Ambassador of the European Union to the United Kingdom, João Vale de Almeida, joins Dr Robin Niblett to discuss the EU-UK relationship.
Webinar: The EU-UK Relationship
João Vale de Almeida, joins Dr Robin Niblett to discuss the EU-UK relationship.
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João Vale de Almeida and Dr Robin Niblett to discuss the EU-UK relationship.
Dr Robin Niblett CMG
Ladies and gentlemen, welcome to this Chatham House webinar. I almost said welcome to Chatham House, as it’s a habit I can’t get myself out of, but we’re absolutely thrilled this morning, lunchtime our time, to have Ambassador João Vale de Almeida, the new EU Ambassador to the United Kingdom, joining us for a conversation on the EU-UK Relationship. I’m just going to let my colleague continue to let people into the meeting, but I think we’re able to go live now, so I can see that we have a great group of – a number of people are already joining us, and I can see we have João Vale de Almeida with us as well from – still from Brussels, though very shortly to arrive to take up his position in London. Ambassador, welcome, so pleased to have you with us, and let me just finish up a couple of words of introduction and then I’ll throw…
Ambassador João Vale de Almeida
Good morning, or good afternoon?
Dr Robin Niblett CMG
Both, I think, and we’re in the midday phase over here, João. So, what I was going to say is, there’s a lot we can cover. The UK-EU relationship is back firmly in the news, with a slightly more optimistic tone, as of the very healthy meeting that we had, a virtual meeting, between the European Commission President, Ursula von der Leyen, and Prime Minister, Boris Johnson, at the beginning of the week. The headlines were positive. I’m sure, Ambassador, you’ll have something to say about that in a minute. But I think we have an opportunity here to talk, yes, about the future of the US, sorry, the UK-EU relationship, but also, more broadly, about where the EU is going, how it thinks about Brexit, how this affects the future of our bilateral relationship, but also, the future of the EU. And, in João Vale de Almeida, we really have a perfect person to have this discussion, not only because you’re Ambassador, but because you came here from being the EU’s Ambassador to the UN, a very important position, 2015 to 19. You were, prior to that, the first EU Ambassador to the United States, 2010 to 14. You’d been Director General for External Affairs in the Commission and had been the Chef de Cabinet to José Manuel Barroso, when he was the European Commission President. So, I do feel like I– and this really isn’t flattery, but it’ll sound like it, but I feel like the EU is sending its best to London, which I’m going to interpret as a sign of either what a difficult relationship it’s going to be and they feel they need a good Ambassador, or it’s simply a sign of faith and confidence. Either way, João, we’d really – we’re pleased you’re joining us this virtual way at this particular moment, we look forward to having you with us physically, as and when that is possible again.
But, for the moment, let me just throw open a big question, I mean, you will be the first EU Ambassador to the United Kingdom, with the UK not being a member of the EU, first time in 47 years, kind of what are your priorities? I mean, I’m sure the negotiation, but you’re not here to negotiate, so what’s at the top of your list and how do you see this relationship? Over to you.
Ambassador João Vale de Almeida
Thank you. Thank you very much, Robin, for your very kind words. I hope you are right, that the EU is sending its best, but that’s not for me to judge. In any case, it’s a real privilege and an honour and to be in London. I took up my functions actually, on the 1st of February already, right after Brexit, but because of COVID, I’ve been staying in Brussels, for the last couple of weeks, but I am coming back next week to London to continue my work. But, as most of us, we’ve been teleworking and some of my team members are in different capitals of Europe and we are all in the process of going back to London. Let me, first of all, thank Chatham House and yourself for the invitation, I think it’s a great opportunity. Let me make a few remarks of introduction, trying to reply to your question, and then be more than glad to engage in a dialogue with all of you.
You know, looking at my job, I think it’s – and the context in which it happens, and, first of all, what comes to mind is that this is an historically unique situation, because we are negotiating with a country that has been with us for almost half a century. So, it’s the first time ever that we negotiate with a country that have already been inside our club. It’s also technically complex. It’s – we realise that it’s very difficult to disentangle something that we built together for 47 years and every day we discover new complexities in this process of disentanglement, if I can use bad English here. But it’s also obviously, a politically highly sensitive process. We’ve seen with – in the last couple of years, how difficult it is, on both sides, to find the right balance. So, again, in a different – in different degrees, a challenging position, I would say, which I take with great satisfaction and – but also, I feel humble about it, to be very, very clear, because we are, you know, entering unknown territory.
So, where are we now in all this? Well, it’s been four years since the referendum now, five months since the actual sort of political Brexit, and four months into the negotiations on the future relationship. We are actually, this week, I would say, or next week, or at the end of the month, entering the, what I would call, the second cycle of these negotiations, after the fourth round and the high level meeting that took place last Monday. So, it’s a very timely initiative by Chatham House and that’s why I’m very glad to, you know, share my views with you and the larger audience. And I would like to start by giving you a broad picture of the, you know, the different levels of engagement with the UK, because sometimes, you know, everything comes together. So, let’s be slightly systematic here for a moment.
The first level of engagement that we have is to prepare the consequences of the UK leaving the single market and the Customs Union. This was the British choice of a model for Brexit, it carries consequences, and this is something that is, you know, around the corner, on the 1st of January, Britain is out of the Single Market and the Customs Union. This has consequences for what happens at the border. There will be controls and checks, regardless of deal or no-deal. So, even without a deal, there will be changes. Without a – with a deal, there will be, you know, a different kind of changes, but even if we don’t have a deal, the simple fact that Britain leaves the Single Market and Customs Union has implications and we need to prepare for that on both sides.
