War on Ukraine: Disinformation

Jessica Cecil

Hello, everybody, and thank you for joining us tonight. My name is Jessica Cecil. I’m a Media Leader and Founder, while at the BBC, of the Trusted News Initiative, a global alliance of tech companies and media organisations fighting disinformation.

Thank you, Chatham House, for hosting a discussion that could not be more timely, The War on Ukraine: Tackling Disinformation. Please be aware, everyone, that this is an on the record event, and please tweet using the #CHEvents. While there’s been a hot war raging for months in Ukraine, there’s also been a less visible information war, but like the hot war, it is costing lives and represents a threat to democracy. We all need to take notice.

We have a fabulous expert panel tonight, joining us virtually from Ukraine and from the UK. First, Volodymyr Yermolenko. He’s Editor-in-Chief of UkraineWorld, which is a multimedia project in English about the Ukraine. Volodymyr is a distinguished and prolific Philosopher, Journalist and Writer, and he joins us from Kyiv.

Next, Dr Kristin Lord, President and CEO of IREX, which is an independent non-profit dedicated to building a more just, prosperous and inclusive world. She has a distinguished career leading non-profits, and as an academic and an author.

And finally, Vlad Galushko. He’s a Unit Manager at the Open Society Foundation’s Europe and Eurasia Programme, and there he works closely on media, communications and digital authoritarianism.

We’ll have plenty of time later for Q&A. Please put your questions in the Q&A function, and only in that, and please be aware that the raised hand and chat functions have been disabled. We’ll call on you to ask your questions and you’ll be unmuted. If you’d rather I asked your questions on your behalf, please write that alongside your questions in your text.

So, first of all, I’d like to ask each of our panellists to give us a perspective on what the state of disinformation and the information war is in Ukraine right now, and I’d like to start with you, Volodymyr. What is the view from Kyiv?

Dr Volodymyr Yermolenko

Thank you very much, Jessica, I really proud to be at Chatham House, unfortunately not physically, but I had a joy to be here physically, several times, I think. Maybe one day I will also come back to London.

Indeed, the times are very, very dark right now, and Ukraine is, you know, in a full-scale war. Let’s not have an illusion, and this war did not start on 24th of February, so, it’s not lasting three months or four months, it’s lasting for eight years and we are calling this in Ukraine a second Russian-Ukrainian war. Let’s also be very attentive to the terminology. Many media used the term “Ukraine war, Ukrainian conflict, Ukrainian, Ukraine crisis, the war in Ukraine.” I’m glad that you are using another word, “The War on Ukraine,” and I think this little change of just one letter is a very important sign. This is a war of Russia against Ukraine, this is not a civil war, this is not a conflict, which is just inside the country. This is real foreign invasion; let’s be clear on that.

Now, we are at Internews Ukraine, the organisation where I’m working in, and UkraineWorld is one of our initiatives in the past years, the English-language website and podcast about Ukraine. We are of course monitoring Russian disinformation for many years, and one thing we are trying – one message we’re trying to convey is that it’s not only about disinformation. I personally think that the word ‘disinformation’ is a bit misleading, because the key goal of Russian propaganda is not only to disinform but to dehumanise. So, the key aspect is rather moral, has to do with morality and has to do with humanity, rather than simply with facts.

Russians are – the Russian propaganda has, you know, played on different grounds, partially on the ground of full disinformation, partially on fake news, but partially also on a little bit a grey zone of manipulations, telling half of the truth, playing with emotions and playing with something that people are considering to be true, and believing, something in which they’re believing in.

So, the Russian propaganda tried to dehumanise Ukrainians, Europeans, Americans for many years, and therefore we believe in Ukraine, many of us believe that it is responsible for what is going on, it has prepared the ground, the psychological ground for what is going on. It has prepared the feeling among Russian citizens that Ukrainians are Nazis, that Ukrainians are cruel, that Ukrainians are genociders, and one thing that we are asking, keep asking, how these atrocities, like in Bucha or in Mariupol, or in Severodonetsk right now, how they were possible. And one of the responses is that Russians first created this image of demonic Ukrainians, demonic Americans, demonic Europeans, so that, just to remove the moral barrier, which allows them to kill, kill us. And this is a very important thing when we analyse disinformation.

The second thing is that when we talk about these three months, it’s remarkable how Russians are talking about crimes, which are going on, and saying that it is all the Ukrainians’ fault or the West’s fault. Up until absurdity, for example, they’re clear – they are openly saying right now that Poland intends to invade Ukraine, Poland intends to take part of Ukrainian territories, or, you know, that they are blocking Ukrainian agricultural exports and because – causing a very harsh situation all over the word. They’re saying it’s all the blame of the EU, of Europe, of United States. Why? Because, for example, Europe decreased the tariffs for Ukrainian agricultural exports. They’re saying that Europe is preparing a new Holodomor in Ukraine, which is absolutely inhumane, absolute – not true, but also morally disgusting, because we understand the reasons, the causes of what is happening right now. So, these increasing arguments about, “It’s your fault,” etc.

