Sir Simon Fraser
Good. Well, are we good to go? Excellent, thank you very much. So, let me introduce myself. I’m Simon Fraser. I’m the Deputy Chair of Chatham House and I have the privilege of chairing this very special event tonight. I’ll come back to why it’s so special, though you may have guessed. But before I do that, can I just do the little housekeeping bits that we always do at the start of these events, so that we can get that out of the way?
So, first of all, to welcome everybody in the room, but also everybody who is joining online virtually, so we have a split audience and we’ll try and bear that in mind. This event is on the record, so you are invited and encouraged and allowed to tweet using the hashtag #CHEvents and of course, when Robert has given his talk, there will be a discussion and then an opportunity for questions and answers. So, I’ll take questions in the room. If you’re in the room, just put your hand up, a microphone will be brought to you. Please would you stay seated while you’re asking your question, I think that’s the approved thing because of the COVID rules. And if you’re online and you have a question, could you just put it in the Q&A function and we will try and pick it up, and then we will invite you to unmute yourself, so that you can ask your question.
Now, I think that that is all the instructions that I have on the housekeeping, so let’s move onto the substance. Now, the reason this is such a special event is because, as you know, this is Robin’s last members’ event as Director of Chatham House, after almost 15 years. So, it’s a great privilege for me to be chairing it, and for all us, and for you, Robin, I guess it’s a bit of a tug at the heartstrings here. So, we look forward very much to hearing what you’ve got to say, and it’s a great pleasure for all of us to be here on this occasion.
Robin is going to talking about Living in a Divided World, which seems to be an extremely appropriate theme, because when you think back, over those 15 years, I think that it’s pretty indisputable that the world is, in many ways – feels and is more divided along many different divisions and lines than it was in those days. And I think Robin’s going to pick that up, but if you think about the geopolitical divisions, economic divisions, the, sort of, divisions that are emerging between value systems in the international community, and indeed divisions within our societies, which are affecting the way that we conduct international policy, whether they are social, political, economic or cultural. All these things, I think, are in a, you know, a volatile state, and therefore, Robin, we look very much forward to your observations on that.
I hope that Robin’s also going to weave into that, some more personal reflections on his experience since 2007, running Chatham House and shepherding us through this, sort of, evolving international situation. So, we look forward to that, and Robin will speak for 20 to 25 minutes from the podium, a formal address, and then we will take it from there. So, Robin, over to you.
Sir Robin Niblett DPhil
Thank you very much, Simon, great to have you here with us, and yeah, it’s, kind of, difficult to do an end rap up piece that tries to capture all the various dynamics of my time here, and try to say something that points to the future, which is what I’m trying to do with these remarks today. And I know that – I think I arrived at Chatham House in a slightly more optimistic mood, but I’ll come to that at the end. I think there’s a bit of an optimism/pessimism flow through the presentation today.
Thank you very much for coming out on this toasty day, and especially with all the new omicrons wandering around the world. I am, as you said, going to draw in a little bit of some of the things I wrote in The World Today article, a little – about a month ago. And I’m actually doing a, kind of, written talk. I always, for the last 15 years, have spoken off notes, but I think on this one, I thought I’d better write them down, so excuse the stilted delivery, if it does end up that well.
What I do want to say right at the beginning, therefore, is I think we’re on the threshold of a divided world. My sense is, we cannot turn back, we’ll have to manage the consequences as best we can. And, as I was writing this, it, kind of, shocked me to write my farewell lecture as Director of Chatham House with these words, given that the Institute’s mission is to help build a sustainably secure, prosperous and just world, but it is where we are. So, in this lecture, what I thought I’d do is explain first how we got here, then trace the drivers that are pushing us over the threshold.
In particular, a focus on Russia and how it’s intensifying US-China competition, and I’ll highlight one of the big differences from the last century’s Cold War, the growing political power of those outside the divide. Then I’ll consider briefly what this could mean for globalisation, and finish with some thoughts about the choices for Europe, and I include the UK in that, the US and its allies, what’s the best way forward, all in 20-25 minutes.
Right, quick, so how did we get here? As I wrote in The World Today, I became Director of Chatham House 2007, at a time when it seemed to me that international relations were settling into a more positive rhythm, after the shock of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, and the Bush administration’s contentious and counterproductive Iraq war, and its global war on terror.
In 2007, George W Bush’s second administration was mending fences with its European allies, China’s annual GDP growth hit an annual growth rate of 14%, highest in three decades. The idea that you have could win-win economic co-operation did not yet grate. Financial regulators had not woken up to the credit crisis that they’d enabled, and the EU was still trying to deepen after widening, and the UK was eating its cake on the sidelines. We could do that in those days.
But with hindsight, 2007 was the fulcrum, I think, between a cautiously optimistic post-Cold War world, and the contested environment that we live in today. Russian President Vladimir Putin, as you might remember, used that year’s Munich Security Conference, to deliver a tirade against the injustices of a US-led world, with arguments that presaged his invasion of Ukraine this year. And, also in 2007, five years before Graham Allison wrote about the “Thucydides Trap,” Yang Jiechi, who gave his first foreign policy speech as Foreign Minister, here at Chatham House, said, “The rise of major powers in the past, has never been peaceful.”
By the autumn of 2008, as the US and European banks imploded, Alan Greenspan’s belief in the rationality of financial markets turned out to be a fallacy. The subsequent economic turmoil, followed by monetary easing that enriched the wealthy, and fiscal austerity, that squeezed the poor, sowed the seeds for the populist politics that have emerged on both sides of the Atlantic. Nevertheless, world leaders, as I saw, did not give up on the promise of international co-operation, in response to the global financial crisis. The G20 became the premier forum for co-ordinating global economic policy, between the world’s major economies. And by 2015, after some lengthy negotiations, they agreed the landmark Paris Agreement to combat climate change and the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, to contain Iran’s nuclear programme.
So, these events offered the prospect of what was called briefly “a polycentric world,” Álvaro de Vasconcelos, who was then Director of the EU Institute for Security Studies, suggested in a 2012 report, to which Chatham House contributed, that that’s how we should think about it. And round the same time, Fu Ying, who’s been Ambassador here in the UK, but who was then the first female Chair of the Foreign Affairs Committee and the National People’s Congress, said here at Chatham House that she could see “a decentralisation of world power, that might lead to a more inclusive order.”