The second level of engagement is, of course, to implement the Withdrawal Agreement that we negotiated last year. And here, again, it will need to be implemented with a deal, or without a deal, and it has an impact in a number of areas, of course. I think the most important attention has been put on the Ireland/Northern Ireland protocol and everything that goes with citizen’s rights, you know, British citizens in our countries and EU citizens in the UK, and this work is mainly, sort of, followed by the Joint Committee that we seem to have, and liable is the one more on the news right now, which is the negotiation of the framework for our future relationship. We need to do that, negotiate, hopefully get a deal, then ratify the deal, and then prepare its implementation, also, for the 1st of January. And this, in case we have a deal, if we don’t have a deal, we have another layer of engagement, which is to prepare for the consequences of no-deal, if ever it happens, I hope it won’t.
So, three plus one levels of engagement with the United Kingdom, which reflect what I said earlier, historically unique, we’ve never done this before, and technically complex, I don’t need to elaborate, and political sensitive. So, on this, these tracks are interconnected obviously, and I mentioned some of that, they need to be judged on their own merits and assessed in their own merits. So, to conclude, two or three more political comments about the present state of our relationship. The first one is the absolute need, absolute need for business and administration, on both sides, to adapt to the new circumstances deriving from the fact that the UK leaves the Single Market and the Customs Union. This will happen on the 1st of January in any case, and we need to prepare for that, and, frankly, let me say that I don’t think everybody has fully grasped this new reality, you know, and I think there has to be a – we have to raise the awareness about the implications of this, again, with deal or no-deal.
The second comment I’ll make is about the Withdrawal Agreement, which I referred to earlier. This is a legally binding international treaty. It requires full implementation by the 1st of January. This is not something that we are still negotiating, or that we are still trying to smoothen or to tweak. No, and we just have to get it done and cannot wait for Christmas to start preparations and hoping that things will be ready for the New Year. So, there’s a pressing – an urgent need to prepare, on both sides, for the implementation of the Withdrawal Agreement and its different aspects.
My last comment, last but one, I would say, is about the future relationship, the negotiations that are ongoing. I think things have become, as you said, clearer in the last few days and, in my view, we are clearly entering a second cycle of our talks. The United Kingdom has confirmed that they don’t want to extend the transition period. We took note. We were open for that, but we respect the United Kingdom’s position. This means very clearly that it will happen on the 1st of January and that means, if you do a countdown and, if you count the need for ratification time, it means that we need to have a deal by, let’s say, the end of October, which is in exactly four months. So, this is the first, sort of, clarification of the last few days.
The second one is that we gladly noted that the Prime Minister of the UK has confirmed that he wants a deal and is ready to invest in order to get there. I think this is very important and, you know, provides a new impetus to the process. On our side, our leaders reaffirm the well-known political ownership of this file and their personal commitment to invest in creating conditions for a successful conclusion, working with the 27 member states. It was also clear, once again, that the Union is fully united behind our Chief Negotiator. Last, but not least, the Chief Negotiators, Michel Barnier and David Frost, they agreed on an ambitious calendar of meetings, for the coming weeks and months, in different formats, until the end of August. And so, all of this means that we now have to get down to work, knowing that the matter that I’ve briefly outlined is not enough/ We need substance, we need meat in the bones of the negotiating process, and we need, for instance, the United Kingdom to fully engage in a number of areas, from which they are somehow refraining from investing, and which have to do with the main chapters of the negotiations, if I take it the level playing field, the fisheries agreement, and the governance aspects, but also, the principles that need to apply, in terms of law enforcement and criminal justice, and co-operation, just to mention a few.
My very last remark to inspire our discussion is to try to put this in an even broader perspective. I think it’s – we cannot isolate the EU-UK relationship from what goes on around the world, as being important players in international scene. So, what is the global context these days? We know very well we are in the midst of a global pandemic and have a global recession. You know, it’s not a very comfortable situation in which we all are. The previously identified, and certainly in many studies and debates at Chatham House, the previously identified strategic trends are likely to be deepened and accelerated, and the direction of travel is not necessarily favourable to countries like ours, and we should be aware of that.
Our 28 countries, 27 plus one, and the EU as such, we are all confronted with very serious challenges these days. They affect our interests as much as our values, and in this context, my point is a simple one. I don’t think we can afford, British people, European Union citizens, our countries, we simply cannot afford to miss this opportunity to shape our relationship for the future, to the benefit of our citizens and our businesses, to the protection, promotion and protection of our values, and our interests around the world.
So, it’s a unique moment, it’s an historic moment. I feel privileged, but also humble, to have this position in London, and I’m very happy to have the opportunity to discuss with you, Robin, and all of your colleagues and members and the larger audience, these issues and many more. Thank you very much, again.
Dr Robin Niblett CMG
Thank you, João, for those remarks and for laying out, as you said, the framework of how you will be thinking about your role here in London and how the EU is thinking about it, the future relationship with UK.
