Party, people, and players: Deconstructing China’s foreign policy

Vincent Ni

Good evening, everyone joining us from London and good morning to those listening from the US. My name is Vincent Ni and I’m The Guardian’s China Affairs Correspondent. For the last ten years, I’ve been reporting on China’s evolving personality on the world stage, from the Middle East, to Europe, to Asia and to North America, China’s everywhere these days. Yet, in different parts of the world, China is perceived differently and it behaves differently, as well. When Journalists report on actors in China’s foreign policy, we tend to refer to China’s top leader, Beijing’s Foreign Ministry and more often than not, the Global Times.

So, who exactly is making China’s foreign policy and representing China abroad? When it comes to the actual policymaking, what is the nuance within China’s vast bureaucracy who are the players, the stakeholders? Do they always compete with each other, or do they sometimes collaborate with each other? If that’s the case, what certain goal are they trying to achieve and if they compete with each other, how do they compete with each other and who decides the winners and the losers in this process?

Now, I’m delighted to say that this latest report by Chatham House’s own China experts, Yu Jie and Lucy Ridout, provided us with some clarity, insight and also challenged many of our assumptions of how China’s foreign policy is actually made. So, today, on the occasion of the launch of this report, we are convening this panel with Yu Jie, the pol – the report’s Lead Author, who is also a Senior China Fellow at Chatham House, but also with two top China experts in this country. Let me introduce them to you, as well. Professor Shaun Breslin of Warwick University, his latest book is called “China Risen?: Studying China’s Global Power,” and Professor Zhang Yongjin from Bristol University. Welcome to you both and welcome to all of you dialling in from wherever you are.

Now, before we start this webinar, just a few small housekeeping reminders. First of all, this webinar is being recorded. If you wish to tweet about it, please use the hashtag #CHEvents, stands for Chatham House Events, #CHEvents. And shortly after speakers’ remarks, we’ll open up the floor to the audience. If you wish to ask a question, please put it in the Q&A box at the bottom of your screen. If your question is being selected, you may be asked to unmute yourself and ask the question live, but if you wish me to read your question to the audience, please also indicate so in your question, as well.

So, without further ado, let me quickly hand over to Yu Jie, to give us an overview of her report and to tell us what prompted her to look into this fascinating subject and what did she find? And with all the complexity in China, what are the implications for countries that deal with China, going forward? Yu Jie, the floor is yours.

Dr Yu Jie

Thank you so much, Vincent, for your very kind introduction and also, I’m extremely delighted to share the stage with my University Supervisor, Shaun – Professor Shaun Breslin, back to 17 years ago and I was his first ever Chinese student from mainland China to study international politics. So, such a honour to be on stage with him and together with the Professor Zhang Yongjin, who is another leading light of the China studies in the UK.

Now, really what prompt me to – me and Lucy to write up this report over the summer is certainly, we just felt China seems to be at the centre of all, sort of, global politics debate, you know, including from – ranging from climate change, to border dispute, and also for international financial governance. It seems to be that there’s so much mystery shrouded around this idea that – who dictate the Chinese foreign policy and the obvious answer is President Xi Jinping and that’s it, as well as the party. So, as a result, within the common perception that China has been treated as a single unified actor on international stage, so, irrespective what we’re referring to China in here today, and most likely, we’re referring to what Beijing choose and what Beijing choose to do, but however, I consider this assessment is rather flawed, for many Western foreign policymakers. This really overlooked the different vested interest groups within China and namely, those Western interest groups, things such as state-owned enterprises, provincial governments and, also, central ministries who also have its own departmental interest that would hope to shape the foreign affairs agenda toward one degree to another.

So, this has really prompted us to want to add a little bit of nuance within the existing China debate and comparing, considering and putting China as being a single unitary actor. And instead, what I want to focusing on – we both want to focusing on what happen on the ground and happen in the corridor of Beijing that the foreign policymaking and also deciding what kind of foreign policy agenda that Beijing would like to put forward to the external world. It is often a result of seeking the lowest common denominator among those players, which I have mentioned so far.

Now, another element, very interesting element, in here, what I’ve found is that within the recent years, since China joined WTO in the past 20 years and so, essentially, I think are expanding in scope, in terms of China’s foreign policy, that ranging not just within the traditional sense of geopolitics and traditional sense of bilateral political relations between country A to country B, but the whole evidence seems that China has entangled all sort of international issues, you know, including, you know, the most advanced one, like the outer space, or for example, in terms of biodiversity, so on and so forth. And all the subjects cannot be dealing alone, in itself, by the Chinese Foreign Ministry, because they even have no such a speciality specialism, or they do not have the required professional expertise and experience to making certain suggestions to the top leaders. So, that really provide a space that letting many of the institutions, or central mini – either it’s central ministries or either it’s scientific research institute, that would have a specific remit that be able to decide domestic policy, but somehow make a Chinese foreign policy.