And the second narrative, which is – the third narrative which is very important right now; they’re trying to present this war as a defensive war, as if this is not a Russian invasion, not a Russian occupation of Ukrainian lands, but it is actually Russia’s defence against the West, and Russia’s defence against the West trying to kill and make a genocide against Russians, both Russians and Ukrainians, but Ukrainians, which they consider to be Russians as well.

So, you can see a very surreal point, very surreal matrix, and just to my last point, but let me come back to the first point, the goal is not only to disinform, not so much to disinform, but to dehumanise, and therefore I think we should be considering this problem, disinformation problem not from – only from the perspective of freedom of speech, of media, development, etc., but we should consider it from the legal and moral point of view, and we should make these people accountable, and this system accountable. We can discuss how we can make them accountable, but actions should be taken, both legal and political.

If we imagine, for example, a trial for genocide, or for the war crimes in Ukraine committed by Russian soldiers, there should be evidently a point, how this genocide have been possible, and how there was a massive and systemic incitement, well, incitement for the – for this genocide. Thank you.

Jessica Cecil

Thank you, Volodymyr, that’s really forcefully made. Vlad, can I turn to you now? How do you see this disinformation war in Ukraine?

Vladyslav Galushko

Thanks a lot, Jessica, and thanks a lot for inviting me to this panel. As Volodymyr said, you know, this war didn’t start yesterday or three months ago, and Ukraine hasn’t acquainted Russian disinformation for the first time. So, I think in many ways Ukraine has been ground zero for Russian disinformation, and has developed a lot of resilience already.

I would have to say that Ukraine’s response, since the start of the Russian war, has been particularly successful based on it, and in my opinion, it’s due to a combination of both technological and human factors. So, on the tech side, we have Ukrainian – the Ukrainian structure of the internet, which is quite decentralised, and that’s quite important because, you know, when the attacks began, people could still have access to information, people could still access news, people could still receive messages, and this is really important during any war, when there can be a lot of confusion and a lot of disinformation just can take root naturally.

But in addition to this technical capability, which also came through, you know, the famous Starlink satellite services that enabled so many Ukrainians to stay online, we have also seen, kind of, a very amazing human factor, which is the response from the Ukrainian Government itself, and in particular the President. So, the ability to respond so authentically and to speak to people directly, especially in the first days and weeks of war, has completely deflated a lot of Russian disinformation narratives from the get-go, both inside Ukraine and outside the country, you know.

And we’ve heard these narratives so many times before the war started, that, you know, “Well, the Ukrainian Government is not really a government,” that it’s going to flee at the first sight of danger, that it’s a completely marginal force not supported by people, and all of this system of lies just fell apart. And all that was needed is several videos, so – and I think it’s easy to underestimate them, but they are really important in this. They were really important in this first days and weeks of war, in terms of framing the conflict, in terms of framing it not just as conflict or as crisis, right, but as a dramatic, dramatic event in European history.

And I think we, kind of, can compare how to handle that, which was done properly in this case, and how not to handle that, when Ukraine had this first encounter in 2014 in Crimea, right? And when there was so much surprise and disbelief, and for a period of time, inability to come to grips with what would go – with what was going on, that in many ways Russia was able to spin successfully a lot of those disinformation tales about people welcoming Russian soldiers in Crimea as liberators, etc., etc.

However, despite their successful response, I see three huge problems ahead, and they’re already beginning to materialise as a result of the war. The first of them is internet re-routing, on the occupied territories, and this is when Russia takes the internet and just moves it to Russian providers, and as a result, internet users in Ukraine on these territories are subjected to Russian surveillance and censorship. They don’t have access to the same kind of information they would have in Ukraine, and they have to use a VPN very often, which Ukrainians are not used to, simply because it’s a much freer country.

The second part is the destruction of physical infrastructure, in terms of TV and radio towers, and this completely cuts off whole parts of Ukraine from the Ukrainian media. And we are seeing already some quite disturbing reporting from places like Molochansk, where people haven’t had access to Ukrainian media, and it’s especially difficult during a very acute phase of the war, and what – another function that Russian disinformation is really good at is creating moral fog and a state of confusion. So, you know, “We’re going to throw every single explanation at the wall, see what sticks, but in the meantime, we’re going to leave you utterly disoriented.”

And the final point, which is quite problematic, is how some of the platforms, and I’m sure we’re going to talk about this later, have moved to implement some of their content moderation policies, and in particular bans, and have disabled a lot of local Ukrainian media from reporting on the war. And this is really critical because if these local Nikolske, near Mariupol, cannot get the news out about these places and to these places, then that’s when that vacuum gets filled in by Russian propaganda.

