Dr Leslie Vinjamuri
I recognise many of your names, so I hope that, by now, you know who I am. I’m Leslie Vinjamuri. I Direct the US and Americas Programme at Chatham House, and I’m Dean of our Academy. It is such an honour and a privilege to be chairing this event, this roundtable, this discussion, with our guest speaker, Ambassador Tony Gardner, who is, I think, a friend of Chatham House, he’s certainly a friend of our Director, who is also here with us, Dr Robin Niblett, Director of Chatham House, and my colleague, Hans Kundnani, our residents, not only Director and Senior Research Fellow, but deep, deep experts on Europe and the European Union, so we thought very important to have this conversation with you.
Ambassador Gardner, you are not only distinguished in your career, through many years and over 20 years working on US European affairs, you were also the US Ambassador to the EU 2014 to 2017. You have written extensively, you have advised in the private sector, in the public sector, and you have written the book, and I think that might be the reason that we managed to attract you to come back to Chatham House, and it has a fabulous – it has a feelgood title at perhaps a moment when we’re not always feeling good. But it is a really great title, Stars with Stripes: The Essential Partnership Between the European Union and the United States. I think I have no doubt about your conviction and your commitment to this, but really, it is an honour to have you here to speak with us about EU-US relations: The View from Washing and Brussels.
I should say that we are on the record, you’re free to tweet. I’m right that we’re on the record, correct, Robin? Yes, we are on the record. We will have plenty of time for questions. We’re going to try – you can obviously ask those questions by writing them in, but we’re going to try to get some of your voices into this conversation. And net me start by asking you a big question, Ambassador Gardner, and then, I think we’re going – the three of us are going to really try and draw you out, because we know the depth of your knowledge, but we’d like to get a little bit more of a sense of where you think things are heading.
We’ve seen many challenges in this relationship. We’re not even entirely sure whether the EU is united amongst itself in its vision and its understanding and its relationship with the US, but whether it’s trade, whether it’s questions of China, whether it’s questions of democracy and the response to COVID-19. Obviously, this hasn’t been easy, but in your view, it’s essential. Tell us how you think about that, and where you – what you think we can expect, and what we can hope for in the months ahead.
Ambassador Anthony Gardner
Well, thank you, Leslie, and I want to start by thanking you and Hans and Robin, Chatham House, for everything that you do, on a regular basis, to promote transatlantic understanding. I’m, sort of, a strange animal, in the sense that I have been interested in the EU for a long time. I got interested in the EU actually at Oxford, when I was at Balliol doing an MPhil, and continued to be interested. I went to Brussels and worked there for a while as a Lawyer on EU competition law, I was in the White House, working on EU issues, and then subsequently, as Ambassador to the EU, as you mentioned, Leslie.
So, you know, it’s tough for me, and let me start here, just a little bit of an intro to the book, and then I’ll answer the question, if that’s okay? You know, I drove off from my post on January 20th 2017, and I drove off to Bruges actually, ‘cause I spent three months at the College of Europe, and I drove off very preoccupied about what I thought was likely to happen to this relationship, which I call essential in the book, but I had no idea, actually, what was going to happen, over the subsequent three years. And what troubled me was that I didn’t see any geostrategic sense to this, you know, every administration’s going to have a different view about how it wants to handle relationships, but I didn’t see any sense behind it.
And then we subsequently saw a real unravelling of many things that the US and EU had been doing together, and let me very clear here, because I’ll – perhaps some people on the call will think I’m terribly partisan, I actually don’t think I’m terribly partisan, at least about the EU, because for 60 years, 60 years, the US has pursued more or less a consistent line about European integration, and it’s this President that’s jumped the rails, very clearly, and in ways, as I said, I don’t think make sense.
So, the book, which I finally decided to write, despite my daughter’s admonition to me not to write it, and I should just say she was quite clear to me. She said, “Daddy, don’t write this book, it’s going to be boring, no-one will read it, and you should focus on making money to pay for my school fees.” But I didn’t listen to her, and I didn’t listen to Tom Friedman, who wrote an article that putting the words ‘European Union’ in the title of an article is a sure-fire way to make people fall asleep. So, the challenge was to write a book that described, not in an academic way, nothing wrong with academic books, but to describe to a broader audience what it is that the US and the EU actually do together in the trenches, so to speak. So, the book is 13 chapters and nine different sectors, it gets into some detail, and it’s not just trade, which is what people normally think of, and very important, I talk about theta, and it’s not just data privacy, which was terribly important and a source of friction, and not just the digital economy, which is so important as well, but it gets into some areas that perhaps some people are less familiar with and don’t realise the depth of our relationship with the EU.
So, there’s a chapter called Saving the Planet, which talks about climate change and tells the story about how we got to the Paris courts, you know, it’s a real story, and it’s a – it’s particularly a historic because, for decades beforehand, the US and the EU were out of sync on that topic. I also talk about foreign aid and humanitarian assistance, terribly important, as we’re the biggest funders of both around the world, and then there’s a chapter on security, writ large, so it’s the sanction storing, and I lived through that on a very daily and very personal basis and how we got implemented biting sanctions against Russia after the Ukraine events.
