsman, the People’s Leader.” China is in a frenzy of adulation for Xi of a kind that we’ve not seen directed at a single leader in the build-up to a congress any time before in the history of the Reform Era.
I’m James Miles. I’m the China Writer-at-large at The Economist and this, I’m somewhat embarrassed to say, will be the 8th Communist Party Congress that I’ve covered, either close-up or from afar, in my career as a Journalist. They’ve all been pretty much the same, the same choreography, the same control, no dissent, no meaningful debate, endless cheerleading for the party’s achievements. One of them did stand out for having a different feel and that was the first one that I covered, in 1987, the 13th Party Congress.
I was there when Zhao Ziyang, then the General Secretary, he’d just been confirmed in that position at the 13th Congress, met the press afterwards in a room in the Great Hall of the People. And what a moment that was. We could ask him anything, it was freewheeling, he cracked jokes, and of – you know, of course, he gave little away, but he was making a statement that Chinese political culture could be a bit more normal. What we’re about to witness will be far from normal by global standards. It will be tightly scripted, a display of Communist Party power and Xi’s power. Xi will not answer questions from Journalists. Zhao’s ideas back in the 1980s, for what he called “political reform” will be far from Xi Jinping’s mind.
But it will be a feast for China watchers, such as those we have with us today. Some of the finest in the business and let me introduce them. From the University of Vienna is Ling Li, who teaches Chinese politics and law and is an expert, among other things, on the institutions and processes of the party state in China. Welcome Dr Li. In Beijing we have Wang Xiangwei, a Former Editor-in-Chief of the South China Morning Post and veteran China watcher, whose columns for the newspaper are always full of insight. And here in London we have Yu Jie, who’s a Senior Research Fellow at Chatham House, specialising in Chinese Foreign Policy and economic diplomacy. So, welcome, all, and I really look forward to hearing your insights.
First, what I’d like to do is ask each of you to summarise your views on various aspects of this event in just five minutes or so, and then I’ll kick off a discussion with some follow-up questions to each of you. And then I’ll invite members of the audience to raise your own questions, which you can do in the chat box of Zoom. So, to begin with, I would like to ask Ling, if I may, to set out what a Communist Party Congress is all about, what does it do and why is it so important?
Dr Ling Li
Thank you, James. The easiest way to summarise what the Party Congress does is to read out the Party Constitution. According to the CCP Charter, the Party Congress has six items of mandate, which include to “discuss and to listen to,” first, and then to “pass, in terms of approval of the report delivered by the sitting Central Committee of this Party Congress,” and then to “pass the Report of the Central Commission of Discipline and Inspection of the outgoing Party Congress.” And the third one is to “deliberate and decide on matters of great importance.” What is great – of great importance is not defined. The fourth one is to “approve any amendment of the Party Charter,” and the last two items is to “elect the Central Committee and the Central Commission of Discipline and Inspection.”
Regarding how the Party Congress is organised and how it operates, I only have time to address two things, which I think has raised the – most of the discussions on social media and the press media. The first thing is about the choreography – did you use the word choreographed the Congress? Which means there’s no ambush, there – we’re not going to see what we see in the Soviet Union Party Congress events, which is very exciting. Sometimes you can topple a very top leader without other people knowing, who attended the Congress. But that’s not going to happen in the CCP Congress, that is because the entire institution is designed, both before the Congress convenes and during the time where the Congress convenes, that the planned outcome of the election will be delivered. The whole institution is designed to achieve that goal.
However, this does not necessarily mean the Congress is not important, because some people argue the whole thing is “just for show. It carries no significance.” My argument would be the opposite. It is because the Party Congress is so important, because it carries the legitimacy of all these leadership changes. So, once a decision has been entered, it will take at least five years to overturn it or reverse it, so it’s super important, and it is because of that reason so much planning, rehearsing, is put into it. But then, why? The event only takes less than a week, and we are told that no surprise should be expected. So, how to explain that? That’s because something else, if we have time, I can address that later on.
But the second issue I want to address is the electoral outcome, or selectoral outcome, is staggered and that means some people will stay, some people will go, so as to ensure a measure of continuity of the leadership. And the pace of the staggering, right now, the only observable consistent pattern for the staggering pace is the age, through the age limit. That is the most important factor that drives the turnout of the leadership. There’s also argument, because there seem to be inconsistency in this age limit law, because Xi Jinping didn’t legislate, he doesn’t comply with it, and there is certain inconsistency in the turnout of the Politburo member.
But if we divide the entire central party leadership into three categories, you will see a very clear consistency. If you leave the Head of the Party, General Party Secretary, or Party Chairman in the past time, out of the group, and then you divide Politburo Standing Committee member and Politburo member, because they are two different groups, they share – they enjoy different level of privileges. So you will see the age is currently the only one that drives the axis, that regulates the axis of Politburo Standing Committee member, other than the disciplinary actions against them, which is rare, in the last 20 years.