I’ll remind our participants, we have a ‘Q&A’ function in which you can put your questions. We’ll be trying to keep track of them, and hopefully, get to as many as we can. I may call on a few people to see if they would like to unmute and ask the question in person, but I’m just going to jump in the deep end quickly right now to see if I can make sure that I catch up on the first part of your agenda, the complex one about the negotiation. I know you’re not in London as a Negotiator, but we’ve got a very interesting question, quite a specific one, from Joe Mayes of Bloomberg, who’s here on the record, I’ll just point out who that was, saying that “The UK has already announced that it will give a kind of six month grace period on imports from the EU coming into the UK, to give time for UK importers not to have to go through all of the process of getting their Customs systems up in place.” The language coming from the other side is, you know, once you’re out, you’re out, you know, the system – the Single Market must be protected, that is not something we’re planning to reciprocate. Do you have any insights you can share as to the kind of – the outlook that the Commission is taking, and the negotiating mandate under which Michel Barnier is operating, on this issue of kind of flexibility, given how tight the timeline is?
Ambassador João Vale de Almeida
Well, certainly, we took note of the British decision and – but we are not at a point in time where we neither wish or need to take decisions on our side. Our line is the one that’s been made public, we will protect the Single Market. Let’s concentrate on the substance of the discussion. Let’s try to make everything possible to have a good deal, and, under the terms of those deal, we will implement it and you can count on us to be forceful and systematic in implementing the deal and, in doing so, certainly protecting the Single Market
Dr Robin Niblett CMG
Just sticking – and I’m going to turn just to let Ludivine, my colleague, know to unmute John. We’ve got a question as well coming in on another just specific aspect, and I’d like to get some of these almost sort of technical aspects of the negotiation out the way, and then we can talk in a – as you did in your remarks, on the broader context. But I wonder if John Peet is there, and we can get him on the line, I’ll see – yeah, there he is. John, either if you unmute – yeah, you’re unmuted, John, why don’t you ask your question? Introduce yourself, first, please.
John Peet
Yes, hello, João, John Peet from The Economist. We dealt with each other many years ago in Brussels. Nice to see you again. I wanted to ask about fisheries particularly. It’s about 0.1% of GDP, in most of the coastal states, it only really affects seven or eight countries, it’s strange that people should be saying without a fisheries agreement there will be no trade agreement at all, when the trade agreement is so much more important. And I wonder if it’s really reasonable for the EU to take the position that it wants to stick to the current access arrangements, when Britain will no longer be part of the Common Fisheries Policy, or do you think you’re not – do you not think you’re taking too maximalist a position?
Ambassador João Vale de Almeida
Well, John, good to see you again, although I don’t see you, but I hear you, but I hope to see you soon in London, physically. You know Brussels well enough and the European Union well enough to know that fisheries is always there. It’s always a difficult politically sensitive fact, but it’s also economically important and I would not underestimate its importance in our relationship, particular for some countries, certainly for United Kingdom, some of our countries more than others. It’s, in any case, a clear part of our mandate. It won’t go away, so I think we need to be pragmatic, we need to be realistic. If you want to have a deal, we need to have a deal on fisheries. If we want to have an economic partnership as ambitious as the one, we have proposed, we need to include fisheries in there.
By the way, I would like to point out that this is not only about, you know, European Union interests, there’s a lot of British interests in the fisheries file, namely, for instance, the interdependence, interconnection between our markets. A lot of processed fishing products from the UK go to the European Union. So, I’m sure you understand, and everybody understands, that this needs to be part of the final deal. Now, what will the final deal on fisheries look like? You know, I think it will be different from the British initial position and different from the EU initial position, that’s what negotiations are for, find compromises. The starting points are the one – is the one you described, but I’m sure, if there is goodwill, we will find an agreement that moves away from what Michel Barnier has called the maximalist position on both sides.
Dr Robin Niblett CMG
We’ve got, as you could imagine, quite a few common questions coming through on the deal itself and kind of – again, I’m just going to stay with it for another two or three minutes, and then go a little broader. On this question of spaces for compromise, obviously this – the discussion right now, on the British side, is we – all we need is a skinny deal, the phrase that is used by many people at the moment, in other words a basic deal. I know at least one of the questions used that phrase, Andrew Farron, I think, used that term. But skinny deals, as I think you indicated, are still complicated deals, and rules of origin that will require all sorts of border checks, where do you see the space for compromise, in particular in the area of governance, which is one where a number of people have talked about here? Will the governance element be one of the most important, either sticking points or resolution points? Because if we’re only able to do a partial agreement, then being able to feel our way through to differences of interpretation, differences of implementation is going to be incredibly important, and you know how much the British Government gives stake to the role of the European Court of Justice or not. Could you just say something, what your sense is of the Commission’s position on the scope for resolution, dispute resolution, governance of this agreement, given that level playing field is going to take quite a while to work out?
