Middle East and great power competition

Nicolas Pelham

Welcome to the session on Middle East and Great Power Competition. I’m delighted to be here. My name’s Nicolas Pelham. I’m the Middle East Correspondent for The Economist, and over the next hour, we’re going to be looking at how the seismic shifts globally are impacting the Middle East. Normally it’s, sort of, the Middle East that seems to determine much of world events and now, you know, the Middle East is very much in reactive mode and it’s that that I think we want to unpick over the next hour.

I’m delighted to have a fantastic group of panellists. None of them need any introduction, but I’ll, sort of, briefly introduce each of them in turn. If I could start with Jane Kinninmont. Sorry, I should say that this event is being held on the record and there probably will be a recording that goes up online at some point. So, yeah, if I – like to start to with Jane Kinninmont, who’s the Policy and Impact Director for our European Leadership Network and Jane, if we – I think it’d be very helpful to look at how the Arabian Peninsula, the Gulf, has been responding and to look at the degree to which this perception that the West is in retreat from the region is having an impact on calculations by the various states in the Arabian Peninsula. Yeah, thank you.

Jane Kinninmont

Thanks, Nick, and thanks to everyone for being here, in person and virtually. I want to start with a few words about great power competition in general and then, speak to Nick’s question about the Gulf and the Arabian Peninsula response. You know, great power competition is not exactly a new feature of politics in a region that has been buffeted by various empires over the years, but certainly, you know, in the 80s and in the 1990s, the Gulf was really a very US dominated, kind of, unipolar part of the world, and that is something that has been changing for quite some time.

The multipolar world has been seen as a reality by decision-makers in the region, I would say for about 20 years. You know, it’s 15 years since Vladimir Putin made the first Russian Leader’s visit to Saudi Arabia. You know, it was King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia who preceded Salman, who started his reign as King by visiting China. Countries in the region have been looking East for quite a long time, because they see that while there is no substitute for US security guarantees in the foreseeable future, China has been the growth market for their oil and has been playing a major role in all aspects of the regional economy for quite some time. Russia, meanwhile, has become more involved as an arms supplier to the region, especially, rather grimly, since its military intervention in Syria.

So, this idea of multipolarity, you know, that has actually been the norm in the region for, you know, most of the lifetimes of the people who are alive there in a region where most people are under 30. And generally, the people with power welcome an element of great power competition, because it is preferable than being entirely dependent on one ally for everything. Having a bit of competition gives elites in the region an opportunity to play powerful countries off against each other and to have more options. So, ideally, you know, go to America for security, go to China for money and then, go to Russia so you have a way to hedge your bets with the others and say, “Stop twisting my arm about human rights. The Russians will give me weapons if I want them.”

However, as the relations between the US, Russia and China are becoming more zero-sum and more competitive, it does pose a number of problems for the region and right now, it’s quite interesting that while many, many issues in US politics are completely polarised along partisan lines, the focus on great power competition is not. It was under the Trump administration that the National Security Framework was revised to, essentially, say, “The war on terror is over, we’ve been focusing on regional conflicts in the Middle East for too long, they’re not really our business. What we should worry about is the rise of China and maybe a little bit Russia, as an enabler.” And this trend has continued under the Biden administration, which came in with interim national security guidance focusing on China as the only country capable of mounting a systemic challenge to the US. And of course, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has made Russia loom very centrally, in terms of challenges to a US-run order, as its seen.

So, the more tensions that do arise between these big powers, the more it does start to squeeze some in the Middle East into less comfortable positions. You see the levels of tension now between Saudi Arabia and the US after the APEC plus decision not to boost oil production, despite the sanctions on Russia during the summer. You see pressure on Gulf states over their use of Chinese 6G forthcoming technology and so on. And I think the elites in the region are beginning to worry, sort of, how much can they stay in charge of this game, versus how much will they be pushed to take a side? We’re seeing some parallel discussions, also, in Israel, which has sought, like the Gulf states, to a large extent, to hedge its bets, needing the US, but also needing Russia’s help with Syria and increasingly, it is being pushed and pulled to take a side in the Ukraine context.

Just as a final point to add, you know, I think I’ve spoken, really, about the interests of the elite and those with power who are able to use great power competition, sometimes, to their own ends. Most people in the region don’t feel very powerful at all and they’ve been used to so-called great power competition coming not just from so-called global superpowers, but also from regional powers who have been fighting their own contest for influence for quite a long time, taking different sides in conflicts in the region. And it’s quite notable that that has often dragged in Western powers, you know, on different sides of the same conflict.

So, if we look at Libya, this is no example of the US versus Russia. You know, this is a conflict where France and Italy have been in the same side. It’s a region that’s really suffered too much already from being used as a theatre for competitions for influence, and I think at a popular level, there’s very little appetite to see more of it. There’s a huge amount of cynicism and Western government narratives that really aim to pose a so-called rules-based international order versus an authoritarian menace coming from the East. They are not playing well in the region, because the cynicism about the role that Western countries, themselves, has played, goes very deep. I hope we can discuss this more with you in the interactive part of the panel. Thanks very much, Nick.

