Alice Billon-Galland
Hello and welcome to this Chatham House webinar. My name is Alice Billon-Galland and I’m a Research Fellow at the Chatham House Europe Programme. So, today we’ll be discussing Global Britain’s New European Policy. In leaving the EU, the UK is undertaking a major strategic readjustment in the European diplomatic strategy, which it had been pursuing since the 1970s. And as the British Government just published its much anticipated Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy, we’ll try today, to understand the scope and the ambition of the UK’s new European policy, but also to reflect on Britain’s cycles of disengagement and re-engagement with Europe throughout modern history. So, we’ll aim to take a step back from the news coverage and to put Brexit, the Integrated Review and Global Britain in the context of wider historical UK-Europe relations. And we think this is particularly relevant, as the review comes at a critical point in British history, and as it was led by none other than Professor John Bew, who is himself, a Historian. So, we’ll discuss what this rather unusual choice means and how it translated into practice.
We’re lucky to have a great panel of speakers today to discuss the topic with us. They’ll each give about five minutes opening remarks, before we have a discussion and open the floor. So, our first speaker is Professor Brendan Simms, who is Professor of the History of International Relations and Director of the Centre for Geopolitics at the University of Cambridge. Professor Simms’s work focus on German grand strategy, state construction and relationships between Britain and Europe, among other things. Our second speaker is Dr Robert Saunders, who is a Reader in Modern History – Modern British History at Queen Mary University of London, where he specialises in political history and the history of ideas, with a focus on democracy and the Britain-EU relationship. And finally, Georgina Wright will be our third speaker. She is the Head of the Europe Programme at Institut Montaigne in Paris and she was formerly with Chatham House, so we’re happy to have her back. Georgina has covered Brexit extensively over the past years, and she now works on a wide range of issues relating to European politics and foreign policy.
So, before we start, let me just remind you that this event is on the record. The chat function will be open to share ideas and comments throughout the discussion. And if you want to ask a question, just use the ‘Q&A’ box, which is what I’ll be keeping an eye on during the event. So, let’s dive in. First of all, Brendan, let’s start with a historical perspective. Where do you see current developments fit in with a longer history of UK-Europe relations and UK ambitions for Europe?
Professor Brendan Simms
Thank you very much for the invitation to this webinar. I mean, my task – our task has been defined as reflecting on Britain’s cycles of disengagement and re-engagement with Europe throughout history, and secondly, to understand the scope and ambition of the UK’s new European policy in the Integrated Review. So, I’ll concentrate following your question on the first historical issue, but I’ve got a couple of reflections and questions arising out of the second.
So very quickly, on the cycles of disengagement and re-engagement with Europe, I think the critical point here is that Europe is the most important relationship, England and later the UK, has had historically. “Europe is where the weather comes from,” as Winston Churchill once said. Now, whether that’s, you know, the challenge of Phillip II, of Louis XIV, of Napoleon, of the Tsarist Empire, of Imperial Germany, of Nazi Germany, of the Soviet Union, and even now, we see a kind of, an ordering struggle between the European Union and the UK. So, it’s the most important relationship, ultimately, for England/UK.
But it’s also Europe’s most important relationship, because of the past England/UK has ordered Europe in a very fundamental way, be it the Utrecht Settlement of 1713, establishing the European balance of power, the 1815 Vienna Settlement, the settlement after the First World War, the Versailles Settlement, and of course, Yalta and Potsdam. So, the UK, perhaps less important than after the First World War, but still one of the major actors determining what happens on the mainland of Europe. In fact, one could say that the United Kingdom has shaped mainland Europe more than any other European power over hundreds of years.
And even today, the United Kingdom – this would be my conclusion from this part – is the most important neighbour of the European Union. It’s much more important than Turkey, it’s more important than Russia. This is partly a question of hard power, which we can talk about later, in terms of UK’s military potential, but also equally important here, more importantly, is a question of soft power. People want to live in the United Kingdom in a way that they don’t, perhaps, want to live in the Russian Federation or in Turkey.
But at the same time, Britain has had a global orientation, historically. As we all know, a first British Empire, which lasted until 1783, principally in America, and then a second British Empire, built in the 19th and 20th Century. And this led to a cycle of engagement and disengagement, where the main debates, historically, have been between those who see a future for Britain primarily on the continent, the Whigs, the continentalists, if you like, from the 18th Century, and then the Tories or the blue-water school of thought, which believed in a more maritime and more colonial identity. And of course, this has been replicated over the past hundreds of years, and we’ve seen many resonances, which I don’t need to draw out for this audience, in the Brexit and post-Brexit debate, the clash between Global Britain and the European alternative.
So, in one minute, what does all this mean for the review, coming from historical perspective? Well, one thing that strikes me is that it’s much less focused on the global dimension than many expected. It defines Russia as the primary threat, militarily, and the People’s Republic of China merely as a competitor. The military focus is very much on Europe, in military terms, primarily on the High North in the Baltic, in deterring Mr Putin, but not just that, the specific mention of the defence of Gibraltar, which is of course, a gesture towards Spain, and there’s also some veiled language around protecting fishing and the space around the United Kingdom. So, it is also a clear signal to the European Union that the United Kingdom will order its own space. And what’s striking here is that Europe is mainly defined as a challenge, militarily. It is a source of problems in many ways and the opportunities, the economic ones, are primarily global.
So, the open questions for discussion, these are my last words of my opening remarks, the opening questions for discussion are whether the United Kingdom will, in fact, have the same historical ordering role in Europe, and if so, how will it discharge it? How will this new relationship between the UK and the EU be managed? Will there be some kind of new architecture? Might it be, for example, a tripod system, which some in the US are talking about, which would see the US/EU/UK as the primary pillars, or perhaps an E2 – an E3 system in Europe, of France, Britain and Germany, or an E2 system, which I would prefer, perhaps we could talk about that later? And what are, finally, the UK’s aspirations for the future of the European Union, the future of mainland Europe? Does the United Kingdom want the EU to go more in an intergovernmental direction, loosening the bonds? That seems to be the preference of the current administration. Or would it prefer the European Union to complete the project of political unification, in its own interest? Which is what I believe it would be. But those are my opening comments, just shy of five minutes. Thank you.