Ambassador João Vale de Almeida
Well, now, without going into details of the negotiation, which I should not do at this point in time, let me be clear. Sometimes skinny deals are more difficult to negotiate than larger deals, for reasons that you can understand. In a more comprehensive deal, you can find better trade-offs, you can accommodate different interests. When you’re talking about 28 countries, 27 plus one, a comprehensive deal is more likely to produce a consensual result. Don’t forget, we need unanimity of our 27 member states, and we need the ratification by the European Parliament, as well as you need your own ratification conditions. So, let’s not – I would not be obsessed with the skinny deal, I don’t think it necessarily provides the solution for our problems. What provides a solution for our problems is the guarantee that the deal, whatever it is, is fully implemented, is fully – you know, respects accountability, is enforceable, that business can have predictability and certainty about what happens, that the different interests are taken care of. So, the governance is not, as Mrs von der Leyen said yesterday, I guess, in part, this is not the bureaucratic obsession. Governance is about making sure the agreement is enforceable, implementable, produces the results that we aim at, and if I can consider another model, which is the one that we’re having with Switzerland, for instance, where the governance mechanisms were less optimal, let’s put it this way, we’ve seen how difficult it has been to govern that relationship. So, I would, to our colleagues and friends on the British side, point and underline that dimension of enforceability, of pragmatic implementation of the deal, as being the reason behind, apart from principles which are well-known on the British side about the way we operate in the Union, this is the main reason why we insist on these elements.
Another comment I would make on that one, when people tell me about, why not have several distinct agreements, as opposed to a comprehensive one? Well, if you multiply the agreements, you multiply the risks in ratification of those agreements. You extend the time needed for ratification, but you also multiply the risk of accidents in the ratification. So, I think one should, again, in a pragmatic way, bear that in mind, and, you know, I think, on the more personal level, that there are ways of coming around the difficulties we have on the governance issue, if there is goodwill to get there, I don’t think that this could sort of block a deal at the end of the day, but let’s see.
Dr Robin Niblett CMG
And as you’re coming to London, an interesting question from Dina Mufti – Dina, if I’ve pronounced your name right, it’s at the top of our list actually, and I’m going to come to Tom Raines in a minute, if you can just be ready, Ludi, on that, but Dina Mufti has a question about the banking industry. You’re coming to London, one of the financial centres of the world, it sounded like actually, some of the banking side of issues, although I don’t know if it will be included or not in the skinny deal, it sounded like there was a sort of coming together around the notions of equivalence and that as long as the City was willing to – or British regulators are willing to live within that context. But do you sense there’s an appreciation, João, in Brussels, in national capitals as well, of the importance of keeping the City of London connected, if you see what I’m saying, with the European Union economy as a whole, and being so, or is it more that people see it as a threat and therefore, it’s got to be regulated in a very different way? What’s your sense of the result of the whole Brexit negotiation on that very currently close relationship between the City of London and the rest of the EU?
Ambassador João Vale de Almeida
Well, first of all, I think we all respect the City of London and its role in international financial scene, that goes without saying, and that reality is well-known and well-respected. Regarding equivalence, let me be very clear on this point, equivalence is the process that is being pursued right now. We are taking all the necessary assessments before decisions are taken, but I would like to underline that this is a unilateral decision of European Union. This is not a matter for negotiation with United Kingdom. Other areas of financial services are being the object of important negotiations, and I’m sure we will find the right agreements there, but not on the issue of equivalence, which is a unilateral one. I am confident that we will find good solutions that will respect each other’s interests, but not on the equivalence issue, which is a unilateral decision.
Dr Robin Niblett CMG
I suppose the EU could unilaterally decide to have a longer warning period for – before an equivalence ruling was given, it could unilaterally decide to do that after having negotiated with the British.
Ambassador João Vale de Almeida
The process is ongoing.
Dr Robin Niblett CMG
I’m not going to push you more on it, I think you’ve answered that question. I wanted to bring my colleague, Tom Raines, in, who runs our Europe Programme, and I know has a question about the foreign policy issue, which I think would – Tom, I see you’re actually on the screen as well, please go ahead, ask your question.
Tom Raines
Hi, Ambassador, and good to see you again. I wanted to ask about the foreign policy relationship between the UK and the EU in the future. Despite what’s contained in the political declaration where there was quite a little – you know, quite a few paragraphs describing the type of co-operation that the UK could have in the future, the UK Government is opposed to having an institutionalised relationship. It’s not tabled any text. I didn’t see many prospect of there being an institutionalised pretty based foreign policy relationship. So, what is your reading of why the UK wants that, and what do you think the barriers, or the risks that could create, without having that institutionalised basis?
Ambassador João Vale de Almeida
Well, if you allow me a more personal remark, there are two issues that, among others, that puzzle me in the British position. One is their opposition to the setting up of a Parliamentary co-operation mechanism between your Parliament and the European Parliament. There is an opposition to that. I cannot understand that and I’m still trying to understand why the British position is against that, because we think it’s obvious that there will be a sense and the need and usefulness for Parliamentary co-operation.
The second one is their position on foreign policy and security issues, and the CFSB, if you will. Why this opposition to even start a negotiating table on the framework for our future relations in that area? You know, Robin mentioned my experience in the last ten years or so in the US, in the UN in the US, and I think I’m well-equipped to assess how important it is that our 28 countries keep working very much together, hand-in-hand, whenever possible, on issues of foreign policy and security. I think our countries need that, but I would say the world needs that as well. So, I’m puzzled by the position.
