Ben Horton
Hello, everybody, and thank you very much for joining us today for this Members’ Question Time from Chatham House, all about COP29, the climate summit that concluded over the weekend in Baku, Azerbaijan. My name’s Ben Horton. I’m the Head of the Director’s Office at Chatham House, and I’m delighted to be with you today. Thanks so much for joining us, and thanks, also for joining us given the rescheduling of this webinar. We apologise that this was postponed from Monday. Our colleague, Ruth Townend, who was due to speak, is unavoidably away, but I’m really delighted that in her place we have the wonderful Chris Aylett and Dr Bernice Lee, from our Environment and Society Centre. Thank you both for stepping in and joining us.
There is so much to discuss on this topic, and so many questions that we were sent in advance, so thank you, everybody, for sending those in. We’re going to hear from both Chris and Bernice at the start, just briefly, on their reflections on the summit, and the, kind of, broader geopolitics of climate change. And then we will move through to questions, audience Q&A, and we’ll fit in as many questions as we can. That’s my job, I’ll try and get through as many as we can.
Just before we start, a little bit of housekeeping. This discussion is on the record, it’s being recorded and it’s being live streamed on social media. So, please do feel free to use anything that you hear in this webinar, kind of, beyond, like, please tweet, if you like, or share on Bluesky or LinkedIn, or anything that – any social media platform that you’re using at the moment, and if you could use the #CH_Events, and add us in, tag us in, @Chatham House, that would be really fantastic.
So, we’ve, as I said, we’ve got some questions that were sent in advance, but you can also ask your questions now and throughout this discussion. You’re able to do that just by typing them into the Q&A box that will appear at the bottom of your feed. If you’ve got any trouble there, please contact – try and get hold of one of the Administrators and they’ll help you out. Okay, and at the very end of the event, we will be asking all of you what you think about the state of climate action after COP29. We’ll just flick up a brief poll on your way out, so please do participate in that as you leave.
Okay, so now onto the discussion, and I’m going to hand over to Chris first, Chris Aylett, for a brief overview of what just happened at COP29. Welcome back from Baku, Chris.
Chris Aylett
Thanks very much, Ben. It’s great to be here, it’s great to be here with you all talking about this conference. So, basically, very quickly to go through what I took from it. The dust has, sort of, settled now to some extent. So, it was meant to be an ‘enabling COP’, that was the way it was billed, and the idea was that it was going to produce the finance needed for more ambitious nationally determined contributions, these are the climate plans that each country is required to submit, and they’re meant to be doing this in the next year in the run up to COP30, and to more generally put the world back on track to keep global warming to 1.5°.
However, I think it’s going to be remembered for three things. The first is that it took place in the shadow of the US election results of a noted climate denier in President Donald Trump, who has said that he will pull the United States from the Paris Agreement, once again. It will also be noted for the fact that the host presidency said that “Oil is a gift from God,” and I think that generally pointed to the, sort of, influence of fossil fuels in the talks. And finally, the deal on climate finance, which really pleased no-one, and has been loudly decried as being inadequate.
So, just to focus in on that finance deal. What was finally agreed, at 3am on Sunday morning I believe, was 300 billion to flow from developed countries to developing countries by 2035. Now, that represents only a doubling, in real terms, of the 2009 commitment that was made to $100 billion, and that’s in the context of much greater needs, countries are far more indebted, and climate impacts are really beginning to show. So, it’s been widely described as ‘radically insufficient’. Lots of unhappiness was expressed, particularly by countries like India and Nigeria in the immediate aftermath, not just around the amount, but also around the process and how it was, kind of, pushed through at the last minute. It’s well short of what’s needed. There was a analysis and general assumption agreement that around 1.3 trillion was what was needed, and that was what was being called for, so you can see there’s a yawning gap there.
Another aspect is the fact that the finance deal still talks about “a wide range of sources,” which basically, brings in grants from rich countries, but also, loans, commercial loans, non-concessional loans, private sector investments. It’s a whole bundle, and actually that, kind of, wide range of sources have been made even wider because now they talk about, kind of, ‘voluntary contributions’ from non-rich countries, and, also, multilateral funds, and so on. So, in some ways it’s got less specific, even less specific, the finance that might be made available.