Alice Billon-Galland
Thank you very much, Brendan, and there is already a lot on the table for us to pick up and discuss later. I want to bring in Robert. Robert, the Integrated Review signals a change of approach in many thing, and to a certain extent, when it comes to Europe. What’s your reading of that clash between the Global Britain narrative and the European alternative? And do you think this phase of disengagement will be potentially followed by one of re-engagement, as we’ve seen throughout history?
Dr Robert Saunders
Thanks, it’s really good to be with you here today. I think there’s a lot in the Integrated Review that’s very welcome in terms of the emphasis on climate change, the idea of democracy and human rights, and indeed, co-operation as being at the core of its strategy. But I thought I would just kick off by making three perhaps more critical points from the perspective of a Historian.
And my first is that it has never been possible, historically, to separate Britain’s engagement with the wider world from its engagement with Europe. So, I started out as a Historian of the 19th Century, which is the period when Britain was most truly a global power, when the British Empire was at its peak. But that empire was governed by a very simple geographical fact, which was that no matter how far the empire extended across the world, its capital city was only ever 90 miles from the French coast. And however deep its frontiers penetrated into Africa or Asia or the Pacific, its frontline was always the English Channel. So, while Britain has a degree of choice about how it engages with the wider world, it does not have a choice about engaging with Europe. Historically, Britain’s security, its economy, its politics, its union, all of those things have been enmeshed in Europe. So, I do think that the silence of the Integrated Review on how we’re going to relate to the EU in future is a problem. I think you could be forgiven for reading the review, for thinking that the EU had ceased to exist in 2019, rather than simply that the UK had ceased to be a member. And I think that is a hole in British strategy. So that’s my first point.
My second point is that the generation of Politicians that took Britain into the EU were as ambitious as Boris Johnson about Britain’s place in the world. So, Harold Wilson famously talked, in 1965, about how “Britain’s frontiers were in the Himalayas.” Ted Heath talked about “a new age of greatness for Britain.” So those governments weren’t turning their back on a global role. What they were doing was engaging with the question of how to sustain a global role in a world where Britain no longer had an empire, where it no longer dominated world trade and it was no longer a military superpower. And in that respect, joining the EU was a strategy for reasserting Britain’s global influence. They concluded that the best way to maintain Britain’s influence in Washington was to have a seat at the table in Brussels, that the best way to serve the Commonwealth was to represent its interests in Europe and that the best way to uphold Britain’s global trading position was to become a global entrepot into the European market.
So, it’s not as simple as swapping a European strategy for a global strategy. Rightly or wrongly, in a sense, it doesn’t matter anymore. Brexit was a rejection of one particular strategy for global influence, so now we have to find another and I’m not totally clear from the Integrated Review, what that strategy is. I think there’s a lot of ambition in the review. There are a lot of declarations that we will be global, but it’s less clear to me how. And that then, links to my final point, which is about the way that history itself is used in this debate. So, when people like Boris Johnson or Jacob Rees-Mogg talk about Global Britain, they always link it to a story about British history and the story that they tell is, broadly, of a small country punching above its weight in the world. So, it’s a swashbuckling, buccaneering, free trading little island, making its way in the world through a combination of pluck, optimism and enterprise. Now, if that were true, then we would only need to reactivate that spirit to start believing in ourselves again, to be again, today, what we were in the past. The problem, I think, is that is a fundamental misreading of history. The Victorian Britain to which they look back was a military superpower. It dominated global trade, to an extent that the United States and China, put together, do not do in the present world. It could draw on the financial and the military resources of the biggest empire in world history. Now, those conditions are gone forever and that – the passing of those conditions marked a rupture in British history, that required new policies and new strategies. So that’s why we tilted away from the Indo-Pacific in the first place.
Now, we can argue that those strategies were wrong. That is a perfectly respectable case to make. But if we don’t take those material constraints seriously, if we exaggerate the power of positive thinking, then we risk dramatically overstretching our resources, and that will leave Britain weaker, rather than stronger, in relation to the globe today. So, I think that’s my five minutes.
Alice Billon-Galland
Thank you, Robert. A lot of interesting things here, I think, on the fact that it’s not as simple as swapping, sort of, a European goal for a global goal, and we may want to come back to that so-called tilt to the Indo-Pacific and what it actually is in practice, and whether it’s a sort of, tilt away, also, from Europe.
Georgina let’s now focus, maybe more specifically, on what is or isn’t in the review regarding Europe. Robert has mentioned that a bit and Brendan as well, but could you also tell us a little bit about how the UK’s new posture is being perceived on the continent and how you see the UK’s new ambition, maybe, compared to the EU’s ambition, or France’s ambition, Germany’s, because in a way it seems to be quite close on a range of global issues?
Georgina Wright
Thank you so much, Alice, and thank you, Chatham House, for the invitation back. It’s always lovely to be back, although I regret that it can’t be in person.
The advantage, I think, but also the challenge of coming last after two eminent speakers, is that a lot of the points that I wanted to make have already been raised. So maybe let me turn to, at least, the kind of, first question you posed, which is, you know, what is in the review itself? I think, you know, let’s start by the review. It’s fair to say it’s incredibly ambitious. There’s a lot in there, and it’s also taken a very, you know, long-term outlook, or 2030 at least. It goes beyond the 2025, beyond COVID, and it does strike, you know, a much longer, sort of, term ambition, which I think gives a sense of direction of what the UK Government’s ambitions are for Global Britain.