I mean, I can give you very clear example that so-called “Made in China 2025,” the very famous initiative that really roused much attention on the other side of Pacific, and what happened was that it was initial idea come from the Ministry of Information and Industrial Technology, then plus the Chinese Academy of Engineer. And then those two ministries have decided, okay, let’s put forward industrial policy that would helping China, by 2025, be able to building a cutting edge – being global champion over those ten sectors. But what those two departments, which are referring in here, that they didn’t really realise the larger repercussion, that by pronouncing China, intend to become a “Made in China” – achieve the so-called “Made in China 2025” goal, that really alarmed the United States, that look into China’s scientific innovation capability, firstly, and secondly, also to look into how People’s Liberation Army would be able to utilise those technologies and, also, having a longer replications in the regional security. So, these are the domestic institutions that not necessarily have the profile for making or shaping foreign policy agenda, but actually have much longer indication for that.

Now, just to give another quite relevant example, what we are talking about so far, since we’re in the wake of COP26, that much of the Chinese climate change diplomacy, even though it is done by the National Development and Reform Commission, that – in terms of dealing with the climate change, but much of the agenda is actually produced by, for example, the top five state utility companies that always refuse to making commitment on the carbon reduction. And therefore, the NDRC have to go back and forth and talk to those state-owned enterprises in order to finding compromise and to see how much carbon reductions that China will be able to do. So, instead of criticising that China does not really fulfil the target for the carbon reduction or carbon emission, but that we actually should look into why prompt China to being so cautious when it comes to climate change negotiation, climate diplomacy? The reason largely align at a domestic factor, but not really a external factor.

So, these are the things really prompt me and try to somehow explain what will happen so far and what we’re facing so far. We’re facing a China that you have to talk to different players and those players, and ranging at a central administration level, for example, if you’re talking about the Belt and Road Initiative, at the moment they around 15 different central government administrations, or central government agencies, that is able to have some kind of vote or have some say to decide which project will be casted as a part of the BRI, or which project are not. And then on top of that, you have different provinces that prefer to quote, to branded which particular project will be consider as the Belt and Road.

So, just to paraphrase, I mean, what Henry Kissinger said, when they come to the European foreign policy and which number I should call, and perhaps for China it will have the same dilemma that when it come to the Belt and Road Initiative, which number that both foreign government and also foreign investors should delve to join on high. And the answer really remain unsatisfactory, even ‘til today, after seven – after eight years of the Belt and Road has been launched.

So, all these are major important Chinese political and diplomatic initiatives, but is not really largely determined by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but largely determined by those central administrations, which have a domestic policy remit, firstly, and secondly, determined by provincial governments and – who prefer to have their own preferences being adopted at a central level policy and therefore, they will be able to accounting a large – bigger budget for that.

So, what I’ve done so far is I’ve summarised all these different ministries and the different sectors and put it into different bubbles, and just to give you some ideas on how complex this entire process has looked like so far. Let me share my screen [pause]. Now, can you all see my slides? Yeah, okay. So, what I have branded in here, that I branded into three different groups, namely the traditional players in Chinese foreign policies, which you already talked about it, but they have very limited capabilities and, also financial capacities to deliver a wide ranging of the Chinese foreign policy.

Now, secondly, I also call for the so-called New Establishment and, obviously, with the Central Bank and – who play a crucial role, in terms of determine the exchange rate, or internationalisation remedy that will be consider, again, as a part of the Chinese foreign economic policy. But there’s a – there are also what I called it the outliers. So the outliers that are not necessarily have the name that bearing any foreign affairs decision-making remit at all. I mean, you would not imagine that so-called State Oceanic Agency in China that would actually largely making – casting a strong vote on China’s South China Sea Policy, and you would not imagine that Central Party Disciplinary Committee, that again, is something have to work together with the Interpol, in order to clamp down, in order to drive China’s anti-corruption campaign globally. So, these are what I called outliers and really casting longer-term implications on China’s foreign policy.

But again…

Vincent Ni

Yeah, sorry to…

Dr Yu Jie

Yeah, hmmm hmm.

Vincent Ni

…quickly interrupt.

Dr Yu Jie

Sure.

Vincent Ni

But the slides don’t seem to be showing.

Dr Yu Jie

Oh.

Vincent Ni

Would you mind trying again, please?

Dr Yu Jie

Okay, right [pause]. Well, if it’s not working, then, obviously, if you’re referring to in the reports, I mean, basically, what I’m referring to in here is the graphics within that report we have been launched in here. And all in together, what we are trying to say is – what I’m trying to say, those policies in China is not exactly a top-down approach that is dictated by the team of seven, the Standing Committee Politburos. Firstly, they don’t have the time and secondly, they do not have the specialism that require them to making the right decision at the right time.

But secondly, what I also do not want to exaggerate that role of the provincial governments and also the role of SOEs in here, is that even though these are the issues which I’m referring earlier, it’s mostly within a remit of foreign economic policies that would be able to have a certain autonomy to play with this power game. But when it come to issues, and the major issues, territory integrity or issues on Taiwan that still largely determined by Xi Jinping himself, as well as this – his team of seven. So, there’s a distinction here on which areas of the Chinese foreign policy that must be decided by the most senior leadership. But I think apart from those really major sensitive issue on terri – related to territory and equity, but much of the space will be dictated and determined by those various ministries and who want to sending their own preferences and make sure the agendas are being adopt across a central government department.