If I try to understand that position, and some people tell me, well, it’s because we prefer to have a looser framework, we want to deal bilaterally with the EU member states, we want to deal with the groups of EU member states, we don’t want to be constrained by a rigid framework with all the 27 and the institutions and all that. Okay, I take it as, you know, academically, a point that we can discuss, but let’s go a little bit deeper and see what member states individually can bring and what the EU, as such, can bring to the UK. And I think the two levels are not incompatible, they complement each other. It’s not because you have a framework with the EU that you are prevented from having, you know, co-operation with – on a bilateral basis, and we’ve seen that in the European Union as such. So – but, you know, the EU side brings you, any country, in this case the UK, an added value that you cannot have by simply even adding the 27 bilateral relationships. And let me give you the case of Iran, and I know there is solid co-operation between what we call the E3 and the UK around Iran and it’s very – it’s an important one, but we would never have had the Iran deal without the European dimension, without the other countries that were not there, the other 24 countries, 25 at that time, that were not specifically into the discussion.
Take the issue of sanctions, for instance, you cannot have German sanctions, or Belgian sanctions, or Portuguese sanctions, you have to have European Union sanctions, because of the way we are built, the Single Market and beyond. So, I think there is – again, I’m puzzled. I hope that the position will devolve. In any case, as I said in my introduction, I think we are positively condemned to work hand-in-hand on foreign policy and security in the future. Let’s see how that will be shaped. We have an offer, the offer is still on the table, whenever the British side wants to open the door and come to the table and discuss this framework, we are more than ready to do that.
Dr Robin Niblett CMG
Thank you very much, João, for that. Tom, thanks for your question. I notice there was an interview with Nathalie Loiseau recently, the former French Europe Minister, now Member of the European Parliament, just saying that she felt that with a lack of that security framework, a formal institutional agreement, that intelligence sharing might be tougher in certain areas, or certainly data sharing, there was a mention of Galileo as well, the inability maybe to share certain types of encrypted data, and obviously, it’s harder to involve the UK in certain military operations. I have to say, as I was reading that, I was remembering back to the time when certain EU governments made sure that the UK was not able to be involved in the next set of contracts for the Galileo process, even though they potentially could have been. So, I’m just wondering, do you think there’s an understanding, on both sides, of the importance of this security relationship for the long-term? Is this – do you think we’re just really caught a little bit in the middle of negotiations here where, in a way, the government, the British Government, is trying to, how can I say, use this a little bit, not as overt leverage, but we’re going to hold back this level of close co-operation that could be useful for you as well, until we see what the framework is overall? Do you feel these two things have been connected a little bit, even if obliquely and informally?
Ambassador João Vale de Almeida
Well, first of all, I was referring mainly to common foreign and security policy, there are issues of security that have parts of the mandate and that we are already discussing, on which you mentioned that, it’s very important the issue of principles. You know, if you start – if we’re talking about data sharing, and if you’re talking about privacy and Data Protection, if you’re talking about human rights principles, all this is absolutely crucial for the European Union, and you will never get a ratification by the European Parliament, for instance, not to mention our own member states, if certain of these principles are not fully recognised and enshrined in the – in our agreement. So, these are some of the issues that we are discussing, even regardless of the fact that the CFSB table, if you want to call it that way, is not being occupied by the Brits.
On the issue of the trade-offs, in any negotiation, you have, you know, the French say, “You don’t want to be [inaudible – 34:22] and you want – you don’t want to look like too eager to do it because you may want to get something, you know, that happens. I’m not going to comment on that, but, you know, what I realise today is that this negotiating table is empty. I would like it to be, you know, occupied by all of us because I think this is incredibly important. But let’s see how the dynamics of the negotiation go and what kind of possibilities and opportunities it produces for an ambitious co-operation on foreign policy and security and, you know, my background with the UN tells me a lot about the need for us to work together, hand-in-hand, in this volatile world.
Dr Robin Niblett CMG
Thank you very much. I have just – my questions have all reloaded slightly. I was about to ask a very specific question, ‘cause we have two former, one former MP, yes, there we are, in Mike Gapes, and Tom Cole, Thomas Cole, who is a former European Commission Negotiator, both asking – I think maybe what I might want to do is the last question about the deal, which is whether there’s a, sort of, phasing-in opportunity here, as Thomas Cole specifically put it, “Is there an opportunity to phase-in the agreement on the future relationship, as a transition from membership,” sorry, “not a transition from membership, but a transition into the future relationship? And so, you know, leaving some of the more difficult issues to the future, which you have just actually described in many cases, would it – do you think that’s kind of where we’re headed under any circumstances?
Ambassador João Vale de Almeida
Listen, we have to go step-by-step, and, as I said earlier, we have clarified a few issues in the last few days. The first one was the extension one. We now know that there will be no extension. That gives us a timeframe for our discussion, which is incredibly important, because of the complexity of the issues that we have to discuss. That’s done. I would not – I don’t think it’s useful, certainly not for a Negotiator, but even for those engaged in this line of business, I would say, not useful to anticipate too much the final steps.
We’ll see how far we can go, in terms of a deal, how ambitious is that deal, how complex is that deal, and what it implies, in terms of implementation before we start talking about the mechanisms of enforceability or implementation of that agreement. But there’s one thing for sure, I mean, we are – we will establish a relationship, and hopefully, with a good deal, and there is the future and the future is open for other initiatives or other developments that we may agree to do together. And so, life doesn’t stop on the 1st of January, right? So let’s first make a good deal, let’s give ourselves time to ratify it, to prepare, to implement it, let’s see how we can implement that in the beginning of the new period in 2021, and then there’s a whole, you know, life ahead of us, where the EU and the UK can decide to go further, in some areas and not in others and creativity will be there as well, and also, reaction to whatever reality we’ll have in front of us.
