Europe’s role in MENA conflict zones: a declining influence?

Michelle Pace

Welcome, everyone. Welcome to our panellists. Welcome to our audience. This is the session today, the webinar on Europe’s Role in the MENA Conflict Zones: A Declining Influence? I will briefly lay out the plan for today’s webinar, which will take us for an hour and 15 minutes. But, first, some practicalities. This session is being recorded, but it’s not going to be distributed and, in terms of the audience, Chatham House would like the audience to be an active one. So, we encourage you to use the ‘Q&A’ possibility at the bottom of your Zoom link, please, and put your questions in the ‘Q&A’ aspect of the, yeah, of Zoom. So, I will start briefly with a background note on the topic today, and then I’ll pass onto our panellists for their brief intervention. And then, after that, we’ll open the floor for questions and answers, and the idea is to have a very interactive session and then, in conclusion, I will just thank you all, and then we can also talk about more events by Chatham House, related to this topic.

So, as we know, the EU and its member states are the leading donors of international aid towards those affected by war in Syria. It has also been the driving force of the Syria Pledging Conferences, which took place in Brussels for four consecutive years now, from 2017 until 2020. As we speak, the fifth one is being organised for March later this year. Following an escalation of fighting in Northern Syria, as well as the threat of COVID-19, the EU repeatedly called for a ceasefire, which eventually came into effect on the 5th of March of 2020. In light of numerous attacks on civilians, hospitals, and schools during the past decade, the EU has continuously urged all parties to the conflict to allow unimpeded and safe humanitarian access to people in need. It also repeatedly called for the respect of international humanitarian law.

Similarly, in the Libyan context, almost ten years after the Libyan revolution ended in civil war, the security situation remains murky in the context of a fragile ceasefire. Years of fighting, exacerbated by a shattered economy and COVID-19, have exhausted people’s coping capacities. Many Libyans, refugees, and migrants have lost their livelihoods, and the country’s health system is close to collapse. The EU is once again the largest donor of aid to the most vulnerable people in Libya.

These two conflict zones that we’ll focus on during today’s event, and the EU’s role in each, reinforce the perception of the EU as a payer but not a player. Russian leadership presses Europeans to participate in the reconstruction of Syria, without giving them much of a voice in ongoing political discussions. Similarly, in Libya, the EU is mostly restricted to a support role for UN Special Envoys, avoiding any initiative that might complicate their efforts.

In the end, this self-imposed powerlessness confines Europe’s role to a provider of humanitarian assistance to the victims in the areas stricken by conflicts, and to the displaced populations across the region. So, I now ask Tarik to kick us off with his focus on the EU’s engagement policy, particularly its economic policy, its development aid, and capacity-building practices in conflict zones.

Tarik Yousef

Thank you, Michelle, for the kind introduction, and thank you to Chatham House for convening us for what I think is a timely debate. In my humble opinion, it is not too early to start thinking about EU priorities in the coming period, EU policy, its neighbourhood engagement, and I don’t think it’s too early to start thinking also about EU engagement in the post-COVID world, post-COVID-19 world. You’re right, Michelle, in highlighting and emphasising the critical role that EU – the EU has played as being the largest international donor, including in a lot of conflict zones. And I would say conflict zones is – has to be now seen much more broadly than just the countries where civil war has been ongoing, whether it’s Syria, Libya, or Yemen. I think the notion of conflict in the future, or potential conflict, or areas where there are tensions that could boil over into conflict, is going to be much more expansive, given everything we’ve seen underway.

I think the question one should ask is, can the EU, even in that minimalist role, that self-imposed powerlessness of the last few years, can it continue to do that, and reap the necessary rewards? What would be required to, in fact, maintain that very role in the future, given everything that has happened in 2020 and 2021? And, in this regard, and, again, being very brief, I have struggled with this very question, as far as whether the EU is prepared, whether the EU will be, in fact, engaged, would be at a level of ambition, and a level of strategic support that will be required.

Look around you in a lot of the conflict countries in the region, I think the COVID-19 public health crisis has taken a much bigger toll than any official statistics suggest. I think the economic ravages from COVID-19 will also be much more significant and catastrophic for the conflict countries in particular than we suspected or expected initially. And I think, overall, these very difficult economic conditions will affect many other countries within the neighbourhood of the EU, and so the question one has to ask is, is the following. In the – given the growing budget constraints that not only the conflict countries face, the neighbourhood countries face, but especially the EU countries increasingly face, as they focus internally on what they need to do to protect their economies and societies, will these budget constraints and these massive debts that they have run up, in order to contain the impact of COVID, will these stand in the way in 2021 and 2022, in the way of the EU continuing to be not just the biggest and largest donor to conflict countries but, arguably, also the most effective player, when it comes to capacity building, technical assistance, and a host of other needs that will emerge, needs that are already there but, in my humble opinion, will become even more, much more magnified and amplified over the next 12 to 24 months?

I pose this question, and I am sceptical. I think the level of political will that’s going to be required, the co-ordination within the EU and amongst member states, the magnitude of the issues that are likely to emerge in the conflict countries, and, with them, the possibilities for problems to be exported aboard, is going to require a complete overhaul, at least in the level of ambition, the scale at which the EU’s going to be asked to play. I don’t think the Biden administration is going to make life easier for the EU as far as what’s expected of Europe as – in terms of its engagement, its support, and its assistance. The view in Washington remains that Europe has to look after its problems, has to look after its neighbourhood. I think the discussions underway in Europe that are targeting thinking about economic recovery, the post-COVID world, have to encompass the neighbourhood, have to encompass the conflict areas in a much more strategic, proactive – and a way that’s also protective of EU security needs and the like.