But I think it’s important to characterise this not as some, sort of, shock result, more of a, kind of, disappointment rather than a surprise. Finance is a truly vexed issue. There was a total impasse before, the signs were not good that there was going to be a great deal. Developed countries have their own economic woes to contend with, and with the likely withdrawal of the United States, the – it’s unlikely that it will contribute to the climate finance pot in the in the foreseeable future, certainly.
What’s potentially more significant than the widely reported finance deal, then, beside its, kind of, symbolism, is the fact that there was also a failure to explicitly reiterate the transition away from fossil fuels language that was agreed at COP28. There was also an agreement on what’s known as Article 6, which is, sort of, rules for international carbon markets, which was, kind of, trumpeted as a success. In some respects that could be considered the case, but the rules are quite loose. So, one way of looking at this is the combination of a, kind of, de-emphasis on phasing out the emissions that – reducing the emissions that actually cause climate change, burning oil, coal and gas, and a greater emphasis on carbon offsetting does, sort of, suggest that the road ahead is tricky to come – is going to be tricky. And there’s a degree that – of concern, that, sort of, momentum that was found around, sort of, COP28 towards transitioning away from fossil fuels, may have been damaged.
So, I’ll leave it there. That’s just a bit of a high-level overview. We’re still digesting I think, Bernice and I, but I’m interested to hear her take on the proceedings.
Ben Horton
Thank you so much, Chris. Yes, Bernice, over to you, thank you.
Dr Bernice Lee
Great, thank you very much Chris, for the great starting point that you set us out with. I mean, I was thinking that it might be useful to, sort of, reflect on the set of dynamics that got us to where you described, really, and, of course, the – it would be churlish for anybody to ignore the spectre of the re-election of Trump as part of the COP, really. And the shadow, in some ways, comes in different form. The first one is that especially in the form of some runners and riders, as I would call them, Argentina, you know, pulling their delegation out, the, sort of, rather performative rejection of both the climate processes, but also, in some ways the underlying substance behind it, you know, i.e., the signs, etc. So, that’s, sort of, part one of where, in some sense, the shadow of Trump cast a shadow.
But perhaps another one, which also was hinted at by Chris earlier, is the extent to which the re-election emboldened, in some ways, the more explicit articulation of oil and gas interest. Let’s be clear that was never – that never – that was never not there, in other words, it was always there. The difference this time is that it is a more explicit articulation, and in some sense, perhaps it’s not necessarily a bad thing that there’s a more explicit articulation of these interests, knowing that they’re not going away anytime soon, and that it is something that we actually have to figure out, and also have to deal with in different form, which we can come back to later with the questions.
At the same time, of course, despite the shadow of Trump, in terms of the US potential role, there is also leaders stepping into the different space, and of course, the most notable would be EU, to some extent China, as well, which we can come back to as well, in some sense, filling the leadership space. In terms of starting to talk a bit differently with and about each other, feeling each other’s red lines a bit more, trying to figure out a way to really move forward. And you can put the UK also in that can, which we can also come back into, as well, in a second.
So, you also get new actors, such as businesses, again, but also, subnational from the US trying to step into this leadership role. But of course, a different set of dynamics, which is extremely important, is the politics of the vulnerabilities, really, which are – which divide the world into, sort of, different pieces, really. Far – first of all, very importantly, we’re talking about some of the very vulnerable developing countries who don’t really – who obviously, will suffer most from the climate impacts, but also, wouldn’t really have the means to address them. You also have the countries, such as the basic countries, which is, you know, the Brazil, the South Africa, India, China, who on the one side they have a foot in the camp of those who could be benefiting from the new market dynamics. You know, in other words, the, sort of, the EU and the China are in the, sort of, positive market transformation, positive transformation space, but at the same time, they also have another foot in the vulnerability space, which is that they also are very susceptible to climate impacts and would need resources to deal with, as well.