But for Politburo member, they don’t enjoy the same level of privilege like the Politburo Standing Committee member is. So, they – for them, age is a limit, it’s a ceiling. If you’re above it, you’re out of the conversation, but if you’re below it, it does not necessarily mean you will have a renewal of your membership. And that – the inconsistency, the breaking of this norm, so-called, did not happen at Xi Jinping’s time. It happened during Hu Jintao’s time and I think the first time is 1997 regarding Li Tieying, who was – who retired before reaching the age 68, and that should be the start of Zemin’s rule. Okay, I will just stop there.
James Miles
Well, thank you very much, Ling, and just a quick observation from me on that. Just how striking it’s been, how few, if any, leaks we’ve had of the conversation at the new Politburo, which is perhaps a measure of how tightly controlled things are in the build-up to this congress, but that’s something we can get into a bit later. Xiangwei, could you set out for us your expectations of this and particularly surrounding those questions of the changes in the leadership? You have to unmute yourself. You’re muted, Xiangwei.
Wang Xiangwei
Okay, can you hear me now?
James Miles
Okay, yeah, sound good.
Wang Xiangwei
Okay, thank you, James. Greetings from Beijing. I’m very pleased to join this panel of influential speakers. You know, as you know, reading tealeaves of China’s politics has always been a challenge because of its opacity and is even more difficult this time around. Until this congress, as Dr Li has mentioned, you know, there are some unofficial rules and norms, including the representation of party factions and the retirement age, that we could follow to make educated guesses about the new leadership line-up. But this time, that things are totally different.
James, as you have mentioned, you know, we are a few days away from the congress and there are fewer leaks, but – I mean, that, you know, the most important reason is that, you know, Xi Jinping is believed to have a dominant side in the leadership composition. And what makes it even worse this time, even more difficult, is that the speculation is mixed with strong feelings towards Xi, so it’s even – so made – so it has made it harder to sift through the speculation and try to guess a – some real sense of what is going on. You know, one obvious example is that the speculation of a coup late last month. You know, the fact that, you know, I find it – I find this incredible. You know, the fact that such speculation could go viral says a lot about some people’s understanding of China’s politics and also the current political climate in the country.
Having said that, based on my experiences of reading Chinese politics over the past three decades and through speaking with friends and sources, I think I can share some broad and reasonable assumptions and the predictions here. First of all, in my mind, there is no doubt whatsoever, Xi Jinping is set to secure his norm busting third term and most importantly, is set to remain as China’s top leader in the next ten years. So, basically means he will serve his third term and very likely the fourth term, until 2032. And I guess the wording and the tone of the speech Xi is to deliver at the beginning of the congress, which opens on October the 16th, and later, the composition of the new leadership will offer more confirmation in this regard.
Secondly, as mentioned earlier, Xi himself, alone, largely decides the new leadership line-up, to be unveiled on 23rd or 24th, at the first plenary session of the Central Committee of the 20th Congress. I think, from what I gather, you know, this is the first time that Xi himself decides the new leadership line-up. At the 19th Congress, five years ago, in 2017, which heralded his second term, I think the belief is that Xi Jinping himself had to defer to Jiang Zemin and the other party veterans over the – over some of the candidates for the top leadership, but I think this time, the influence of those party veterans definitely has waned.
Third point I want to offer is that China’s leadership changes, this time, may be more dramatic than expected. I think right now, there were two basic scenarios. There were, basically, two scenarios, I’m sorry. I mean, the first one is that Xi himself may have broken with tradition and made exception to himself, but the norms and unwritten rules would apply to rest of the leaders. The, you know, they – unwritten rule, including the seven up and the eight down, which means the leaders who have reached the age of 67 could still serve another term. The leaders who have reached the age of 68 this year will step down.
So, in this scenario that only two current members of the Politburo Standing Committee will retire, including Li Zhanshu, the Chairman of the National People’s Congress, China’s legislator, and Han Zheng, the Executive Vice Premier, and Li Keqiang, currently China’s number two. Premier Li Keqiang is number two, in terms of the ranking in the Communist Party. He faces a two-term limit as Premier and in this scenario, he will move on to become the New Chairman of NPC, and Wang Yang is currently ranked number four in the hierarchy of the Communist Party, will become the Premier.
And then, you know, this is the kind of – you know, in a way, it’s, kind of, a safe option that will be welcomed at home and abroad. The second option is that given Xi’s rising power, you know, he wants to build a new team around him, in this scenario that at least four of the other six Politburo Standing Committee members are likely to retire, and including at least two people who have not reached the retirement age of 68. In this scenario, you know, as I mentioned earlier, Li Zhanshu and Han Zheng look set – are set to go and in this scenario, that both Li Keqiang, the Premier and Zhao Leji, the Head of anti-corruption agency, are also most likely to retire.