But, there’s always a but, this sense of relative optimism, masked two fundamental problems. The first, is the erosion of the cohesion of democratic societies, under the pressures of globalisation, and after the aftershocks of the financial crisis. With his usual perspicacity, Zbigniew Brzezińsk argued in the John Whitehead lecture, back in 2008 here, that “for the first time in all of human history, almost all of mankind is politically awake, activated, politically conscious and interactive, and that is creating a worldwide quest for personal dignity and cultural respect in a diversified world.”
Now, the problem is that instant access to unintermediated, and often manipulated information, has actually polarised societies as much as stimulating them. It’s deepening the divide between those searching for the certainties and dignities of the past, and those who are open to the opportunities, but uncertainties of a more globalised future.
Now, some argue that this involves a healthy rebalancing of democratic power away from metropolitan elites, “citizens of nowhere” as Theresa May, I think unfortunately, described us, and in favour of those who had long felt politically marginalised. But the simultaneous threat to democracy, was neatly encapsulated in an exchange I had here, with the Hungarian Foreign Minister Péter Szijjártó, at Chatham House, in October 2013. I asked him what he thought Viktor Orbán meant by a liberal democracy? And his answer was that “robust democracies should be able to accommodate political illiberal parties, like Fidesz, which reject further EU political integration, and oppose gay marriage, and immigration.” I then countered, that Fidesz’s illiberalism also included something more structural. It deliberately undermines the checks and balances of liberal democracy, and those checks and balances are provided by an independent judiciary, independent media, and an independent civil society, of which we’re part. And Fidesz seemed to me to be pursuing policies that would entrench control, by the ruling party. And this made me think again that cultural illiberalism can easily transform into political illiberalism. Politician’s motivated by the desire to protect fixed ethnic and cultural definitions of national identity, rather than the values that underpin that identity, tend to believe that they are the patriots. That their opponents are enemies of the true nation, which then justifies measures that block their opponents from regaining power, as we’re seeing in the US today.
The second fundamental change has been the erosion of the global hierarchy, a slightly “think tanky” term to use, but what I mean there is obviously the domination of multilateral institutions since the end of the Cold War, by the US and its Western allies. This erosion has been driven by many factors, beyond the internal schisms I’ve described, the most obvious obviously, is the growing technological and economic power of China. But the main driver, I think, has been America’s schizophrenic foreign policy. 2007, you will remember, was the tail end of the unipolar moment.
In 2010, the Obama administration sought to introduce a more inclusive form of American global leadership. It became synonymous with the term “leading from behind,” but Obama’s most damaging legacy was to raise doubts about the credibility of US power by ignoring his red-line over Bashar al-Assad’s use of chemical weapons in Syria. And by turning a blind eye to China’s takeover of the disputed islands in the South China Sea, following his declaration, Obama’s declaration, of the US pivot to Asia.
And Donald Trump’s policies then just compounded the problem. He converted the US into an overbearing and unpredictable version of the other self-interested powers. America’s allies, therefore, also lost confidence in the reliability of the US. Although Joe Biden’s election, I think has been warmly welcomed, and broadly welcomed internationally, they’re of course now a lot of concerns about the potentially transitory nature of his claim that America’s back.
So, this brings me to Russia and Putin. Putin has seized on this moment of internal division in Western societies, and uncertainty about US leadership, to create a legacy, as the leader who reunited greater Russia out of the rubble of the Soviet Union. He had no prospect, I don’t think, of leaving a legacy as an economic reformer, and no amount of global adventurism, whether in Syria, in Africa, Latin America, would compensate for bringing Ukraine back into the Russian fold. And at the same time, removing the risk and the threat, of a successful democratic neighbour.
His commitment to the operation, the special military operation, strikes me as total. Military failures around Kyiv are going to be no deterrent. He’ll persist with his military assault for as long as he believes he can take another inch of Ukrainian territory, and absorb it into Russia. And as we all know, he’s got strong domestic public support, from his control of the media and it looks, for now, like the military and the FSB are on his side. But this simply means there will be no stable solution to the conflict for so long as he remains in power. And the most likely near-term outcome, is a fragile armistice around current lines of control, a frozen conflict, a bit like the Korean peninsula. And this means that allied sanctions remain in place, and the process of economic disentangled – and disentanglement between Russia and Europe will continue.
But globally, and this is the important point, it means the emergence of a big divide. Why? Because Putin’s invasion of Ukraine now overlays, and intensifies, the pre-existing rising tensions between the US and China. My view of the competition between the US and China, is that it is structural, it’s zero sum, each believes the other is out to weaken its own position. Chinese believe that US efforts to export individual human rights and liberal democratic governance, are a threat to the rule of the Communist Party. And therefore, to China’s sovereignty, because only the party can guarantee that sovereignty in their mind.
For their part, American’s believe the communist system of government is inherently unstable, and will eventually pursue external aggression as a way of propping up central control. And the planned extension of President Xi’s mandate beyond 22, confirms America’s worst fears. Under Xi, the slightest sign of dissent at home has been crushed, Human Rights Lawyers have been imprisoned, state surveillance is reaching Orwellian proportions, not only in Xinjiang.
Xi’s personalised style of leadership increases the likelihood of miscalculations around foreign policy. The potential cost of these miscalculations rises with the ongoing Chinese military build-up, from naval forces, to new nuclear and now hypersonic weapons. Taiwan obviously is the most likely future flashpoint. But US policymakers also see China’s export of surveillance technologies to other authoritarian regimes, alongside it’s global infrastructure, as a threat to US economic and strategic interests around the world.
America’s response from Obama, through Trump, to Biden involves decoupling the US from dependence on China for sensitive imports, punitive tariffs, sanctions, a raft of restrictions on imports of Chinese technologies and the export of US sensitive technologies to China. President Biden, as we know, has talked about winning the 21st Century against China, and on 26th of May, three months after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Secretary of State Antony Blinken, described China as “the most serious long-term challenge to international order.” And I think it’s interesting to see, that this time, the Biden administration has done a real pivot, a true pivot 2.0 towards Asia, from the Quad summits, to the Australia, UK, US Defence Technical Partnership. The US has now a more layered and comprehensive approach to its security relationships across the region.
The EU, I think, has reluctantly, but I think consciously now, followed the US lead on sanctions, blocked the EU-China Comprehensive Agreement on Investment. And as a result, Beijing has read the rooms, it’s reducing its own dependence on Western markets, growing its domestic technology base, relying increasingly on domestic consumption to grow its GDP.