So, this is a complex picture and what are we trying to do in here is trying to suggesting that when we’re talking about China, it is not the – just China. It is not just a single country you speak to, but perhaps a foreign affairs community in the West. What they should really aware is, firstly, which part of China are they going to talk to, firstly? And secondly, are they really aware there’s a huge domestic vested interested groups still remain relevant and powerful, even if in the China nowadays, that Presidency remain within very strong command and control? So, I think keep that in mind and I look forward to hear your comments and questions. I’m really sorry that slide will not be able to work in here.

Vincent Ni

Excellent, thanks very much, Yu Jie. I think it’s – the graphic you’re trying to show is on the page nine of the actual reports, and it’s also a reminder to our audience that you can find this report on Chatham House’s website. Maria just sent a link through, which you can download this report. It’s an excellent read and it’s also a very, very useful and a timely reminder that China remains a big, vast, complex and nuanced country when it comes to foreign policymaking. So, many congratulations to you and your colleague, Lucy, on producing such an insightful report.

Now, our next speaker is Professor Shaun Breslin. Shaun has been writing about China’s foreign policy and has been following the evolution of China’s international persona for many years. Shaun, over to you.

Professor Shaun Breslin

Thank you for reminding me that it’s been many years, Vincent, but it has indeed been many years and this almost takes me back to where I started. Because I think my first publication was part of the Chatham House project organised by David Goverman – David Goodman on “China’s Regional Development” and the second was the Chatham House project that Gerry Segal ran on “Chinese Politics and Foreign Policy Reform,” and my paper was, indeed, on the “Foreign Policy Bureaucracy,” published in 1990. I suspect it doesn’t stand up to the test of time. But I echo your words on this report. It is very interesting, it’s very clearly set out, it’s very easy to follow, and I really do recommend it as a good read for, well, not just the people here, pass it on.

And rather than talk about what’s in the report, I want to, sort of, talk about the things that are around it a little bit more and leave you, Chair, to talk about the actual content itself. And I think there’s a prior question that I’ll focus on to those that are very skilfully answering this paper, and that is quite simply, what is foreign policy and what is international relations? Because I think a lot of this confusion about who does what and who’s responsible for what and understandings of who is driving Chinese international interactions emerges from a very wide and broad definition of the parameters of what is political and what constitutes international relations when it comes to China. And I would argue that it’s a much broader understanding and conception of foreign policy than is used when we often study other countries.

And I think this rather stems from an understanding of the nature of the Chinese state and what China’s leaders want to achieve, which sort of, imbue foreign policyness on things that wouldn’t be foreign policy or international relations if they were being conducted by other countries. Now, I think it’s very fair to say here that this is an understanding that has been, in large part, reinforced by the way that the Chinese leadership have presented themselves in their ambitions and their control agenda in recent years. So, if people, you know, are assuming a certain role for Xi Jinping, then I think Xi Jinping and certainly the Chinese media has helped propel that image of him.

But here’s a good example of what I mean about this – these – this understanding of what is foreign policy. Now, the study of investment decisions is not typically considered to be a topic for international relations scholarship. It’s something done by specialists in business and management, and there’s some very, very good studies of Chinese FDI by business management specialists that I’ve benefitted from over the years. But in general, if you were looking at business management journals, there would be a focus on what commercial objectives have driven the decision to invest wherever it is that investment is strong.

Now, to be sure, investment decisions of companies that are affected by politics and diplomacy and international regimes, but primarily, it’s a firm level analysis that we’re talking about, based on conceptions of commercial gains and objectives. But I hesitate the middle bit, because there has been, within international political economy scholarship, quite a strong interest in – on investment, but even then, the focus has tended to be on the impact of non-state actors and their interests on the distribution of power in the global political economy.

But when it comes to China, the focus is often, and I would argue, actually, typically, on the national level and national objectives and national goals, rather than the firm level analysis that we typically see when it comes to analyses and investment elsewhere. And this refers to the language of China wanting that Yu Jie notes in the report, which is so often used without any real nuance about who or what is China. And I simply ask, you know, one question that perhaps illuminates the way that China is viewed differently. Would we ask what Finland or Canada wants if Nokia or BlackBerry were investing overseas? And I think the answer will probably be no, and even if we did, I think we would be – have a very different nuance on the way that we’re talking about this investment.

Now, to be sure, there are very good reasons why we treat Chinese overseas investment a little bit differently. I wonder whether that early phase of Chinese overseas foreign direct investment has created a perception that still, sort of, lingers today even though the nature of Chinese overseas investment has changed quite considerably. That first, sort of, wave after about 2002/2003, the big wave, I mean the substantial wave, it was primarily done by large centrally owned state-owned enterprises, primarily seeking resources, often in countries that companies from other places didn’t want to go in. I mean, that, sort of, created an idea of a certain type of Chinese objective and a certain type of Chinese actor, which has, I think, persisted, even though the nature of who is actually investing overseas from China has changed.

The nature and profile of Chinese investment has changed quite significantly with the private sector and locally owned state-owned enterprises now playing a very important role. And I really do think it’s important to try and have a nuanced distinction between the different types of, you know, not just different types of actor, but different type of state-owned enterprises in China, because all the evidence suggests that the objectives of those smaller state-owned enterprises owned by local governments is very different from the big national ones. So, that’s one reason, I think, why there’s a statist focus when it comes to China.