I think it’s also fair to say that it should be understood as a work in progress. You know, there’s a lot that can be, kind of, modelled there, change over time, to react to context in changes, and I think, the other, third point is, of course, that the UK is a European power. It considers itself a European power and a guarantor of European security and I think that comes across quite strongly in the review, but also, in the Prime Minister’s, obviously, speech at the Munich Security Council and the Foreign Secretary’s speech at Aspen Institute, again, something that just comes back again and again.
I think there’s a lot in there about working with allies, including EU allies, and I think a recognition that a lot of the global challenges today simply cannot be answered by one state, it requires countries to work with their allies, and, you know, there’s a real emphasis, I think, on bilateral relationships. The US, unsurprisingly, is the principal ally, but you know, France is mentioned 11 times, Germany is mentioned seven times, Italy also gets a mention. So, I think, again, there’s, kind of, indication that the UK wants to continue working closely with European countries.
But of course, and I come back to what Robert was saying here, you know, not everything can be done through that bilateral track. And I know, Alice, you’ve done a lot of work on, sort of, E3, E2, the Quad, and I think those are going to be interesting formats to watch how they evolve over time. But of course, the elephant in the room is the EU and in particular, sort of, the absence of structured co-operation with the EU. I’m a bit less sanguine, to be honest, than what a lot of – I – well, at least, a lot that I read in the media. I mean, true, there was only one sentence in that 144-page review which was devoted to EU-UK security co-operation, but, you know, I was also pleasantly surprised that the UK says that it would support closer EU-NATO, you know, co-operation and also, that it would be open to working with the EU on issues of mutual interest, you know, such as tackling climate change, biodiversity threats, and you know, even organised crime. But like Robert, I think the key question there is how. You know, there is an absence of clarification of how that co-operation will work in practice.
But I think, for me, the greatest risk, perhaps, is that we lose ourselves in this debate about whether the UK and the EU need an institutional structure and an institutional setup and what it should look like, and we miss that fundamental point, which Brendan was, kind of, talking to, which is, you know, if the UK and the EU share common interests, then, how can they work together even if there isn’t that institutional setup? And I think, Alice, you’re right, you know, if you look at the UK’s vision for Global Britain, it shares a lot of similarities, you know, with the EU’s ambitions and individual member states. So, you know, the power of regulatory diplomacy, both want to – you know, the UK and the EU and individual member states want to invest more resources into research and development to deal with, you know, global challenges, threats of cyberwarfare. Trade has been seen as a tool to promote openness, you know, defending the multilateral system and all of that.
And I think the risk of, kind of, downplaying the EU’s role in that, and the fact that the EU holds its own ambitions and answers to those questions, is that there’s not enough political and diplomatic attention that is paid to what is actually going on in the EU. So, I think yesterday, you know, is a case in point. The EU’s, like, published its proposal for an Indo-Pacific strategy, really interesting, you know, France and Germany pushing that, and very much embracing it. So again, if the UK doesn’t want an institutional – you know, a formalised institutional relationship with the EU, it at least, needs an answer to some of what the EU is doing, and be – because that’s just also part of strategic thinking. So, I think knowing what’s going on and having an answer to that is perhaps, I would argue, more important, even than kind of, losing oneself in debates on how that co-operation, does it need an institutional structure, yes or no?
But I think, and Brendan alluded to this, and I think he’s right, you know, the EU and EU countries also need to spell out how they see their co-operation with the UK. You know that onus is not just on the UK, having left the EU. And I – you know, Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer, so Germany’s Federal Defence Minister, just today, actually, was in conversation with the French Defence Minister, Florence Parly, Minister for the Armed Forces, I believe is the right title, you know, and she said, “We need to work with the UK. We need to find a way to work with the UK.” So, I think there’s a lot of work that needs to be done, that needs to happen in the EU, but also in individual member states, about how they work with the UK government. This isn’t about UK exceptionalism. This is about making sure that you can have a new partnership that works, given the, kind of, political constraints and realities.
Very, very quickly, how has it been perceived in continental Europe? ‘Cause I think that is important. I think overall it was welcomed, but there’s still a bit of caution. I think there was a lot of reassurance that, you know, after five years, essentially, of Brexit civil war, the UK had finally taken a stab at trying to explain what Global Britain meant, and you know, the message is clear, the UK has left the EU, it has not left Europe, it’s not going to become a fortress, either, and it wants to work with its allies. But I think there were some eyebrows raised about, you know, there’s a lot of ambition in there, there’s a lot of stuff, but what are the priorities? So, we know that there’s, you know, been considerable investment in defence, and that started in November 2020 when the UK Government said that it would increase the defence budget, but push comes to shove, when you’ve got all those priorities, which are the ones that the UK’s going to prioritise? And I think that’s a big question that they have. Also, the tech superpower, like, how do you become a tech superpower?
I think there was a kind of appreciation for the fact that this was a review that was also for the British people. So really trying to listen to what actually public opinion wanted, that was interesting. But again, coming back to the point I made earlier, not everything can be done through the bilateral track. And I think I’ll end on this, it’s really important to remember that the EU is very fundamental to many EU countries’ foreign policy, and even for France and Germany. So, by ignoring the EU, you risk then, kind of, limiting your ambition of how you can work with allies and understanding how they position themselves on the different threats that face all of us.
So, yeah, there’s a lot that could be said on tone and the fact that the EU has, and EU member states have a lot to get on with right now, so all their attention is not on the UK. But I guess we can come back to that. Thank you very much.
Alice Billon-Galland
Thank you, Georgina. To start the discussion, I’d like to come to something that was mentioned by Brendan, which I think is also a good bridge between, sort of, British history and the situation today, which is the debate within Britain between the more continentalists and people with more global inclination. Is this a division that you’ve also seen over the past years, and to what extent do you think it’s been aligned with the party politics in the UK? ‘Cause we’ve seen both Labour divided on Brexit, the Conservative Party divided, so to what extent do you think this, sort of, ideological division and strategic division fits in with party politics in the UK and how is that likely to move forward?