So, this landscape meant that we have a set of different dynamics which is driven by different kinds of geoeconomic interests, really. Those that are –obviously Trump, and the runners and riders. Those who are very, very bent on making sure that their fossil fuel interests will continue for – from their perspective, economic perspective. But also, those whose vulnerabilities couldn’t really bear the extension of many of these production systems.
Now, let’s be clear, the fight is real, right? It’s real because a 1.5° goal versus a 1.7° goal implies an almost a doubling, I believe, of oil and gas production, in terms of volume, from the ideal scenario, which I can doublecheck, again. And so, therefore, we’re talking about real economic interest in play here, but at the same time, as China and other developing economies, as well as the EU, step into a different role, we are also seeing that new alliances are going to be built, and new alliances going to work in such a way that perhaps couldn’t necessarily negate some of the negative impact, but certainly can step into it in such a way that really focus on the positive transformation aspects, and also developments of new economics in the new green economy. That will, in the time to come, hopefully, displace some of the misgivings about the transition space from the fossil fuel space.
So, with that, I think that we can leave it. I mean, look, basic countries, China, in many ways, foot in all camps, fossil fuel interest, new market dynamics, as well as their vulnerabilities. So, in some sense, we are talking about how these different interacting dynamics are going to play out in the coming years. So, my last sentence, therefore, is to say, given the complexity of this multipolarity, everyone talks about, “This is about multipolarity in play – at play,” it is – therefore, I would argue, that even though it is obviously inadequate, the result, at the same time, it is actually pretty impressive that there was an outcome, and that the outcome, at least, point to something we can work towards.
And a lot of the stuff that is kicked to the long grass that is talked about, which we can come back to later in more – in the questions, as well, perhaps it gives us some time, as well, to work out some of the detail, which of course we need to do. We can’t wish things to happen on the back of a hope and a prayer. Now it’s time to make sure that we unleash all the policies, indeed the factors that will help them happen. Thank you.
Ben Horton
Thank you so much, Bernice, yeah, and thanks for setting it in that wider, kind of, geopolitical frame. So, we’re going to move on to questions. If people listening in have questions, please do type them in the Q&A box below. For now, I’m going to go with some questions that our audience sent to us in advance. And Chris, I just wondered if I could direct one to you, which is just on the approach that Azerbaijan took to the presidency this time around. Obviously, there was a lot of toing and froing in those last days, in this, kind of, struggle to bring about a deal and an outcome, as – which, as Bernice said, there was, ultimately, an outcome, even if it fell short of what some people were expecting. But what did you make of Azerbaijan’s presidency of this COP, and what do you think could have improved their approach?
Chris Aylett
I think they had a difficult task, you know, finance, that’s huge. They didn’t have as much time to do it as others may have had. You know, if you talk about the UK at COP26, they had at least, sort of, two years run-up. I mean, part of that was due to being postponed due to COVID, but yeah, the location for this year’s COP was decided only a year ago. They’ve got, sort of, very little experience in international environmental negotiations. They’re trying to, sort of, carve a role for themselves, but it was always going to be difficult for them, for various reasons.
I think the fact that their economy is so dependent on fossil fuels made it hard for them to really present themselves as a truly neutral broker, as I say, that, sort of, inexperience. And I think the political culture, sort of, authoritarian political culture, which is resistant to scrutiny, which is – doesn’t really sit that well with the principles of transparency/inclusion, within the, sort of, you know, UN multilateral processes in COPs more generally. So, I think they were always going to struggle, and there’s an interesting paper that some of my colleagues just published called “Azerbaijan’s Climate Leadership Challenge,” which I highly recommend you check out. It, basically, sort of, sets that out, and explains the difficulties and challenges and potential shortfalls, some of which have – we’ve, sort of, seen come to pass.