Another reason, we simply can’t ignore the fact that the state provides a supportive environment for investors overseas and can withdraw that environment from companies that it feels that is doing the wrong thing at time. As already noticed, the way the Chinese leadership projects itself, signals China’s ambitions, is obviously important, too. And we often see reference to the role of party committees in even private enterprises creating a link between party objectives, state objectives and commercial objectives that we don’t – simply don’t see in companies for other countries. Although here, I think it’s quite interesting that, often, the emphasis is on what might happen in the future if the party decides to utilise these channels of communication, rather than on explaining why investment happened in the first place.

And one of the things that results from this is it’s not just the idea of what is foreign policy that becomes different, I think, and the parameters of it grow when we’re referring to China, but what is economic statecraft? The understanding of what is economic statecraft changes in the Chinese context and, sort of, gets stretched, as well. Because even when commercial objectives seem to be driving Chinese investment overseas, by smaller companies, provincial, locally owned state-owned enterprises, even the private sector, even this is often imbued with a strong political dimension. So, economic statecraft should really be about using economic measures to try and gain political ends, political objectives. But in the Chinese case, if commercial actors are trying to gain commercial ends, this has a political context, because if it’s something that makes China bigger, richer and stronger as a whole, then this is generally seen as having big political implications because a bigger, richer and stronger China is seen as providing a challenge to the global order. So, even where we can identify commercial drivers as being the reason that private Chinese investors are investing overseas, it still often seems to me to be giving a political meaning and significant in context that simply isn’t the case when it comes to investment from other countries.

And just to finish off, because I think people want to ask Yu Jie questions, rather than listen to me, I think one of the big problems that we face, and I think this is perhaps one of the drivers for Yu Jie wanting to do the report in the first place, is that consequence can easily, and is often taken as evidence of intent, when actually, the consequence might be a result of something else entirely. So, let’s take the example of the debt-trap theory. I think it’s a really good example. Has debt increased as a consequence of Belt and Road and Chinese investment and aid spending in – across the world? Yeah, probably has, in a number of countries it has. Is China the leading cause of debt in all these countries? Well, certainly not always, certainly not always by any stretch of the imagination. But there’s a big difference between trying to respond to something that you think is a result of a deliberate and skilful policy and decision-making on the one hand, which has to be the argument at the heart of the debt-trap theory and responding to what might be the dysfunctional and even unwanted consequences of bad decision-making by fragmented sets of economic actors, on the other hand.

So, I think unless we try and take the sort of things that Yu Jie is talking about this report very seriously, I think we can end up finding the evidence that we want to find, when in fact, that might be evidence of something else entirely. So, that’s why I’ve tried to identify different sources and drivers of different Chinese international interactions in my own work, and this is why I find this report such a good and useful one. And I think I’ll just leave my comments there, Vincent, and leave some more time for questions, perhaps.

Vincent Ni

Fantastic, great, thanks very much, Shaun. Before we hear the insights for our last speaker, just a reminder to our audience that if you wish to ask a question, please do send it in the Q&A box. You can also tweet about this event at #CHEvents. This discussion is, once again, being recorded and it might be up online in the next few days. But if you have any questions, please do send them my way and we will try to go through as many as possible in our Q&A section.

Now, our last speaker is Professor Zhang Yongjin of Bristol University. Professor Zhang has a very unique perspective on this subject, I believe, having just conducted a major research project looking at international relations in Ancient China. So, Professor Zhang, what is your response to Yu Jie’s paper? Over to you. I think you muted yourself. Would you unmute.

Professor Yongjin Zhang

Many thanks, Vincent. Let me just start with a brief comment. First, China’s foreign policymaking is a subject of perpetual puzzle, of perpetual attraction, if you like. There is a perpetual debate on Chinese foreign policymaking on three questions: who makes Chinese foreign policy, where the policy is made and how the policy is made. Those are, you know, sort of, consumed scholar interests around the world. So, in that sense, I think this report is really a timely contribution to that debate and has done a very good job to demystify this kind of almost unwanted assumption that China, authoritarian China, in particular, today, functions as a unitary actor in international affairs.

I want to just, sort of, tease out probably three, kind of, points, just to provoke a little bit more discussion and questions. The first one is really look at, you know, the policymaking process described in this report, is still captured well by the so-called fragmented authoritarianism as an analytical framework. Now, this analytic framework, fragmented authoritarianism, was first proposed by some American scholars in 1980s, in analysing and understanding Chinese policymaking process at the time. Now, its basic argument or assumption is that policy made in Beijing, at the centre, is very malleable through bureaucratic bargaining at different levels of the Chinese Government, leading eventually, to incremental change in the policy outcomes. So, the policymaking and outcome tend to be quite different.

Now, of course, at the time in the 1980s, and even in the 1990s, this analytic framework was used mostly to look at domestic policymaking in China. Now, if you look at, you know, this kind of analytical framework, it’s increasingly applicable to both domestic and international and foreign policy analysis in China. Now, if you use this particular lens, then it’s very clear, or it’s not difficult, to actually see why, for example, in the report, we have seen these descriptions of skirmishes among central government ministries and the resistance innovation initiated by provincial governments and SOEs, and certainly, there are three very good examples of how the provincial governments actually, you know, take initiatives, or whatever, to resist or to actually change the policy outcomes. So, that’s really interesting empirical examples.