And a second question would be about that cycle of engagement and disengagement, which I think you all agree with. So, if we’re now in a phase of disengagement, what do you think the phase of re-engagement could look like? Will it be over the next couple of years with the EU, will be more on trade, on security, will it be on foreign policy, what will motivate it? What do you think the next re-engagement could look like? Brendan, do you want to come in, and then we can do Robert and Georgina?
Professor Brendan Simms
Thank you. Well, I think these divides on foreign policy don’t map very exactly onto party political divides. I mean, there’s a rough sense, obviously, sometimes quite a strong sense, that Conservatives are, you know, for Global Britain and a maritime or a broader commercial engagement with the rest of the world, and perhaps Labour and the Liberal Democrats more for Europe. But I mean, you all know, everybody knows the divisions that there were within the Conservative Party on Europe. And of course, one of the things that’s often lost from view is that a great many strong Brexiteers are, themselves, also very powerful critics of Putin’s Russia and Russian expansionism, in fact much more robust on some of these issues, people like Michael Gove and Bob Seely and others, much more robust than many on the other side, on the more ‘Europhile’ side of the divide. So just because you’re in favour of Brexit or Global Britain, doesn’t mean that one has gone soft on European defence, and I think that’s often forgotten.
As for what Britain’s engagement or re-engagement with mainland Europe will look like, that of course, I don’t know, I’m an Historian, I’m not a prophet. I know what I’d like to see, which is that I would like to see some really serious thinking about how mainland Europe can be assisted along the way towards a full political union like the one the United Kingdom achieved in 1707, and I hope will survive its current tribulations. And I agree with what Robert Saunders said about the enmeshing of the Union within Europe. I think it’s very much in the UK’s interest to help push that project further down the road, and one of my great regrets is that mainland Europeans, particularly people like Emmanuel Macron, spent so much time and energy trying to demonstrate to the British that they made a mistake over Brexit, rather than concentrating on what he set out to do in 2017, which was to move forward with the unification of Europe.
Alice Billon-Galland
Thank you, Brendan. Robert, do you also agree that the next phase should be about thinking how the UK can help continentals achieve that union?
Dr Robert Saunders
Yes, I mean, on the point about disengagement, I think, of course it’s true that Britain has a long history, as many other European countries do, of looking outside of Europe, but there is that incredibly strong gravitational pull that is always going to draw Britain back in again, and if Britain wants to pursue the objectives that are set out in the Integrated Review, then it’s going to have to work with the EU, if it wants to tackle climate change, if it wants to deal with the economic challenge of China, if it wants to respond to the geopolitical challenge of Russia, if it wants to stabilise Northern Ireland. You know, regardless of the rights and wrongs of the current situation, Northern Ireland is exposing the fact that the integrity of Britain’s union, the security of its streets, the working of its internal market and its influence in the White House, all require a positive engagement with the EU, and indeed, for that to be reciprocated from the EU.
So, we have – disengagement isn’t really an option if we want a global role. We have to find a way to work with the EU. And I agree with Brendan, I don’t think that those historical attitudes really map onto the Brexit debate. You know, if you want someone who believes that Britain should be out there being globally influential, then you look at Remainers like Tony Blair and David Cameron, and a lot of the rhetoric of the campaign was about leading Europe as a player in the world. Whereas the intellectual godfather of the Brexit right was Enoch Powell, who was a great critic of gigantism and wanted Britain to stop trying to cut a dash in the world and to draw in its horns. So, those historic attitudes towards Britain’s, kind of, tripartite relationship with Europe and with the world have always been quite chaotically distributed across the Brexit divide.
Alice Billon-Galland
Thank you, Robert. Georgina?
Georgina Wright
I mean, to be honest, I think most everything’s been said, really. I think it’s important, when you’re thinking about the EU, that back in 2016 there was a real attempt of the EU to think more strategically about a) it’s place in the world and also, how it could co-operate with third countries. Now that, sort of, stopped a little bit with Brexit. I think, you know, the politics just weren’t there to think, kind of, ambitiously about that and there was a lot hanging on, sort of, how the UK would leave the EU. I think there is a certain degree of appetite to, kind of, you know, turn the page, but my view is that perhaps there needs a period – we need a period of mourning before we can really start thinking strategically about what that relationship looks like.
And I think there are two important things here. One is the UK’s role in Europe, and we know that NATO is obviously – we haven’t mentioned NATO, and I’m, sort of, scared to talk about NATO in front of Alice, ‘cause she is really the expert on all of this, but, you know, NATO is obviously fundamental to the UK’s foreign policy, and, you know, NATO is undergoing its own strategic thinking about what it does and how it does things. But then there’s also the question of the UK and EU, be that individual member states, or the EU as a whole’s, co-operation outside of Europe. And the Sahel is obviously one of the big examples where, you know, if you look at the United States, they clearly help with intelligence, they’ll help with, kind of, you know, weaponry and everything else, but they don’t really want to be as involved in the Sahel. And that’s really going to be up to, you know, France, the UK, Germany, but also the EU is increasingly – it’s, kind of, done more there.
So again, I think it might be that there’s just a force of events that mean that this disengagement will have to stop and go back towards re-engagement, but it will look different. The question I think Brendan and Robert both actually talked about it is, how can we think about this strategically? Rather than look at what is or what has been, think about how it could be, you know, what’s an ideal situation? Then work back from there. But of course, that’s very difficult, particularly in a context where politics is quite fraught, I think, still.
Alice Billon-Galland
Yes, I agree, and actually, I was actually going to ask you about that, Georgina, because, you know, I think you will agree that it would be good for the UK to take a, sort of, proactive role, constructive also, to engage within discussions on the continent, etc. So – but first of all, is that politically realistic today? I mean, we’re seeing the government that is in power now, we’ve seen what’s in the review, there doesn’t seem to be an appetite to either engage with the EU or even to help the EU achieve more integration.