That is the question that I’m afraid we’re going to be looking at over the coming period, the next 12 to 24 months, and I think it’s up to Europe, in many ways, to define the parameters of its engagement, the scale, the level of ambition. Based on what we see in the conflict countries and within the neighbourhood at large, at least in the Middle East, problems will be bigger. They’ll be more complicated, the resources will be scarcer, and competition from within countries and amongst countries for economic security, for food security, for protecting livelihoods is going to place much more demands and heavy burden on Europe in the coming days. I will stop here and look forward to a discussion. Thank you.

Michelle Pace

Thank you, Tarik, and, in fact, you have already addressed a question that has been brought up by Mike Gapes, former UK Member of Parliament, in regards to whether “We anticipate any change of approach, particularly by the Biden administration, in terms of EU policy towards these conflict areas, but also MENA in general?” But we will definitely take this up again, I’m sure, as the discussion proceeds. I think you also laid a ground for Daniela’s intervention now, which will focus more on the internal dynamics between member states of the EU, in terms of how they are thinking through lessons that we can possibly learn from past failures in this regard, but also whether there is any new momentum precisely to touch upon what you, Tarik, referred to as this need for political will and a clear agenda for the way forward. Daniela?

Daniela Huber

Yes, thank you so much, Michelle, and thanks, of course, to Chatham House and the Al Sharq Forum for organising this. Yes, so I will focus more on the view from the European Union on Libya, because Libya is, of course, the one conflict which has shown EU weakness and inability to act more than any other conflict right now. Because two EU member states moved in direct opposition to each other, this has opened the door for other actors to move in. We know, of course, this story. Now, there seems to be some positive momentum right now with the new Unity Government, but I think we also need to make sure that we learned lessons from the failure of the last Unity Government in 2014/15, and that applies in particular also to the European Union and to three member states, that is, Italy, France, and Germany, which are very crucial to these questions.

Now, the argument I would like to make here is that France and Italy have very much focused on their diverging short-term interests, rather than staking out shared European long-term interests, while Germany has become active, actually, on this, but a bit late. But, of course, better late than never. Now, for Italy, in particular, we are right now exiting a government crisis, and let’s see how long actually the current government will last. But the new government won’t change the main lens with which it looks at Libya, and that is, of course, containing migration, and access to energy. And France, on the other hand, looks at Libya mainly from the viewpoint of what it sees as security in the Sahel and as counterterrorism.

Now, in this, in these lenses, both countries have made what I would assess as strategic mistakes. Italy, on one hand, with the deals that it made with Libyan militias to constrain migration that, of course, happened in the absence of EU action on that issue. And, right now, actually, NGOs in Italy have called upon the new government to actually abandon this minuted doctrine, how it’s called, because it was the Minister of the Interior who made these agreements and make a new bilateral agreement only once there will be a new government. Now – so, this has, in some way, of course, undermined the UN’s supported government, and Italy at some point, also took a more distance position to that government, at which point, as we know, Turkey entered the conflict. But while Italy’s policy has been within the European position that supported the UN process, France, on the other hand, has actually openly undermined that by putting itself firmly into one board with the Emirates and with [inaudible – 14:48]. And by undermining a shared European position, this has, of course, created a European vacuum and, as a result, it opened the door for Russia to enter.

Now, I would also like to make here very briefly a difference between Russia and Turkey because they are typically mentioned now together as two rivals of the European Union in Libya. But I think we need to differentiate between the interests that Russia and Turkey have. Russia’s main interest is to actually act as a spoiler of European influence in Libya, and, in contrast to this, Turkey actually needs Europe eventually to stabilise Libya. It surely cannot do it by itself, and, as we heard in the previous talks there, Europe actually has capacities in this. So, I think this is a crucial difference actually between these two actors, of which Europe needs to take account of, and it means that Europe also needs to find some common ground with Turkey on Libya. Otherwise, it’s clear that Russia will try to repeat the Astana model in Libya, if the European Union doesn’t do that.

Now, while French and Italian short-term interests might be divided, I think it’s very clear that actually the long-term interests converge. An unstable Libya fuels conflict in the Sahel, fuels conflict in the Eastern Mediterranean, contributes to migration crises, and also destabilises Tunisia. So, it is very clear, in a European interest, to stabilise Libya now. And I think actually France, Germany, and Italy, in particular, need to work together on Libya, even in the form maybe of a lead group, which is a format which has worked very well on other foreign policy issues, and such a lead group could also take advantage of the new US administration.

Now, I very much agree that Libya is not in the focus of the new US administration and, as Tarik has said, they really want the Europeans to take care of this. But what is really important is that the wind in Washington is changing, and this has not only already led to the mending of fences in the Gulf, but particularly, also, the new US policy vis-à-vis the conflict in Yemen is putting, of course, the Emirates under pressure and I think that EU can seek US support on pressuring the Emirates when needed. So, the new administration, the new US administration has a clear interest in actually supporting an EU, which throws its weight behind the UN process. So, I will stop here, and maybe go into various of these issues, once in the ‘Q&A’ session.

Michelle Pace

Thank you, Daniela, and we move swiftly onto Maria, who will now take us actually to the case of Syria, and EU strategies specifically for Syria.

Maria Fantappie

Thank you, Michelle, and thank you for Al Sharq Forum and Chatham House for organising this panel. As other panellists have said, this could not be more timely, and I think for discussing the future of EU strategic vision for conflict and for conflict areas, I will say for at least three main motives. One is that there is a level of maturity within the EU at this moment where the discussion of how actually to transform principled action into a strategic – a common strategic vision has matured already with the 2016 Global Strategy. And now we’re discussing also, the 2022 Strategic Compass, which really aims at this, creating a platform where EU member states could actually create a common vision over common threats, and, according to that, really define political objective on how to operate more strategically in conflict areas.