And also, I talk about Iran, and if it hadn’t been for the EU, we would not have been able to implement biting sanctions in Iran, nor have Iran come to the negotiating table to agree this JCPOA, and the agreement that limited Iran’s nuclear ambitions. And then there’s a chapter on energy security, terribly important, where I would argue there’s been more continuity than disruption under this administration. I talk about law enforcing co-operation, again, there’s probably been more continuity than disruption under this administration. And this is a bit of a novel topic for some people because a lot of people assume that this is really a – an area where the US co-operates with the member states, not so much with the EU, but actually, the EU, through Europol, plays an important role, and I had a – kind of, a personal ringside seat to some of this after the terrorist attacks.
And then I talk about military and security co-operation, where some people may say, “Well, really, does the EU have much power in this area?” When I argue, “Actually, it plays, while a modest role, a significant one in parts of the world, including in Africa.” Then, of course, there’s the Brexit chapter, which doesn’t hold its punches, and, kind of, gives a view about what the Brexit – sorry, what the Obama administration thought after the referendum and the analysis we did of what the likely impact of Brexit would be for the United States, Europe and the UK. That’s essentially the book.
So, you know, this was written before COVID, and here I’ll get to your question, so it gets before COVID, and, of course, a lot has happened, in terms of the Brexit issues and, sort of, the risks of fragmentation of Europe. But let me just say this, you know, despite all of the challenges, I’m left with one big impression. You know, in 2015, I was getting calls from the White House almost every week, and calls from the State Department almost every week, asking me when is the EU going to fall apart, and remember, it looked pretty wobbly. It looked very wobbly. Frontiers were sprouting up, member states were taking things into their own hands, just like in the early weeks of the COVID reaction, and from Washington’s perspective, it looked like the whole thing was going to fall apart, and I said, “No, it’s not going to fall apart and here’s why.” And I wrote a couple of cables and people thought, “Oh, we have an Ambassador who’s gone native, he’s drunk the Kool-Aid.”
But they, of course, did deal with the financial crisis, and with migration, and with the Brexit, and now, I think, with Brexit, and it’s going to deal with COVID. You saw the reactions after the wobbly first start is now much, much better and the member states, and here’s the big point, the member states actually do realise that for most of the big regional and global challenges facing the EU, they have to work together, and they actually have to work together in many instances through the EU, even in an area such as healthcare, where the EU has very few competences, right?
And now, we have the Franco-German – and we’re – I’m sure we’re going to get this, the – I think historic agreement that moves forward toward the Commission actually issuing debt in the public markets, right? Since this is not a Hamiltonian moment, but it’s a significant step between the French and the Germans to actually come together to respond on a pan-European basis. So, I hope that answers the question. I – you know, I don’t think I’m too naïve about the EU’s problems, but my bottom line in the book, Leslie and Robin and Hans, is – and others, is that the EU remains an essential partner.
Dr Leslie Vinjamuri
So, let me ask you one question, and then I’m going to come right to Robin, and then to Hans. The EU remains an essential partner, we are all in London, and not everybody on the call, but the three of us certainly are, and this means something different for the UK now, to hear you say this, and, you know, things do look different, with respect to the question of China, and they look different, with respect to the question of the UK. I will say that a few years ago, under the Chatham House Rule, there was a US official who said – who made it very clear that the EU would be much less familiar and comfortable space for the US, if the UK were to leave. So, you know, if you were to go back, in a similar capacity, is it really that straightforward, you go back, the UK’s not in, the world looks very, very different? You know, one of your chapters was on humanitarianism, nobody even really speaks in that – quite that way anymore, although COVID-19 is perhaps bringing that back, and the question of security around – I mean, does it feel very differently? Do you imagine the fact that the UK is not there to help you through any number of these challenges, with that deep familiarity and translation role, how much does it matter?
Ambassador Anthony Gardner
Well, certainly it matters, right? And there were a lot of reasons why, in the Obama administration, we concluded that Brexit would be bad for the United States, and I’ll leave aside for the moment why we thought it was bad for Europe and the UK, ‘cause it’s less relevant. But bad for the United States because the UK has played such an important role, you know, in European immigration and the Single Market, Lord Cockfield’s brainchild, to a great degree. But it’s been so important also in sanctions, and provided the intellectual input, to a great degree, on sanctions, but on many, many other issues that I can think of, and to – you know, we were so philosophically aligned on these topics that, indeed, it was an easy thing to do for me and my predecessors, to be in regular contact with the UK [inaudible – 12:46] Ambassador of the UK to the EU, and basically co-ordinate policies, and they would help us understand the EU mechanisms better. So, that’s no longer going to be the case.