Nicolas Pelham

Yeah, thank you, Jane. If I could now turn to Wadah Khanfar. He’s the President of Al Sharq Forum. He’s the Former Director-General of Al Jazeera. And I suppose, kind of, when you’re looking at, sort of, other region – global powers coming into the region and coming into the region, perhaps, with different governance models, it’d be interesting to explore to what extent those governance models are having on leadership in the Middle East. Is the sense that democracy isn’t working particularly well in the West, it certainly hasn’t delivered much, as far as we can see, in the Middle East, leading to an age of strongmen who are just going to be determining the region ‘til kingdom come.

Wadah Khanfar

Thank you, Nicolas. Yes, it is a theatre, I’ve no doubt about it. The Middle East has been, for now, from the First World War until today, a theatre for great powers in a bad play. A play that has been, you know, played horribly, in fact, marked by double standards, hypocrisy, lies. It started with a lie. It was 1914 to 1917 the British, that British promise to the Arabs of having their own kingdom was a massive lie, while there were, at the same time, sites and people deciding on unch – on – and how – on dividing the region.

The American, the most celebrated, you know, always event that we refer to, the Roosevelt meeting in February 1945 with King Abdul Aziz, on the Quincy ship, it was also marked by a massive lie. For a world discussion, most of it was about Palestine and Roosevelt said, “We’ll never, ever endanger the Palestinian people right of – and land,” and just over three years later on, the Americans recognise the partition of Palestine and the set of Israel.

So, the issue is our experience in the region with great powers, and by great powers, I mean the Western powers, and that is important definition, is actually a very negative one. I cannot even imagine how good and magnificent – I don’t remember how, you know, many magnificent things that we really had in our region. Yes, the Western interest was served in our region very well by, you know, playing the game, against Russia, against the Soviet Union. Right now, there is something called China emerging and Biden, in Jeddah told us that “America is not going to withdraw from the region, because we will not allow a vacuum to be filled by the Chinese and the Russians.”

Very insulting, of course, to us, because also, the constitute vacuum, the way – do not exist. It is a vacuum, someone else has to come and fill it and Biden arrogantly said that, in front of leaders who are sitting and listening to him. And the Chinese, if you remember, that day, they tweeted, the speaker of the Chinese – the spokesperson of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, said, “But this is a region full of history and culture of nations. How can you describe it as” – but this is exactly what the Western mind has been seeing us, a theatre. We are just a theatre, and they play the game. It doesn’t matter what do we think about it. Of course, people have discovered that some time ago and the elites did discover that a long time ago, but the elite had the different play playing in their domestic theatre, which is trying to subjugate nations and try to dominate and they try to do a lot of things and the West was tolerant with them.

So, the people, they are saying now, “You know China is much better for our dictators because the Chinese do not mind whatever you do to your nation.” Did really the West mind when most of our countries were ruled by dictators? Did they really mind when the Arab Spring was suffocated and the counter-revolutions took over the region? I mean, really, I mean, okay, in rhetoric, in appearance, the liberal values were always put in the discourse of the nice speeches and press conferences. But technically speaking, on the ground, real context, did the West really stand for the democra – for the values that liberalism of the 17 and 18 Century stood for? I don’t think so. This is – what we have seen earlier in the region is the end of enlightenment, the end of the age of reason, the end of all kind of magnificent ideologies and ideals and values that the West promoted.

So, now we come to this moment. At this moment we have China. Yes, China is rising, the West definitely is declining. I think the American presence and the Western presence all over the region is declining on a geopolitical level, I mean, and China is emerging. China a replacement, I don’t hope so and I don’t think so. Why? Because first of all, I am pro the idea that this region will never be stabilised, because we have not been stabilised from 1917 until today, by the way. It is not going to be stabilised until there is a geopolitical centre in the region by the people of the region trying to work out their differences and establish a balance of power in the region. That is must, otherwise, we will always have conflicts. Always are going to fight someone’s else war, you know.

But the fact that China exists, China’s not going to be like America, China is not going to play the same role. It’s not going to fill the same domain, it’s not going to play the same, you know, the same way that the Americans and the Western powers like to play in the region. They will not present themselves as the protectors of certain kind of governments and regimes in the region, or enemies to certain kind of countries or regimes. They have a different game to play, which in my opinion, is suitable for the rise of a regional order, more than the dominance of a Western geopolitical paradigm.

So, this is – you know, I’m not pro-China, I don’t like China. I mean, the Chinese record with human rights, many other things, but the idea is, someone living in the region, I would see the decline of the West as a reference point for our geop0litical, you know, reality, is very good news to have at this moment in time. Does that mean that we are capable, at this moment in time, Turkey, Iran, Saudi Arabia, the rest of the Arab world, to establish that kind of a geop0litical centre and that balance of power that could lead us into much more stable and prosperous reality? No, not yet, but this is a way that we have to go through and this an experience that we need to test, and to see the bitterness of it, until we reach a moment of – like everyone else in the world. So, this is why I am positive, and I feel optimistic about the decline of American – the American hegemonic power and the Western world, of course, and I hope, with time, this region will reach a moment of stability by the same actors who inhibited this region for thousands of years. Thank you.