And a second argument also that is the evolution of the new Biden administration and the US in general, it is more and more clear that the EU cannot be reliant on the US, and that the EU dependency on the US has become less sustainable. First of all, because we are seeing that the Biden administration is, sort of, taking the – like, setting itself in continuity with the previous administration in gradually retreating from the Middle East and, at the same time also, it is more and more reluctant to do the micromanagement of crises really that comes from this region.

And that’s why I will say that it becomes more and more imperative for the EU to really get the push and to move forward this discussion on how to build its strategic autonomy, and especially because the way in which most of these countries in the Middle East are evolving, it looks like that this, which is an area geographically very close to Europe, there are going to – there’s going to be a lot of crises that are going to directly impact the EU. And I can just mention at least two developments that are hinting to the fact that we are going to see more and more crises coming from this region.

The first is that we’re seeing more in relation to the negotiation of the return to the JCPOA. We can see stepped up Iranian activity, in terms of moving its own localised within different areas from Yemen to Iraq and probably in other areas. And this, of course, destabilise areas, which are very close to the EU neighbourhood, and might bring back threats, such as a return of ISIS, such as a return of migrant crisis, and also, of course, a very hectic Turkish activity which, on the one hand, Turkey seems to be very keen in negotiating on the Eastern Mediterranean. But, at the same time, both in the Syrian and Iraqi platform, we see that they are very keen in showing boldness in front of the Western partners, and that they are going to be actually, very, very, very active, and perhaps also, conducting a new military operation on the Southern border.

Therefore, it is very imper – it is really imperative for the EU to, I think, rethink how to move forward their strategy, and also grasping some of the opportunities that this Biden administration gives. In terms of the specific element of the strategic approach, the approach towards the Syrian conflict, I think it has become clear, unfortunately, that this strategy that the – has – that the EU has implemented since 2016, meaning following the Geneva communique, which says – which leverage on the reconstruction card to push for political transition, it’s unfortunately something that it’s backfiring on the EU, its own interest, because there is no actually political transition that it’s at least in the sight for the time being. And, therefore, this is backfiring also on the image of the EU itself for how much capable it is to bring forward its strategic role in the Syrian conflict.

So, there is definitely a need for reviewing that approach, and understanding really, also in relation to the coming strat – I mean, that coming signs that the Biden administration would give on Syria, how it could be – how the EU could actually reframe its own approach on this to actually gain more relevance. On the one hand, this – and I think on the other hand, I think we relate to the first point of saying any crisis that is going to come from Syria and specifically, for example, if there is going to be a new crisis coming from new Turkish movements on the North-eastern Syria, this, of course, is going to be something that is going to challenge not only the US position, but also the EU itself.

I think that among all the different files that compose the Syrian conflict, perhaps the North-eastern Syria is that one in which the EU could rethink better on how actually, to be more strategic perhaps by thinking how to initiate really, talks on how to channel aid that is not only to civil society or – but also, really to understand how it could also transform their semi-autonomous administration into a more inclusive entity, and also, so use that sort of process, in order also to de-escalate tension between the North-eastern administration and Turkey, in addition, of course, to continue its support for the Kurdish peace process within Turkey itself.

Perhaps that is one of the avenue where the EU could leverage a bit, and to have a more important and strategic role. But, overall, I think it has become imperative really for the EU to look at its neighbourhood and to really speed up this process of understanding how it can actually also seize the opportunity also with perhaps of a regional de-escalation between Iran and Saudi Arabia, which might come at some point, to be also placing itself in a mediation role between the two, which can also have a good impact into the Syrian conflict. I will leave it here, and for more further discussion in the ‘Q&A’, thank you.

Michelle Pace

Thank you, Maria, for giving us really an insight into what it really takes to have a rethink within the EU. And on this, I invite Christian now to tell us a little bit what has actually been going on within Brussels, in terms of reviewing, rethinking ways forward.

Christian Hanelt

Thank you very much, Michelle. Thanks to Chatham House and Al Sharq Institute to include the European expertise of Bertelsmann Stiftung here from Germany. We’re greeting all of you. And to build on what Daniela, Maria, and Tarik have said, the next months are very decisive, because the EU and its institution have put itself under a pressure to act in their direct neighbourhood in the South, in the Middle East, and North Africa. And when we look to the South, you will see it’s a very diverse region. We’ve seen that Libya and Syria here the European Union should develop conflict resolution capacities. Then you see the social and economic pressures also by COVID, which are put to Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt, Jordan, the Palestinian Territories, and Lebanon. These are countries where the European Union, with its specifically socioeconomic support, has the most influence to build resilience for these countries. And a lot of seasonal migrants are working in Europe from these countries, and remittances are decisive for the development of the societies in the South.

Then we have the specific relations, what Maria said, with Turkey. Turkey is an accession country, and we’ve got a customs union with Turkey, but the government of President Erdoğan is shaking our policies very much. And then we have Israel. Israel is an innovative First World country, is one of the leading financial and economic leading countries, which it’s linking itself with other innovative countries in the Arab Peninsula, for instance, with the United Arab Emirates. So, then we spoke also about Iran and Saudi Arabia. Here you see it’s a very diverse neighbourhood and, on the other hand, the EU feels itself pressured to act in a very complex framework. What we heard with Russia and with China and with Iran and Turkey’s negative influence because the EU’s transformation tools, which are dedicated to put good governance, democracy, and social market economy forward, they are threatened by action from Russia and Turkey, and also, China, who have very different interests in our direct neighbourhood.

25 years ago, when the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership has been founded, and the southern neighbourhood has been created as a direct neighbourhood of us, the EU was the centre actor in the region. Now, we are one of others. But we have two advantages. The one is that our soft power can in the co – post or in a COVID economic recovery be decisive. It can. When the EU COVID Recovery Fund is really successful that means if we – if the economies and financial situation of Spain, France, Italy, and Greece, they need really to get back on a good economic track, because when the recovery process of France and Italy and Spain is back on track, you know, they will automatically have a positive economic and social impact on our North African neighbours, because then we create jobs. We will have a more economic exchange, because the countries in the neighbourhood, they have 50 to 70% of their trade is with Europe. So, trade relations, agriculture trade relations, industrial trade relations are a decisive tool of European action, but it needs to be underpinned by a stronger political activity, and this is why the foreign policy capacity is really under test.