Yeah, so I would, basically, say they – even taking that into account, they didn’t do a fantastic job. I don’t feel they’re massively to blame for the lack of a finance deal, and there was a op-ed they wrote in the – the President wrote in The Guardian, which was fairly, sort of, robust in saying it was the developed countries fault, rather than the presidency’s fault. I think the fact that they weren’t able to secure this reiteration of a transition away from fossil fuels is a real failing that will probably become to be seen as particularly significant in the years to come, losing that momentum. So, yeah, I think they were dealt a weak hand, they were not seen as being particularly effective, and yeah, I think it’s turned out largely as you might have expected, a, sort of, inexperienced President, strong fossil fuel interests, not as much time to prepare. I – that would be my sense.
Ben Horton
Chris, thanks so much. Now, obviously you mentioned that finance was the big-ticket item, very much the – on the agenda this time around, and we had many questions, actually, on the, kind of, climate finance, sort of, brief, ahead of this event. And it’s encapsulated really well, actually, by a question that Liang Lei has put in the chat now, which, sort of, once – you know, we want to tackle this question of the gap between what we understand is needed to create, sort of, effective climate action, particularly for developing countries, and to support them in this transition, and what finance we’re actually able to mobilise.
And so, Liang has asked us here, “To what extent is a bigger financing volume something that developed countries are unable to provide, versus unwilling to provide? And what exactly are the challenges to scaling that up?” Like, are we actually asking too much of developed countries, or is there just a lack of political will in those places? I – Bernice, would you like to have a go at that one first, and then, Chris, I might also ask that of you?
Dr Bernice Lee
Sure, happily. I think that, I mean, you’re, sort of, asking almost, like, a, psy –you know, a psychological question, in a way. Look, it is not a secret that this is difficult once you arrive at the COP to revise what is in the envelope already, right? So, in some sense, COP was never the place where you could expect, you know, any numbers to go up on the basis that priorities were pub – where, you know, the numbers are already in the envelope. What you can do is to use COP to, in some sense, reshape the priorities for the envelope.
And in some sense, I think that this is instructive to ask ourselves the question, really, which is the, sort of, 300 versus 1.3 trillion question, which is that, clearly, given the politics around the world, very few countries nowadays would be actually comfortable – or the electorates would be actually comfortable with seeing that their country is sending money abroad. However, I think that this is partly a question of framing and partly a question of the politics. If we continue to see that as charity, and therefore, we’re giving money away, perhaps it is going to be much harder to bring electorates in. To understand that this is actually not about charity, because it is actually also about investing in our long-term energy and food security, for example, as we’re making investments abroad.
So, I think that the key to this is that when we are talking about climate finance versus financing climate, they’re two separate things. Climate finance is – sorry, I just came from a talk this morning, thankfully, with Rachel Kyte and Avinash. So, I feel quite prepped for this. But we are talking about climate finance, which is about a particular set of envelope that is dedicated to specific purposes within the climate regime, versus resources that we need to finance climate, which is including both investing in renewables and green industries, as well as investing in a climate adaptation, which is about ability to shelter us from impact, for example. Then we’re talking about very different types of envelopes, in general.
Now, unwilling versus unable is a nice way to split the two problems, really, which is that, on the one side, I could buy five maps tomorrow, but I choose not to tomorrow, and ultimately, this is a electorate’s choice to decide whether or not this is the money they wanted. So, in some sense, I think what we can focus on is how money doesn’t come because – on the back of hope and a prayer. We have to do something to unleash them. So – and this is as true for persuading our own electorates at home that this money isn’t just grants and charity and actually money that is needed for our long-term economic security, long-term energy security, long-term food security. Looking at investments, and, you know, the renewables around the world, green critical supplies, critical minerals, etc., all of these are investments versus necessarily grant money.
So, in some ways I’m, sort of, deliberately trying not to answer the question, because I feel that whether or not they’re unwilling or unable, the reality is that we have to work a bit harder to build the case with our own electorates, in terms of why is it that it’s more important to infect – effectively invest in the, kind of, policies that will help us unleash the, kind of, finances that we need? Which we know that doesn’t just happen because anyone says so anymore, much as I would like to.
Ben Horton
Thanks, Bernice. Chris, anything to add?