One mystery is whether Wang Huning, the Ideology Tsar, will also retire. So, that means the – other than Xi, the only person who most likely to stay will be Wang Yang and – now, as things go, I think the latter scenario, this scenario, now seems more likely. And Ding Xuexiang, Xi Jinping’s trusted Political Aide, his Chief of Staff, is a leading candidate to get a seat on the new Politburo Standing Committee and Tianjin Party Secretary, Chen Miner, you know, he is another Xi Jinping’s favourites. He is also picked for elevation. And then, the Shanghai Party Secretary, Li Qiang, as I understand it, he is still in the race, despite the earlier debacle in handling a major corona outbreak in Shanghai, where, you know, the people in Shanghai endured at least two month of lockdown. And the Guangdong Party Secretary, Li Xi, I think, is also another strong contender to make it to the top seven.
Vice Premier Hu Chunhua, he also has a chance and the, you know, the fate of who – whether – who will receive the elevation is very interesting, is because right now, he’s – other than Li Keqiang, he’s the – another candidates with the, sort of, a strong affiliation with the Communist Youth League, the power base of Former President Hu Jintao. Wang Yang may have come from the Communist Youth League background, but he is known as the “man for all seasons,” so he should not be seen as a representative from the Communist Youth League. So, in this scenario, you know, Wang Yang could just be one of the candidates to become Premier. I mean, there are – if the second – if this scenario I’m talking about happens and then, you know, there could be some other stronger candidates to assume the premiership.
And now we also come to another interesting question. If the scenario I have just described occurs, then another interesting question is whether the heirs apparent will emerge. As I mentioned earlier, you know, Xi, is set to stay in power for at least another ten years. I don’t think he has any need, nor he’s in a hurry to appoint a successor. Doing this early could create policy uncertainty. So, you know, in my mind, you know, I will guess that the question of heir apparent may be addressed at the 21st Congress five years later, the earliest. So, at this congress, the promotion of younger officials to the Politburo Standing Committee, that’s not really necessary to give any hints at the succession. That’s just my two cents worth, James.
James Miles
Thank you very much, Xiangwei. So, a lot of very important detail there and, of course, worth repeating what you’ve already said, that this will come out after the congress, in fact, at the first plenary of the new Central Committee. So, it’s really two extremely important meetings we’re looking forward to, what – the first one lasting about a week and then, the next one half a day on the day after the congress, and that’s when we’ll get the big announcements of the new Politburo line-up.
Yu Jie, can we turn to you now and would you like to point out some of the policy issues that might arise from Xi Jinping’s report to the congress, which is expected to be a three-hour speech, if the record of the 19th Congress is repeated, particularly in the area of foreign policy? And, of course, so much of the speculation surrounding the leadership does relate to who will be the next Foreign Policy Chief after Yang Jiechi steps down from the Politburo, if he does. But in that domain, and economic foreign policy, what can we expect?
Dr Yu Jie
Well, thank you so much, James, for this. First of all, welcome, everyone, to Chatham House. Delighted to see so many faces here. Secondly, what I’ve – according to what I’ve heard from Xiangwei, it seems to me that the Party Congresses, which I have covered and will continue to cover, and that seems to be go – be under President Xi, so in the next ten and 20 years or so, so this is my second congress being covered. Previously, I covered this at LSE.
Now, let’s look into some big policy directions in here and surely, as we said, there will be a political report published on Sunday, which is, firstly, to review what the party has done in the last five years and forecast what party will do in the next five years and to ten years and so on and so forth. It is not a standard speech that really attracts attention and public perception, to be honest. I mean, it’ll be quite a dry public account that, essentially, is Xi Jinping tell the rest of colleagues of the world largest Communist Par – the wor – largest political party, what are we expecting to do?
Now, the three things coming to – on my mind and firstly, it is on this very strong notion of self-reliance of China. So, that is – according to what has been published last week, you know, the 7th plenum of the 19th Party Congress, readout, I mean, much has been pointed towards that China has now entering a period that extremely choppy water, in terms of economy and, also, a very precarious international situation for China. So, obviously, that would require some sense of assessment and some of direction turning that Chinese economy will have to rely on by itself.
It can no longer just rely on expert growth-led economic model, like in the past, for example. Firstly for the weak demand from the global market, but secondly, it is also for China’s much fraught international relations with its major trading partner, such as United States and European Union. So, we’re going to hear so much sense of self-reliance, not just in term on technology sector. I mean, technology sector is one thing, but I think we will hear far more on how China going to engineering the economy for itself. So, for me, the big headline would be the economic self-reliance, that’s one thing.