And as you said, Michelle, there is the new Biden administration, and with them, a new approach on public diplomacy and on multilateral approaches, the EU will really put under test if they are able to bring stability and conflict resolution into the neighbourhood. So, it’s correct if we discuss further on, Libya and Syria and the Iranian-Saudi conflict. And I would say, because we are talking with Chatham House in London, it’s also important for Brussels, you know. It’s a new experience. I had the privilege to work on Euro-Mediterranean issues since more than 25 years, and I can tell you that British Diplomats have been very active in designing and supporting European neighbourhood policy, and especially European Southern neighbourhood policy with good ideas and good intention. And it’s very difficult to compensate that, and it will be, in the European Action Service, very important to include the capacity and the political and conflict resolution capacity of Britain, and you’ll see that this is not easy.

There is the E3 on Iran, in solving the nuclear issue with Iran. In the past, before Brexit, we had E3, that means Britain, France, Germany, and the EU, that means the EU, our representative of foreign policy. That was a good team of four. Now, after Brexit, there are just, you know, there are Germany and Britain and France, and it is in our interests and also, in the British interests, from my point, analysis point of view, to keep the EU structures closely in because, you know, we have, and this is the last idea for the kick-off. The EU Council is having quite a lot of issues of the Southern neighbourhood and the Middle East/North Africa on its agenda this year. There is a new agenda for the Mediterranean. There is a joint communication it had from the Commission, and the very interesting thing is, it’s not just only about the money distribution into big projects for the next seven years.

It is, for the first time, from my point of view, that the EU Commission is very strongly addressing in these official documents the EU member states telling, you know, we can only be decisive in solving the problems and the economic recovery in our neighbourhood, if there is a unity of words and deeds, not only nice words, in the resolutions. And then, what Daniela said, you know, different national policies, you know, this has to come together. If this cannot come together, we will be very weak, and we cannot be a good partner of the Biden administration, and we want to be now. We have four years of chances. We have seven years of money back of the EU financial institutions. Now it’s a good time to really be active with the commitments, which we have put on our shoulders. Let us see what’s going to happen, and we, as think tanks, are really in an important position to remind all of them, you know, how important it is to work on the Middle East and North Africa. Thank you for here, Michelle.

Michelle Pace

Thank you very much, Christian, and I see that our audience is very active. So, what I’m going to do, I’m just going to re-emphasise that we kindly ask all the audience to use the ‘Q&A’ and not the ‘Chat’ function, please, so that we have the questions organised in one area. Now, we’ve had a number of questions that are similarly pointing at external actors, whether it’s the US, China, Russia, Turkey, and how these will impact on the work of the EU in conflict zones. I’ll start with a question where the person who’s asking has asked me to read to out, and then I’ll move on to Mike Gapes, and ask him whether he would like himself to ask the question, please, and then we’ll take it from there.

So, Euan Grant from London, who’s a former UK Law Enforcement Intelligence Analyst, and who has worked on the Middle East, asks, “Does the surprise of the EU nations and EU central bodies at the arrival of Turkish and Russian private contractors in Libya demonstrate a need for much closer co-operation with UK and the new US administration on better intelligence analysis and situational awareness?” So that’s Euan’s question. And then, I would like to ask Mike Gapes whether he would like to read out his question or actually…?

Mike Gapes

Yes, I – can you hear me?

Michelle Pace

Thank you, yes.

Mike Gapes

Yes, my question is, in the light of the new approach to Saudi Arabia of the Biden administration, what are the implications that that has for European Union policy towards Syria, Libya, and the wider Middle East and North Africa region?

Michelle Pace

Thank you, Mike. So, I’d like to start with the order in which our panellists have spoken. So, could we start with your reflections, Tarik, on these questions, please?

Tarik Yousef

These are very broad questions, and I think Daniela has already addressed a few of them. It was precisely the vacuum left by the EU, over the last few years in Libya that invited other external actors to come in with the tools they saw fit for the conflict in the country. The failure in Libya is directly linked to the failure of a common vision, set of policies, conversions of interests amongst EU members, coupled with the previous US administration and its unpredictable and highly personalised approach to making deals in the Middle East with autocrats around the region.

That’s precisely what I thought Christian was suggesting the EU needs to avoid in the future, the alignment, the convergence of interests, the agreement on a minimal set of objectives that will ensure that stability in Libya can be achieved. However, this is not to say, and perhaps I disagree with one element of the question, that the EU assertion of its role, of its relevance, whether it’s soft power, diplomatic interests, need to come necessarily at the expense always of countries like Turkey and Russia. They potentially could bring their own tools and their own approaches that can be made more constructive and more supportive of a broader global objective of stabilising conflict, whether it’s Libya or elsewhere.

I think the key would be to, as Christian also suggested, to find common ground with, let’s say, a country like Turkey, given its economic influence, its size, and its newly found activism on the global – or within the region and more broadly, within the Mediterranean. How can one achieve that and, at the same time, project this common ground to working towards achieving the necessary objectives in Libya? I think the Biden administration is going to be very supportive, and it will lend itself, where necessary and where relevant, to providing both the diplomatic, political, and security support for achieving precisely that goal. I just don’t think the Biden administration is going to be too active, too committal, or necessarily would want to lead. It’s going to be up to Europe, in this regard, in the way that Christian had suggested, to advance a vision and to develop the necessary policy alignments and objectives and tools.