Nicolas Pelham

Thank you, Wadah. Now like to turn to Sanam Vakil, who, of course, is from Chatham House. She’s the Deputy Director and Senior Research Fellow for the Middle East and North Africa Programme, and focusing on – very much on Iran and Gulf Arab dynamics. Kind of – Iran hasn’t really been part of this conversation until now and yet, it clearly exercises a huge impact on regional dynamics. How has Iran reacted to what is happening in Ukraine, to the rise of China, to the sense that the West is losing both interest and, sort of, grip on the region? And how should we be looking at the protest movement at the moment and what impact that could have on the region?

Dr Sanam Vakil

Thank you, Nick. That’s a lot in five minutes. I’m going to, sort of, piggyback on Jane and Wadah’s comments, to bring Iran into the picture, but also talk a bit about the regional security dynamics that I also see have shifted since the war in Ukraine. Firstly, I think this is, you know, a moment that we’ve long defined as ‘hedging’ or ‘recalibration’ and it comes, really, also, as a result of the COVID period, this moment of conflict fatigue, prioritisation of economic interests in the region, recognition. Also, that US influence is, of course, prioritised on geopolitics, but the Biden approach to the region is very much defined by its new National Security Strategy, that is less military focused and more directed to supporting indigenous regional groupings and indigenous regional multilateralism that has been growing over the past two years. And really, also, as a result of the normalisation agreements that have given rise to greater regional security discussions and multilateral security discussions, that haven’t always included external actors, specifically the United States and definitively, Europe and the UK.

So, I think this is a big shift coming out of this moment, which is positive, also. It’s unclear where these groupings, whether it’s normalisation between the UAE, Bahrain and Israel, that has also brought in Egypt and Jordan and The Negev, and Morocco and The Negev, seven conversations and those are still continuing, with greater discussions and focus groups looking at water, looking at economic and energy alignment, I mean – and on and on. I think that’s a positive outcome that we should be watching. We’ve seen the Baghdad Summit and, you know, there’s talk that there should be another summit and that summit is important because it also brought in Turkey and Iran and that, sort of, regional discussion with countries that have not had engagement, classically in the region, it’s important to also see and support.

We’ve also seen the US work through CENTCOM, more deliberately and it’s still very much in its nascent form, but to help curate a regional security construct that would bring together regional states to manage shared threats and here, this is where Iran is the principal shared threat. Iran’s drone and missile programme has long been fingered out, pointed to, by regional states and specifically by Gulf Arab states, as a direct challenge to their regional security. And tying it to the war in Ukraine, Gulf Arab states have been complaining, particularly this year, as the UAE was attacked by Houthi drones, and obviously sent to them by Iran. The Saudis have been under fire for a long time, as have many other regional states been destabilised by Iran’s transfer of lethal aid abroad.

The war in Ukraine has very much highlighted that Iran’s role is moving out of the region and its support of Russia and the export of drones into that conflict has played back, you know, in positive and negative ways in the region. On the one hand, of course, regional states are happy to see that finally, the West is paying attention, but then, finally, aspect is the problem. It’s resulted in a lot of anger that their concerns have been neglected and it’s leading, ultimately, to I think what we are all, sort of, highlighting, this is a period of defensive nationalism, tied to deep frustration, over great power competition and the region’s lack of agency in this process.

Perhaps we might be entering that moment of agency, you know, it’s something that we have to watch, but you know, these feelings are one that I think we have to pay attention to. It’s playing out in the World Cup, where you see deep-seated celebrations. Actually, even when Iran beat Wales, you saw – I mean, I received so many messages of support from Gulf Arab friends who were happy to see that, in addition to Tunisian Secretary, Saudi Secretary. This is a moment that I think we need to pay attention to.

And I think my second point here is I do think, while the West is very much prioritising the war in Ukraine, they might be missing some of these trends in the region and this is a problem, because there is no real investment in policy development investment on regional security challenges going forward. This has to do primarily with the case of Iran. The unravelling of the JCPOA is here, it’s on our doorsteps and it’s not being publicly discussed.

The protests, Nick, you asked about them and, of course, these protests have been ongoing and signify deep-seated legitimacy and governance challenges Iran – in Iran. They showcase the brutality of the Iranian regime, and they showcase, also, the limits of Western policy in changing Iran’s regional activities, in impacting human rights inside the country. And with a rapidly advancing nuclear programme, where does that leave the West in managing these security challenges?

I think here, if we shift back to the region, I think this is a moment where regional states are thinking that it’s time to manage some of these challenges independently. Over the past two years, we have seen an uptick of diplomacy, restoration of ties between the UAE and Turkey, Saudi and Turkey, Israel and Turkey. We’ve had the Al-Ula Agreement signed, resolving the Gulf Rift. All of this, I think, showcases – and the UAE has sent back its Ambassador to Iran – some of the small shifts we’ve been seeing that showcase that regional states also realise that outsourcing their security to the United States or to the West is no longer necessarily a reliable outcome and that perhaps through bilateral and multilateral fora, this is going to be the model to manage some of their security challenges, particularly with the Islamic Republic. So, thanks.