As you remember, you know, on the first day of Mariupol’s so-called liberation, Russian troops wielding flat-screens broadcasting Russian television, so, I think this is something that is another problem. So, I’m going to stop here for the moment.

Jessica Cecil

We’re going to turn to Kristin now. Kristin, tell us a little bit about the disinformation war, from your perspective, and particularly the Ukraine response.

Dr Kristin Lord

Yeah, thank you, Jessica, and I would say that overall, I think the Ukrainians have been teaching us a masterclass on how to deal with disinformation. I don’t in any way discount the threat, I don’t discount how powerful Russian disinformation still is and can be and what will be required to fight it, but I think, in many ways, they have given the rest of us a lot of clues on how to deal in a more concerted fashion with disinformation.

First of all, President Zelenskyy has been just relentless in his own messaging, and then the Ukrainian people have been incredibly creative and vigorous, and civil society has been very vigorous in getting their own message out; that’s one thing. But at the same time, as Vlad mentioned, you know, the Ukrainian population themselves have developed a real resilience to Russian disinformation, both because the war has been going on since – for eight years now, although the February 24th invasion obviously brought it to another level. The war is nothing new, and neither is Russian disinformation or information attacks, so, they have built up resilience.

But in addition to that, the Ukrainian Government has been very concertedly educating its citizens, in order to be more resilient to disinformation. My own organisation, IREX, has partnered with the Ministry of Education, we have worked in well over 1,000 schools with more than 100,000 Ukrainian students. We’ve been helping to give them media literacy skills to help discern fact from fiction, but also to question sources, to check sources, to recognise emotional manipulation, to be alert to manipulation of images and other techniques that propagandists and disinformation perpetrators use, like the Russians.

And we really see, this has been established in scholarship. Jessica, we worked with RAND on some of our research, which, I know you’ve worked with them as well, and we have really seen repeatedly that, you know, we see, say, a 70% increase in ability to recognise disinformation, emotional manipulation, increase in media consumption skills. And so, it’s not a silver bullet, but I think that working on the information consumer side is part of the equation. You have to have quality independent media to provide good information, you need a trust in the government, which Zelenskyy has earned in the course of the war. You need to work at the levels of platforms, through algorithms, and you need to think about government regulation.

But I think one of the things we’re seeing around the world is that you – when – the cost of producing disinformation is basically zero, and some information will – some disinformation will always get through the net in a free society. You have to make sure that citizens are part of the equation, and I think the Ukrainians have been ahead of most countries, frankly, because of the Russian threat, in arming their own citizens.

The last thing I’ll say on this is that it’s not just the government, there has been an incredible effort by Ukrainian civil society, organisations like StopFake, that have been around for years, but also very local organisations that have risen up to debunk, to prebunk information, and again, this has contributed to Ukrainian resilience.

The last thing I’ll say is that you asked, Jessica, what’s new about this crisis? I would point to one really new element, which is the use of intelligence by the Government of the UK, by the US Government to prebunk Russian disinformation. We really have not seen this before at this scale, this is a new development. I think it’s extremely interesting, it breaks with a lot of previous practice, and again, I think the war on Ukraine is teaching us all some new lessons, because the Russian disinformation and disinformation from other countries is just a relentless tool of warfare now, and democratic societies, frankly, have to do a much better job in upping their game.

Jessica Cecil

Thank you. So much to think about there. I’m going to now move onto the responses to disinformation from outside Ukraine, particularly how the platforms have responded to the disinformation we’ve seen, and whether this sharpens the focus of regulation. Vlad, can you give us your thoughts on that?

Vladyslav Galushko

Thanks a lot, Jessica. I think, in terms of the platform response, I would say, we see, kind of, two things happening. On the one hand, we have half measures that are bringing half results, because ultimately any legitimate content moderation would impact the platforms’ business model. So, as – and as a result, you have this, sort of, a magic quilt over policy that applies in some parts of the world, but doesn’t apply in others. So, we see a ban for Russia Today and Sputnik in Western Europe and Ukraine, which is a ban, but not as strict of a ban as, let’s say, on Azov Battalion that Meta instituted.

And there are still reports that you can download RT content through a VPN and you can repost it on your personal Facebook, and RT Spanish and RT Arabic are not affected. And then of course Ukrainians turn around, and we see the discourses around the food crisis in the Global South, and we see how these discourses are mirroring Russian talking points, in many senses, and we are not surprised, right? Because the platforms have not done their job thoroughly, or they’ve just responded to the pressures from the parts of the world where they know they’re going to be regulated very harshly.