And, last but not least, as I was trying to suggest earlier, the economic needs of the European Southern neighbourhood post-COVID, are going to be far greater than anything we have seen in the last two to three decades. If Europe wants to be active, wants to be relevant, wants to have impact, it has to scale its resources up, and it has to get the necessary political support for that within its own structures, given that all countries in Europe are going to be looking after their own primary economic recovery needs. How you square the circle, how you find the right trade-off, I think, is going to be a big test of whether Europe steps up and asserts itself, or whether other countries continue to erode Europe’s presence, relevance, and role in the Southern neighbourhood.

And, last but not least, China is also knocking on the door, making its own offers for economic assistance and economic support, and technical support. So, there’s a lot for Europe to have to work through together. But I think Christian is exactly right in suggesting now is the time to start thinking about all of this strategically in a very targeted, very smart way to try to reverse years of irrelevance, decline, and erosion of European relevance in the Southern neighbourhood. Thank you.

Michelle Pace

Thanks, Tarik, for elaborating on those reflections. Any of the other panellists would like to add something to Tarik? Yes, Daniela, you go first.

Daniela Huber

Thank you, Michelle. Well, I actually wanted to respond to the question on intelligence, which was on Libya, so I think it responds also, to what I said. I think, I mean, this can maybe be an ingredient in some way of when it comes to particular issues of militia security of sector reform, etc. But I think the large issue in Libya is to have a political solution, to have – to make sure there is unified national institutions and there is – unifying the country, yeah. I think that’s much more important than – of course, intelligence plays the role on some military issues, etc. But I think that the centre of our attention needs to be a political solution, and that already links me to answering the question, which role can the EU play? I think that, actually, Libya is the conflict where the EU can play a role if it gets its act together. It has all the capacities to play that role in Libya, and, in that, it’s very different to the other conflicts, which have been mentioned today.

Yes, Israel-Palestine is, for example, dominated by the US. Syria is absolutely dominated by Russia today. So, obviously, the EU can play less of a role. But in Libya, it can assume that role, and it should assume that role. I would also like to respond – to link this to the questions of the role lead groups could play. I think that that is a format, which makes a lot of sense in European Union of 27 member states where it is, in fact, as one of the questions pointed out, very difficult to find a common ground. And so, I think that makes sense on Libya, as I said. I think it would make absolute sense to have Germany, Italy, and France have form actually a lead group on that, and someone ask in a question also about Israel-Palestine. I actually published a commentary on that, arguing for a lead group of European donors on Israel-Palestine.

Now, it’s in difference to Libya, as I said, in Israel-Palestine, the US is the dominant power. But the European Union has an important role to play as a paradigm setter. So, it has done that in the past vis-à-vis the EU. So, in Venice Declaration 1980, it set the ground for a new paradigm on Israel-Palestine in which the US eventually bought into. And I think the European Union, and a lead group of donors, could play the very same role again today to lead a paradigm change. And in my commentary, I argued that this should go towards equal rights, but that is a different issue to, I think, the discussion we’re having here today

And, Michelle, if I can make one last point, on the question on Russia and Turkey, again, as I said, this is different in Libya and in Syria. In Syria, it is the dominant power, so the European Union needs to understand how it can deal with Russia in Syria, and how it will deal with Russia in Syria. And, for sure, Maria has more to say about this than me. But, in Libya, I think the choice should be to side-line Russia, and that is possible. And the question on Turkey, I think this is actually not only related to Libya. I think, given that the region, as was already said today, is very multipolar, there are a lot of powers in this region, it is essential for the European Union to get its relationship with Turkey on a track again, on a constructive track where – I think this is actually one of the only paths how the European Union can continue to play a constructive role in the whole Mediterranean region. Thank you.

Michelle Pace

Thank you, Daniela. I’d like to ask Maria now, and then Christian, please.

Maria Fantappie

Yes, thank you. Thank you, Michelle. Well, I think that here the point some reactions. First, I mean, it is clear that the Middle East, it’s not a priority for this Biden administration. Priority are in relation to, I mean, competition with China, relation to Russia, so – but geographically, the Middle East is an area which is close to Europe. So that, of course, already point us to the fact that it is important that the EU really look at this area with a strategic eye. In terms of how to grasp the opportunity, I think that, as I said initially, there are some gaps that the EU can fill in the Middle East, due to the fact that the US is a retreating power from the Middle East. And in areas where the US has troop on the grounds, and where the EU has normal relation, for instance, with governments, it’s already actually happening, in some way where, for example, if we look at the case of Iraq where actually, the tensions between US and Iran have left – have led the US to retreat some troop, but now a new and large NATO mission is coming, and with it, a new member state leadership on it.

So, here we see how, for example, the EU, it’s, sort of, embedding itself into a strategic initiative. Same thing when it comes to other opportunities coming, the US and Iran are actually in a very difficult time where they need to renegotiate the return to the JCPOA. On the ground, there is a lot of – there are a lot of escalation going to happen. Again, the EU has the civilian mean with the CSDP tool to actually engage some of the paramilitary groups, which are closely allied with the Iranians in Iran and in Iraq, in other countries, things that the US cannot and don’t want to do because they don’t want to come down to the micromanagement of this crisis, and, politically, it’s more difficult.

So, let’s look at the example of how the JCPOA, in negotiation, has been successful in, and also how the [inaudible – 46:02] has been able to carve itself a role for the EU. The US carve itself a role as the mediator, and, again, I think, that can come again, especially in this Biden administration, which has the will, unlike the previous administration, to engage, but has not the power and not the domestic support to actually come to the micromanagement. Here, also, the EU has a role again in setting itself as the mediator also in a future de-escalation between Iran and Saudi Arabia.