Chris Aylett
Yeah, I think Bernice summed it up really well. The only thing I’d say is that the securing contributions from nation states, from governments, and particularly, as we were saying, the, kind of, importance of, like, grants, and, kind of, you know, aid funds rather than, like, loans, and so on, is always going to be really challenging because of the, sort of, democratic implications. And in some respects, taking this money out of, kind of, public coffers, that come from, sort of, taxation, and other sources of, sort of, national wealth, versus, you know, targeting the country, and, sort of, public sources of finance, versus, for example, targeting individuals that may have higher emissions, or industries that have done more to cause it, you can argue – and actually, there are increasing arguments at G20 and other places for, sort of, international taxation schemes that would spread it in that way, rather than looking purely at the country level. So, I think that’s always worth something to bear in mind.
Structurally, there’s always going to be this problem, I think, with getting countries particularly, sort of, democracies, and anyone that’s accountable to their people to, sort of, splash out huge amounts of cash that they send abroad, if it’s perceived that they’re not, you know, paying for, you know – people aren’t – if everything isn’t completely hunky-dory back home, that is always going to be a very difficult sell.
Ben Horton
Thanks, Chris. I wonder, as well, just while we’re on the, kind of, politics of this, there’s a good question in here from Duncan Brack, who’s asked about Saudi Arabia’s, sort of, positioning in this COP, and in particular, their opposition to stronger pledges on fossil fuels. And Duncan asks, “How do you think this can be overcome in future COPs?” Chris, did you have any thoughts on Saudi Arabia and maybe other countries’ role on this particular question?
Chris Aylett
I know that they’ve been very much highlighted as the blocker to the reiteration of the transition away text. Yeah, and I think it’s probably, to the, sort of, long time COP-watchers, it’s probably not a surprise, but I’m wondering what Bernice thinks about this, ‘cause I’m sure she’s got a view specifically.
Dr Bernice Lee
Well, I mean, first of all, I’m loving that it’s from Duncan Brack, my predecessor thrice removed at Chatham House, a million years ago. I think – and which is why he should know the answer to the question, which is to say that Saudi Arabia was always very effective in these COPs, in many ways. And perhaps it’s a bit different when the processes are less open, in some sense, when it’s less, you know, infe – you know, less communicated across perhaps. But Saudi Arabia was always very effective in promoting its own national interest, and its national interest clearly relates to oil, so therefore it’s not surprising that they take a view. But perhaps what is important for us to note is the fact that their oil interest isn’t going to go away unless the market interest or the market signals are there.
Now, having said all of this, we have seen the market signals is indeed that, you know, the renewables are increasingly the bulk of the investments for the future, and in some sense, there is a whole question about the stranded assets as well for the oil economy. So, in some sense, I think that – and I thi – I’m not sure the answer is how do we make sure that doesn’t happen? The answer is, how do we make sure that these interests are acknowledged? But at the same time, we move forward, nonetheless, because these interests are not going to go away until such time when, you know, global society really send the right – send the signal suggesting that there is a deadline on it.
As I said earlier, I do find that statistic quite striking that I learnt recently, this whole 1.5 or 1.7° target – temperature target is equivalent to about doubling of oil production within the next ten to 15 years. So, it is not surprising that someone with a strong economic interest would fight tooth and nail. And understanding that dynamic perhaps will help us get to a COP where we will move forward, even though these interests are going to be there, and we’d have to address, in whichever way possible, the part of the concern that perhaps is legitimate, and the part that is a wrecking ball, and institutional destruction perhaps less so.
Ben Horton
Absolutely. Thank you very much. While we’re still on different, sort of, countries’ approaches, I wanted to bring in a question that was sent to us in advance, which was just about the perspective of small island states, which are obviously, actually an increasingly vocal group at COPs year-on-year. And as we saw over the weekend, there was some, kind of, late drama, including a walkout from the negotiations by some of those countries, based on the – how they saw the, sort of, lack of ambition in the ultimate, kind of, finance offer. So, I just wondered – the person who sent this in, who is anonymous, but thank you for sending it in, basically asked, “How can future negotiations ensure that these perspectives are taken more seriously into account? And, also, has there been a breakdown in trust between the richer countries and the more vulnerable countries at this COP, but also at previous COPs, and,” kind of, “what can be done about that?” Chris, would you like to comment on that?