And then, my second question is on continental debates, because, you know, we’re talking about the UK, and what’s sometimes happened is that the UK talks to itself, and we need to also look at what’s going on, on the continent. There have been lots of discussions about European strategic autonomy, European sovereignty, because the EU is also moving its own way. To what extent do you think that the direction that the EU is now taking is one that the UK could get on board with, realistically, politically? And would there be any appetite to get involved in those debates on European autonomy, sovereignty, etc., which, you know, continentals are very unclear about as well? Is it just the EU, or are we talking wider Europe, is it NATO? So, I’d be interested to hear your thoughts, maybe in reverse order. Georgina, if you want to start, and then Robert and Brendan.
Georgina Wright
I mean, it’s always a fine balance, isn’t it? I remember at the time, it was just after the referendum result had been announced, and I was speaking to an EU Diplomat who said, “You know, I feel like the UK is part of the club that was always telling us what to do, and now it wants to be out of the club and still tell us what to do.” So, I think there is that risk that, you know, how do we shift, essentially, from that to something which is much more constructive, which is, you know, Brendan and Robert’s point about, well, the UK’s always been part of it and has, actually, you know, really shaped the EU continent. How can it play that role constructively?
Again, I sort of, I know this is an easy cop out answer, but I do think there needs to be a period of mourning, and for two reasons. One, because I think, you know, this review is incredibly ambitious and it’s welcome, but again, I think there’s a lot of questions about how it’s going to work in practice, and I think the government is going to have to, at some point, try and give further clarification on – in terms of priorities.
But also, the EU, as you rightly say, is going through a big period of reflection about what its place in the world is. I mean, you know, the last, kind of, publicity hasn’t been great in terms of, you know, EU leaders, and particularly, you know, Charles Michel and Ursula von der Leyen and their recent trips, but also Josep Borrell. But I think, at a more strategic level, that the EU’s working on its strategic compass, which is basically, trying to move beyond visions and definitions of, you know – which, frankly, are a distraction. Like, what do we mean by strategic autonomy? And much more looking at, okay, what are acti – you know, concrete actions can we take together, and if we can’t take them together, should we facilitate and make a space where individual member states or groups of Member States can move forward with certain action?
And within that strategic compass, there’s going to have to be a place of co-operation with third countries. Now, we know the EU’s been trying to, kind of, work more strategically with the US, inviting Tony Blinken to its you know, European Council and then the Foreign Affairs Council, as well. But I think the work, really, is as much the EU’s work in figuring out what it wants to do, how it does it, and how it works with third countries, as it is for the UK, as well. So, a period of mourning and a period of thinking before we can ask the UK what they think, I think, is how the EU are approaching this.
Alice Billon-Galland
Right, thank you, Georgina. Robert?
Dr Robert Saunders
Well, I think you put it beautifully, actually, Alice, when you said that the UK talks to itself about Europe. And actually, I think that’s a fundamental dynamic that’s problematising this relationship, that there were a lot of warm words in the wake of the referendum in 2016 about how after Brexit, Britain will be the closest ally, the best friends, most reliable neighbour of the EU, but I think the government finds it very difficult to resist the temptation to use the EU as a kind of, punching bag for domestic politics. We’re still really in a mindset of the primacy of Innenpolitik or the primacy of domestic politics. And that’s a tremendous difficulty, that if the government – we’re going to keep running into moments where both the EU and Britain need a constructive relationship and dialogue, and the temptation, to some extent on both sides of the Channel, is going to be to play that in a way that wins applause lines at home and we have to find a way to reset that.
And I would say, actually, I think there’s a responsibility on Remainers, as well as Brexiteers there, in so far as those labels still have meaning, because it sometimes feels like everybody wants relations with the EU to go badly. Because if you’re a Remainer, that proves that this is destructive, it’s been a disaster, whereas if you’re a Brexiteer, it proves that the EU was horrible in the first place. And that Remainers, as well as Brexiteers, need to commit to the idea that we can have a positive and constructive relationship with the EU without actually being inside of it. So, in that sense, I think – Georgina will know much more about the, kind of, institutional framework that we might create for our relationship with the EU, but behind that there needs to be a change of ethic and a change of the mindset that we bring to that.
Alice Billon-Galland
Thank you, Robert. Brendan?
Professor Brendan Simms
Well, I think what’s the absolute prerequisite, before anything can happen, is really, two things. One is the future of the UK union needs to be resolved. I mean, the ordering struggle that we saw, which is really what caused the problems that Robert referred to, which was really the result of EU’s attempt to maintain its ordering role within the United Kingdom even after Brexit, and that’s what the whole withdrawal agreement debate was about, that’s been resolved. But of course, it hasn’t been resolved in Northern Ireland and it hasn’t been resolved in Scotland. But I think once those issues have been sorted out, then I think there will be a re-engagement on the British side. But for that to have any chance of success, the European Union needs to resolve not merely what Georgina refers to, which is what it wants, but what it actually is. Because the question has come up very recently with the EU Ambassador to the UK, who was not recognised, at least last time I looked, as a full Ambassador, and I can understand, intellectually, why the government is taking that view. Personally, I would actually turn it round and I would say, “You, European Union, have got to explain to us what the function of the Ambassador is. If he is to have any meaningful function, then we should only have an EU Ambassador and no national representatives.” And similar – by the same logic, the UK should only be represented in Brussels and not in the member states.
So, that would be a radical approach, and what I would like to see on the UK side is some thought around how it can nudge the EU in the right direction. So, for example, dispensing with the concept of E3, which I think is highly divisive to the coherence of the European Union, because it suggests a special position for France and for Germany, and to go for the concept of E2, that we have just two unions, two main new principal unions in Europe, which is the United Kingdom and the European Union. Or, if that’s not the case, the European Union should explain why that is not the case and why it is not completing its project.