Now, secondly, come back to the question on security. Obviously, Xi Jinping introduced his holistic approach of national security back to two years ago, and so on and so forth. So, what we expect to see is that – expect Xi Jinping to tie up that sense of national security, together with economic growth. So, this is no longer just about China will be able to producing this amazing, staggering, economic growth data. So, GDP, the growth, I mean, so on and so forth, double GDP digit is no longer really matters anymore, but instead, Xi Jinping is generally seeking, firstly, whether China will be able to secure the food security and secondly, China’s able to secure its energy security. So, I think this is a naturally the party thinking of its own survival and, also, the survival of the state, precisely because China is now having an extremely difficult relationship with the West – US-led West and so on and so forth. What will be the way to save itself?
So, that sense of caution and soberness, which is rather unprecedented, compared with in the 19th Party Congress, the time when the economy was doing okay and China’s relations with the rest of world is relatively stable. So, then that bring, ultimately, the question on foreign affairs, you know, what kind of relationship that China is very keen to set up? I mean, a more optimistic person, that hoping there would be a positive cost correction regarding on China’s relationship with the West, and especially given China’s very interesting choice on Russia’s invasion towards Ukraine. Because what China has done is China has underestimate the unity of the West, but overestimate the disunity, the division between EU and United States. So, I think if Beijing want to save its own economy, really out of economic necessity and that perhaps we should have a positive cost correction on – so foreign affairs and improving its relationship with the G7s and others.
But this doesn’t means that China only focusing on G7s and the relationship with the West. I think what we’re going to hear is we’re going to hear much – far more emphasis on China’s relationship with the – many of the developing countries. So, for example, Xi Jinping introduced his ideas on Global Development Initiative and so on and so forth. That is precisely tailored for from now on, what kind of development relationship that China is very keen to establish with the so-called Global South. And China also realise that it will have to counting on the Global South to help China internationally, irrespectives of votes within the United Nations or on something else, on China’s own neighbourhood, for example. I mean, this is the country shared a border with 14 different countries and predominantly, they are developing countries and I would say predominantly, even if the Chinese economy is turning inward, I think much of the foreign economic policy will be pointed towards South Asia and South East Asia and Central Asia, really to guarantee a safe neighbourhood for China’s own economic development. So, I think these are the things.
Now, obviously, this leave a very old of the Taiwan question, so-called Taiwan question, referred by party, what are they going to do? I think the key thing in here, it is to carefully observe the language on the paragraph that is soldered together with Hong Kong and the Macao and Taiwan, to see whether Xi Jinping would like to keep the term, so-called “peaceful reunification” in there. And if we still have that term, and that means that we do not really have a dramatic shift on the policies towards Taiwan. But if we do not see that term and then, that really signify a significant shift, in terms of China’s Taiwan policy.
So, I think these are the big foreign affairs issues. Now, when you ask me for the prediction of who will be the next Foreign Minister, hmmm, it’s a very hard one to choose. Obviously, Yang Jiechi, my alumni from LSE, will step down. Whether Wang Yi will be able to fill that shoes, we don’t know, and, also, I think the backdrop for this said Wang Yi is someone who has not really served as a Ambassador to United States. Has sufficient experience in dealing with Asian affairs, but not necessarily sufficient experience, in terms of dealing European affairs and American affairs, which it seems to be always the first choice when they come to the Foreign Ministers or the most senior foreign officials.
So, there has been quite a discussion that we might likely to see a Foreign Minister that is not come from the Foreign Ministry, but from somewhere else. So, who knows? I think we’re going to have a firm name by March next year, in the time of National People’s Congress, which essentially, about the Cabinet shuffle for the State Council. So, I think by then we should know who the Foreign Minister will be, but I think so far, what we can say is that we will have one spot to be kept on the foreign affairs issue at the Politburo. So, you’re going to remember that when they come to China, it is always the domestic politics given the priority over foreign affairs, so therefore, you only have one spot on Politburo to dealing with foreign policy issues. Back to you, James.
James Miles
Well, thanks very much, indeed, yeah, fascinating. I suppose one term, just to follow up on that, that has come up at previous congresses, is the idea of strategic opportunity for China. That yes, there are challenges in the global environment, but overall, the period China faces is that of opportunity, in terms of its global rise. Would you expect, given, you know, just how those challenges have evolved over the past five years, since the last congress, not least the war in Ukraine and COVID, the growing tensions with America over Taiwan, would the language surrounding that be changed? Would we expect China to portray the world as a more threatening place, I suppose, to China’s rise?