Chris Aylett
Sure. So, I think when it comes to small island states, as you noted, Ben, they do have a relatively loud voice in COPs. It’s an important forum for them. It’s actually one, I think, good reason for the continued existence of COPs, even if it’s proving effective – ineffective in different aspects. Like, they’re able to really mobilise there and form coalitions and make their voice heard, so that is extremely important.
My view is that, despite the, kind of, you know, extent to which they can make their voice heard, it’s going to be really hard for them small, relatively small economies, relatively poor, being able to override, like, the fundamentals of economic and political power that are underlying the whole, sort of, COP process, and the transition away from, you know, fossil fuels, which have dri – has driven the world for centuries, to something completely new. It’s going to be difficult to see how they will really be able to, ‘cause basically, factoring in their interests means moving away from that pretty, pretty quickly. So, I think it is difficult to see.
And just to add quickly on the question of trust. Yeah, it seems hard to imagine how that will be re-established. The, sort of, lack of trust has been a persistent feature. I think, with the potential with – one thing I was, sort of, struck by, with the, sort of, shock of the US election result and the expected withdrawal of the United States, I do wonder if this is going to catalyse some new thinking and new coalitions and new groups. So, you know, it’s, kind of, COP Plus, basically, sort of, new things that can be added to it, that may be able to restore trust in different ways. Maybe that’s a little bit naive, but I’ve certainly sensed, sort of, post the COP, that the, sort of, shock of the result and the fact that, you know, this finance COP was – did not go well, a recognition, a, sort of, clear eyed recognition for a lot of people that we need to do something different. So, I do see some grounds for optimism there.
Dr Bernice Lee
If I may add to this a little bit, as well, that I think that specifically about small island states, on this occasion, they certainly felt that they weren’t consulted enough by the presidency. So, in some sense, you know, that is – this is a fix that could be fixed. So, a more inclusive presidency, or a presidency perhaps spending more time listening to parties on different sides. And we did see the UK and Brazil, and others, stepping up, as well, in the, sort of, final stages, to try and make sure that they listened to all sides and bridge all sides. So, in some sense, I think that there’s nothing like old-fashioned diplomacy, that that needs to be put back – you know, making sure we remind ourselves of those. And that, if indeed, there was a lesson to be learnt, is to make sure that a presidency that’s – is not seen to be not consulting enough of all parties next time round. Which I doubt it will happen, given that it’s Brazil already on the ball from this COP, as well.
Ben Horton
Thank you, Bernice. We’ve obviously spoken quite a lot about finance in this conversation so far, but, Chris, we had a question in from Chris Hagedorn, which was just asking about ‘food systems’ and whether there had been any progress at this COP around food, as a, kind of, separate point on the agenda. Did you want to speak to that?
Chris Aylett
I must confess, it’s not my area of expertise and I wasn’t overly following it. I didn’t detect a huge amount. It seemed – from what I heard and saw, it seemed to be overshadowed. I do – our colleague Richard King was here, and I know he attended a few events on that, but I’m afraid I’m not really equipped to say much more than that. I don’t know if you encountered much, Bernice, when you were there?
Dr Bernice Lee
Well, I think that, obviously, on – in – on the way to Belém next year, there is an understanding that there will be much more discussions around climate, nature and biodiversity, and certainly forest, and therefore, related to which all these agriculture systems. And like Chris, I’m feeling like I’m letting my very learned colleagues at Chatham House down, who are not only huge experts, but also leaders, really, in many of these areas, that the two of us aren’t the right people to talk about that. But now, perhaps not surprisingly, however, given that it’s not our area, that if we are saying that we haven’t followed it and therefore, I think it might be safe to assume that therefore, we – I’m not aware of many major breakthroughs as a result from this COP in itself.
I suppose the – oh, the good news, if there is one from here, is that here on to Belém, it would be hard to imagine that it wouldn’t be a big part of the focus in Brazil next year, and so, that’s the hope. I mean, I don’t think it is the majorly big thing here.