Nicolas Pelham

Hmmm, excellent, thank you, Sanam. This is almost your turn, and both to those in the hall who are with us now, but also to those who are online, just a reminder that if those who are online could please submit their questions and ideally direct them to one of the panel members. I’m going to take the prerogative from the Chair of asking a few questions to the panel and then, we’ll come directly to all of you.

Yeah, like to start with Jane and to look at – I mean, clearly, kind of, as far as the West is seeing the region, it’s largely seeing it through a Ukrainian lens. Is that the right way to look at the region? What are we missing and just what impact is Ukraine, at the moment, having on regional dynamics? Is it exacerbating trends we’re already seeing, is it changing them? And by all means, to other members of the panel, if they’d like to come in off the back of Jane, but yeah, Jane, if you could start.

Jane Kinninmont

Thanks. I think, you know, the correct lens to look at the Middle East is the lens of the Middle East, basically. I think there is a problem that for quite a lot of the last 20 years, Western countries, especially the US, looked at the region very heavily through the prism of terrorism and terrorism as a minority phenomenon, and that came to distort everything, really, by looking at this very violent minority. And I think that’s – you know, Western Diplomats need to try hard to understand why their friends and allies might not have been siding with them as much as they would like on Ukraine and understand that that’s not always actually about the US. It’s just often about the specific interests that those countries have. And, you know, it might be right to try to use levers to influence their positions, but you need to, at least, understand where they’re coming from.

I think, initially, it’s been pretty clear that most countries in the region wanted to hedge their bets and really interesting that several of them, depending how you define the region, put themselves forward as potential mediators, Turkey obviously most significantly, but also Israel. At the beginning of the conflicts, Iran were speaking to both sides and very much trying to emphasise good ties with both sides. It seems like it’s increasingly difficult for countries to hedge their bets over Ukraine, but there might well be moments again in future where having countries that are not exactly neutral, but able to speak to both sides, can be quite useful, you know, as we saw that Turkey was able to be with the UN brokered grain deal.

Nicolas Pelham

Excellent. Would either Sanam/Wadah, would you like to comment on the degree to which Ukraine is – is it…?

Wadah Khanfar

No.

Nicolas Pelham

Has the – has – I mean, has the war in Ukraine, in some way, been…

Wadah Khanfar

I think…

Nicolas Pelham

…good for the region?

Wadah Khanfar

…it deepened exactly what I have been talking about. I mean, on the issue of Ukraine, everyone saw how much the West actually tried to, you know, mobilise everyone against Russia and definitely, that was amazing, how to see, you know, people stood for the Ukrainian people, for anti-incubation and so on and so forth.

Two weeks ago, there was a vote in the United Nations Committee on the issue of the following resolution. The Palestinians suggested that the question should be delivered to the International Court of Justice, whether the continuation of the incubation of the Israelis of Palestinian territories is legal or not, based on the following, international law, UN Charter. That simple question became a major issue. The amount of pressure that the Americans put on the Palestinians to withdraw that notion was immense. And then, when the voting came, guess who voted against it? The Western Bloc, most of the Western countries, of course, led by the Americans and the Canadians and the Australians.

So, if I am sitting there and watching this scenario, what do you expect from me? Like, you know, saying, “Yes, I am pro the West and everything they are doing about Ukraine”? Of course not. This is why I think the West has missed a point. I don’t know how many people outside the Western, you know, sphere of influence are really pro this whole, you know, conflict, in a sense most of Asia, most of Africa, Latin America and definitely the Arab World do not see exactly the same perspective that the West see towards Russia. Not because Russia is great, because we have seen what did Russia do to us in Syria and many other parts of the region. But because we see the double standards with the Western way of doing things, and this is one.

Second, when it comes to the regional situation right now, Iran, in particular, there are two ways of looking at it. There is the regional perspective and there’s the international perspective. The Americ – the core issue of the perspective of the Americans looking at Iran as related to Israel, number two, to the allies in the region, including Saudi Arabia and everyone. The core issue of us in the region is the Iranian, you know, utility, utilisation of proxies in order to gain support. So, it is not exactly the same, you know.

So, we are not against Iran because Iran is, basically, developing itself. Iran is a nation in the region. It’s going to continue to be there, we have to live with it, we have to reach a balance of power with it, and I don’t think the Western approach to Iran is exactly the same approach that we would like to have to Iran in order to reach that moment of equilibrium in our region.

Nicolas Pelham

I can – that, sort of, opens the question directly to Sanam, really, is to – you know, what should the right approach towards Iran be, both within the region and from Western powers? We’ve seen the Western powers, sort of, backing away from the JCPOA. Pretty much the European position is now the same as the Iranian – as the American position. There used to be daylight in the past. And, you know, what should – should we be looking at, sort of, at stabilisation there, concern about, kind of, the nuclear programme? Should we be looking at some form of compromise internally within Iran? Should we be looking at regime change? What is the right approach?