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is now compounding this division, because it’s driving Russia and China closer together. In their joint statements now widely reported of 4th of February, just ahead of the Winter Olympics, Presidents Putin and Xi, said that the friendship between the two states had no limits. They added that “there’s no forbidden areas of co-operation;” they included technology, counter-terrorism, arms control and AI security.
Now, many people that that statement was a hostage to Russia’s future behaviour. But since the invasion of Ukraine, the Chinese Government has doubled-down publicly on the alignment of their two country’s interests, marshalling the full power of its media and social media, to promote Russian narratives about the conflict.
Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s accusation on 7th of March that the US is building an Indo-Pacific NATO, echoed the Kremlin’s argument that the Ukraine issue has been triggered, not by Putin, but by NATO members’ insistence on expanding Cold War structures in Europe. So, though it may seem highly risky, China’s commitment to the no limits partnership is entirely logical, given US sanctions and Biden’s statements that the world will be defined by the contest between democracies and autocracies, Beijing is not going to drop Putin, and put China at America’s mercy. Beijing now relies on Russia as a counterweight to the US. A defeated or weakened Russia will mean a strategically weaker China.
So, building on this confluence of strategic interest, the economic relationship between China and Russia is intensifying. Gas imports from Russia, obviously, one of the main examples, critical minerals, etc. So, as logical as this might all seem in Beijing, and despite not crossing the line, so far at least, into providing material support to Russia’s war effort, the strategic alignment between Russia and China has galvanised co-operation between the US and it’s European and it’s Indo-Pacific allies, who all now see Putin and Xi as interconnected threats to their long-term security. They are organising to resist, through a re-energised NATO, a variety of structures for Indo-Pacific co-operation, but most interestingly, through cross linkages between these two groupings that resemble a new Atlantic-Pacific partnership.
Last month NATO’s Summit in Madrid, launched a series of new initiatives, including the planned enlargement to Sweden and Poland, a sevenfold increase in the number of NATO troops on high alert, and deployment of NATO forces in Poland. But this is no longer a transatlantic affair.
In June 2021, pretty much a year ago, Australia and South Korea, along with a couple of other countries, joined G7 leaders at their summit in Cornwall. After the Russian invasion of Ukraine, both nations, plus Japan and Singapore, joined the US, Canada and European allies in sanctioning Russia, for the first time. And most significantly, NATO invited the leaders of Australia, Japan, New Zealand and South Korea to the NATO Summit in Madrid, and updated their strategic concept, with them there, to include China for the first time, as a challenge to the transatlantic alliance. So, it looks to me, that America’s Atlantic and Pacific partners are demonstrating, showing, an intention to support each other, in both hemispheres, and buying America into their own security more firmly as a result.
But, as I said earlier, I think there’s a very important difference to the last Cold War. These divisions are far from incapsulating the reality of today’s world. Only 39 countries are imposing on sanctions – imposing sanctions on Russia over its invasion of Ukraine. And actually, for their part Russia and China can only count on political support from the usual global outlaws, including Eritrea, Iran, Nicaragua, North Korea and Venezuela.
The fact is that the largest group of countries in the world today, lie outside these two divided groups. They are the neo-nonaligned. The US and Europe expected, more at least, of these countries to align with them in responding to Russia’s flagrant breach of international law. But for most Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the NATO response, just seemed to be a continuation of the Cold War. Moreover, they believe, perhaps rightly, the US picks and chooses which bits of international law it adheres to.
Americans, as we know, circumvented the UN, well, we can debate that, to invade Iraq. It was a marginal call in 2003. They ignored the UN to bomb Serbia in 99, to support Kosovo. They ignored the responsibility to protect, to protect Syrians from Assad’s atrocities. More recently, the reports and best estimates are that at least 3,000, at least a third of the 9,000 civilians killed, and Mosul Iraqi civilians trying to recapture the town from ISIS, were killed by Iraqi and our coalition forces.
America demands that China obeys the independent tribunal on its occupation of the islands in the South China Sea, but the US Senate refuses to ratify the UN Convention on which that demand is based. America’s and Europe’s global credibility and soft power have been damaged by their past hypocrisy and double standards, but now it’s getting worse.
Allied governments are bringing massive resources to bear on defeating Russia in Ukraine, but they were unable to deploy vaccines at scale and reasonable price to the poorest countries in the world. Or find, so far, the 100 billion a year, that they pledged many years ago, to help those same countries cope with the massive challenges of climate change. And now, in the upshot of Russia’s war in Ukraine, is a big hike to those same countries’ fuel and food prices. So instead of global solidarity, what we’re witnessing is a divided Northern Hemisphere, locked in a sort of hot and cold standoff, alongside some 140 countries representing the global majority of population, which refuse to become involved. They, including India, reprising its role in the Cold War, as the leader of the G77 online movement, and other major G20 democracies: Brazil, Indonesia, South Africa, as well as large non-democracies like Egypt and Vietnam, are standing on the side of this.
So, the strategic competition between China and Russia, on the one hand, and the US and its allies on the other, has actually empowered these countries as never before. The new and the neo-nonaligned can now triangulate between the world’s democratic and authoritarian poles. Rather than institutions like the Shanghai Co-operation Organisation or the BRICS summits becoming vehicles for power for Russia and China, they’re spaces where their neighbours can express their own views and demands. And rather than lobbying China for an MoU to join its Belt and Road Initiative, even a small island nation, like the Solomon Islands, can leverage their strategic value to gain benefits from both sides, simultaneously.
Now, are there reasons to be optimistic in this divided world? What does this, sort of, trilateral structure hold for the future? I’m going to be very telegraphic here, ‘cause I am coming to end. Does it presage major conflict between the great powers? I’m going to stick my neck out, and say not for now and not for the foreseeable future. I think nuclear weapons remain a critical deterrent between them. Does the global divide herald the end of economic globalisation and the international co-operation needed to manage global challenges? Again, I think not necessarily.
While Russia will be excluded from liberal democratic markets, as far as, and as long as Putin’s in the Kremlin, that country will find new markets for its hydrocarbon and mineral exports, thereby, actually, ironically, freeing other countries to export more of those fossil fuels to Europe and America during their own energy transitions.