Now, the second point I wish to, actually, to make, is really to look at the policymaking process has become increasingly pluralised and again, this is very much demonstrated very well in the discussion in the paper. Of course, China today remains a party state, but Chinese society has become increasingly pluralistic, in terms of world views and, also, in terms of social interest. There is – you know, again, in the report, there is a proliferation of interest groups trying to shade policy outcomes, right, and also, the barriers of entry for multiple actors to intervene and influence the policy process have been significantly lowered. So, nowadays, we can talk about, for example, policy entrepreneurs and policy also spoilers in China at different levels. This, of course, again, applies to both domestic and foreign policies.

Now, if we, again, look at the discussions and examples in the report, those provincial level governments, Shànghăi, Jiāngxī and – Shànghăi, Yúnnán and also Jiāngxī, and also S – those SOEs, they fit this description very well. I mean, they are either policy entrepreneurs, in one way or another, or sometimes policy, I will say policy spoilers, as in making things difficult for the central government. Now, if we go on this line, then we could also look at the row of media and social media, for example, again, as either policy entrepreneurs or policy spoilers. I mean, that’s quite an interesting discussion that we could have.

Finally, the third point I want to talk about is really talk – looking at China as a global power. So, unsurprisingly, again, as the report has actually discussed, surpri – unsurprisingly, China has an increasingly broad and diverse range of foreign policy interests, but also very complex challenges. Now, foreign policymaking, therefore, increasingly demands special knowledge and expertise, I think Yu Jie’s presentation also mentioned. There is a very interesting phenomenon that I think I would like to brought – bring it to your attention. This is what I call invitation of bottom-up intervention in Chinese foreign policymaking process. This is issued directly from the very top of the Chinese leadership. So, this invite bottom-up intervention and influence. Let me give you two examples.

The first one is really the very – I hope it’s well known to some audience, the Politburo Study Session, studied under, I think under Hu Jintao. It continued under Xi Jinping, when all the Politburo members came together, maybe every two months, to have a study session and they invite experts to talk to them, for example, in the case of foreign policy and global governance and world economy, so, just to get some ideas or knowledge. So, this is one interesting, kind of, bottom-up intervention and influence in foreign policymaking.

The other one, of course, is one phenomenon, which is the proliferation of think tanks in the last few years in China, sponsored and funded by the central and local governments on various policy issues, and many of them are on foreign policy issues. So, again, this is something that, you know, this is something we call the row of epistemic community in policy – foreign policymaking, which the paper, sort of, alluded to, but does not really elaborate.

Okay, finally, let me just finish by, sort of, giving you a kind of, what I call cautionary note, which is, it is true, I mean, from the examples that we’ve given, discuss in the paper, there are some kind of influence from different actors in shaping and determining the policy outcomes. But influence needs to be differentiated in this particular instance, I think at three levels, if we go for the discussion in the paper: agenda setting, policymaking and policy implementation, that’s very different.

My view is really, you know, sort of, the other actors, the actors described in the paper, for example, the SOEs, the provincial level governments, even the central ministries, they have diminishing role in these, kind of, three levels of influence. Agenda setting is probably the least they have influence, policymaking a little bit, but most of the influence I would find actually in the policy implementation. I will just end up my comments there. Thank you.

Vincent Ni

Great, thanks very much, Professor Zhang. This is a fascinating insight, as well. I do wonder, though, Professor Zhang, we start from you with the questions and answers, and we do understand now there’s so much nuance, a complexity, in terms of policymaking domestically in China, whether it’s domestic policy or foreign policy. But to a international audience, does that actually matter how nuanced it actually is if the presentation of the policy is what people perceive nowadays as wolf warrior or, you know, this whole framework of great power competition seem to have been set? Does that matter how nuanced or complexed it is inside China?

Professor Yongjin Zhang

No, I mean, it certainly matters in the sense of, you know, with this kind of what we might call the asymmetrical information, you know, in a way that you actually do not actually have the right information to make the right strategic judgment. And that is really very, very damaging to, not only to the Chinese foreign policy, of course, but it’s mostly to Chinese international relations, to the interests of the other, kind of, countries and states dealing with China.

So, I think, you know, this kind of – that’s why I think the report is important in the sense to actually try to correct – try to provide this kind of information, certainly, you know, sort of, to balance that kind of asymmetrical information that is put out there. Unfortunately, I think, I mean, as I mentioned, given, for example, fragmented authoritarianism has been an analytic framework out there for many, many years, I don’t think, you know, a non-academic audience or non-academic specialist, even in China, where – would actually go there and try to find answers to their questions.

Vincent Ni

Hmmm, that’s really interesting. We’ve got questions coming in. Just a reminder to our audience, if you wish to ask a question, please do put your question in the Q&A box. If you want me to read out your question, please also indicate. So, we’ve got a question, I suppose, to Yu Jie, from Patrick, “How big a role in foreign policy has the PLA?”