Dr Yu Jie
Well, I think it’s already indicated, again, from the readout of the 7th plenary of 19th Party Congress last week. I mean, I went through the line – sorry, this week. Now, what we have in here is they drop the word of the strategic opportunity, which is – has been referred from Jiang Zemin, ever since. So, what Beijing really sees the international situation is almost like it is too threatening for China and what can China do to protect itself? I mean, that’s how I read things, and especially when they referring to the war in Ukraine, is not the war in Ukraine, it’s the so-called “Ukraine crises.”
So, how Beijing could rise to the challenge of this particular crises and hence, what would change, in terms of a geopolitical standing, beside China? Because what China felt so far seems to be that sense of loneliness, almost in a sense of loneliness at international stage. That thing by being a great – by being a big country, but very few followers. So, I think it’s no longer about the talk of strategic opportunity, but the talk of strategic survival that seems to be more in tune with the mood in Beijing these days.
James Miles
Ling, I’d like to turn to you on the mechanics of this congress and, you know, we’ve all, kind of, characterised this as something that is tightly choreographed, scripted and yet, of course, we should bear in mind that there will be more candidates than the number of seats to be filled in the Central Committee. In the past, the difference has been more than 8%, I believe. And perhaps again worth recalling that 13th Communist Party Congress back in 1987, when there was a startling development surrounding the voting procedure for the Central Committee. Deng Liqun, who was then the propaganda chief, failed to make it onto the Central Committee and therefore, failed to make it into the Politburo. Could we see surprises like that again? How important is that particular part of the process?
Dr Ling Li
Let me address the question about the in – the weird paradox between the tightly script and choreographed process of the Party Congress and at the same time, the congress is supposed to be a forum to legitimise very important party decisions. How come – so, there’s a guy, Professor Wu Guoguang, who I respect a lot, who has done a brilliant research about all the parts – Party Congresses and he has developed one concept, which was, “The Party Congress was hollowed out, because it was so scripted and choreographed.” But my argument would be it is because the Party Congress is so important and the current party leaders doesn’t want any surprise to happen during that process, because once it’s done, the damage will be deep. It’s very difficult to reverse, and they don’t want similar situation as happen in the Soviet Party Congresses.
So, what has happened, in the last about 40 to 30 years, is the party has changed how the Party Congress was conducted. In the Maoist era, the Party Congress could take two month. So, there would be a lot of deliberations, back and forth, changing the candidates, suggested candidates’ list, and send it back for a re-vote. It can go on several rounds and that’s why the Congress took so – such a long time. But it is – from the first Party Congress that you attended, in 1987, it started to standardise the time and shorten it, and for the last – since then, every Party Congress ended on the seventh day, very sharp and punctuate.
So, within a very limited time period, you have to achieve this result, which is half of the delegates to pass the suggested list of candidates to these positions. So, they have advance all the deliberation process way ahead of the congress, and we have learned the party started to prepare for the list and deliberate on the list, inviting opinions, suggestions, consultations, at least six month ahead of the congress. So, they have, kind of, segregate the deliberation phase at the final voting phase, so that to ensure the voting can be done in a very short span of time with great certainty and predictability. So, that should explain why it’s, on the one hand, important, but on the second hand – on the other hand, it seems all symbolic, which it is not.
The second question is about the – sorry, I put so much focus on the choreography, but I’ve forgotten…
James Miles
The…
Dr Ling Li
…the second question.
James Miles
…differential in the number of…
Dr Ling Li
Oh, yes…
James Miles
…Central Committee seats…
Dr Ling Li
…the supply.
James Miles
…and the number of candidates.
Dr Ling Li
Yes, because the – there’s a target, right? For Central Committee members, they – it’s is competitive at the minimal level, right, for the Politburo. Politburo Standing Committee and General Party Secretary, it’s non-competitive, which means only one candidate will be proposed for one seat. But for Central Committee members, you will have more people, more candidates than the seats, although it’s still very low. It’s, like, for every 100 seats, you will have 110 or 109 candidates proposed to fill those seat. So, there will be people, candidates, who are going to be voted out and that’s tolerated in the process and that’s what it’s supposed to be.
And to control the process, as I argued, there is a preceding Standing Committee, which is comprised all the sitting members of the Politburo and all the retired former members of the Politburo Standing Committee and sometimes, at critical times, you will see more members from the military, because they have some contingency seat for that body, as well. So, they are going to deal with any surprises, any unexpected events, like if a highly wanted candidate didn’t get the sufficient vote, and then, they can start the political persuasion of the delegates and put them to the right direction. So, it’s still very much controlled competition to ensure that the final outcome is expected and acceptable.