Dr Robin Niblett CMG
Thank you on that. Look, we’ve – I want to move a little bit more to some of the foreign policy questions here. There’s a question from Fariah Chozad on the EU’s developing policy towards China and the Commission, as I think you know, as you noticed in this question here, published a white paper on foreign subsidies, sounds like the latest iteration of a gradual tightening of that relationship up with China. Obviously, if the UK and the EU get out of sync in any way on how they deal with China, this could add complexity, and we know China is back already of the 18 plus one, or maybe it’s 19 plus one, they keep adding countries to that process. Could you just say a word or two about, given all your experience diplomatically, how you see that relationship developing, and how it may even – what you’d want out of the UK as well, in terms of that kind of co-operation, once Brexit has happened?
Ambassador João Vale de Almeida
Well, first of all, allow me to salute my good friend, Fariah Chozad, it’s good to have him in the call. And, of course, China is, well, is the elephant, right, and it’s important for us, it’s important for the UK, I will add it’s important for the United States, and I think we should try to keep a global – a more global picture of our relationship with China. But let me start on the bilateral one. I think it’s, you know, of strategic importance for us, the way we deal with China. It’s not a one-sided relationship, in the sense that there are several tracks. I think the principles that we are applying these days is the idea of trust, the transparency and the reciprocity. We need trust in order to be able to co-operate, we need transparency in order to understand what’s going on and increase the degree of trust as well, but we also need the reciprocity, and I think there is a process ongoing of rebalancing the reciprocity, or the lack of it, in our relationship with China.
But I think what is more important is for us to have a clear view of what is involved in our relationship with this very important country, and I think there are, you know, at least two – three levels that we can identify. There are a number of areas in which we have to be partners with China. You know, how can you address global issues without involving China, without having China in part of the solution? Climate change is the obvious example. There are areas in which we are competitors with China. China competes with us, certainly in economic terms, very much so. There are also a dimension, which is what we call in our jargon, and that was an important concept introduced some time ago, of a systemic rivalry between us and China. What does that mean? I think it means that we have different systems of values and, in that sense, we are not in the same wavelength all the time, and certainly on human rights and a number of other issues that you know very, very well. So, you know, you cannot look at China and say this is the way we deal with them. There are different sort of layers and qualitative layers of engagement with China, but, you know, what I sense is what Fariah was mentioning as well, we are rebalancing this relationship, that’s for sure.
I don’t think we should be alone in this and, as Ambassador to the United States some years ago, I was involved in discussions that, of course, had China in the back of our minds, in the background of those discussions, about the way you organise the multilateral system, the way you, you know, revamp the World Trade Organization, you know, the rules that need to – the International Trade Rules that need to adapt to the new realities brought in largely by China, and – but also around the values. You know, we share the same values, fundamental values, with the United Kingdom and the US, and I think we have a number of strategic interests which are aligned.
It’s not about isolating China at all, it’s not about ganging up against China, and not at all, it’s about understanding the issues and working with China to address those issues. And I think here, as you were asking, I see a future in which I hope the EU and UK can work together and I’ve noticed, you know, just want to take note of a very recent – I think a few hours ago, a statement by the G7 on Hong Kong, which is a very important one. It follows a statement by the European Union and several statements by High Representative, Josep Borrell, but I’m glad to see the G7, including, of course, the UK and the US, aligning themselves on the statement on Hong Kong, which I think it’s an important illustration of what we can do together. Again, not against China, but being clear with China on the things that we can agree and where we cannot agree.
Dr Robin Niblett CMG
Thank you, and if you don’t mind me taking you a little bit round the houses on this, I wanted to bring the issue of Russia on the table. Again, I’m thinking of a topic you will find high on your in-tray when you come to London, given the very specific relationship that the UK has with Russia, not least given, as British citizens were reminded about over a TV series that ran earlier this week about the poisonings of Sergei and Yulia Skripal. There is a particular sensitivity, including with the UK Government, about efforts to reconnect, should we say, diplomatically with Russia, in a more proactive way, which have been championed not only by Donald Trump, with some of his suggested invitations to the G7, but also by President Emmanuel Macron. I’m just wondering if you could say a word or two about how you think the EU is envisaging the evolution of that relationship, especially as it has a tougher relationship with China, and the sanctions regime, ‘cause this is going to be very interesting. The UK will be technically outside, or will be, I don’t know, does that happen on January the 1st 2021, the UK will be outside, I suppose, the sanctions regime, would have to impose its own, to reciprocate. Could you say a word or two about – strategically about Russia and something about sanctions co-ordination?
Ambassador João Vale de Almeida
Well, on sanctions, I made the point earlier, it’s clear, once the UK is fully out, that, you know, we’ll have to have different regimes. But if we have a framework for co-operation, which involves co-operation on sanctions, we’ll be much more effective when we want to collectively address a particular situation. Regarding Russia, I mean, there’s one thing that will not change, at least not up to now, that’s geography, right? We will remain their neighbours for the foreseeable future at least, if not forever, and our economies are, you know, pretty much interlinked and we also share, to a large extent, the common culture. So – and history links, historical links as well. So, Russia is there, will stay there, and we need to find a way to interact with them in the best possible way.