Dr Sanam Vakil

I can’t say that I have the answers. I have the same question as you do. I would just say that we are in this moment where there is no distinct policy on Iran. It – the West, for well over a decade, has been prioritising managing Iran’s nuclear programme and I have to say here, the outcome of the JCPOA and the US withdrawal is something that regional states, I think, upon reflection, should consider if that pressure was useful. Because here we are in a moment of uncertainty about great power competition, we have seen the West marshal support when it’s wanted to. And so, the takeaway in – among many regional states is, okay, they don’t want to, so what does that mean for us?

As you know, the region is awkwardly watching the protests in Iran, feeling very uncomfortable by the potential for these protests to escalate, maybe some might – would like to see the disintegration of the Islamic Republic, but with that, you know, worry about the spill over or the – or, you know, what that might mean as Iran externalises its crisis, as we’ve seen it has in Kurdistan, where it has launched multiple strikes against Kurdish groups. I think there’s a worry that we’re moving towards escalation and this peace – this moment of peace or de-escalation might quickly come to an end.

And in absence of the US, what does that mean for the region? This is where the Iran policy conundrum becomes important, because Iran’s nuclear programme is quickly accelerating. It has just decided to enrich uranium at an underground facility in Fordow, and, you know, it is, perhaps, I think, the leadership in Iran. And my hunch is that they’re seeing their nuclear programme as the most important source of stability and security to protect the Islamic Republic. Why would they surrender it now? I know that the protests are very important and destabilising and powerful, but the Islamic Republic sees itself as a strong state, that has a monopoly of force and has a monopoly of wealth and isn’t afraid to marshal wealth and force in order to say in power.

So, where does that leave us? With a rapidly advancing nuclear programme and sanctions on Iran. I see a scenario from Tehran’s perspective, where acceleration of its nuclear programme is the only pathway to ultimately give the Islamic Republic what it wants, security and stability. And that, for protestors inside Iran, for the international community that is contemplating regime change on Iran, leaves us with, ultimately, where we began, the Islamic Republic.

Nicolas Pelham

Thank you. Wadah, I presume that your vision of, kind of, some form of regional, sort of, collective leadership, collective – was some sort of regional order, was – it felt messianic. I’m not sure which countries it included, which countries it didn’t. Do you see it primarily as an Arab club, does it go beyond that? And just, I mean, given the degree of polarisation we’re seeing internationally, isn’t that just going to render any attempt at unity internally, you know, which, you know, over the region, is reactive, pretty much a non-starter? I mean, how do you, sort of, pull together both an axis of resistance and a, sort of, Abraham Accords collab of states that want to normalise with Israel?

Wadah Khanfar

I think the dynamics in our region was severely damaged by the Israeli – by the politics towards Israel, the Western approach to Israel from one side and the attempt of certain regimes in the region to gain legitimacy in the West through approaching and befriending Israel. So, it is not a regional dynamics based on the traditional forces that exist in the region. It’s not because suddenly the people in the region realise that Israel has become part of the region and then, we are going to embrace it and live peacefully with it. The World Cup right now happening in Qatar and you see the attitude of the ordinary people towards the Israeli Reporters and towards the Israelis’ presence in the World Cup.

It’s not as if there is a serious shift and change in the attitude of the Arabs towards Israel, but there are benefits that certain regimes feel that – because, you know, you should know something important. Most of our leaders, for the last six/seven decades, are dependent on the West to gaining legitimacy in their territories, not on their good governance and the prosperity they’re providing to the public. No, it’s about the Western, you know, support of them being there. Part of that Western support perceived by most of them is to be good with Israel, simple. Does that reflect a reality on the ground? I don’t think so.

Now we are speaking about Iran, again, another perspective on Iran’s story. Yes, you know, we have a regime in Iran that we know we attribute to it, or can be attributed, but of course, the regime in Iran is not reckless. I think the Iranian – you know, I disagree with a lot of things that Iran does in the region, but definitely, they are not also an extreme bunch of people who are going tomorrow to shower everyone with nuclear bombs. But we have a government in Israel soon is going to take over, which has very extreme views about the Palestinians and many others in the region and they are nuclear, also, at the same time.

So, when we are preventing Iran, which is fine, I wish if Iran doesn’t have a nuclear power, but also, I don’t want to see Israel having a nuclear power, but the Western way of looking at it never been from that perspective. This is why I’m advocating the concept that we in the region need to develop that with time. It might not happen tomorrow. I cannot answer a question and say who’s going to be included, but I know that once all of this is go – once the Western influence is weakened in the region, more and more dynamics in the region will emerge in order to reach a moment of equilibrium. From now until then, we might have regional wars, confrontations, conflicts, in balance of power, but the end of it is going to be visited, because we are going to share the region. This is our region; we’re not going anywhere. We’re not withdrawing our – we are there. We have been for few thousand years, the Turks, the Iranians, the Arabs, well, they have been there. So, we will share this regional reach, that kind of moment of peace.

Nicolas Pelham

Thank you to all the panellists. We’re now – we’ve got some very interesting questions online. I presume there are some from the floor, as well. Could I – I’m going to start with a couple from – that have come in online. One for Wadah, from Zia Chaudhry. Zia, are you with us? Would you be able to ask the question? If not, I can ask it for you. Zia, are you able to unmute and come online? Okay, let me ask it for you, and this is for Wadah. “To what extent do you think the current coverage of the World Cup has been a missed opportunity, or to what extent has it simply reinforced historical negative tropes about the Arabs?”