And so, then, last point, I think that there was a point that was raised and regarding the relation with Russia in Syria. Well, I mean, as it has been said, I mean, Russia is dominating, unlike in Libya, Russia is a dominating power in Syria, and there has been not so much signs that it can deliver actually political reform. I have seen in the ‘Chat’ box that someone has actually suggested, “Why don’t the EU use the mechanistic actor against specific personality of the regime, in order to put pressure, in order to advance political reform?” Well, I mean, and this is a potential. There is a possibility on this. But, until now, the leverage of the reconstruction card has actually provided no result insofar. So, I’m not sure how the listing could do.

This is why I was pointing at the opportunity of the North East and Syria not specifically because I think that is more important, but because it is an area where perhaps also, in the light of the relevance of the EU/Turkey relations, it’s important to actually operate there in a way in which the EU could carve itself a role in the Syria framework and, at the same time, de-escalate tension with Turkey, and set itself in the path of what it is already doing, which is supporting a peace process and democratisation and within Turkey. So, I will leave it at this, and we can come back later, if there are any other questions.

Michelle Pace

Thank you, Maria. Christian, can you come back and try and maybe wrap up, ‘cause we have quite a lot of questions waiting to be heard?

Christian Hanelt

Yes, Michelle, I’m very happy that so many questions are being posed. I would say, you know, the most important thing for the EU is vis-à-vis the new Biden administration is that Brussels and the member states can count on more multilateral and global rule-based policies against how Trump has been designing foreign policy. And, for example, we can expect to have – I hope, for an excellent Diplomat, you know, who will come from Washington to Germany. We are lacking an American Ambassador since more than a year, for example.

Secondly, on Russia and Turkey, on the one hand, Putin and Erdoğan are vis-à-vis the EU in a, it seems, better position because they are more easily risk military escalation in our neighbourhood. But on our positive list is now both Russia and Turkey are economically and financially extremely under pressure, and both Putin and Erdoğan are in the end phase of their ruling, and we can be very clever in using our modernisation tools and our diplomacy. And already some targeted sanctions against personalities in Turkey and in Russia are, you know, they can deliver if they are used very cleverly.

Vis-à-vis the Gulf states, there were so many questions about Saudi Arabia. I would like to explain to our participants that there’s now a chance to enhance the so-called EU-GCC relations. The GCC Gulf Co-operation Council that is not only Saudi Arabia, but also the Emirates and Kuwait, Bahrain and Qatar and Oman, and both buddies, multilateral buddies, EU and GCC have been trying over years to form a free trade area and to enhance their economic potential. And I think because Britain, and here there is a positive thing of the Brexit, as Britain left, you know, London was not so enthusiastic about pushing EU-GCC relations forward. So, there is now an opportunity, and there is a Commissions’ project ahead to enhance, you know, EU presence in soft power related issues in the Gulf.

But it also mean that it is a duty for us to also make the naming and shaming when we look to Libya, what Daniela said, you know, yes, we have a stake in Libya, and this also means that the spoilers have to be named officially. And, obviously, and the Emirates are somehow spoiling it, Egypt beside Turkey, and who is breaking the arms embargo, has to be named. And there has to be a control, or should be a control, of the arms inflow to Libya, not only by sea, but also by land, and that is also part of the Berlin Declaration to be implemented.

And, finally, here, Michelle, to say, calling all the questions herein, there is with all criticism still the EU is so attractive for a lot of people of our neighbours, yeah. So, the European model of freedom in society, in a democracy, and economy is still attractive, in spite we are also very much hit by COVID-19, and financially and economically under pressure. We are still very, very attractive, so the – speeding up Erasmus and other projects, capacity-building, what Tarik said, in order to create networks with the young people and the diverse NGOs settings in our neighbourhood is an important future capital for our relations with the neighbours in the South.

Michelle Pace

Thank you, Christian. I would like to move on to Chris Doyle, who is the Representative from the Council for Arab-British Understanding, to pose his question, please.

Chris Doyle

Thank you very much, Michelle. I just wanted to ask really how will the EU overcome widely different foreign policy perspectives that seemingly have actually grown worse between West and East, North and South? You see Eastern European countries like Hungary running quite different approaches, for example, refugees Israel, Palestine, Syria. Libya has already been mentioned. So, is a common foreign policy wishful thinking, and therefore, will we see more coalitions of the willing where certain groupings of senior EU states take the lead perhaps actually against some of the other states?

Michelle Pace

Thank you, Chris, and, on a related question, we have a question from Hamish Kinnear. His question is, “More than creating a vacuum, are some European actors not fuelling conflict in some cases? For example, France has provided backing to the LNA, and UK provided military support to Saudi Arabia and Yemen.” So, could I ask Tarik perhaps to try and answer that as concisely as possible, please, so that we give space for more questions?

Tarik Yousef

Yes, thank you, Michelle. I think Christian had alluded to a very important demand that the previous US administration had made repeatedly of Europe when it came to the conflict of Libya. You have to name countries. You have to name countries. You have to name countries. Nobody should be given a carte blanche. You can’t be selective when it comes to criticising counterproductive – what you think is unconstructive intervention in the country. You can’t give a free pass to a group of countries or several and come down very hard on others and I think it’s that consistency of policy which relates to the second question or the initial – the first question.

How do you actually develop a common foreign policy amongst European countries on such a diverse set of geopolitical issues, conflict matters, when, in the last few years, in fact, countries have chosen – already we have coalitions of the willing formed up, the anti-Turkey camp, and the pro-Turkey camp? The – and so, you know, and this, sort of, gets repeated, replicated across a host of issues, where divisions within Europe have been made glaringly clear, and policies have developed on the back of that. So, I’m – I am – I add my voice here, and I add, as somebody who’s wondering, who’s sceptical about the possibility of developing common foreign policy, especially given the nature of problems we have now, and the likelihood of bigger problems moving forward.