In the last decades, we’ve seen different models and different fluctuations in this relationship. Today, they are not at the best spot, I would say, and largely due to Ukraine and Crimea, and I think this should not be forgotten, and this is an area in which, for instance, we are working relatively well with United States and Secretary Pompeo discussed this with our Ministers just a few days ago, and we are working, of course, extremely well with the United Kingdom. But it’s also an area, Russia, where you have 27 countries with their very different degrees of interaction, historically, economically, and otherwise, with Russia.
It’s not the same between Portugal and Estonia, there’s a different perception of Russia, obviously. So, we need – our job in the Union is to bring together all these countries and find a consensus, and if you – and going back to sanctions, it’s been remarkable how we have sustained our economic sanctions against Russia, in spite of all the differences among our member states regarding that partner, and this has been an incredible and remarkable achievement, which tells a lot about, you know, how much we can do when we are united. But it will remain a difficult subject, of course. I hope – my hope is that, with time and engaging forcefully with Russia, and we have a number of principles that we agreed upon in European Union, including sanctions regarding Crimea and Ukraine, that we’ll find a balance in our relationship with Russia in the near future, and hopefully, having the UK very close by.
Dr Robin Niblett CMG
A contrarian question, which Neil Piggott has put on the list here, which I think is a very interesting one, you know, do you see any points of flexibility where Brexit opens up for the EU, with it being an external partner, not only in terms of trade, but international relations? You know, the UK has been, for a long time, often a block to the EU being able to do things inside. I’ve tried to imagine what the UK attitude would be to the EU Recovery Fund and the Commission securing additional funds, like, and I’m trying to imagine the British Chancellor signing off on that idea, maybe you – you know, do you think there’s actually an opportunity here where actually having the UK outside, but still a close partner, might be good for the EU? I hope I’m not overly interpreting Neil Piggott’s question, but I think that’s at the heart of it.
Ambassador João Vale de Almeida
That’s a very, very good question. Listen, I keep saying and I keep believing that Brexit was a lose-lose situation. I think we all lose out of it. This being said, we always have to try to look on the bright side of things, and the bright side, in terms of Brexit, if I may, on the 27th, I would highlight two points. The first is that in a number of countries and citizens in the Union realised that nothing should be taken for granted, and the – you know, you see that in the opinion polls. The support of the European Union went up instead of down after Brexit, and that’s a sign of, you know, people being aware of, you know, how much, you know, attached they are to the idea of being together in European Union, so that’s one sort of positive effect of Brexit, in a way, in the political terms.
The other one is, of course, that it has unblocked a number of areas and policy areas where there was some, you know, restraining on the side of Britain and that has liberate some impulses and some dynamism in – within European Union, and I take, you know, the foreign policy on security, in terms of, you know, the defence side of it, and what we can do together, and there has been a remarkable development, in the last few years, about the EU’s capability to act in this domain. And the other one is, of course, everything that has to do with the budgetary dimension, the capacity of us addressing some of the issues that you mention right now. So, all-in-all, I remain of the opinion that it was not good for anybody, and – but there are bright sides of it and we are trying, I guess, to maximise the new possibilities of action inside the Union, once the UK has left.
Dr Robin Niblett CMG
I’m conscious we’re coming into the last eight minutes or so, ‘cause I know you’ve got a very hard stop at 1:30 our time, 2:30 your time. I’m going to put two sort of foreign policy questions together, if I may, to you, and then we’ll hopefully have time for a little cluster of questions around the end of the deal. We’ll go back to where we started, if you see what I’m saying, ‘cause I’m…
Ambassador João Vale de Almeida
Yeah.
Dr Robin Niblett CMG
…keeping an eye on the questions coming through here. Africa is one question, do you see the continued possibility, or how do you see the relationship between the EU and the UK in working on Africa, which has become so much more of a focus for all of us for lots of very good reasons? And, similar region, but not exactly the same question at all, what if – and this is more a foreign policy question, if there is a move to continue with the annexation of some of the occupied territories, one of the questions here that we’ve got, would there be a possibility that there would be sanctions undertaken as well on the EU side, in respect and response to that? I can’t see who asked that question, but it was there a minute ago, yeah.
Ambassador João Vale de Almeida
Yeah, well, on Israel, we are – we remain committed to the two-state solution and the agreed international parameters. We believe this is the only way out for the present stalemate. And, in that sense, we don’t believe that an annexation of Palestinian territories is any – a good contribution to that. We actually think they are against international law, and that’s been our sustained position, so we are pressing Israel to refrain from going on down that path. We discussed that with Secretary Pompeo, just a few days ago. And, if ever, unfortunately, Israel goes down that path, of course this could have consequences for our extremely good, by the way, and deep and intense relationship with Israel. So, we hope that we would not get there, but we are quite worried by the prospects of that happening, because we believe it does not provide any contribution to a solution to the Palestinian-Israeli problem. It will further destabilise the region.
Regarding Africa, this is a priority for us, European Union, I know it is a priority for the United Kingdom as well, so I see no reason why we shouldn’t get together and try to do – you know, have a common effort towards Africa. I think there’s the first – the issue of development and that we are together in the UN on the Sustainable Development Goals agenda. In New York, where we were working hand-in-hand, of course, with the United Kingdom on all this, with the Secretary General, I think there’s a lot we can do together there, in terms of aid, the effectiveness of aid, in terms of migration as well, you know, a very delicate issue. So, we need to try to – but also supporting them, facing the consequences of COVID, COVID-19, and this is the most pressing one. So, we have revamped considerably our approach to Africa. We have put a financial means on it, and I think this is clearly an area in which – and we know UK’s engagement and knowledge about Africa, I think there’s a very promising area of co-operation in the future.