And the second part of the platform response, I think the war has really, kind of, exposed again and amplified the problems that platforms have, in terms of content moderation, algorithmic amplification and oversight, right? We know even before war that platforms are really bad in doing content moderation and algorithm work for languages other than English. So, it’s no surprises that places like Bulgaria, for instance, in the European Union are now complaining that Russian disinformation is spreading there like bushfire, and the government, whenever it asks Meta, cannot get a very clear response, what sort of content they’re amplifying.

I also think that it’s profoundly disturbing that Meta itself has asked its own oversight board not to look at the content moderation policies on the war against Ukraine. So – and some say, “Okay, Meta was concerned about its staff who is in Russia,” which again, is the devil’s bargain that platforms strike with authoritarian governments, without thinking that it’s going to come and bite them.

But then, on the other hand, I feel it’s just a fear that even if a body that is closely associated with Meta is going to lift the hood on these policies, what we’re going to see is going to be quite disturbing. That they are not applied well, that they are not applied uniformly, and that’s why disinformation is spreading, and disinformation is mutating. So, for instance, now we have a lot of Russian Embassy accounts that have been picked up quite thoroughly, as an example. So, I’ll leave it on here, and I hope we can talk more, a bit, about regulation.

Jessica Cecil

Fantastic, we will. Volodymyr, what’s your thought on what the response should be from outside Ukraine?

Dr Volodymyr Yermolenko

You know, talking about platforms, the reality which – in which we are now is that, for example, many Ukrainian users have been blocked by – on Facebook by Meta, for simply telling the truth about the war. So, for example, maybe expressing something very emotionally, and that comes to the question of what – which emotions are admitted, which are not. Of course, we understand that hate speech is not something that should be allowed, but otherwise people who are spreading the news about the war, for example, showing pictures of the atrocities, they’re being blocked on social networks by numerous complaints, seems to be. And so, there is a lot of routine work to unblock them, and there is work, which is being done, but I think should be done better.

Another aspect, and which we are, for example, are facing at UkraineWorld, is that you cannot really proceed with – when you make a – made a video on YouTube with reporting about the war, it’s really very harsh to, you know, to promote it and to make it visible throughout the world, let alone advertising, because it is just blocked because people do not want to see it. So, here we come to a very interesting situation, when the facts about the war are basically perceived by the platform as worse than disinformation, worse than lies about the war.

And secondly, I would say that again, for example, if we look at how Russian authorities are communicating, they keep on being present on Twitter, on Facebook, wherever else. Yesterday, for example, we have retweeted – well, we have tweeted a tweet by Mr Ragozin, who was famously saying that he’s on the side of Mr Mladić and Karadžić, and calling them “heroes and my friends,” and this is the content which is very comfortable on Twitter and is present, the same on Facebook, etc. We can also talk about, you know, government, Russian Government officials.

Russia is banning social networks, Western social networks, is calling them a demonic structures, but at the same time feels very comfortable on these social networks, and continue to spread their narratives.

About the prebunking, I think it’s very good that we are start talking about this. I think it’s very good that we try to find something else than debunking. Debunking is very important. Debunking is a key thing, but we cannot limit itself – ourself with that. The same with disinformation – well, the skills to identify disinformation. Let’s be frank; if we are facing with a very complicated story, no ordinary citizen can really debunk it, and such skills as, like, debunking or debunking skills are very – you know, this is a very, very dubious concept.

For example, if we are facing with a message from, you know, upper-level physics and asking an ordinary citizen to debunk it, to say it is true or not true, we understand that he or she will not be able to do this with a matter of seconds, he or she will need an advice from experts. Therefore I’m a bit sceptical about our capacity to – really to measure the capacity of citizens to debunk fake news.

What is important, in my view, is two things. The first is to understand the very structures of the disinformation content, to understand that there is an intent behind it. There is always an intent, for example, the manipulation with emotions, or the calls for action, or something else, and just to make citizens be a little bit more cautious about it, a bit – a little bit more mistrustful about it.

And the second thing, well, it’s all about the fight of narratives, let’s also be clear on that, and if, for example, a society does not have a clear immune attitude to that, to the hostile narrative, for example, as Vlad said, was the narrative that Ukrainian Government is weak and it’s going to collapse, if the society does not has a belief in its own polity, in its own community, you can give it lots of facts, lots of confirming that the government is good, but they will not believe it, they will be still mistrustful to you.

Jessica Cecil

Thank you. Kristin, briefly, if I may, can I jump in with you and that same question? What have you made of the responses to disinformation outside Ukraine?

Dr Kristin Lord

Well, I think there’s more that can be done. One thing I’d love to see is, as the war goes on we’re seeing regional and local media outlets in Ukraine starting to really strain for funding. They managed to survive through grants and crowdsourcing, so far in most cases, but their coffers are running towards empty, and I would really like to see a more concerted response to keep them up. It is not realistic to have a digital advertising revenue stream, like you would in normal times, during an active war, and that’s going to take, frankly, foreign assistance and private philanthropy in order to see those – continue to see those media outlets continue.