Alice Billon-Galland
Thank you, Brendan, and I’d love to get back to your E3 point, ‘cause I’ve been doing a lot of work on that, but I’d like to get the questions in. We have a couple of questions about countries beyond just UK/Europe. The first one is from Richard Whitman, who’s an Associate with us at the Europe Programme, about the US, because this is also something we haven’t really talked about, the UK-US relation and how that relates to Europe. So, Richard asks, “What lessons can we learn from history on how the UK balances its relationship with Europe, against that with the US, and whether that provides a guide for the new future?” Because Brendan, you’ve said that, to you, the most important relation for the – relationship for the UK was Europe, but if we read the review it seems to be the US. So how do you see that going forward?
And I’d also like to take a question from Peter Watkins, which is about Russia, and asking, you know, “whether you could impact the,” Brendan, the “parallel with Russia as the ordering power in Europe?” And I think, you know, for all the panellists, if we can think a little bit about specific cases in the sort of, UK/Europe. You know, are we talking about the US, are we talking about Russia? The tilt to the Indo-Pacific is also something that is of interest. So, how do we think other powers and factors come into play? Should we go with Brendan, then Georgina and Robert?
Professor Brendan Simms
Thank you. Well, the historical relationship with America obviously has changed substantially over time. So, you know, from the – in the 18th Century, the North American colonies were seen as counters in the European balance. So, you know, one of the reasons why – the principal reason, perhaps, why George III was so unwilling to give up the 13 colonies, ‘cause he says, “If I lose these, I lose all consideration in Europe.” One of the reasons why they tried to drive out the French and Spanish was also because they used these as counters in a European balance. Now, obviously over time, the United States has become, you know, the preponderant actor in its own right, so that historical role that America have played in the European balance has shifted. But it has also been brought in, as the phrase goes, “to redress the New World, brought in to redress the balance of the Old,” so there’s a continuity there.
On Russia, I think the key point will be, for post-Brexit Britain, is the extent to which it is prepared to confront Mr Putin, particularly in the Baltic and in the High North, and to what extent that is – that intention, which is definitely there, and it’s there in the review, is cut across ordering struggles with the European Union in other areas. So, just to give you one very simple example, you know, why would the United Kingdom defend Baltic Sea regional states if these states are leagued against it to its economic damage in areas like fisheries and trade policy? Or in the case of the vaccine blockade, as originally mooted, by not less than a Latvian EU Commission? How would you justify to a UK public, defending these countries when such vital interests are being threatened? So, these are the sort of things we would have to resolve before we can have any, kind of, joined up policy on Russia, I think.
Alice Billon-Galland
Thank you, Brendan. Georgina?
Georgina Wright
Really great questions. I mean, on – the UK’s position on Russia, I think, is, kind of – hasn’t come as a surprise at all to EU and, you know, the EU as a whole and individual member states, obviously, ‘cause events of the past few years, you know, Skripal, Navalny, have really pushed the UK to embrace a tough line towards Moscow. But clearly, as Brendan alluded to, within the EU there are some member states that think that, you know, Beijing is perhaps more of a problem than Moscow, and so, it’s very difficult to see what role Russia plays in, kind of, forcing the UK and the EU closer together. ‘Cause I think the EU itself has a line, but it needs much more of a strategic line towards Moscow, so, I think that’s going to be one of the key challenges over the couple of months.
On the transatlantic relationship, I’m always struck when I talk to, you know, officials and diplomats in different member states, that often we get a bit lost. You know, what do we mean by ‘transatlantic relationship’? Is it, sort of, this relationship between the US and Europe? ‘Cause often when you talk to people, they naturally default back into, oh, UK/US, France/US, Germany/US, so I, sort of, again am, kind of, pushing against this, you know, trying to define what it means and look much more about, okay, what are the US’s priorities and what are the EU priorities and individual member States? And then try and tease out their ways that we can co-operate together.
And I think it is really important, because, you know, one of the things that you, kind of, pick up on when you talk to Americans, is, they say, “You know, the UK and the EU have got to sort this out, because there are things that they are going to have to do together. That is not our role.” But inevitably, there are a lot of people who think, well, the US has sometimes, in the past, pushed the UK and the EU to, kind of, take ownership over certain things and, kind of, work together. So, I think it will be interesting to see what the US does and doesn’t do, because I suspect a reluctance to, kind of, force the UK and the EU’s heads together, but also, perhaps, by indicating that the US will be less present in certain areas of the world or whatever, maybe that will force a, kind of, better dialogue between the UK and be that individual member states, or the EU as a whole.
Alice Billon-Galland
Thank you. Robert?
Dr Robert Saunders
So just a postscript, really, on the American point. I think we often talk about this in Britain as if it’s an either/or, as if we have to somehow manage the seesaw of Britain’s relationship with the EU and its relationship with the United States. And yet, historically, we see a very different picture. So, it’s every President from Eisenhower to Trump wanted Britain to be inside the European Union. It was assumed that it was part of what Britain could bring to the Atlantic Alliance, was its influence within the EU. And of course, that’s also why de Gaulle repeatedly vetoed British entry, because he too, thought that Britain would act as a voice for the United States inside an integrated Europe. And very Atlanticist Prime Ministers, like Tony Blair or Margaret Thatcher, also assumed that this was part of what Britain could bring to the table, and to some extent, that will remain true outside the EU, as it was during Britain’s membership.
And at the same time, our relationship with Europe, whether we like it or not, is going to have an impact on our relationship with Washington, because if there’s Global Britain, there is also, if you like, Global Germany, as a major international trading player, and there is certainly a Global Ireland, which is very well represented in the White House at the moment. And we’ve already seen the sense that, you know, the Irish diaspora can exert a diplomatic pull in Washington, if it wishes to do so, that is not necessarily helpful to the UK. So, I think we have to switch mindsets and to think about these two relationship in synergy, rather than always thinking of them as two sides of a seesaw.
Alice Billon-Galland
Very interesting, Robert, and I think, especially when comparing, maybe, the continental view with the British view, there are interesting debates around whether, you know, Europe should be, you know, its own pillar, or whether it should be part of a Euro-Atlantic pillar. And even, you know, continental Europeans are disagreeing on that, and that’s the type of debate where the – you know, London hasn’t been engaging as much as, maybe, other continental Europeans would want to.