Ben Horton
Yeah, no, absolutely, point taken. Thank you. So, I’d like to throw it forward, actually. We’ve got a question in the Q&A from Martin Harris, who basically, asks, “What impact has this year’s COP had for next year,” for 2025, which is already feeling like a big one in Brazil? I wonder if both of you could just speak to us a bit about, you know, we’re a year out, effectively, from Brazil, what did COP29 mean for what’s possible this year, and what do you see broadly being the, kind of, priorities for Brazil in 2025? Chris, do you want to go first?
Chris Aylett
Well, I might actually pass it to Bernice. I’ve got a couple of thoughts on this, but it actually speaks quite a lot to a project we work on, on, sort of, strategic dialogue, so I wondered if Benny would like to kick off, and I’ll maybe, sort of, chip in after that?
Dr Bernice Lee
Great. So, as Chris described at the beginning, there are quite a few items that were, so to speak, kicked into the long grass, and that related the UAE dialogue, UAE – you know, from the UAE consensus, about the transition away from fossil fuel. A lot of the stuff that wasn’t able to be agreed on. Now a lot of the stuff – and, also, the carbon market piece is not also entirely – not also an entirely closed chapter, even though there were progress, definitely. So, in some sense, a lot of technical work that needs to be done will happen probably next June by the technocrats, which means that there will be a space between now and June for the technocrats to work on some of the technocratic issues, technical issues.
And then on the way to Brazil, where the general assumption is that because – and we hadn’t managed – mentioned this yet, technically, the deadline is next February, and next February – end of next February, countries should have come forward with their national climate pledges. And so, in some sense, the reality is that given the situation that we talked about from the beginning, which is the different types of dynamic with the election of Trump, we are beginning to see that new countries and new actors stepping into the leadership space. So, in some sense, for Brazil, what we know is that all the stuff that we now put a marker on, such as, for example, the 300 billion, how do we get to 1.5 – to, like, 1.3 trillion, this is something that could be worked on.
Secondly, the discussion around the solidarity levy, that I don’t remember whether Chris talked about earlier, which is being discussed in terms of being a way to – innovative and different ways to bring in place more financing climate as well as climate finance, so to speak, for financing climate, as well as climate space. So, there will be some space to build on these ideas around which.
So, in some sense, I think that Brazil obviously already had a big agenda. It has just grown in some ways bigger because of the technical challenges, but at least there is now a timeframe that we know we need to get into. So, we will go through obviously the national pledges end of February, and then there will be no doubt be a question about whether or not they are enough, and I would be very surprised if the answer to the question at the end of February is, “Fantastic, all the work is done.” So, imagining that we will see Brazil being a genuine transition, in some ways, from being a COPs about, you know, targets into a COP about implementation.
So, I think that what is quite clear from this COP is that the politics has gone – has, sort of, taken us to some ways, but at the same time, given the challenges around the politics. It does mean that, you know, the doing have to do a lot of the lifting, so the implementation have to do a lot of lifting as much as the promises to do. So, in some sense, a lot of it would be about all the different countries doing stuff and the extent to which Brazil, as the host and as the presidency, can help, effectively, become the interlocutor of the COP of yesterday to the COP of tomorrow, which is going to be much more about implementation and making things happen.
I mean, Chris alluded to it, obviously, this does require different types of diplomatic dialogues and climate diplomacy, again. Again, nothing – not that necessarily is really new, but we – I mentioned obviously the way China, for example, is gently, in its own way, stepping into a different kind of leadership role. Much has been made during this COP about the way China started using the language of climate finance negotiation to describe its own contributions on the back of a, I think, excellent paper, done by the World Resources Institute, that looks at all the different contributions China has been making, via the Belt and Road Initiative, via others, in terms of financing climate in different parts of the world.
So, countries obviously have to find their own way, within their own rhythm, to step into the leadership role, and therefore, start new, kind of, dialogues and initiatives. And so, in some sense, we are seeing some of the green shoots from this last COP, and I have no doubt that, you know – I mean, it wouldn’t be a silly thing to say to say that the impending, you know, change of government in the US is really focusing mind in terms of how do we invest in the future together for those who still believe that this is a key part of the puzzle.