Dr Yu Jie

Right, thank you, Vincent, and also much enjoy the comments put by the other two Professors. Now, I mean, if you read the report, I think on a foot – first footnote, I said, very specifically, “This report doesn’t deal with the PLA’s role in diplomacy,” because otherwise, that report could be enormously long and firstly, and secondly, if you are looking for the hard public available sources and you can’t find any. But I mean, so far, what we have noticed so far, judging by the official announcement and also the policy – the press release and so forth, is that since we know any sense of formal co-ordination between the Central Military Commission, and vis-à-vis the Central Commission of the Chinese Foreign Affairs by the Chinese Communist Party, so that’s where [inaudible – 39:58], and there’s no any sense of formal co-ordination between these two, that PLA would prefer to leading its own type of diplomacy. And – whereas at a civilian space, that seems to want to setting its own policy agenda. So, so far, these two side don’t talk to each other very well.

Vincent Ni

Hmmm hmm, interesting. And we’ve got another question from Alistair, to Shaun. Alistair, would you like to answer the question live to Shaun, please?

Alistair

Hi, yeah, good afternoon. Can you hear me?

Vincent Ni

Yes, please.

Alistair

Yeah, so, my question refers to Shaun’s just ending remarks on the debt-trap diplomacy, and I think what you say is, kind of, echoed by a report last year by Jones and Hameiri, where they talked about the “Myth of Debt-trap Diplomacy” and how the nature of the Belt and Road Initiative is very fragmented and often these countries get into the trap themselves by making poor decisions. And often, the mismanagement within these countries if often what gets them into debt. I think they referred to Sri Lanka and Malaysia as the two test cases to disprove this myth. But even if it is unfragmented, is there still a responsibility for the hierarchy of the CCP to intervene and, kind of, rectify this, and similarly, is it the responsibility of the liberal international order or foreign countries and institutions to, kind of, intervene and step in and assist these countries out of the debt?

Professor Shaun Breslin

It’s a good question. I mean, it’s not just the – I think Lee’s actually on this call, so maybe he’ll say something. It’s not just an issue of the agency of the partner country. It’s also issues identified with the lack of sound oversight of the investment from the Chinese side, as well. And in fact, one of the responses within China has been to try and resolve that, to stop so much what we might call ‘rational exuberance’ in spending money overseas and to move towards a, what Xi Jinping called a “higher quality Belt and Road,” where you aren’t creating debts, but you’re actually having projects that are beneficial for both sides.

So, there’s a moral element to your question and I guess the moral element to that would be, well, I think yes, it would be nice if they did so, but I suspect the Chinese Government is hoping that those that are directly responsible for the investments actually do something about it. And I should say here that, actually, they are, in many cases. For each Hambantota Port, there are two/three/four/ten cases of projects and loans and repayments being renegotiated, where the Chinese side isn’t actually benefitting, isn’t coming out on top and in fact, the new rescheduled – the new schedules and structures actually are much more beneficial to the borrowing side of things.

So, I mean, there’s a moral dimension to your question, I guess, that I think I would agree with what I guess you’re suggesting. In terms of practicalities, more often than not, we’re seeing a very pragmatic response to try and sort things out and, you know, there are very, very few ports being – suddenly becoming Chinese, or partially Chinese, as a consequence of this. So, we need to be a little bit careful that we step back from the headlines, sometimes, and the big picture, you know, the big splash case studies, and take a slightly more holistic look at what’s taken place, and if we do, then I think we do see perhaps more responsibility and pragmatism and responsiveness on the side of a whole range of Chinese actors than maybe the headlines seem to suggest.

Vincent Ni

It’s interesting.

Dr Yu Jie

Sure, I mean…

Vincent Ni

Yes, yes, it’s…

Dr Yu Jie

…if I may add, I mean, of course, I mean, there’s a moral – there’s moral element on the question. But secondly is that to what extent did China, or the Chinese Government, repay those debt that would help China to stabilising its domestic economic slowdown? And perhaps is – perhaps it’s not the price that the Chinese Government willing to pay, and that’s firstly. I mean, if we’re talking about debt-trap, perhaps the Chinese Government is willing to pay Evergrande, but not necessarily for the Belt and Road that the mess has been left so far.

So, secondly is also, I mean, again, back to this domestic and – domestic politics and dictator foreign affairs, is when those projects have been made, has actually state-owned enterprises thinking about the wider repercussion that would perhaps potentially really damage China’s international reputation and perhaps not. And those state-owned enterprises, the reason why they are interesting in sign up those projects, firstly, to show the political loyalty to Presidency and secondly, make sure once they sign up and they will get the political promotion and that would help them gaining much greater political clout within the Party Apparatus. So, that is perhaps a more real reason to sign up the BRI, even if those commercial, again, are not necessarily sufficient enough for them to make a deal.

So, I think the question – well, the answers in here is that, firstly, it’s about political loyalty and less so about commercial gain, but secondly, is also to what extent that repay those debt will be a threat towards the China’s society or political stability. Perhaps not.

Vincent Ni

Hmmm, that’s really interesting thoughts. So, you’ve pledged the political loyalty to the top leader, you’ve made foreign policy. Can you – it actually has contributed to Chinese foreign policy. What if this policy actually failed in disaster, as we have seen with some of the overseas projects over the years? You know, who is actually, back home in China, who is actually evaluating these projects and who’s making, you know, these final judgment on whether this person, despite the loyalty pledge, whether this person is promotable or not? Yu Jie, would you want to start with this question?