I am – I do think we can’t relent on arming citizens to be critical consumers of information, and also teaching those cyber-citizenship skills. Yes, you may not be able to debunk yourself every single piece of information, but you cannot share it if it doesn’t seem right, if you haven’t checked it, and that alone can provide such a critical contribution.

The last thing I’d say is that this can’t just be Ukraine’s fight. I would really like to see a much more co-ordinated effort by the democratic and NATO allies to fight disinformation, not just in Ukraine, but across the region. We are going to see the Russian targeting not just populations in Ukraine, but especially Russian-speaking populations across the region, and all populations in the region. They’ll be focussing on migrants, they’ll be focussing on other wedge issues, and if we only treat this as a Ukraine issue, we will be missing the larger ground that this is operating on. And so, those are just a few things I’d like to see, and I do think it’s going to be hard as the war goes on. The information is likely to – the war is likely to go on past whenever the shooting war ends, and so, we need to arm for the long information fight, just like we need to on the more kinetic side.

Jessica Cecil

Fantastic. Can I ask you, Kristin, finally in one sentence, what has Ukraine changed in the landscape of disinformation?

Dr Kristin Lord

I think Ukraine has shown that we can fight back, and that there are tools and the rest of us need to learn them too, and Ukraine needs to keep them up. That was more than one sentence.

Jessica Cecil

Vlad, same question to you.

Vladyslav Galushko

I think it just showed, as Kristin said, the importance of resilience and the importance of adaptability, as we see now how disinformation narratives quickly change, and how, where they matter, also changes. You know, someone was asking a question about the West versus the Global South, so, you know, perhaps that’s also the next frontier in what we can tackle.

Jessica Cecil

Fantastic, thank you, and finally, Volodymyr, a sentence.

Dr Volodymyr Yermolenko

A sentence, I think that Ukraine has shown that it has certain – a big subjectivity, a big agency, and with many problems of today’s world, in particular in information, it was facing first and therefore its lessons are important for the whole world.

Jessica Cecil

Interesting, thank you very much. We’re now going to open up our discussion to questions and answers. We’ve got lots of questions already, which is fantastic, in the Q&A box. We are going to turn to you to ask your questions. When we do turn to you, we’ll be able to see you, unless you tell us that you want me to answer – ask your questions on your behalf.

I think the first person I’m going to turn to is Saleh, and Saleh Kamil, Saleh.

Saleh Kamil

Yes, hi, thanks. Can you hear me?

Jessica Cecil

Yes.

Saleh Kamil

Yeah, so, thank you very much for a very lively and informative discussion. My question is, surrounds, I mean – so, the latest iteration of Russian misinformation is in the invasion of Ukraine. However, have we not seen a long trend, starting perhaps most importantly with the 2016 US elections, through to Brexit, through to Mali, who are teaching Russian now at universities, through to Sudan and, you know, through proxies such as Wagner and others? So, I think you’ve touched upon this, but what should the West’s response, proactive response be towards this seeming arm of misinformation and statecraft? Thank you.

Jessica Cecil

Thank you. Can I ask Vlad, you to take that one on?

Vladyslav Galushko

Thanks a lot, Jessica. I think you’re absolutely right, Saleh. I think we just have to ask ourself a very basic question, that disinformation is not an end in itself, right? It’s a means, and what it is usually a means of is to, kind of, subvert a normal political discourse and conversation, or even public conversation that we’re having, make it really, really impossible for people to talk to each other.

And that is why – and possibly, you know, kind of, it also goes back to the issue of what lessons we learn. A) we should stop partitioning neatly local, domestic disinformation actors and foreign disinformation actors, because we see how closely they work around critical events together, and it’s not any conspiracy, they’re not, kind of, meeting and agreeing on doing things, but I think in the online world they’re often amplifying each other’s messages.

I think it’s also very important to continue looking at the points of vulnerability in our own societies, because these are the points that disinformation will ultimately tackle, and one of that point is the availability of information. I think Kristin mentioned regional and local media. I think we see societies that have strong regional and local media to be a lot more resilient to disinformation, simply because people are very much connected to what’s going on in their communities and it’s really difficult to, kind of, confuse them.

And finally, I think we have to be aware of the fact that these disinformation efforts, and that’s why monitoring them consistently, they usually move from issue-to-issue, you know, US election, COVID, global climate change, Ukraine. A lot of these efforts – a lot of these actors move partly because the platforms allow so much monetisation of their efforts.

Jessica Cecil

Fantastic, thank you. The next question is from Ruth Deyermond. She is from the Department of War Studies at King’s College, London, but she’s asked me to ask the question on her behalf. “The Ukrainian Government and civil society have done an extraordinary job combating Russian disinformation and have managed to shape the understanding of the invasion in the West. Why do you think Ukraine has been less effective in combating Russian disinformation, targeting opinion in other parts of the world, MENA, Sub-Saharan Africa, for example? Is it only an issue of platform response, and what can Ukraine do to combat it?” Volodymyr, can you take that on?