So, in some sense, Brazil’s job is not easy. It was never going to be easy. In some ways, you could argue that it’s been made harder by the fact that we – there were many things that were, sort of, patterned into the future. However, the fact that next year – by next year, will be pretty clear that minds have been very focused on delivery, is hopefully the one that could really help focus minds as a result of the confluence of all these different interest groups that we talked about. That we would be hopefully going to see emerging some new types of leadership, as well, and a refocus on implementat – or maybe refocus is a too strong word. A genuine focus on – that’s also not the way I would like to put it, a focus on making things happen and making sure that we’re very specific about how to make things happen, but – for next COP, and during the COP, as well. Thanks.
Ben Horton
Absolutely. Thanks so much, Bernice, that was awesome. Chris, did you want to add anything?
Chris Aylett
Yeah, just very quickly. I mean, I think there’s a general sense that Brazil is a good, sort of – is a good candidate for President at this time because of their sort of, you know, big emerging economy. They’ve got a leader and a government who is, sort of, pro-environmental action. Generally been a, sort of, constructive and collaborative actor. So, that, I think, is probably a slight sense of relief. I think the fact that it has these relationships with countries like China, like, China being the biggest emitter. As Bernice says, there’s signs that China is wanting to step up on, sort of, climate leadership. There’s room for lots of interesting, sort of, coalitions there, that can maybe, sort of, navigate the withdrawal of the US.
The only thing I think is fair to say is that we should probably be wary of putting too much stock in the power of the presidency to work miracles. We had an interesting event at Chatham House a while ago where we, sort of, talked about the role of a lot of the initiatives that came out of COP26. And it was seen as that, like, COP26 with the UK, where the presidency was suddenly seen as a very, very significant thing, and it centred on the, kind of, figure of the presidency and what they’re going – then able to do, and apparently, it hasn’t always been like that. So, I think, you know, we shouldn’t see Brazil as necessarily being capable of working miracles, but I think there’s some degree of, kind of, confidence and hope that they will be able to move this in the right direction at an important time.
Ben Horton
Chris, thank you so much for that. We’ve got a few more questions in the chat, but if – I hope the people that asked them will understand, they’re quite, sort of, sector specific, and I would encourage you to get in touch with our Environment Team outside of this webinar, to maybe pick up some of those threads. And we will be publishing on issues like the aviation industry. We published a major report on that last year, and we will be publishing on it more in the future, but we’re not going to get into it in this particular conversation right now, but thank you very much for – sent that in.
So, yeah, we’re going to draw this to a close. Thank you so much, Bernice and Chris, but before we go, we have a question for you, our audience. Thank you very much in advance for answering this. You should imminently have a popup on your screen, here we go, of a poll, which just simply asks, “Has COP29,” and this discussion perhaps, “made you more or less optimistic about global climate action, and the, kind of, prospects for progress?” So, please just let us – give us a – give us your thoughts, give us your view. Obviously, over the weekend, the people – we had a range of different responses to this question coming out from the people who had been at the summit and the many, many NGOs, civil society organisations, international organisations, who were part of the negotiations, and on the fringes of the negotiations. Curious to know where our audience here today, kind of, leans on whether this is progress, or whether it’s, sadly, more to do.
And, actually, the answer to our poll, thank you everyone who took it, is that people are broadly less optimistic. So, we’ve got – yeah, approximately 17% of you said that you were more optimistic. 54% of you said that you were less optimistic after this COP. So, definitely more for the leaders of global climate action to do, and plenty for Chatham House to be writing about in that space, as well, as the year goes ahead and as we look forward now to Brazil in 2025.
Chris, Bernice, thank you so much for joining us today for this session. If anyone who joined this discussion wants to find out more about our work, I encourage you to visit our website at chathamhouse.org, and check out the Environment and Society Centre, where you can find all of the great work that Chris, Bernice and our colleagues have been doing. Thank you very much for joining us and have a great rest of your day.