Dr Yu Jie

Sorry, Vincent, and yeah, I didn’t catch, like, exactly what you’re trying to…

Vincent Ni

Yeah, so, what I’m trying to say is that evaluation of these, you know, bureaucrats, who, as you say, you know, some of these ministries or bureaucrats, you know, pledge political loyalty and, you know, fit into China’s overall – what they perceive as, overall, China’s foreign policy goal, what if these policies actually end up being a disaster? You know, how are they going to be dealt with? How are they going to be evaluated? Do we see a mechanism here, as well?

Now, before you start Yu Jie, I just wanted to remind our audience, again, that if you wish to pose questions, please do send them my way. We’ve only got ten minutes left, so last chance to call for questions. Yu Jie, would you…?

Dr Yu Jie

Okay, well, I mean, this mechanism that will be operated and the so-called Department of Organisation, so by the party, that you can evaluate on how well the Provincial Governors or the Diplomats has been performed, but no-one would really know the current mechanism, what are the benchmarks that would tick to offer them a promotion? But I mean, two things which I do know now is that, firstly, you have – one province have to make sure they have reduced a certain amount of carbon emission that has been pre-agreed, quote, and that is since 2017. And secondly, you have to make sure that your economic growth rate for the GDP will grows to a certain level that would meet the annual provincial target. So, these are the two things which I do know.

But when it come to diplomacy and no-one would really know, like, what will be the mechanism that – to judging how well they have performed so far. I mean, if we’re putting a very hard benchmark, and perhaps many of the Diplomats will have to find their ways to fulfil different tasks, and probably in those almost impossible tasks, like, say, for example, improving the Sino-US relations, you know, to what extent you can improve that? And that seems to be very little room to manoeuvre.

Vincent Ni

Fantastic, thanks, Yu Jie. There was a question for Shaun, from Rodrigo. Rodrigo, please?

Rodrigo

[Pause] Ah, hello, can you hear me?

Vincent Ni

Yes, we can. Please.

Rodrigo

Oh, hi, Professor Breslin. I was very intrigued by your mention of economic statecraft and what I was wondering is that in those geoeconomical actions, does China have an ideology, and if so, what is the ideology?

Professor Shaun Breslin

Yeah, I think – perhaps this isn’t a real answer to your question, but I think China’s leaders want to rule China and I think they want to be able to rule China in a way that they see best, free from let or hindrance or even comment by outside forces. And I think that’s the main ideology that actually drives Chinese policy and if we might call it, Chinese economic statecraft, if that makes some sort of sense. So, I think this is about trying to create the environment through which a variety of Chinese economic actors can go overseas and do things that make them perform better, to make them richer and stronger and that in turn, will create the situation where China itself becomes richer and stronger. So, it’s not necessarily the ideology behind Chinese economic statecraft that some people see. Nonetheless, I think it is quite significant and has an impact on the way in which a range of Chinese economic actors have found it easier to go overseas and do certain things in certain places, and then find, sometimes, those freedoms withdrawn from them. I think that’s not a very elegant way of trying to explain what I mean.

I don’t think it’s this sort of ideological agenda to rule the world, and then it comes back to, really, trying to – it’s often very difficult to know who is doing what, for which reasons, when it comes to Chinese investment overseas, and the extent of the link between a Chinese company and the party state. And there are, I think, some companies that are going overseas to do specific things to increase China’s leverage and power and auto – and perhaps even leadership in certain sectors, but there are many that aren’t, as well. So, I think that’s a really bad answer to your question, but I hope within that bad answer, there’s the germs of something that might satisfy your query.

Vincent Ni

Excellent, thanks very much, Shaun. We’ve got another question from Mikhael. Mikhael, would you like to ans – ask your question, please? Mikhael, you are in [pause] – I think you muted yourself, as well. Mikhael? Right, I think we’ve run into some technical problem, but anyway, I can always read it out for Mikhael. “What implications does the fragmented foreign policymaking process have on China model and China solution? How does the outside world perceive Beijing’s promotion of alternative global norms and the standards?” I suppose, before we answer this question, does China try to promote an alternative global norm and standards? Who would like to start? Yu Jie, would you like to take on this – the question?

Dr Yu Jie

Sure. I think it’s a combination of both actively promotion, but also sometimes, rule follower. So, if we actually look into then areas on global economic governance and also on climate change, that is where China is actually actively play a role that to offer the so-called ‘China solution’. And – but however, those China solution on economic realms, if you look into it very clearly, this is actually not quite different from the so-called Washington Consensus based solutions, you know, in terms of economic governance, in terms of building international financial institutions. But when it come to the issues on cybersecurity and on maritime security, you see clearly that China is trying to define the subjects and define the question very differently.

So, I think for China – so-called this China solution or promote China’s ideas, it’s almost like àl a carte and to choose whenever that fit into China’s model and dismiss whenever the Chinese interests are at stake. So, really, that’s the part of reason why China gives so much emphasis on the platform – on the multilateral platform, like United Nations and the G20, and I think part of the reason that that’s where China has the space to promote itself, whereas not necessarily likely to be intervened and be undermined by the United States. So, I think we should treat it very differently, depends on which subjects and area we’re talking about in here.