Dr Volodymyr Yermolenko

I think the – one of the responses to this question is the way how Russia frames the debate, and Russia frames the debate as a big fight against Western colonialism and Western imperialism, and of course these messages are, I can imagine, very warmly, you know, greeted in Sub-Saharan Africa, or in Asia, or in Latin America.

For Ukrainians, I think the key thing is to say that Russia is not a colony, Russia is itself an empire, and all this anti-imperialist discourse, which were applied to the Western imperialism, should be apply maybe to even bigger extent to the Russian imperialism, going as deep as, for example, Russian culture. So, my question is always, is “Why we examining imperialism in Flaubert, Kipling and Joseph Conrad, and not examining the imperialism in Pushkin and Lermontov, in their Caucasian, for example, poems or poems about Ukraine?” I think this is a big job to be done, and I think some – also some societies, which were also colonised by the Russians, not necessarily Ukrainians but, for example, Caucasian societies or Central Asian societies also have a big word to say in the future about this. But it is – I think it is globally important to say that, “Look, if we’re critical towards Western imperialism,” and I think we should be critical towards it, “we should be even more critical towards Russian imperialism.” Because there is a difference between the two, is that Russian imperialism has never, on any occasion, accepted that it is an imperialism, and it is also committing imperialist crimes.

Jessica Cecil

Thank you. Next I’m going to turn to Pablo Garcia Torrent. Pablo. Do we have Pablo there? Okay, I’m going to read out his question, I think. “Thank you for the fascinating discussion. My question is to Kristin, about media literacy of Ukraine. Are there plans to support long-term media literacy projects, either on the local or national level? Are there any projects in Ukraine, additionally to the ones you already mentioned, co-operating with the Ministry of Education, which might have the potential to tackle disinformation in the long term?” Kristin.

Dr Kristin Lord

Yeah, thank you very much for the question. Of course, what my organisation is doing is only one of the many, many efforts to build media literacy and resilience to information manipulation, but I think it paints a picture. Working in schools is of course very important, it embeds it and makes sure that as young people get older they have the skills to be citizens, so, I think we do need to see that continue. But things we’ve worked on also, I think, paint another path. Schoolchildren are only part of the population, and so, we’ve also worked through public libraries across Ukraine at various times. I think there’s huge potential for the libraries in Ukraine, which reach older populations, which are very prevalent in communities everywhere in the country, they can be harnessed as well. And then of course online content; we’ll be rolling out some new online content this summer. I know other organisations are as well.

There are many local civil society organisations that are working on media literacy and prebunking and debunking, StopFake and others, and so, I think just continuing to press and get these kinds of materials and these supports and these programmes out across Ukraine, not just young people, will be very, very important. So, I think there’s a lot more that needs to be done, but part of it is just sustaining this in a war.

But I just wanted to add that Teachers are very interested, and we’ve recently surveyed Teachers, and they’ve been continuing to teach this content online, it feels very salient to them.

Jessica Cecil

Fantastic, thank you. Next, can we turn to James Nixey? James, can you give us your question?

James Nixey

Yes, good evening. Can you hear me?

Jessica Cecil

Yeah.

James Nixey

Thank you, Jessica. Evening, everyone. Nice to see you, Volodymyr and Vladyslav, who I know well. Yeah, it’s about, I suppose, the idea that there is more than one kind of disinformation. There’s the really outrageous stuff that Volodymyr was talking about in particular in the first few minutes of this session, which is just so obviously untrue. I understand some people take it in, but really, abominable Nazi-like stuff.

But there’s another kind, it seems to me, which is a lot more subtle and a lot – and I would imagine, harder to deal with, because you have to – ‘cause it’s mixed in with certain truths, it’s – and it’s perhaps more systemic in nature rather than, almost, name-calling, if you like.

So, I’m asking, I suppose, which do you find the more threatening, and which do you find the more dangerous? And in terms of your countering of these different types of disinformation, I’m not saying it’s Manichean, obviously, but something in between these two I’m mentioning, then what would you prioritise, and how would you go about that, especially in dealing with the more cunning and the more heatedly types of disinformation, if you like?

Jessica Cecil

Volodymyr.

Dr Volodymyr Yermolenko

Thank you, James, that’s a very fantastic question, and I think one of the key questions, but I think the response depends on the audience, because the outrageous lies that we consider as outrageous lies, for example, are very much accepted by Russian citizens. We are travelling right now a lot across Ukraine, visiting the destroyed villages during this war, and we are talking to people who stayed in the occupation in March and talked to Russian soldiers, and Russians, these Russian soldiers were clearly saying they believed that there are Nazis in Ukraine, and asked the Ukrainian villagers to show them where Nazis are hiding, so that they just kill them in – very quickly and proceed.