And China’s continuing reliance on global markets, including the US and Europe, for a significant portion of its employment and growth, and the importance of its market for the rest of the world, including the US and Europe, make it unlikely, I think, that we’re going to see a new economic Cold War. And that means that there will still be space, I think, for international co-operation, especially to combat climate change, and manage the environment, and hopefully to manage the emergence of new pandemics.
And two other good things, our technological innovation is going to accelerate still globally, even in this divided world, into quantum computing, bioscience, nanoengineering, drought-resistant and urban agriculture. It’ll open new prospects for sustainable development and employment, in developing countries as well as advanced economies. And, I think, hopefully, we will see soon a tipping point where women hold a critical mass of leadership positions in many parts of the world. And given that male leaders are the instigators of the latest spasms of violence, more gender-balanced leadership holds out the prospect, I think, for greater political stability and more inclusive development.
But these are all positive medium-terms, and they depend on us getting through a very painful, near-term. As I said, the spiralling prices of energy and food, threaten politic instability in Europe, in the United States, in Africa and Asia, although European governments, I think, will have the financial reserves to manage an energy transition at the same time, as deal with these pressures. Most of the developing world is in a much, much more precarious position, as we’ve seen in Sri Lanka.
The other thing to watch out for is that Europe and the US will not allow its rivals to benefit from their pain. The 2021 US-EU deal to lift the Trump tariffs on aluminium and steel imports, promise to prevent a leakage of imports from third countries, meaning China. So, if you think that China’s carbon emissions are going to continue to grow, and its exports are increasingly dependent on Russian carbon inputs, then the pressure to impose carbon taxes at the US and EU borders is going to increase.
A more geopolitical approach to international trade will lock in the current financial sanctions that America and its allies have imposed against Russia. And Chinese companies will likely fall more and more regularly into the crosshairs of allied regulators, as they’ve done for a long time over links to North Korea. And this will accelerate Chinese and others’ efforts to build alternative means of trading outside the reach of the dollar-denominated global financial system. So, with less investment in global economic integration, multilateral economic governance is likely to suffer. Above all, I think the splintering of the internet will continue.
So, last section, last point, what choices does this possible future, this divided future present for European governments, including the UK? Let’s talk about us here, I’m always told not to use the ‘us’, but I am going to ‘we’ it going forward. We should, and will, double down on our security. The era of the peace dividend is over, it’s time to upgrade the insurance policy and pay the premium. Maybe, I’ll have to become – I’ll have to do some columns, you know, with that stuff. Hopefully – I can see someone in the front row who will correct my terrible column writing. Hopefully, NATO governments and their allies will do so intelligently, learning the lessons from Russia’s early failures and Ukraine successes. The resilience and interoperability of energy and other critical infrastructure, cyber systems, space assets will be as important as the quantity of deployable troops or the size of the defence budget.
Second, the US and its allies need to formalise what I have been calling, it’s a rather clunky term, the “G7+,” i.e., the original G7, which includes the EU, and, at a minimum, to start with, Australia, New Zealand, and South Korea. It should become a values-based economic alliance. It should help its members sustain some of the benefits of globalisation, but through what Janet Yellen is now also clunkily calling “friend-shoring,” by ensuring some trusted diversity of trade and investment in critical technologies.
Moving this grouping onto a more formal footing, perhaps with a small Secretariat, perhaps with an agenda that flows from G7-to-G7, makes sense, particularly because now the G20 is going to revert, I think, inevitably to being, at best, a mechanism for global crisis management. And getting a G7+ up and running before 2024, would be a hedge against the return of Trump or another US leader committed to America First. I would not call this grouping “The West.” It’s a tired term, it’s redolent of the old global hierarchy, and it’s also how Russia and China like to define us. So, my next effort’s going to be call ourselves the “Free G.”
Third, we cannot wait to fix ourselves, before we reach out to the Global South in this more divided world. Liberal democracies will need to rebuild and sustain diplomatic and economic relationships with autocratic governments, so long as they’re not exporting autocracy or seeking to undermine other democracies. And the extent and depth of those relations, will need to be calibrated to reflect the ways that those leaderships, do or do not, respect their citizens’ basic human rights.
Fourth, we are going to need to engage in what Kevin Rudd has described as “managed strategic competition with Russia.” I think most of this group knows what that calibration means. But in the end, we’re going to have trade and investment with China, in much more clearly defined and circumscribed red, yellow, green lanes.
And finally, on Russia, well, there’s going to be no return to the status quo ante, apart from maybe arms control, and some conflict mediation, until Ukraine is again reliably and confidently, a secure sovereign country
So, I leave Chatham House at time when the world is fragmenting into what I see as two competing blocs. When the risks of major conflict, is higher than at any time since the end of the Cold War. But the checks on that escalation are significant, liberal democracies have re-found a common sense of purpose, and the citizens of larger numbers of states than ever before, are no longer vassals or proxies to the great powers. They’re acquiring new agency by dint of the divisions across the Northern Hemisphere.
The world seems more anarchic, and yet, at the same time, the pressure is for co-operation, driven by climate change and the risk of pandemics, have never been higher. So, as I confront this dichotomy, and everything tapered as a dichotomy, I have, I think become, as Antonio Gramsci described himself, “a pessimist of the mind and an optimist of the will.” And speaking for the last time to those folks on camera, as well as in the room, on behalf of Chatham House, I can assure you that my colleagues and I, are committed to conjuring positive ideas and creative solutions to build a much better future, despite everything I have said. I’ll finish there [pause].
Sir Simon Fraser
Okay, right. Well, Robin, thank you very much for that. Can I just remind people, online virtual participants, as well as those in the room, if you’re a virtual participant, please do feed your question into the Q&A, so that we can try and pick them up. And if you’re in the room start thinking about your questions, while I take the opportunity to ask the first one, which is the prerogative of course, of the Chair. So, Robin, very elegant, sort of, bringing together of a number of complex themes, and strands, and of course that’s right because it is a complex world and it’s evolving very fast.
I thought very interesting thing for me was the way that you pick up on the sort of evolution of the US-China bipolar confrontation that we’ve been talking about recently, and then look at how Russia and then other developments, in terms of the reinforcement of Western cohesion and the extension of it, is taking us forward into, a further sort of configuration of the international system with this potentially evolving new nonaligned. So, the question I want to ask you is this, I mean, if we buy that analysis, and sorry if that’s a, sort of, a gross simplification of it, but if we buy that, sort of, broad analysis, that it seems to me there are three – so, what’s the answer, what’s the outcome, is my question?