We have quite a number of questions in the chat and the Q&A about all the politics of it and the fact that there are, sort of, competitive tensions emerging, you know, on trade, COVID vaccine, China, etc., between the EU and the UK, and the fact that maybe the UK needs to move from this ideological position and obsession with the EU, towards something more pragmatic, which is a word that was often used to describe the UK beforehand. And Robert, you’ve mentioned how history has been used in the debate, sort of, portraying the UK as a certain type of country. Something we haven’t touched upon, but that’s being brought in the Q&A is also the British public and public opinion. How do you see, sort of, British public opinion evolving on those discussion around European policy? Because we know that this is something that’s looked very carefully and that was obviously crucial when it comes to a referendum. So, can we maybe look more at British public opinion and their view on the role that the UK should play in Europe and in the world? Should we have maybe Robert and then Georgina and finally, Brendan?
Dr Robert Saunders
So, on the point about public opinion, I always think that this is very treacherous terrain to venture into, because we’ve got very used in Britain to talking about what Brexiteers think or what Remainers think, and actually, we’re talking about extraordinarily diverse alliances of 15/16 million people, who are, themselves, very internally heterogenous. It seems to me, as far as it’s possible to generalise, that the British public isn’t hostile to the idea of engagement with Europe. That in fact, one of the odder dynamics of the period since Brexit has been the, kind of, constant sense of, “Well, why can’t we do this anymore?” You know, people still want to travel in Europe. They still want to be able to study in Europe. They still want, you know, the kind of cultural relationships, the kind of personal relationships. They’re still going to be trading with Europe as a major bloc in the future. So, I think it should be possible to create a kind of, political space in which Britain is outside the EU and in which that question is, essentially, closed for the short term, at least, but in which we’re also optimistic about a constructive and positive relationship with the EU.
And on your point about pragmatism, I think perhaps one area where I would disagree with Brendan, is that I do just think that we should recognise the EU’s Ambassador and just get past that kind of issue, because the EU is a very unusual beast. We do have bilateral relations with individual EU member states, but we also have a relationship with the EU. So, it doesn’t seem, to me, unreasonable that we should have diplomatic representation on both of those levels. I think that’s the kind of issue that we probably just need to park as quickly as we can, if we’re going to move into that more constructive relationship.
Alice Billon-Galland
Thank you. Georgina?
Georgina Wright
Yeah, some very quick points. I’ll just bounce off what Robert was saying about the EU Ambassador, ‘cause I wrote a piece about this, saying that, you know, “The UK should recognise or grant full diplomatic immunity to the Ambassador,” and that’s because I agree with Robert. You know, the EU is not a state. It is a union, and so there are things that it does and there are things that it doesn’t do, and so, you know, there are – in lots of policy areas, the EU has limited, if no say at all, and on those issues, the UK would need to engage individual EU governments. But also, because the Ambassador plays quite an important role in, sort of, conveying the mood and the intricacies of domestic politics back to the EU institutions. It’s a lot harder for, you know indiv – like, you know, the German or the French Ambassador to do that, because they’ve got to, kind of, you know, inform the Élysée, they need to inform Berlin, and so, that’s really where the EU Ambassador plays a role. And if you look at who he is, I mean, it’s not a coincidence that they’ve appointed João Vale Almeida, which I’m probably massacring his name, but because, you know, prior to that, he was at the UN, I think he was in DC for a bit as well. He’s a very skilled, kind of, diplomat, and someone who is also, I think, in a lot of – if you’ve hear him speech – you know, speak about, sort of, the future relationship, is trying to be very constructive. So, I think he’s quite an important interlocutor and, you know, full diplomatic immunity allows you to have more access and perhaps more ability to, kind of, shape some of the thinking back in Brussels.
On public opinion, I mean, I think Sophia Gaston’s work for the British Foreign Policy Group is really great on this. She published a big report in January where they polled, sort of, British public opinion. It’s really interesting, because I agree, what comes out of there, very strikingly, is that many Brits think that the UK should have a relationship with the EU, consider the EU an important partner. Of course, with COVID, we’ve all, kind – you know, everyone’s been stuck at home, no one’s been really able to travel, but I wonder in the future, whether there won’t be a bit more pressure on the UK. Again, not necessarily look for an institutional arrangement with the EU but look at some more structured co-operation or the ability to work with the EU a bit more.
And finally, I’ll end on the pragmatic. I often hear, you know, “The UK is very pragmatic, very pragmatic.” I wonder if we don’t – if we’ve got this wrong. Isn’t it that the UK can adapt, you know, its agility? It’s the fact that it adapts very quickly, which is something that I think is the envy of many governments around the world, and less this pragmatic, kind of, emphasis? Maybe it’s just me being pedantic, but it’s something I’ve been thinking about for a while, particularly now that I’m in Paris. Thank you.
Alice Billon-Galland
Thank you, Georgina. Brendan?
Professor Brendan Simms
I think everything’s been said on public opinion. On the Ambassador, I completely agree, he should be recognised. My argument was that the other national state Ambassadors should be de-recognised, because on every issue that really mattered to the UK over the last few years, like Northern Ireland, trade policy and so on, it has been dealing with the European Union, and that is the body with which the United Kingdom should be dealing with. That was the only point I was trying to make.