Wadah Khanfar

Oh my God.

Nicolas Pelham

And one second, and I’m going to take one from David Clarke. Are you – David, are you able to unmute? So, David’s question is, I think it’s addressed to all the panellists, “Are Russians moving their money to Saudi Arabia?” If any of the panellists would like to comment on that. Perhaps I’ll take, sort of, one more from Tibion Sulzfeld. Are you with us, or shall I ask your question? Okay, I’m going to ask your question. “Is the current regional geopolitical environment now worse than during the second half of 2019 when there were frequent attacks against energy infrastructure and shipping?” And I presume that’s a question about Iran and its regional activity, so all three questions for the panellists.

Wadah Khanfar

So, about the issue of the World Cup in Qatar, of course. I mean, I think by now everyone is fairly – I mean, you see, I don’t know if anyone here really believes that the attack against Qatar, during the last few weeks, which was unbelievable, the amount of articles published and so on, was really just effect, you know. Of course, I believe that this is another way of telling the Arabs, in particular, that, you know, “You don’t deserve to host the World Cup. You are not exactly as equal as civilised humans. You are part of the jungle,” that Borrell spoke about, “and the jungle doesn’t deserve to play the same game that the garden has played.”

And I think no-one has mentioned anything about how the World Cup, right now, in Qatar, is organised in one of the most beautiful and organised way, no complaint about people accessing going out, in and out, in a country where they are enjoying everything that they would like to do. And when it comes to the issue about human rights, no-one asks the question, the other question, a counter-question. We are going to have the World Cup in America next time, America, Canada and Mexico, isn’t it? Are we going to internationally demand from the fans also to put the Palestinian ban because the Palestinians have facing a lot of injustice and they need to be there, and then, the flag of Palestine should be also in the stadium, because this is what is right about the human rights?

The people who are preaching to us all these kind of issues, they been the – ban the [inaudible – 43:48] and demonstrations in France, they ban it in Germany, and many other countries in the West, and they’re regarded not good idea. Why? I have to ask the question, because as I told you, I’m not from the West, I am from that part of the world, and I assumed once that the values of equality and justice and enlightenment that I read in the philosophy of the West stands. Then I have to ask innocently that question, why am I not allowed the same equal stance like what the West defined to be human rights? You know, it is not.

So, there is a lot of politicisation that happen for many reasons. Every country has its own reason, you know, especially the French and the British and the German, to do whatever they have done against Qatar. But in my opinion, the response to that did not come from the authorities in Qatar or from the football authorities. It came from the fans, from the same people who we suppose to attract them into our cause. I think the fans in Qatar, the people, the ordinary people, not only of Qatar origin, but of the region itself, most of them right now in Doha, they do not see that as a stance for human rights, but they see it as an insult to the culture and to the ability of the people in the region to define their own specific and religious beliefs.

Nicolas Pelham

There are a lot of questions online. I presume there are quite a few in the audience. We’ve got two questions already that are outstanding, Jane and Sanam, if you would like to comment.

Jane Kinninmont

The question about security in 2019, I think, is really a question about Trump. Was security better at that time? And I think there, you know, there was a big impact at that time, when Gulf countries felt that the US wasn’t adequately defending them from missiles, especially after the missile attack on Saudi Aramco, but also, they were very worried about maximum pressure on Iran potentially getting out of control. And it sparked a series of mostly bilateral dialogues, starting with UAE Iran and going onto Saudi Iran, with the countries in the region sending each other the message that “We need to begin something.” And it’s far away from the, kind of, indigenous regional security structures that Wadah has talked about. You know, Sanam has a project that looks at some of these issues in much more detail, on the Chatham House website, if you want to get into more depth. But it was at least a signal that countries in the region wanted to do something that was independent of the US and that was regional and trying to focus on their own security together. So, that, I think, was quite significant.

Just wanted to say on the World Cup, I mean, football is in every single tabloid and most of the coverage is going to be written by people that don’t know the region, haven’t been to Qatar before and often, that is going to lack nuance. But I would say that the spotlight that has been placed for several years now on the issue of labour rights in Qatar because of the World Cup, I think it’s actually been quite a positive thing, because it’s a real issue and it has pushed Qatar to carry out reforms that might not have happened without that publicity. We will see Morocco bidding for a future World Cup, so that is really going to be the time to tell whether there are dominant stereotypes of the whole Arab and Eastern world.

Nicolas Pelham

Thank you. Sanam, yeah?

Dr Sanam Vakil

I would just jump in very quickly. You know, 2019, of course, was that moment, as Jane rightly said, that, sort of, showcased Iran and Trump’s policies. It did, ultimately, make the region, if not the world, aware of Iran’s – the, sort of, growth and development of Iran’s ballistic and drone programme. So, that was a real awakening moment that has been building today and I think that it’s, sort of, since then, also – and I think we have to be quite clear, the region itself, many regional states are doubling down on their own indigenous defence programmes, procuring technology from Russia and China and building their own capacity within the region. So, that’s on the horizon that we should pay attention to.