There are three options. There is this inevitably leads to conflict, and you have said you don’t think that is inevitably the answer. I guess, the second one then is, does it lead to some sort of separation, which is accepted and becomes a sort of stasis of separation where we have mutual, sort of, disregard, but manage to run the world separated? Or thirdly, is there actually a route back to a more co-operative, collaborative world? You know, you talk about the erosion of multilateral systems, but is there – is this a phase from which we may find a positive exit? What do you think about that?
Sir Robin Niblett DPhil
Well, as I said in – thank you, and it’s very helpful to get a neat encapsulation, because I’m not good at neat encapsulations. As I said at the beginning, and you reiterated, I think major conflict is unlikely, even now, even in Europe, even with Russia. I know that’s my own hostage to fortune, but you’ve got to have a view, so I said it, you know, so I can’t take it back. You’ve got to have a view if you work in a think tank, you can’t dodge.
Now I also think, I’m afraid, that a route back to a more co-operative world, I do not see it right now. In the time horizon, that at best I can work through, which maybe is five years, I don’t see it. I don’t see it because I think, the – I can’t, I just – unless Vladimir Putin goes that change isn’t going to happen, yeah? If Vladimir Putin is somehow – dies of natural causes or, you know, leaves power through some other way, I think even with a nationalist leader that might follow him, and probably would, there could be a way to, sort of, negotiate an ‘off-ramp’, let’s use that term. But ultimately, Russia is insecure because of its system of government, it has unfinished business in Putin’s mind, and those of many of those who hold power around him and therefore, they are not going to step back, or cry uncle, or admit, or – it’s like, when are you going to stop doing the sanctions, it’s hurting you and the rest of the world? Why are you doing this to the rest of the world? I mean, you just get, “We didn’t start this,” and it seemed like a rather feeble answer to that question, but nonetheless, this idea you can get away with it, that might is right.
The spheres of influence is the way of the 21st Century, as well as the 20th and the 19th is unacceptable, so we won’t accept it, they won’t accept it. I do think, you know, I’m not – look, who is a real expert on China and the thinking of the leadership in China? I do my best. But my sense is, there is unfinished business, you know, China is reasserting its influence and power in its region, and Taiwan is unfinished business. And at some point, that business needs to be resolved, hopefully, peacefully, and the Chinese Communist Party have said peacefully, most recently again, that word ‘peacefully’ is in the lexicon. But again, it means it’s unfinished business, and so long as that’s there as a risk, we, on our side, are going to be constantly looking at what the risk is of the risk of the future. Which is why I come back to my conclusion, that where we’re at, I think, is the liberal democracies, have to feel stronger in and of themselves, inside themselves, by doing various steps that are being taken, in terms of, let’s use the shorthand ‘levelling-up’.
But most importantly as well, sensing that they are a community, as they were a community after 1945, when, you know, nascent institutions, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation in Europe, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. You know, these were early efforts, where likeminded nations came together, and tried to setup structures of cooperation they felt would be sustainable, that they invited others to join.
And I would rather put my effort, I’m leaving Chatham House, I’ve put my effort, into trying to make sure that there is a strong community of liberal democracies, in this divided, very unpredictable world. ‘Cause I think it will then be a pole of attraction for picking up the best of what we have to offer, we have bad things as well, but we have, I think, on balance, the best to offer. And if we’re strong, we’ll be in a better position, actually to co-operate with China, in particular, and other governments, in areas where we can collaborate, and I mentioned that climate, as Tony Blinken did as well.
Climate, global health in particular, probably development in Africa should be an area of possibility. The AIIB, I think, is a route for that. So, I’m not, you know, off the cliff and in Cassandra land of it’s all woe, and we’ve got to put up the barriers and circle the wagons. But we do need to work out a way, for those countries that feel precariously vulnerable in the Indo-Pacific, a Europe that doesn’t – not quite sure if it could trust America, the America that’s not quite sure if its allies are going to be with it. You’ve got to get that together first. I think, you’ve got to be in a position of strength, to get to a position for really more global co-operation.
Sir Simon Fraser
Okay, well, thank you, very much. I mean, there are a whole lot of questions that come out of that, which I’m not going to ask, ‘cause I’m going to let others ask questions. But, you know, the international financial system, the regulation of technology, the internet, and so forth, which are going to cut across that. But I’m going to take a couple of questions in the room, if I may, and then I’m going to try and pick up some of the questions online. So, Claudia, the lady at the back, I’m not going to give people’s names. Could you please introduce yourself when asking your question, and a little bit about if you represent anybody, other than yourself, who you represent, yeah.
Claudia Hamill
Right, I’m Claudia Hamill. I’m a member of Chatham House. I have other iterations, but I won’t bore you with those. It’s a simple question, Robin, it was a brilliant overview. And you talked – you referred quite often to the term “Cold War,” I’d really like to understand in this context, what you mean by that, and when does a war stop in this context, being cold?
Sir Simon Fraser
But let’s take…
Sir Robin Niblett DPhil
Yeah, I think you should do exactly that.
Sir Simon Fraser
Quick answers.
Sir Robin Niblett DPhil
Yeah, I’ll try and give you quick answers.
I’m pretty certain that I didn’t describe the situation we’re in now as a Cold War. In fact, I said there would not be a new economic Cold War. I did say that there was ideological competition between the US and China, and many people associate that with the definition of a Cold War. I think what’s interesting about this is that, and we were discussing this yesterday, China is not exporting an ideology and therefore, it’s a very different context to that in 1945 and for the next 20 years.
However, China is sharing and exporting technologies that are seen as being counter to the values and systems that liberal democracies believe are effective, not just for themselves, but for other countries as well, and so, there is a competition of systems of governance. Because ultimately, I think, many of the more authoritarian governments, including China, believe that their system is best for their people and for other people as well.
In other words, you know, leaving it to the vagaries, and not like the UK has been providing the best example, the vagaries of democratic governments, you know, can just lead to chaos and non-development. And you’ve got plenty of comparisons of countries around the world that have not had clear and consistent leadership, that have not been able to get out of poverty traps, etc. So, it is a contest of views, but I don’t think that constitutes a Cold War that has any echoes of the 1945 period.