Vincent Ni

Excellent, thanks. Professor Zhang, do you have any insights into that? You study Ancient China’s international relation. Do you see any inconsistency here, as well?

Professor Yongjin Zhang

Now, my comments on this kind of norm promotion is really, you know, if you look at, a little bit, history of the evolution of liberal international order and how China participated and eventually integrated into the liberal international order since 1945, there has been very few chances or opportunities when China could actually be present at the creation. That is to say China has always been a follower of the existing norms. Very few chances for China to create, or to help create norms, for example, economic – global economic governance, mostly already there, the norms, and certainly United Nations, and People’s Republic of China was not in the United Nations until 1971. Although, of course, China was the – one of the Big Five in 1945.

Then, the chances come when we have, now, for example, Yu Jie mentioned cyberspace governance. Then of course, China will be very keen, actually, to be part of the creation, you know, of the new norms, and is certainly, in many other global governance areas, for example, global health governance, and now we were confronted with the COVID-19 crisis. I am actually writing a short book on China’s, kind of, activism, even in global human rights governance, you know, sort of, try to influence the norms over there, too. So, you see a broad range of Chinese efforts at the moment in different areas, particularly the different global governance areas, and trying to influence, even create norms, in diff – in those areas. It’s not surprising, I mean given – and it will talk about China as rising in global power and Shaun, of course, already put reason, although there is a question mark, it should not be a surprise that China would want to play that kind of role and want to be a rule maker, rather than always be a rule taker, or sometimes a rule breaker.

Just one very quick note on Huawei, for example, and Huawei, of course, is trying to define, you know, in technologic terms, 5G kind of technology. So, you see how Huawei has been decimated at the moment. That’s tell – that tells you how difficult it is for China to be a norm maker, anyway.

Vincent Ni

Hmmm, excellent. A lot of food for thought here. I think we’re running out of time. We’ve got three minutes left, and why don’t we squeeze in one quick question from Lee Jones, please?

Lee Jones

[Pause] Hi, thanks for the presentation. I wanted to ask all the panellists whether they – how they would respond to the charge, which I don’t agree with, but I’m interested in your view, that all this fragmentation has ended under Xi Jinping and decision-making is now much more centralised than in the past. Thanks.

Vincent Ni

Who would want to kickstart? Yu Jie, would you like to give it a go?

Dr Yu Jie

Sure. I mean, I wouldn’t necessarily – I mean, [inaudible – 56:56] said very clearly, I mean, this centralisation is taking place, but however, despite that centralisation, there’s still plenty of room and there’s still plenty autonomies that each province will be able to shape the foreign affairs agenda and some of the SOEs would be able to play a major role. I mean, within the paper we said very clearly, “We do not deny that the centralisation process didn’t happen.” The centralisess – process is happening and it’s probably you might go even further, really depends on how Xi Jinping run the economy, judging by the result. But however, given the fact that the most senior leadership is not be able to make any decisions on every single item on the Chinese foreign policy and therefore, this really gave the Diplomats, the ministries, the provinces and SOEs and, also, even the think tanks, the space to fill that gap, and that’s what I’m trying to say.

Vincent Ni

Great, thanks. Shaun, 30 seconds, please.

Professor Shaun Breslin

Oh, what she said, in that case.

Vincent Ni

Great. Yongjin?

Professor Yongjin Zhang

Oh.

Vincent Ni

30 seconds.

Professor Yongjin Zhang

Oh, okay. I mean, I think that an illusion, partly because, I mean, even if you look at Mao, when Mao was so absolute in the Chinese communist leadership and he couldn’t really even rule beyond Beijing. I mean, even in Beijing he was saying Deng Xiaoping has – is establish a kind of autonomy, even within Beijing. He couldn’t even control Deng Xiaoping in the 1960s. And then, of course, this is also the Chinese tradition, as well, you know. So, I mean, you talk about this kind of Ancient China, I mean, you get, you know, this kind of, sky is high, Emperor is far away, and just always have autonomy, you know, the Chinese provinces or local authorities, all has autonomy in one way or another. I don’t think Xi Jinping can define the history of tradition. Yes, I mean, he was trying. The fact that he is trying means that, you know, he’s so very successful. Otherwise, he is stop trying, because he had already monopolised the decision power. I mean, to some extent, he was successful, but only to a very, you know, to a very limited extent.

Vincent Ni

Great, thanks very much, and thank you to all our panellists. Yu Jie, congratulations again on the publication of the report with Lucy Ridout at Chatham House. It’s a truly excellent read. I will encourage all of you to go to Chatham House website to download this report. And, also, to Professor Shaun Breslin of Warwick University and, of course, to Professor Zhang Yongjin of Bristol University. Thank you so much for providing insights and enlightening us and reminding us of the vast complexity of China. And I also hope our listeners will continue to engage in Chatham House’s research, not just on China, but also in – on other parts of the world. And a big thank you from me, and thank you for your time, thank you for your insights and thank you for your engagements. Thank you. Bye, bye.

Professor Shaun Breslin

Thank you.

Dr Yu Jie

Thank you. Bye.

Professor Yongjin Zhang

Bye.