Now, there’s a window with the new Biden administration that Europe could step in and get its act together, to borrow a phrase from Daniela earlier. But it’s a big ask, and I think when it comes to violations of human rights, when it comes to violations of UN Security Council resolutions, the minimum you should be doing in Europe is to name and shame countries, hold them accountable, do it consistently across the board, not selectively, for a host of reasons that the public or observers or people on the ground may not fully understand, comprehend, or appreciate. Thank you.

Michelle Pace

Thanks, Tarik. Maria, would you like to come in on that, please, just briefly, please?

Maria Fantappie

I just wanted to actually respond or react to the idea of an – I mean, how great is it to continue to project soft power? I think that I am personally more in the camp of those one who think that it’s about time to actually understand that we have common threat, and this is why I’m a supporter of this strategic compass and this idea that we should actually understand that there are a common threat coming at our door, and we should invest time and effort to actually translate principled action into tools to – and even on – I mean, tools to defend our strategic interest as European because it’s no longer the time that we can just rely on soft power, in order to do that. Therefore, it’s I think a time of make it or break it the full year to come. And in terms of developing the so-called strategic autonomy in a way which is not in competition with the NATO framework, but in complement to this, but I think that it’s about time to develop – to go beyond the idea of soft power, if we really want to continue to be relevant and, sort of, emancipate ourself from the dependency on the US, to some extent. That’s it.

Michelle Pace

Thank you, Maria. Daniela, do you want to come in briefly?

Daniela Huber

Yeah, maybe again on the lead groups, which I think is important, or the groups of the willing, as one of the participants said. I think that, of course, this cannot go against the will of other member states, at least not at the presence. But, usually, there is some form of common ground, and the JCPOA is a very good example because the EU – the E3 could act because the other member states let them act. So, intrinsically, they were happy with the approach taken. And so, I think it is in this case that lead groups and a shared view of European and active foreign policy can actually work.

And I also wanted to add something briefly to the question on the EU actually fuelling conflict. I think this is something I’m very sympathetic to because, typically, we speak about how can the EU solve conflict in the Middle East? And this question already implies that the EU is not actually entangled in these conflicts, but the member states are typically often entangled and somehow involved in these conflicts and an example is the arms trade, of course, in that respect. And what is interesting here in this respect, I think, with the Biden administration, again, is that he has put arms trade on, with Saudi Arabia, on a partial hold because of Yemen, and there some European member states, which have done the same already before. So, I think it will be interesting to see how this particular issue will evolve, over the next four years. I mean, it was one of the first foreign policy actions of Biden, and I thought that was actually very interesting and also maybe indicative.

Michelle Pace

Thank you, Daniela. Christian, just before you come back, I just want you to be aware that we had a commentary, let me just find it, by a former Ambassador, yes, and he just says that as a form – it’s William Patey, “As a former British Ambassador to Saudi Arabia, I have to take issue with your assertion, Christian, that now that the UK is no longer a member state, it will be easier to conclude the GCC-EU free trade agreement. I was involved with this over a number of years, and the UK was one of the most enthusiastic about concluding an agreement.” But you have your word again.

Christian Hanelt

I saw that William Patey is with us, and I was very happy that he is participating. Of course, he was more much involved than me. It was my reading of what was happening, but, as he was involved personally, I will believe him. So, maybe, hopefully, from that side long, we could advance the EU-GCC activities on a broader ground more deeply.

In calling on the issue of EU foreign policy tools, what Tarik and Daniela said, I would like to add two ideas on that. I think that the E3 model cannot be the only role model anymore. I think when you have 27 member states, you can put conflicts on 27 shoulders, and we have described so many conflicts. It means there can be other groups of trios who can tackle conflicts like in Ukraine or in the Middle East, Israel-Palestinian conflict, what Daniela said, or with Lebanon, or with Yemen. There should not only be France and Germany or Italy in these groups.

We can also include Spain and especially Poland because, as one of our participants said, Hungary, it’s not only Hungary, but also Poland and other new EU member states who have a quite different view and approach to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. And the interesting thing is, when you read the new joint communication on the new agenda for the Mediterranean, there is a – one of the key areas is now advance that is peace-making. So, the EU has made a commitment to stronger invest into peace-making, and the first of the seven engagements they’re saying is the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, before Syria, and before Libya.

So, it’s interesting to see if here, beyond the Trump plan, and the Abraham Accords, the EU can put itself with its financial contributions back on track to push the conflict forward to conflict resolution. And, in the end, when you see foreign policy also in our countries, foreign policy in Germany is also made by – you have the Development Ministry, you have the Foreign Ministry, you have the Chancellery, also, you know, external economic activities is also part of foreign policy. So, the whole-of-government approach in each member state designs the foreign policy capacity of each member state, and this multiplied with 27, you see, it’s really a very huge challenge institutionally. And there are some member states who have a very, very strong foreign policy because their ministries co-operate very strongly together when they deliver foreign policy, and others are more weakly. The same with the EU institutions. So, looking into this with every member state is a very interesting scientific exercise.

Michelle Pace

Thank you very much, Christian, and because we have ten minutes left, I would like to now read out quite an interesting comment from Ronan Tynan, just to be a little bit provocative, even more, in the last ten minutes. He says, “No mention of the fact that a number of EU countries operate universal jurisdiction, and already Germany and France have issued international arrest warrants against key Assad regime figures in Syria for crimes against humanity. Surely, here we have the chance to advance political transitional by making justice and accountability the core element of engagement when the EU provides by far the largest amount of humanitarian aid, which has run into billions since 2011.” So, for the next minutes that we have left, I would like the panellists to reflect on the actual substance of EU policy, in terms of conflicts, and I’d like to ask Dina Ramadan to perhaps read her question because that relates very much to the starting point of this webinar.