Sir Simon Fraser
Okay, thank you. I’m going to take a question – any non-European and non-British people who want to ask a question from a different perspective, please feel free. But I’ll take this gentleman in the front here, and then this lady in the front as well. Could you just wait for the mic, and could you introduce yourself, please? I think we’ll take them – I’m always told that Chatham House likes to do them one at a time.
Sir Robin Niblett DPhil
We start at one at a time, and then if we run out of time…
Sir Simon Fraser
Well, we’ll do these two together.
Sir Robin Niblett DPhil
Yes, ‘cause…
Sir Simon Fraser
Okay.
Member
[Inaudible – 48:02]. Robin, can we say thank you very much for the last 15 years in this House. What I want to ask you now, since you have come to the end of your time at Chatham House, as a Director, are we going to see you or likely to see you in the Foreign Office, and if not, why not?
Sir Robin Niblett DPhil
I like it. Are you saying I could have a life in the FCDO?
Sir Simon Fraser
Very good question, to which I don’t know the answer, but can we take this question as well, and then Robin can – and I’m going to – after this I’m going to ask Natalie Porter to ask a question online, so if you could be ready to do that, Natalie, that would be great, but…
Tilde
Thank you so much, Robin, for an amazing tour of the conflicts that we’ve heard, possibilities and opportunities developed across the material landscape. At the very end, in your response to Simon’s question, you mentioned Africa by name, although it was implied as the Global South. And I just wanted to ask you, my perception of your stewardship and leadership of Chatham House has been to do two remarkable things, which have positioned Chatham House as a, kind of, leader and taking the system view of the, kind of, wicked problems the world is facing and looking at every aspect of that in some extraordinarily, kind of, coherent way as possible. And a lot of that particular perspective seems to me to have a conversion on Africa, as the one area, where there is obviously the greatest threat of climate change that is biodiversity loss and the greatest opportunity for co-operation, which is, I think, where you were heading in your response to Simon. Would you be happy to say a bit more on it?
Sir Simon Fraser
Okay, are you going to be in the Foreign Office and Africa?
Sir Robin Niblett DPhil
No, I can save time on – pay more time on the second one with the answer to the first, not joining the Foreign Office. Yes, it’s not, I think, an option on the cards and yeah, any case. If I’d made that choice, that’s a choice I think you have to make earlier in your career and commit time to it, as Simon has done, and really invest in that process. I think jumping in late, is probably not effective for the Foreign Office or for oneself. Big supporter of the FCDO, but I don’t think me being – you know, me trying to join it would be a help.
Right, on Africa, Tilde, thank you for asking the question. I mean, the first thing I’ll say most obviously, and simply, is that I had to do very little on Africa. We had a strong – relatively strong Africa Programme when I arrived here, thanks to Alex Vines and his team, and I leave and it’s even bigger and stronger. It is the largest of any think tank Africa Programme in the world, I mean, setting aside the big Chinese institutions, which have 2,000 employees, and so on. But think tanks of our sort, but I think part of the reason for that is Alex spotted something, which is that these are countries that have agency, not just should have agency, have agency. And if you treat them as venues for development, and experimenting with development solutions, it’s just you never quite get through to the next – you don’t turn the page, you just keep writing over elements on the first page.
So, I think the approach that Alex and his team, and therefore Chatham House, has taken was instrumental in its opening strength. And you are right, so thank you, and I can be quick, we have overlaid, and now integrated, our very strong programmes on sustainability on the environment, to – and especially now with this next two sets of COPs, to try to make sure we’re building in a programme of positive progress from Glasgow through to Sharm El Sheikh, and then onto the UAE, that puts Africa, as you said, as one of the absolute test cases.
Africa is going to have to do so many leapfrogs of stages, this has to be their journey. We need to help, whichever way we can, and I think, systemically, thinking of the work we’re doing, ‘cause I see Rob is here as well, on global health in Africa, it has become a place – we’re invested in Africa’s success. We think of African countries, and citizens and civil society, as our partners there and we’ll do our best.
The one thing I’ll say at the end, is we still have a very small Latin America capacity. It’s partly to do with geography, and where we’re at, but that’s another part of the world where the systemic approach is really needed. Because you talk about the impacts of climate change, migration is huge there as well, but that’s another story. We can talk more about it later on, but thank you for the question. Yeah, yeah, we’re doing – I came back from a conference in Mexico, which we did, first one ever, a month and a half ago, so we’re making an effort in that area.
Sir Simon Fraser
Very good and also the, sort of, migration issue is going to be very important and, kind of, one of the themes is going to emerge from your picture of the future world, and Africa is going to be central to that.
Now, it’s ten to seven, if people will permit me, I’m going to, sort of, extend ‘til five past seven. So, we’ve got 15 minutes, so we’re going to have to be disciplined. I’m going to take two questions online, Natalie Porter, and then David Manning, if you’re ready David, could you come in afterwards? But Natalie, if you could unmute yourself and ask your question, which is about, sort of, freedom of speech and disinformation, which I think is interesting.
Natalie Porter
Hi, can you guys hear me?
Sir Simon Fraser
Yeah, very good.
Natalie Porter
Especially with the balance and the growth of social media, we’re seeing increasingly polarized opinions become far more generalised now. How, in your experience, how do you propose that we’re going to maintain the really fine balance between an individual and a nation’s freedom of speech and expression, with restricting, and having subsequent consequences for that freedom of speech, expression, and whatever potential disinformation comes from it?
Sir Simon Fraser
Okay, can you hold that one? It’s important in the context of your authoritarian democracy debate. David Manning, are you there? Could you ask your question?
David Manning
Yes, thank you, if you can hear me, Simon. Sorry, I can’t be with you. Can I just echo the thanks of others to Robin for all he’s achieved in the last 15 years, it’s been remarkable in itself and also, I think for Britain, as an example of soft power through Chatham House.
My question for Robin is this, if your successor gives a farewell address in 15 years’ time, do you think she may be reflecting on how the forces of fragmentation have led to the break up of any, or indeed all, of the United States, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the EU and the destabilising impact that that would have on the international landscape?
Sir Simon Fraser
Okay, you don’t have to answer in detail for each one, but do you want to pick up those two questions and bear in mind the time? Yeah, thanks.