And while we do want to, sort of, celebrate, sort of, regional channels and multilateralism, I do have to also tell you at the same time, many Gulf Arab states are trying to upgrade their relationship with the United States and develop stronger security based partnerships, that are not fully military, but are much more diversified. So, we shouldn’t just think that the US has up and gone. Despite however loudly and proudly the region continues to say that the US is still very present in the region, but perhaps repositioning its investments in a non-military way.

Finally, I think, on the Qatar World Cup, you know, to me, this is really a reflection of the outcome of the Arab Spring and that strongmen have been the great winners of the Arab Spring. The great, sort of, outcome here is that debate in the region is very much dominated by the state. And here we are on this panel talking about the rise of the state, the strength of the state in the Middle East. What is missing, I think, for local actors and people in the region, is debate that isn’t allowed to be had. And yes, you know, there is a lot of criticism of the Gulf, much that is orientalist and Western and unfounded, but we have to also be able to say that there isn’t that free and fair debate to push labour issues forward and to push other really important social, economic and political issues forward.

Nicolas Pelham

Thank you. I think that’s an important point. It’s very easy, I think, when you’re talking about, sort of, great power competition, to lose sight of those who are, yeah, the ultimate [inaudible – 49:48] of the population, which is having – where this has the greatest impact. And, you know, it is astonishing, really, to see, on separate sides of the Gulf, sort of, a protest movement in Iran, which – and, you know, perhaps the largest gathering of people from the Middle East that we’ve seen in Qatar coming together in stadiums. Obviously in much more controlled circumstances, but still coming together and voicing their thoughts, perhaps in greater numbers than we’ve seen since the height of the Arab Spring.

But with that, I will come back to the audience online. It’d be nice to turn to – be good to turn to the floor. I’ll try and take three questions. If you could each introduce yourselves, when asking the question, thank you. So, the gentleman at the – if I could take the gentleman on the far – my far left and then, come to the one in the blue – in the green jacket.

Lee Solomons

Hi, Lee Solomons from the Foreign Office. How’s the region posturing itself towards the emerging competition in areas like semiconductors, general, kind of, US-China tech competition, competition over critical minerals necessary for renewable – the – you know, the energy transition? Some of these emerging areas of great power competition, does the region see risks in that for itself, or opportunities? And perhaps you might remark on how European states should posture themselves towards those areas of competition, in terms of opportunity. Thank you.

Nicolas Pelham

Thank you, and to the second row.

Valentina

Hi, Valentina from Vision Monitor. I wanted to ask a question about some of the most high-profile conflict that are going on, specifically Libya, Syria and Yemen, and whether you perceive that the rise of great power competition and the Ukraine War has seen further internationalisation of the conflict, or rather a return to regionalisation and to rise in importance on the actors on the ground? Thank you.

Nicolas Pelham

And to gentleman, again, in the second row, three along, so over here.

Bahey El din Abrashy

[Pause] Bahey El din Abrashy from the Egyptian Council on Foreign Affairs. You have been mentioning that the region is playing superpowers against each other. I think there is something – there is a rising tension between the Middle East and the West. I will name five areas of the action. First is human rights versus good governance. China, basically, promotes good governance while the West concentrates on human rights.

The second issue is democratic failure of the US intervention in Iraq. Number three is the democratic failure by social media and the threat of misinformation in the West, which indicates a big challenge for the democratic development. Number four, the concept of inclusiveness promoted by the West, which is – for the first time they’re moving away from their Christian heritage, into considering certain elements of religion as immoral, and this is creating a tension in the Middle East. Fifth and last, confrontation with Iran. The West promotes confrontation with Iran, while Russia and China promote accommodation with Iran and probably the Middle East prob – prefers the accommodation rather than confrontation. Thank you.

Nicolas Pelham

Thank you, so, we’ve got energy transition, sort of, risks and opportunities, the forgotten conflicts of Libya, Syria and Yemen and to what extent they’ve been impacted, either towards greater regionalisation or internationalisation, by our global events. And then, we have, I think if I understood the question, that it’s, sort of, looking at the disadvantages of aligning with the West and the growing discordance between the region and traditional, kind of, Western powers.

So, we’re getting toward – we’ve got ten minutes left. If we could try and do this quite quickly, sort of, maybe a minute and a half to each of the panellists, and feel free to take your pick.

Jane Kinninmont

Oh.

Nicolas Pelham

Okay, Jane, if you start.

Jane Kinninmont

Semiconductor competition, not a huge impact, because there isn’t that much very technologically intense manufacturing in the region. But I think they are acutely aware of these things as the, kind of, new oil. I think there might be niche sectors where they are positioning themselves to have a disproportionately big influence on supply and future, such as maybe in batteries or electric cars in Saudi Arabia.