James Miles
Thanks, and a follow-up to you, Xiangwei, and that is I suppose why does all this matter? I mean, we’ve been saying for quite a long time now that Xi Jinping is incredibly powerful, that he has no real challengers, that he has, or will have, more proteges in the Politburo. Does that really make a difference? You know, a striking thing, in parallel to our assessment that Xi Jinping is as powerful as Deng or Mao, is that in fact, all along, he’s been surrounded by people who are legacies of the previous system, including the Prime Minister, Li Keqiang, including his hatchet man in the anti-corruption campaign, Wang Qishan, including his propaganda chief, Wang Huning, including his Foreign Policy Chief, Yang Jiechi. They’re all people who rose to extremely prominent positions before Xi Jinping took over. So, clearly, it has not prevented him from establishing his authority already. Why should having more people close to him actually make a difference?
Wang Xiangwei
James, I think that’s a fascinating question. I, you know, I think, you know, right now, that the message is that, you know, as a henchman – as the great leader, you know, he has set very grand direction for the country. I think the, sort of, economic problems, the financial difficulties, the social problems that China is facing, I think Xi’s supporter is pushing the message that his – Xi has set a wise direction. You know, he is the wise man. It’s the people who work under him have not really fulfilled their tasks. They have done a terrible job.
I mean, you know, as you have mentioned, that until the 18th Party Congress at 2012, when he was made the Party Chief, that he barely had any say in how the leadership team was formed. I mean, this mainly – you know, Jiang Zemin made the final decisions. I mean, even at the – as I mentioned earlier, even at the 19th Party Congress in 2017, he will have to defer to Jiang to – you know, on some of the choices on the Polit – sort of, Politburo Standing Committee. So, now, you know, after five years, that now he has become the Chairman of everything and now he wants – I think that he wants to – he believes that, as I said earlier, the problems that China is facing, the economic headwinds China is facing, is because it’s not he has set a wrong direction. It’s because the people who work for him have not really done their jobs well. So, I think the message is that if he promotes the people he believe are more capable and things will change. I think that’s one thing.
The second thing I want to say is that I, you know, I want to touch on the issue that Dr Li has mentioned about, you know, how China’s leaderships election process has evolved. And I would like add some thoughts on that, you know, to show that, you know, the – sort of, previously, at the Party Congresses, under Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao, that there was room for debates, for political manoeuvring. As you mentioned that Deng Liqun was manoeuvred out of the Central Committee. I don’t think that’s the case now. Even with the competitive Central Committee elections, I think the things are, basically – have already decide, as you know, things have already been decided.
I – you know, let me just, sort of, give you example. I mean, because under President Xi, I think the so-called intraparty democracy has died. You know, I think Xi’s predecessors, Jiang Zemin and particularly Hu Jintao, had actively promoted the standardisation and institutionalisation of leadership process through internal polls and competitive election of the party Central Committee members, you know, known as the intraparty democracy. I mean, you know, the results were that a series of norms were established, including the norm that requires leaders to remain at the age of 67, but will have to retire at the age of 68.
And you know, let me give you example that, for instance, in June 207 [means 2007], four month before the 17th Congress, when Xi is promoted to the Politburo Standing Committee, Hu – at that time, President Hu Jintao and his supporters organise a straw poll to recommend candidates for the 25 member Politburo. And five years later, in May 2012, five month before the 18th Congress, the internal poll was extended to create a shortlist of candidates for the Politburo Standing Committee. And in both cases, the internal polls were used as a major benchmark to shape up the new leadership line-up, and as you can see, that Xi has benefitted immensely. But after the 19th Party Congress that Xi believed – after 18th Party Congress, I’m sorry, that Xi believed that the – you know, those internal polling methods and, also, the so-called other practices of the intraparty democracy were – could elect the wrong people.
So, I think in the run up to the 19th Congress in 2017, Xi has completely transformed the leadership’s election process and concentrate the power in his own hands. That, you know, back, you know, five years ago, he had completely abandoned all the intraparty democracy practices and he has chosen face-to-face interviews to create a shortlist of candidates. And then, the mo – you know, the rest of the people are – were kept in dark until the very last minute and then – and I’m sure he will follow-up this practice for the upcoming leadership changes. James?
James Miles
Thank you, Xiangwei. I’d like to put some questions that have been raised by members of our audience and one has come in from Dina Mufti, who asks what the “circumstances” were “in which Xi Jinping announced that he was staying on for a third term?” Was there a moment in the party, at a Central Committee meeting, or some other forum, at which he actually declared this? I mean, of course, we all supposed that this was the case when the Presidential term was ended in 2018. But how did it actually work inside the party?
Wang Xiangwei
Me?
James Miles
Yeah.