Alice Billon-Galland
Thank you, Brendan. We have five minutes left. I want to ask a question that also has come up in the chat by a couple of people, which is about how the UK can maintain leadership and legitimacy in Europe while outside of the EU and also, without an arrangement with the EU. A couple of people have talked about NATO and whether the UK, being outside of the EU, will have an impact on its standing, role and leadership within the union – within NATO. We also know that it has an impact on bilateral relations, which is something that someone mentions in the chat, and I think some of you have talked about, as well, and there are limits to what the E3 can do, to what a bilateral relation can do, when also the EU, again, is developing its role, is wanting to play a bigger role in the world, is redefining its area of competence. You know, we’ve seen that with COVID, in terms of health, in terms of supply chains, etc. So, more things are coming under the EU competencies, while the UK refuses to have an arrangement with the EU. So, just a last question for your, sort of, concluding thoughts, and also on how the UK can maintain some leadership and legitimacy on the continent and with continental partners outside of the EU, and given the current political tensions. Georgina, do you want to start? And then we can go to Brendan and Robert for final words.
Georgina Wright
Yeah, thank you. Very quickly, I mean, it’s, kind of, the point I made in the introduction, which I think is, sort of, refusing to, kind of, contemplate any form of engagement at all with the EU, means that the UK misses an opportunity to either notice or track important EU developments that are happening. And, you know, as Brendan said, there might be those developments that the UK will want to shape, or at least react to, and I think, you know, that that – it will make it harder to, kind of, gauge political and diplomatic attention to the EU.
But on your broader point, I think, you know, actions speak louder than words, so I think it really, you know – EU countries will be watching very closely what the UK does, and frankly, the same can be said about EU and individual countries. You know, the UK will be watching about what they’re doing and, you know, how they’re reacting.
I think NATO is important. I think most NATO allies would welcome the UK, kind of, you know, pushing that strategic thinking. But, you know, not all EU countries are NATO allies, so, you know, focusing exclusively on NATO could limit the UK’s opportunities there.
But finally, and this is not going to come to a surprise, I think, to anyone on this call, tone matters hugely. And you can write an impressive Integrated Review. You can, you know, make as many speeches as you like. Fundamentally, if you have quite a combative tone on certain aspects of your relationship with the EU, even if it’s just about the trade components of that relationship, I think it will, inevitably, bleed into the kind of, other areas of co-operation that might emerge over time. So, I think tone is something that the government should think very carefully about, because it matters, as we’ve seen from the tone of other governments sometimes, vis-à-vis the UK.
Alice Billon-Galland
Thank you, Georgina. Brendan?
Professor Brendan Simms
Thank you. Well, obviously over the last few years, the idea of the United Kingdom representing a model would’ve seemed problematic, given all the divisions we’ve discussed, domestically, and then of course, the initial COVID response, but I think over the last six months or so a corner has been turned, and I think there are three areas in which it can be a model. On NATO, it’s already been mentioned, the UK is the largest military contributor in Europe. It is contributing most to security and deterrence in the Baltic Sea region and indeed, the entire Eastern periphery. Secondly, on the vaccines, a very good example of how the UK union can function effectively. Unfortunately, a very bad performance by the European Union, for reasons which are entirely to do with its non-union structure. And finally, the UK, assuming it can survive the current challenge in Northern Ireland and in Scotland, the UK is the most long-lasting and successful example of a multinational political union in Europe. That remains the case, and so, that will be my last word.
Alice Billon-Galland
Thank you, Brendan. Robert?
Dr Robert Saunders
So, I think the first question was, how can the UK maintain leadership in Europe? I do think it’s actually worth asking why Britain should maintain leadership. Leadership is a founding assumption of British foreign policy, and that was true of both sides in the Brexit referendum. Gordon Brown’s book was called “Leading, Not Leaving”. But I think it is worth asking, given that leadership comes with costs, why must we be a leader? Why can’t we simply be a partner or a friend or an ally? If we are going to lead, then I think we might want to think more about leadership by example.
And if, perhaps, to end on slightly more contentious point, perhaps, one thing that struck me re-reading the Integrated Review the other day, was how much of this I would like to see carried out at home, or to what extent there is a tension between some of the values that Britain is projecting and celebrating abroad and the policies it’s pursuing at home. So, the Integrated Review repeatedly boasts about the BBC being the world’s most trusted news source and yet, the BBC is under constant political assault in British politics. There’s a lot of chest-thumping about Britain’s world-leading universities and yet, universities are constantly under political attack as part of a wider culture war. We are apparently going to be an advocate of human rights across the world, which is wonderful, but we have a number of Senior Ministers who routinely come on the airwaves laying into do-gooding Human Rights Lawyers as people who are, in some way, frustrating the will of the people. So, if we must lead, let’s lead by the force of our example, and let’s apply some of the admirable principles of the Integrated Review to our own domestic politics.
Alice Billon-Galland
Thank you, Robert. I think that’s a good word of conclusion. And it’s been a brilliant discussion with the three of you. I think my main takeaway would be what’s – something that Georgina said, which is that the review has been mostly well received on the continent, and actually, despite that, sort of, Brussels-shaped hole inside, which I think says a lot about, first of all, how, maybe, relieved continental partners were to see the UK still committed to European security, European defence, having a tilt to the Indo-Pacific, but not a complete turn away. Second, it actually says a lot about the current bad relationships between the EU and the UK, that people were happy to see that the EU was even mentioned, and you know, Robert said that it seems like, for the UK, the EU, sort of, stopped existing.
But finally, something that, for me, has been, sort of, an important thought over the past couple of weeks, is what British officials have been reporting from how the review was received in the UK, and that maybe it was within the UK that there was – there were even more, sort of, criticism about what approach that the Review was having, which, you know, is not surprising, because it’s the British review. But I think that brings us to the fact that this – there are still tensions between different ideologies, between strategies within the UK, for what role towards Europe, towards the world, and that this debate is still ongoing, and maybe this is just one phase of disengagement with Europe, and in the grand scheme of things, we’ll see how it plays out in the longer term. So, maybe an encouragement, sort of, take a step back from the daily news and political bias and see how it plays out.
So, thank you very much for joining us today. Many thanks to the Chatham House Events Team as well, for their support in organising this event. And for more analysis, discussions on UK foreign policy and European developments, do stay in touch with us at the Europe Programme. Many thanks to all of you for attending, for your great questions, and we hope to see you again soon. Thank you.