Sir Robin Niblett DPhil
Yes, both super questions. Natalie, thank you very much. I mean, I can save a lot of time on this. I’m going to have to skate over all sorts of issues, but I had the pleasure of sitting where Simon is sitting two Fridays ago, or I’ve lost track of time, maybe it was one Friday ago, with Jacinda Ardern, sitting where I’m sitting and she got a similar question, and I thought she answered it extremely well. Until we have proper scrutiny, oversight, access to the algorithms, of the main social media platforms, which are designed for the purpose of advertising, not informing, that’s my added bit of editorialising, we’re not going to get there. So, it will involve regulation, it will stymie and slow down the pace of innovation in some aspects of platforms, but I share your view, Natalie, and I think your instinct that the damaging impacts are becoming just too intense. You can do a lot of education, a lot of it is about education of population, so they can pick and choose and, kind of, inform themselves effectively. But everything we’re seeing is telling us that we’re losing that battle, to be frank, at the moment. So, I’d be in for more hands-on regulation, but especially around what creates that element of visceral reaction, and therefore polarisation.
On the question – David, wow, what a question. I think, you know, I’m need to, sort of, take it home and unpack it, and now David is of course now a Distinguished Fellow.
Sir Simon Fraser
You can pass it onto your successor.
Sir Robin Niblett DPhil
Exactly, I will. I shall tell her that this is a question that came through to Bronwen, you’ve got adva – I didn’t get advanced warning, you’ve got it. So – and the question is relevant in five years or 15 years, if she has to answer those questions. I think the risks of fragmentation, because they follow on Natalie’s point, are absolutely real, the United Kingdom is very vulnerable. I don’t know about the EU. I think the EU is sufficiently, so don’t go into everything, but I’ll say one line on each one. I think the EU is sufficiently flexible, and members, in the end, would rather cause trouble inside it, than be outside it, and not be able to cause trouble inside, if you see what I’m saying. That includes Viktor Orbán, I think they’re more likely to stay inside. But Russia has to be a consideration, especially, it’s a very interesting thought, which I hadn’t thought about before, if this war carries on going badly, and the military is seriously depleted, a lot of the troops are being taken not from the main capitals, but from across the rural areas and the poor areas, you could end up with a real push here. Putin over presses his luck, which he tends to do, it could end up weird.
I think the US, it’s about states. I got a question about this earlier today in another talk I was giving, a small briefing. And my comment on that, which I can be quick on, is that are US states a safety valve? In other words, yes, decisions have been given to states, and we don’t like a lot of those decisions and where they’re going, I say ‘we’, again, I can do that sort of stuff now that I’m leaving. But I think that it is – the states may end up being safety valves from – for more serious schisms. America will be more separate, and more federal, in a negative way, I suppose, than it was before, but I think it hangs together as a country.
Sir Simon Fraser
Okay, and look, I’m sorry, I’m not going to be able to take everybody’s questions. There were actually two at the front here, that hands were up quickly, so maybe I could the two of you. It’s not the family holdback principle here.
Member
David – actually, David Manning summed up very much a part of what I was trying – I was going to ask, but I do – I mean, the only thing with America that is worrying for most of us, I don’t think it’s really more – and sorry, I did scribble this down, because I haven’t had enough coffee today, so I’m spinning my point. But on all – you know, we’ve talked about, sort of, post-revolutionary Soviet Union, out of date, you know, and anachronistic, but we’re not talking in the same terms about America’s democracy. And frankly, I don’t think it has kept up and modernised with what we need today, and whether it’s on rancorous voting, on primaries, on campaign finance, on electoral college, on re-districting, all those things. I don’t see how America can become, or continue to be the powerhouse of influence and leadership, that we will all need for our global solidarity, in pursuing our end of it, our human rights. And what happens if America does descend into civil conflict for the rest of the world? Thank you.
Sir Simon Fraser
So, it is a very important question, can we rely – is America reliable as a future partner? Phillip you’re going to come in as well, and then we’ll take this one.
Philip Stephens
Yeah, Philip Stephens, a member of Chatham House. It seems to me we’ve become too addicted to, sort of, neatness in our descriptions of the geopolitical landscape, the bipolar world, the unipolar world, the G2 world, and as you eloquently expressed this evening, the new landscape is going to be full of jagged edges and overlapping alliances. But I felt that you, sort of, still fell into the trap by trying to draw this line between democracies and autocracies. And that seems to me completely the wrong line, particularly as, as you said, we’re going to be competing for the nonaligned. And isn’t the real and the more productive line for the West, a line between those who want a rules-based order, and those who don’t. And the pitch to countries that may not want to sign up to European or American style democracy should be “you as smaller nations have a huge interest in the preservation of the rules and that’s what we stand for.”
Sir Simon Fraser
Okay, so that’s very interesting, and also just so I can pick up, a very similar point was made by John Kampfner in the chat here, in the Q&A about “how do we sort of redesign our message to this new nonaligned, and what is the pitch we make?” So, could you do those two, and then I’m going to take one final question over here and then I think we’ll probably be out of time.
Sir Robin Niblett DPhil
Yeah, I mean, look, the first thing I would say is democracies and autocracies exist, so I’ll just make that point. I don’t think you can define a democracy, and you can define a country that is not. There are ugly terms and democracies aren’t perfect and autocracies are all quite different, but I think we know the difference when we see the difference. But, and what I would – the point you made is the point that Liz Truss made here when I asked her a similar question about network of liberty versus being relentlessly commercial and she said, “Well, I think we can engage with trade with those countries that are not undermining the rule of law and not undermining democracies, even if they have different systems of governance.” So, I’m not sure you want to be bracketed with Liz Truss, Philip, but that was – she made exactly the same point and actually, whilst talking quickly, I said here, liberal democracies will need to build and sustain diplomatic and economic relationships with autocratic governments, so long as they’re not exporting autocracy, or seeking to undermine other democracies. So, I used the terminology, as you did in your question, and we’re going to have to work with them absolutely, yeah, so, I agree. And this can be difficult by the way, and difficult for governments to try and get that calibration right. Yes, and I think I answered the US question. So, was there another question?
Sir Simon Fraser
Well, you did, yes, you said that actually you did, you said you’re not sure that US is going to be…
Sir Robin Niblett DPhil
I just don’t think the us is going to collapse, but I definitely agree that its democracy, like Britain’s by the way, is well out of date, and democracies should be able to update themselves. The problem you have in the US right now, and I’m just going to say what everyone knows, you now have a balance on the Constitutional Court where originalists, literalists, are in a clear majority and actually trying to roll back the modernisations that took place and take it back to where it was. That’s dangerous, but I still think the states are a safety valve and the states will have different viewpoints and, yeah, it becomes a longer answer after that.