They were also believing that Zelenskyy not only will fly, but has fled already to Poland, and therefore they will march on Kyiv in three days and will capture Kyiv and will stay there. So, for these people, obviously these outrageous lies were okay, but if we’re talking about more complicated issues, I think we have studied it before the war, and we understood that – we have a report that Internews Ukraine, UkraineWorld and Arena think tank, which you know probably, Peter Pomerantsev’s think tank, about conspiratorial propaganda.

What we understood is that if we – if you ask Ukrainian citizens, before the war, it was, some outrageous disinformation, like about American biological laboratories that are used to produce viruses, etc., well, there is not a big number of people who believed in that. But if you’re asking about conspiracy theories that, for example, the Western masons or some hidden societies are governing all over the world, including Ukrainian Government, about 50% would say they would agree with that, even those people who would be very anti-Russian.

That means that obviously sometimes in the societies, which are not willing to buy Russian narrative, there is a big thing, which can be bought by citizens and this is, for example, anti-Western narrative, or the narrative about hidden societies, or the conspiracy theories, which talks to the people’s critical thinking. And basically, this is the – when Russian propaganda is the most dangerous, in – because it is saying, “Look, I provide you with more critical thinking that your media, that your Journalists, that your Politicians, that your Teachers, etc.” And I think one of the important thing is to teach people to be critical, with regard to their critical thinking, in the contemporary societies, because there should be some barriers, there should be some limits where you just stop criticising everything and stop being mistrustful to everything. So, it’s very important to work with the critical concept of critical thinking. Thank you.

Jessica Cecil

Fantastic, thank you. Next I’m going to turn to Amber Mass, and she’s asked that I read out her question. “Before controlling cyberspace, we also need a better knowledge of the human environment. Well aware of the social networks’ role as the main relay of misinformation when a high-intensity conflict occurs, should we decree the end of anonymity on Western social platforms, as a first step to reaching strategic objectives?” Kristin, what are your thoughts about that?

Dr Kristin Lord

I think that’s a really interesting thing to consider, but it has a lot of consequences that I’m not sure we’re ready to grapple with yet. You know, there are a lot of places in the world where this is extremely protective for people, in terms of speech. But I think we’re moving in directions at least where if people are not anonymous and maybe they have to verify that they’re real people, even if all of their information isn’t public, there are things to do like that.

But I do want to point out that it’s not so easy to just deal with one social media platform or another. I mean, increasingly, we’re seeing the information space fragment, and it is increasingly hard therefore to come up with policies across them where users don’t just migrate from one to the other and pick their policies that they like.

One thing I’m hearing about Ukraine is a lot of Ukrainians getting their news from messenger services that have been passed on, and again, it’s very hard to have policies that regulate how information is shared in those spaces, let alone podcast, television, radio, private chatrooms and so on. It’s – I just don’t think there’s an easy silver bullet here; I wish there were.

Jessica Cecil

Okay, thank you. Next, can we turn to Anna Zelkina? Anna. Anna. I’ll read Anna’s question on her behalf. “Thank you for the poignant discussion. I completely agree that the Russian Government is waging a wide-ranging information war in which Ukraine is on the frontline, but which goes far beyond. Are there any attempts to consolidate the anti-propaganda efforts between Ukraine, West Europe and America, as well as Eastern Europe, the Baltics and North European countries?” Vlad, this is a question to you, I think.

Vladyslav Galushko

Well, I think there are quite a lot of efforts, I would say, especially in the legislative space, and if we look at the conversation or big legislation in the EU, where Ukraine recently got candidacy status, which is in itself a historic decision and hopefully can take part in that process as well. So, you know, the code on – the Code of Conduct on Disinformation is one of these efforts, right, in the European space, to consolidate our practices, to consolidate what James mentioned, right?

There are issues, there is disinformation that is awful and illegal, and it is actually quite easy to deal with, through straightforward legislation, and then there is disinformation that is awful and legal because it is threading into very grey zones. So, the Code on Disinformation, as well as the Digital Services Act looks at that as well, right, and, I mean, it also ties a little bit with what Kristin was saying about anonymity. Before we yank that out, perhaps we should consider how we de-amplify some of that grey content, right, and it’s much easier to do than take away those privileges that may be critical in other countries.

So, I think, kind of, the Trump election and Brexit have been such wake-up calls in Europe that they prodded this legislation, and now there is a reformed code, and what it does, to our pleasure, is it also mandates platforms to provide country-by-country breakdown of their efforts to tackle disinformation in the EU. And that is amazing, right, because there is going to be no longer, you know, heavyweights like Germany and France where Meta is going to say, “Okay, well, you know, we got to do what we got to do here,” or the United States, and then there are smaller countries like Hungary and Bulgaria where they say, “Well, your languages don’t matter, your markets are too small.”