Dr Robin Niblett CMG
I think this – we’re pretty close to the last question, so I’ll see how you deal with these. They’re quite specific ones, so if I can just put a couple of them to you. Do you think that a deal can be done by July? The outlined deal, as Prime Minister Boris Johnson has announced he thinks should be possible, this is Antonella Garella, I think of [inaudible – 54:17] sorry if I got the wrong newspaper, but do you think – you know, how optimistic are you about that kind of outcome being done in this very tight timeframe? What would that be, if we have a deal by July, does that mean there’s a framework agreed at that point and we’re then into details? What do you interpret this July deadline as meaning?
Ambassador João Vale de Almeida
Well, I think that speed is good. We need to accelerate, because we are now clear of the timeframe that we have, as I said earlier. It’s 31st of December, in order to ratify it, we need two months. That’s end of October, that’s four months from now, so we need to use every week and every month to try to find a deal. So, speed, acceleration’s important. But, you know, when you drive a car and you speed too much, you can risk, you know, falling out of the road. So, you need to be careful, and because the purpose is not to go fast, the purpose is to get to the destination. And if we want to get to the destination, we need to build a consensus that allows us to get there. So, substance is as important, if not more important, than the matter of the negotiation. So, if whenever we get a deal, we’ll be very happy, but I think we should now focus on the quality of our discussions and the Chief Negotiators are determined to do that. They’ve set out a timeline for meetings, different formats of meetings, hopefully, some of them physical, once the conditions allow, in order to progress as much as possible. Then we’ll see where we are, and we’ll come to the, sort of, final solutions for it.
Dr Robin Niblett CMG
You are entering, as I’m sure you know, a highly politicised environment, not least because of all the COVID tensions, the post-Brexit, people talk about the UK being quite a divided country still today in all sorts of levels, but you will be entering that as the representative of the EU, which has traditionally been one of those external totemic issues people could organise for or against. An interesting question, so last two questions for you, and you’ve got two minutes, so you could decide on your time, and give me 30 seconds to thank you at the end, please. But, Nick Westcott, who I think you know, asked a question about whether you will see, as part of your role, to liaise with pro-EU movements in London. They’ve got a long history, they go back a long way, how will you manage that kind of relationship and position yourself? Question one. Question two, from my colleague, Richard Whitman, at Chatham House, are all issues resolved regarding the establishment of your mission? ‘Cause, again, I think people feel there are elements of a political game going on here a little bit, and so, any insights you can give on those two points to finish up with.
Ambassador João Vale de Almeida
Yes, thank you. Thank you very much. My job, like any other Ambassador, is to engage not only with the British authorities, the British Parliament, the devolved nation authorities as well, but also with the British people, and I don’t make any discrimination among the UK citizens, regardless of their opinion towards the EU and that, of course, includes very much our friends that support European Union. And I’ve already seen a number of them and I’m more than – and my door is open to them, as much as it is open to people who don’t like us and that I will try to convince otherwise.
On my mission, yes, we are discussing and negotiating what we call the Establishment Agreement, you know, it’s a new reality in London, I understand, that people are asking questions and seeing what kind of shape this will have. We have, around the world, 143 delegations, they are all fully recognised, like the national Embassies, and under the Vienna Convention, and I’m sure that will be the case, but it takes some time and we are constructively working with our British friends on solving that. In any case, let me, before you conclude, Robin, thank you very much for this opportunity, and say to all our friends and colleagues and the audience that, you know, I’m – my team, we have a small team in Smith Square, Westminster, but we are open to engage with all of you. We want to contribute to an informed debate about the relationship between the EU and the UK, but also, our place in the larger world, and we remain open and we are ready to engage and myself, personally, whenever I can, I’m more than glad to participate and engage with all of you. Thank you very much.
Dr Robin Niblett CMG
Well, João Vale de Almeida, thank you very much for giving us a full time. I don’t know how many questions we answered. I know that we didn’t answer all of them, but I felt like I asked a lot. I could show you my piece of paper with all the scribbles on it, trying to get through them and group them in ways, but that is a reminder of what a great group of members we have at Chatham House, all ready to ask very good questions. But I think, as I said at the beginning, it is important and it’s good that the EU is sending over such an experienced Diplomat, because, as you yourself noted, this is going to be a very delicate period, not just completing this negotiation, but what was likely to be an extended series of negotiations that will continue well into the future and probably, into most – through most of your term. But alongside that, there will be the questions of Russia, China, a new US administration, and making sure that the EU and the UK, in my opinion, remain as aligned as is feasible, because I think we will be – have a lot stronger voice. Both the EU will have a stronger voice, aligned with the UK, and the UK, where it’s possible, aligned with the EU. This is a time for people to be sticking together as much as they can, if they share values and, in my opinion, interests as well. So, let’s see what’s going to happen. We look forward to welcoming you here.
Let me say a big thank you to all of you who joined us, a very large group that have joined us this lunchtime. Thank you for joining us and we can’t unmute you all, but maybe we’ll unmute whoever’s on there to say a big thank you to João Vale de Almeida. Thank you, João. See you later.
Ambassador João Vale de Almeida
Thank you. Thank you. Thank…
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