Sir Simon Fraser
And I suppose it’s true that in times of change and transition, you know, people do try to get clarity, to define the issues with clarity and living with the ambiguity of this change, is a very difficult thing to do, and certainly for Politicians, and those of us who are trying to put neat categories around these things. Yes, lady over here, last question, could you remain sitting, sorry, if you don’t mind. Yeah, that’s the rules, I’m told to apply.
Bernice Lee
I should remember. Bernice Lee. I’m a very happy employee at Chatham House, may I say, and what an honour too have been hired and empowered by Robin over the past 15 years or so, to have built and grow – has built and grown one of the largest, and I hope one of the bestest, sustainability projects and programmes within Chatham House, and among certainly international affairs think tanks.
But my question today is that you started off by reminding us that it wasn’t just the 2008 crisis, but also our responses to it, that sowed the seeds of, among many things, the populism and the world in which we live right now. How confident are you that the “Free Gs” as you call us, or call the countries of the G7+, in tackling the current problems of the day, which are the energy and food crisis? And if not, what would you advise other stakeholders to help governments do the right thing at this point? Given that if we don’t get it right, we may have sown seeds for other types of discontent down the line.
Sir Simon Fraser
I promise you that wasn’t a planted question, given it’s the last question that Robin is going to answer in his current capacity. This is a very tense moment for you. Anything that you want to say, you have now got two minutes to say, roughly.
Sir Robin Niblett DPhil
I’ll answer the question. But how confident am I that we can provide the responses? Boy, this is not a time to be going into elected government, I mean, what a difficult sequence, and series of things to deal with from the global financial crisis. Okay, I’ll use a little bit of the time, from the global financial crisis which was itself, the creation of a slowdown of fast economic growth in many developed economies, which was then turbocharged by credit. I’m looking at people who had to live through all of this, and try to unwind it, but ended up being turbocharged by credit and then the credit fell over. So, the problems pre-existed, we all think it all started with the global financial crisis, the problems were before the global financial crisis. So, in a way the West, as it then was, was racing to catch up, trying to, sort of, amphetamine itself, you know, into success. So, when you go from that, everything’s been a defensive move from then on, as I said, quantitative easing was good for a while, it got us through the immediate crisis, it created a different one. Austerity, probably necessary ‘cause in any case, what’s austerity? There’re various levels of austerity, but that element has certainly been the experience for so many people in the UK, and Europe, and America, and other parts of the world
But where we end up then – then just as you’re coming out of that, you get hit with COVID, as you’re trying to do an energy transition, that is absolutely inescapably necessary and essential, for the future of this planet, so you cannot escape that choice. You cannot escape the impacts of having to keep people afloat through COVID. And then just as you think, maybe you’re coming out of that, you get, you know, what’s happening now. So, I mean you could not script, I don’t think, this sequence of events, all coming from that weak moment, that moment we thought was the glory, including of Britain, in the early 2000s and the naughties, we were growing faster than the rest of the EU.
I remember I arrived here and being told how successful Britain was in 2007, well, that’s ‘cause we were on fumes. We were using, you know, we were raising tax off money that didn’t exist. Never mind. Germany was exporting cars – was lending money to Greece, to buy the German cars and then blaming the Greeks for building up debt, you know, and them having to bail them out. I mean, the perversities of that time, I have not forgotten clearly, as you can tell.
So, what do I want to say about now? The Russia invasion of Ukraine is the deus ex machina, which these democracies needed. That would be my answer. Now it doesn’t mean they’ll get it right, doesn’t mean it’ll succeed, but if you’re a democratic Politician, at least you’ve got something emotional to rally people around, if you can do it, if you’re good enough.
You know Boris Johnson was leaning that way, I just don’t think he was capable of knitting the two sides of that proposition together. I don’t know what the next person will or will not do, on that front. We are lucky that the populist didn’t win in a sequence where, if this invasion had happened at a different moment, you know, you might have had a populist in the [inaudible – 67:42] you might have had a populist in government in Italy. We’re lucky that in a way, we’ve just had some elections or you’re in a position where you’ve got relative stability in some of those governments.
So, can they mobilise around, not just the inescapability of having to deal with the environmental challenges, and the climate, and the energy transition, but can you leverage this moment of crisis, where you’ve got, to put it bluntly, “a baddy” in Vladimir Putin, who is doing stuff that we tend to watch in World at War, in black and white? And that’s what’s happening in Europe right now, if you cannot mobilise the British people, and the Europeans, and others around the threat that Vladimir Putin is providing for us, you don’t deserve to be in democratic politics, in my opinion. So, I think there is an opportunity, it’s going to be brutally difficult, but at least you’ve got something to engage people’s heart with, whereas the Gilets jaunes moment was ‘cause Macron was doing it and weak attacks, and, you know, it just doesn’t work. You’ve got to have a sense of purpose.
Sir Simon Fraser
So, we have a cause.
Sir Robin Niblett DPhil
We have a cause, I’ll finish with that.
Sir Simon Fraser
Well, I think that’s – I’m afraid we’re going to have to finish. I mean, there are many other questions that people wanted to answer, and can I just say, all the questions online, which were excellent questions, we picked up some of the themes. They all said, Robert, big thank you to you for everything you’ve done, so I want to transmit that message, on behalf of those who sent those messages, and you’re…
Sir Robin Niblett DPhil
Save it. Save it.
Sir Simon Fraser
Yeah, I will. And just very briefly, on behalf of me, thank you very much for this lecture, for the discussion, I mean, a huge canvas to try and cover, but you did it admirably. I think even more than that, we all want to say thank you for everything you’ve done in the last, nearly 15 years. I mean, you’ve brought so much to Chatham House. You’ve grown the Institute, you’ve led a lot of the thinking here, you have represented Chatham House very effectively internationally, and nationally, and you have led the teams here. You’ve improved the finances, which is important, and if I may say so, you’ve also improved the estate, which, as you know, was something that was very much on my mind when I started. So, I think we’re all immensely grateful to you. And we’re going to have a chance to say thank you to you again, because we have the AGM, which is on the 26th of July at 5:00pm. And then there is the members’ drinks, which I think is happening after that, in the garden, so this is not the last chance, but would you please take this opportunity, nevertheless, to thank Robin both for his talk, and for everything else that he’s done.