So far, the conflicts in which Russia has been involved in the region have, if anything, slightly cooled down. I mean, people are still dying every day, so I don’t want to overstate that, but Russia’s preoccupied in Ukraine, and it’s been more difficult to get things through the Bosphorus Straits as a result. So, for now, there’s not enough bandwidth to fight on multiple fronts at once, but maybe if Ukraine also cools down and turns into a frozen conflict, these will be other honourable areas for great power competition. Needs to be thinking now about how to prevent that.

And, you know, thank you for the very interesting questions and comments. I think that the areas that you mention are not just differences between the Middle East and the West. I think they’re very live issues for debate inside our own societies. All, you know, very true challenges, but not something I think where the world – the West is necessarily campaigning, “We’ve got this right. Everyone else should be like us,” even if that is often a tendency in the West. I think we – some of these things, like social media and disinformation, are really global problems and to end with an optimistic note, maybe they call for more co-operation and more dialogue, rather than seeing everything as blocs that are fighting against each other. Thank you.

Wadah Khanfar

I think, you know, there is an international relations moment. We call it the ‘Suez Moment’, the Suez Moment 1956, when the American administration demanded put ultimatum, actually, to end the war, the aggression of the French and the British and the Israelis against the Egyptians. And that was a definite moment of saying that the British influence internationally, or Britain is not the leading force on international scene and America is the boss. I wonder when are we going to find the Suez Moment for the American foreign policy in the region?

Maybe someone would say the reluctance of Obama when using force against the Syrians in the moment, you know, that kind of reluctance, showed the region that America is running out of steam and that led, eventually, to people start to think in a different way. The regional aspect became much more powerful and the relationship with China and Russia. And, also, I must remind you that Russia that we talk about is a Middle Eastern power, you know, more than also just an international. We – America is very far. The West has its own dynamics and Russia is there, you know. So, the – that is important.

I think right now, the region is going through very interesting phase. Yes, there is a reconciliation taking place across the region, especially Turkey reconciling the region – reconciling with Emirates or Saudi Arabia. Qatar is celebrating the Saudi victory over Argentina and the Emir of Qatar and the Government of Qatar are happy. And there is a new dynamics, which we have not seen for a while, which in my opinion, very interesting to watch and to see, that doesn’t mean that differences have ended.

But also, you have Iran, which in my opinion, Iran has found a space for itself within the current situation internationally, much better than before, because they can now, with Russia and China, find much better environment and space, although the domestic issue in Iran is becoming – is creating nervousness in the system. This is why one of the expectations that Iran might try to export the problem to Yemen, for example, the issue of the Houthis, assuming, again, their power. Iran now is much more clearly in control of the situation in Iraq, after the new government has been formed. Iran will be definitely much more, you know, present in the region during the next few months, maybe, because of the internal conflict.

But to a large extent, these dynamics of Turkey emerging as very important regional actor, especially after the Ukrainian-Russian war, and Iran has its own dynamics with China and Russia, plus, the Arab World reconciling with Turkey and maybe soon, also, some kind of communication with Iran might emerge, that might be a positive scenario to look at and to monitor during the next few months.

Nicolas Pelham

Thank you, Wadah. I had hoped to get another round of questions. I don’t think we’re going to have the time. So, I think, actually, this means that, Sanam, you’re going to have the final word.

Dr Sanam Vakil

Okay. So, just to pick up on some of the questions and try to thread them together. I mean, I think where we are today in this Middle East moment, there – something we haven’t talked about is their, sort of, agenda, or their priorities with the war in Ukraine. The region, in general, most of the traditional American partners, would like this war to be over and the sooner, the better. So, they are looking for avenues, openings, to end this war, and for Western policymakers who wonder why there has been a more hedged position from Gulf Arab partners, Turkey, Israel and others, really, because in absence of a strategy to manage Iran, our Russia-Iranian relations have grown as an outcome of this war.

And so, Iran sees through this war, even a weakened Russia, an opportunity to strengthen ties, economic ties, military and strategic ties, build with Russia and China, growing linkages to Asia, growing ties into Central Asia. And from this perspective and vantage point of other regional states, maintaining a positive relationship with Russia can be seen as a check on Iran. In absence of having a direct military check on Iran, in absence of being able to manage the threat theatre away from Iran, regional states are looking for different avenues of how to manage this potential next phase of confrontation vis-à-vis Iran.

And this, I think, is the key issue on the table for regional states. With uncertainty of the Western position, are they going to maintain de-escalation and dialogue with Iran, or are they going to take a more confrontational posture? And this is not what is clear, going forward, to me, as Iran accelerates its nuclear programme, continues to pummel its people at home. You know, is this an opportunity for the region to pushback against Iran, or are they going to continue with the more calibrated approach in the regional security environment? I don’t have an answer, but that’s what we should be watching, ‘cause that will tell us the appetite of the region militarily, economically and social and politically, of course.

Nicolas Pelham

Thank you, Sanam, thank you to all the panel. If – I’d like to invite the floor to express their thanks and just to say that, yeah, I think the, kind of, conclusion from this is that, you know, take your eyes off the Middle East at your peril, because it’ll be certain to be attracting headlines for many more decades to come. And, yeah, engagement, rather than disengagement, is probably the way forward, and we’re going in the right way. Thank you.