Dina Ramadan

Yeah, thank you very much. My question is, there was some hope on the US change its strategy toward the Middle East, based on the presidential change from Trump to Biden. What are the specific practical, concrete factors that might drive Europe to change its strategies, and play a role – and to play a role toward the Middle East? Thank you.

Michelle Pace

Thank you, Dina. So, I’ll start with Tarik, then move onto Daniela, then Maria and Christian.

Tarik Yousef

Thank you, Dina. This is a very broad question, and I hate to sound too practical and realistic here, in terms of how much one can expect from Europe in the coming period. I think 2021 is going to be a very difficult and challenging year for most countries around the world, just dealing with the impact – continued impact of COVID-19, planning an economic recovery, let alone trying to, sort of, invest too much into foreign policy, although Christian has assured us that that is already happening.

My concern is moving beyond 2021 to 2022, 2023, should the, you know, the ravages of the COVID-19 pandemic, both economic, social, humanitarian, and health, create wider instability in the Middle East beyond the conflict countries, in other places, as livelihoods get decimated, as people are unable to find means of rebounding, and if – and with governments clearly stretched, do we see the return of civil unrest? Do we see mass protests? Do we see political instability, the likes of which created big pressures on migration abroad? And with it – and with the challenges to domestic security, could the return of the, kind of, exodus of refugees that we saw in the last decade become a new reality that challenges Europe, challenges many of the neighbourhood countries?

I think that will get the attention of many countries in Europe. There you will see resources more, sure. There you will get the co-ordination and co-operation and alignment in foreign policy, and maybe the resources that will be needed to address a source of instability and insecurity that is real, that is facing every country. So, I think this is a test, as many of us have tried to articulate today, this window of opportunity provided by a new US administration that is multilateral in spirit and in substance, and with Europe feeling the pressure to act differently, will they step up to the plate, or will problems overwhelm them if problems go neglected, unaddressed, and without a robust European response?

Michelle Pace

Thank you, Tarik. Daniela?

Daniela Huber

Yeah, so I think these two questions are really important, almost million-dollar questions. I don’t know. So, the issue on transitional justice, I think this is an important question because, in the end, not only in Syria but, for example, also the ICC has taken up the investigation on war crimes in Israel-Palestine. This goes against individuals, and it’s important for accountability, but does it really go to solve the larger questions that are at stake, yeah? So, I think that beyond the transitional justice can be important, but I think that, for example, South Africa and how it has dealt with this is also an important role model to take into consideration in that respect. But that is an enormous question. I’m just reading a book by Mahmood Mamdani on that issue. I can just recommend it. I think, well, it’s an important question when it comes to any conflict, this issue of transitional justice, but it’s an enormous question. I don’t really know how to answer it.

With the question, when will the EU become a player, and I think this is actually a question that has been sinking in Brussels and into all European capitals. And why the EU suddenly starts to speak about strategic autonomy now is, of course, because of the Trump administration. Yes, it understood suddenly it had this erratic transatlantic partner, which made a lot of problems to the European Union. And so, the European member states understood, well, we actually need to move forward if we want to make sure that we solve conflicts our – on our own behalf. And that’s – but that came in, that realisation, with Trump, but it’s not specific to Trump only because I think it’s very clear that, for the US, since Obama, during Trump, and for all the years to come, the main foreign policy issue will be China. That is a structure that will remain, and so, it is very clear that, for the Europeans, there is now a necessity to actually take over this role. So, I think that’s why we actually have this strategic autonomy discourse now.

Michelle Pace

Thank you, Daniela. Maria and Christian, you have a minute each. Maria first.

Maria Fantappie

Yeah, what it takes for concrete step for a EU role, I guess, unfortunately, it’s both a mix of a common threat with the lack of having visionary leadership, and the right US administration in place. So, it’s a mix of all this, and I think that, as I said before, now – and also EU-NATO, a good co-operation, I will say is the fourth point.

On the provocative question on Syria, I will say that there is people advocating [inaudible – 71:58] advocating for a step-by-step strategy, which will mean that instead of EU using sanctions just as a mean in itself, let’s say, as many criticised the EU for, they will actually explicitate what sanctions they will lift, in order to then what they want in return for in terms of the political process. This, I think, will deflect some criticism on the EU being stuck into the Geneva talks, but, at the same time, I don’t see as it is now, both neither Russia nor the regime, being set into a mode of giving concession.

On the contrary, it’s more of the extenuating war that they feel that they are winning on their time – and the time is playing on their favour. Plus, on the issue of targeting specific individual for war crimes, then you have to open an entire war crimes chapter that also goes, for example, to continue the investigations that are already ongoing on the areas such as Afrin or other areas that are – and so there is a lot of political complication about that. So, it’s a very sensitive issue, and I would leave it at this, thank you.

Christian Hanelt

And I will build on this with one minute, Michelle, that there are 1.1 million Syrian refugees as our inhabits in the European Union, 800,000 alone in Germany. And, from my personal experience and point of view, it is better to invest our European taxpayers’ money into the capacity-building of these 1.1 million Syrians in our 27 member states countries than to invest the money in reconstruction in Syria, what we cannot control where this money is running into what projects. And when I talk about ‘reconstruction’, I mean what’s going beyond humanitarian aid. Credibility is an important factor in the future of European foreign policy, and we should try to keep as much as credibility as possible. Thank you.

Michelle Pace

Thank you, Christian, and with that note, I would like to thank Chatham House and Al Sharq for offering us this opportunity to actually discuss some of the most pertinent issues of our time, I should say. I would like to thank our panellists for not only being active, but for trying very hard to answer most of the questions I think that were raised in our ‘Q&A’ area. I would like to thank the audience for being patient and for being quite active as well. It’s been great, and I just want to conclude by saying that a webinar which may be of interest to a lot of people here is coming up on the 3rd of March in the same series, and it will be precisely about Great Power Competition in the Middle East, so watch this space. Thank you so much.