Wang Xiangwei
Okay. I…
James Miles
If – well, if…
Wang Xiangwei
Well…
James Miles
…anyone else – but…
Wang Xiangwei
Yeah, I mean, you know, I’m sure Dr Yu and Dr Li can add. I mean, from my understanding that you don’t really need an occasion. I mean, because over the past five years, particularly this year, I mean, the propaganda is out every day to say that, you know, Xi is the man to lead China. So, I don’t think – I think, you know, as I said earlier, that the rest – you know, the – all the – you know, the majority of the party delegates attending the Party Congress, which starts in a few days, they have no idea what are the, you know, what are the candidates being promose – proposed to the leadership for the top leadership.
It’s that the party delegates at the 20th Congress, they are – you know, their mandate is to elect the new Central Committee members. And the new Central Committee members are only to be given the list of candidates for the Politburo and the Politburo Standing Committee on the day. As you mentioned, the day after the Congress ends and the – at the meeting, at the first plenary session of the Central Committee, the new Central Committee of the 20th Congress, where the new Central Committee members are given the list, you know, for that half-day meeting.
And then – I mean, because for the Politburo and the Politburo Standing Committee, it’s not a competitive election. They are, basically, give a list of people to vote and then, probably – and you know, I’ve never been into this meeting and they have never – there has no reports about how this meeting is conducted, but I’ll presumably that the Central Committee members will be given a list and chose that Xi Jinping as the Party Secretary – as the Party General Secretary. And then, his name will probably at the very top, so the new – all the new Central Committee members will know that he’s the man, and then that the, you know, the list of candidates will probably ranked according to the ranking in the party.
So, probably Xi’s name at the very top of shortlist and then, whoever is going to become the Premier will – his name will be second, and then third, fourth. And in that case, the new Central Committee members will know who will be the Party Chief and who will be the Premier and who will be the NPC Chairman and CPPCC Chairman, Anti-Corruption Agency Chief and Executive Vice Premier. I’m sure the list of candidates the new Central Committee members are given are probably ranked in that way, so they will know.
James Miles
But…
Wang Xiangwei
Does that answer your question?
James Miles
It does, thank you.
Dr Ling Li
Can I just…
James Miles
I…
Dr Ling Li
…add some…
James Miles
Yeah, no, go ahead, Ling.
Dr Ling Li
…more speculation, adding to Xiangwei’s picturing of the ballot? It’s – yes, it’s – so many things are still not known to us, including the actual – the practical voting procedure. So, to go further on this question about the ballot, we don’t know whether there will be one single ballot where all these three offices of decision-making bodies will be listed separately, or you vote – so, in theory, you should vote the Politburo first and then, among the Politburo members, then they will – certain people will be selected for the Politburo Standing Committee. And then, from that body, there will be one person heading the party. So, we don’t know whether that takes three steps to achieve to the end, the Head of the Party, or it’s voted in one go, everything is written in one ballot. It’s something we still don’t know, and probably will never know.
Wang Xiangwei
That’s true, but I can tell you that, you know, for CCDI, the anti-corruption agency, I think that’s easy. Probably just one ballot, one name, so people will know that person will be the new Chairman of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection, I guess.
Dr Ling Li
For CCDI…
Wang Xiangwei
But…
Dr Ling Li
…there is still a Standing Committee and usually, there will be, like, a dozen, or a little bit more, Standing Committee members and among the Standing Committee members, there will be a one, yes, one Secretary, but several Vice Secretaries. So, they have to be able to figure out. But the sequence of the name, obviously, is a very strong indication, usually, according to…
Wang Xiangwei
Yeah.
Dr Ling Li
…party practices. If they don’t list them separately, then it must be according to the sequence of the position on the list. So, there will be a way to signal that and remember, all the voting is going to take place after this political persuading [inaudible – 57:48] and during that procedure, the information will be hinted to the voters, for sure.
Wang Xiangwei
Yeah.
Dr Yu Jie
I mean, obviously, it’s not a party that you run through a campaign, like what you have the in the British Tory Party campaign, as such, at all. I mean, there’s certain unspoken rules there that you just don’t expect the senior party leaders will spelled out very clearly, because everyone certainly have a stakes within this and if anyone who be able to leak the information, and I think that person will be accused at the end. Now, not just the Politburo and Politburo Standing Committee. I think what will be also interesting to look into is who will be the new Central Committee members, and many of them, actually, interestingly, have a very strong background on industries and innovation and technology. So, that is clearly indicated at the policy direction this country’s going to go and, also, what – how influential they are likely going to be calculated and how likely that China is going to pursue that path of self-reliance. So, I think it’s not just a 25 and a seven, oh, we might get seven or we might get nine, and we got five, but also is that 203 number of people which should be – also be watch out, as well.