So, I think these legal instruments are quite important in consolidating our approaches to fight disinformation in general, and Russian one in particular.

Jessica Cecil

Fantastic, thank you. Next, Euan Grant, from London, and he’s asked that we speak his – we read out his question. “I’ve worked in EU programmes in Kyiv, post Orange Revolution and immediately post Revolution of Dignity. What messages do you all have for Westerners who cascade Russian disinformation? What are the leading indicators for identifying such persons?” Volodymyr.

Dr Volodymyr Yermolenko

For identifying which persons? I didn’t quite catch – who spread Russian disinformation?

Jessica Cecil

These are “Westerners who cascade Russian disinformation.”

Dr Volodymyr Yermolenko

Westerners who cascade Russian disinformation?

Jessica Cecil

Yeah.

Dr Volodymyr Yermolenko

Well, I think, again, we are going back to those points, which I already raised. Russian disinformation is – its aim is basically to strip its enemy of subjectivity, of agency, to prove that the enemy, the opponent does not exist, or does not have a moral right to exist. These are just two major lines of Russian propaganda.

On Ukraine they was saying that either Ukraine does not exist as a state, or does not have a moral right to exist because it’s a Nazi state; these were two major lines. And I think everywhere, when you have this line of narratives, when you have, for example, criticism, which goes beyond criticism, which sees – which is not – which seeks to be constructive, which is not a criticism, which is aiming to get to understand the truth, but its intent is just to destroy the opponent, I think you are already in the field, which is very close to Russian disinformation.

Just to give you an example, when RT was covering Yellow Jackets’ protest in France, it was just showing the picture of yellow jackets, and pretending that this is the ultimate truth, that this is the fact. They were doing this with no comment, and if you approach to the question of disinformation with this opposition fact versus lies, you just don’t understand the point. Because if you show the part of reality and say, “Okay, we’re just showing the fact,” this can be also a tool of propaganda because you’re just showing that, “Okay, in your French society nothing is good, everything is a problem and you will soon collapse.” As long as you are answering this narrative, you’re probably on the side of Russian propaganda.

Jessica Cecil

Okay, fantastic, thank you. And then the final question, I think, Konstantin Hayutin, who is – has asked that we ask this question on his behalf, and I’m going to ask Kristin to answer this one. “The recent BBC interview with FM, Foreign Minister, Sergey Lavrov, epitomised a skill operator of disinformation and challenger of other narratives, often putting his interviewer on the backfoot. How can Journalists and political leaders deal more effectively with this malicious adversary in these direct interfaces?” Kristin.

Dr Kristin Lord

Well, I think part of it is that Journalists need to really be on their game and not to – I mean, it’s put such a burden on Journalists to be so well-read, know their facts so well, and also, I think, to be a bit relentless in their questioning and not give the platform – to keep going back with those tough questions, be willing to cut people off if they’re saying things that are factually untrue, being willing to say, “That’s – there’s no evidence for what you just said.” And I think, you know, in some contexts, like, certainly in the American context in the past has seemed very politicised or rude, but, you know, I think Journalists are put in a very difficult position if they end up inadvertently providing a platform for people who then spread disinformation.

So, I do not envy Journalists their job right now, I think it’s harder than ever, but I also think we need them more than ever. So, thanks, Jessica, to you and others who have done this.

Jessica Cecil

Fantastic, thank you. I’m going to draw this to a close now. Thank you very much for what has been a truly fascinating discussion. I’ve learnt a huge amount, and it’s wonderful to have our three distinguished panellists, and particularly, can I say, Volodymyr, to hear direct from Kyiv, that has been a real, real pleasure and an honour.

We’ve heard a huge amount about the purpose of Russian disinformation being about dehumanising people in Ukraine, suggesting they have no moral right to exist. We’ve heard about the many ways in which Ukraine actually has been very well prepared for this, and its response to disinformation has been a masterclass, and technical ways in which a decentralised internet has also helped.

But we have also heard that there need to be many bricks in the particular wall of a response to disinformation, and I think Kristin’s work has been absolutely revelatory, in the many ways in which individual citizens can be made more resilient. And finally, thank you, Vlad, for giving us a really clear overview of the international platform and policy outline here.

So, thank you, finally, to Chatham House for hosting this important discussion at this really, really crucial time. The next event for everyone to be aware of is on the 7th July and it’s the next in this War on Ukraine series, and it’s about the evolution as a war. I’ll certainly be joining then, and I hope you are all too. Thanks very much for joining us tonight.

Dr Volodymyr Yermolenko

Thank you.

Vladyslav Galushko

Thank you.

Dr Kristin Lord

Thank you.