James Miles
We’re running out of time, sadly, but I would like to put a final question to all of you, and I think it’s, for many people, a burning question. It is a question that relates to the future of China’s economy and therefore, of global prosperity. What’s going to happen to zero COVID? We can certainly expect that what has been achieved so far will be declared a great victory, but will we get a signal that this is going to be wound down? What about soon after the congress, will a timetable soon emerge for getting us out of zero COVID and back to normal? Xiangwei…
Wang Xiangwei
I come back?
James Miles
…yes, yeah.
Wang Xiangwei
Okay, thank you. I think China’s going to send a message that soon after the Congress ends, probably November, that China is going to further reduce the number of the quarantine days for overseas arrivals, from currently – from the current regimen that was seven plus three, to four plus three. However, on the – at home, I think the tight restrictions will remain in place until China’s – this political cycle is – has come to a full stop, which is in March, when the NPC, the National People’s Congress annual sessions will be held to elect – to confirm, I should say, to confirm Xi Jinping as the President for another term and, also to elect a new Cabinet.
I don’t think China will relax the COVID restrictions at home until March. However, because the Chinese leadership is under huge pressure from businesses and from foreign investors about keeping out the visitors, overseas visitors, so that’s why I believe that they’re going to relax the – reduce the number of the quarantine days for overseas arrivals. And, also, China has also started to issue visas to foreign students, who, over the past three years, been, sort of – do remote learning in their own countries. I think the – but the rest – but at home, the restrictions definitely will remain in place.
James Miles
Thank you. Ling, do you agree?
Dr Ling Li
I will also make some comments on the COVID policy, because it’s in everyone’s mind, including my own mind. I can think of three practical functions of keeping the zero pol – COVID policy right now, one for disease control, which is a arguable case, scientifically and medically. I won’t go into that, but the persuasive value of continuing to use zero COVID policy as the method of disease control will decline if COVID continues to develop the way it develops.
And the second reason, or function, is for restriction of mobility. It’s very important, it has high imminent value for the party ahead of the Party Congress, which can probably be extended to the National People’s Congress next year, in March, as well. But once all this political cycle, as, oh, Xiangwei mentioned, has ended, then that function will start to decline in its value, as well.
And the third function is for political legitimacy, because the COVID control had worked at the beginning, in the early stages of the pandemic, and it was – at that time, it was promoted. It was written in this discourse, which – where the policy was a living proof of the superiority of the Chinese chara – of the political system of China, with Chinese characteristics, which was associated with the emergence of the Xi Jinping thought, his personal ideology. So, once this ideology is confirmed and written into the party charter at a elevated, even more elevated level, at this current congress, then its value will decrease, as well.
So, once all that had happened, I don’t see any rational reason to keep it as it is now, and remember, even for the Great Leap Forward, it ended within three years. For the Cultural Revolution, the most core part of it, which is to cease power, also ended within three years. So, there’s no reason for all this policy to continue, especially under so much pressure from home and abroad that the government is facing.
James Miles
Thank you. Yu Jie, I suppose your thoughts about self-reliance and so on in the report suggest that they’re not going to be in a hurry to import foreign mRNA vaccines, so it could be quite a long wait before they’re confident enough in their own ability with vaccines.
Dr Yu Jie
Well, mRNA is one issue. I think another issue in here is that – the ICU bed coverage in China. I think that’s perhaps really at leadership’s back mind is that well, we have around 30,000 public hospitals, but the ICU bed coverage, and for the elderly population, like, in China, will be insufficient. So, I think that’s perhaps one reason to keep the zero COVID policy over here. But then, the misfortune in here is that zero COVID policy has really led a very high-level youth unemployment, the number of young people that generally the party looking to attract towards to, and they would really lost the faith towards the party.
So, I think, ultimately, for the legitimacy question, the party will have to stake, somehow try to mending its relationship with the younger population and open up the society, firstly, and secondly, even though, as I said, the pain threshold of having a lower GDP growth has been adjusted, but that means that China cannot really slide into sluggish economic growth. That’s won’t just – won’t help the CCP performance at all. So, I think for all that various reason, zero COVID will be lifted very soon, not as soon as we going to have a prophesised timeline, but surely this is not doing party any good.
James Miles
Well, thank you all very much. Apologies for running over time and lots more to discuss, but I hope you’ve all learned from our panel of wonderful experts today, I certainly have. Thank you, Wang Xiangwei, Ling Li, Yu Jie. It’s been a fascinating hour of discussion. Thank you all very much.
Dr Ling Li
Thank you.
Wang Xiangwei
Thanks.
Dr Ling Li
Bye, bye.
Wang Xiangwei
Thank you.
Dr Yu Jie
Bye, bye.
Wang Xiangwei
Bye, bye.
Dr Yu Jie
Thank you. Thank you, James. Bye. Bye.
Wang Xiangwei
Thank you, James.