The point I’m making is going to be more complicated for the United States to deal with a messier EU. We’re going to have to find coalitions of the willing on different topics, from digital to military and security and sanctions, and it’s not going to be as easy, for sure. But I think we still – if the question’s can we deal with the EU effective operator? I think the answer is yes, and if I have to identify one area particularly where I think the current administration’s policies don’t make sense is that this team in the White House views the EU not just as an ineffective actor, but worse. It subtracts from the United States’ ability to get things done. We have not sat down with the EU, for example, on WTO reform, or putting pressure together on China, and that’s something I just simply do not understand.
The only way I can understand it is I think the Trump administration distains many of the things that the EU represents, the rules-based multilateral order, and it doesn’t like the EU because it magnifies the leverage of the individual member states. And if you’re – if you have a short-term perspective about how you can maximise your benefit in negotiations, well, of course you’ll want to deal with individual EU member states, but that view as a short-term is so counterproductive because we should be caring about the medium and long-term, obviously, whether it’s China or trade, and this is what disappointment – disappoints me so much.
Dr Leslie Vinjamuri
Robin, I’m going to come to you to get your – and your reaction to that. It must be complicated, since, of course, the desire to continue to work with the EU still leaves the question open of what that means for America’s relationship with the UK. I – it can’t be anything but more complicated than it might otherwise have been. But, Robin, let me come to you ‘cause I’m sure you have some reactions and thoughts on this.
Dr Robin Niblett CMG
Well, thank you, Leslie, and, Tony, welcome to a virtual Chatham House meeting. It would have been a pleasure to have welcomed you to 10 St James’s Square, but there will be other opportunities to have you back there, but great to have you with us this evening here in London, at least London time. I was struck, when I saw the title of your book, and the use of the adjective’ essential’, ‘cause you will remember that that was the – reframing of the special relationship was reframed into an essential relationship by President Obama and David Cameron during President Obama’s first visit to London in March of 2012 and there was much made of that.
It was the time when David Cameron was desperately trying to avoid using the word ‘special’ ‘cause he felt that almost disempowered the UK. It was a, kind of, way of being overly dependent on America, a little pleading, if you see what I’m saying, and so they tried to recast it around that notion of essential, and they had this long list in the op-ed, which I was looking through ahead of this meeting with you. It was just, kind of, a list of topics in which the UK and the US were working together at the time, from Afghanistan, to development aid, to vaccine development, interesting, given where we are today. And I suppose the, kind of, opening big question I’d love to put to you, ‘cause you’ve gone through this list almost like Barack Obama and David Cameron did, the list of areas where the EU and the US are incredibly important to each other, but ‘essential’ is a really big word.
As I said, essential was picked in the UK-US side ‘cause they almost tried to dodge special. I don’t know how much time they’d put into thinking about it, but you’ve written a book with the word ‘essential’ rather than op-ed and I’m wondering where is it that you think the EU is and will be, and maybe will be is almost more important, essential to the US in achieving big global objectives here? If you’ve got your list, I could maybe triage two or three which I might think where that relationship is essential, rather than important or special or whatever, but – you know, and maybe looking ahead, outside all of the drama of the tensions that exist right now between the Trump administration and the EU specifically, but thinking more in the round, looking ahead, maybe one or two years, who knows what the – will happen in the election, where do you think that element is essential that, in a way, only the EU and the US can do, and where the – only the EU can really help the US, most importantly?
Ambassador Anthony Gardner
Well…
Dr Leslie Vinjamuri
That’s the exam questions.
Ambassador Anthony Gardner
Yeah, well, no, that’s – it’s a great challenge. So, you know, some readers might suspect that I was engaging in a hyperbole with the use of the word ‘essential’, but I actually think it is essential. But you’re right, if we ever had to pick out a few, let’s start with climate change. We’re not going to get – we’re not going to save the agreement that we signed, and we wouldn’t have signed that agreement to begin with if the United States and the EU hadn’t been aligned, and, of course, China was ess – you know, also essential to getting to an agreement. But, you know, the story I tell in that chapter about climate change is that, you know, during the 70s, the United States was leading on environmental protection, and then the EU was leading for a while, as we withdrew and basically absent, and then we had these eight years, these eight years under Obama, in which we finally were largely in sync.
We had some debates, which I recount in the chapter, but we got to that agreement. So, there – that’s an example where we were essential. Without each other, we’re not going to get there, and now we’re even bigger into the hole, into the ditch. We have to dig ourselves out of this ditch. On sanctions, this – I argue that we were essential, you know, if – you know, we, the United States, our perceptions, we had to do some spine stiffening, on a couple of occasions, and yes, it was the downing of the Malaysian aircraft that was the turning point in July, I think it was, 2014, but had – it had not been for the EU joining us and co-ordinating an international effort, ‘cause let’s remember, it wasn’t just the US and the EU, it was Canada, it was Japan, and Australia, and so forth, and others, but, again, essential, on both Iran and I think on Russia. And it reminds me, and I quote this, that if you want to go fast – this is the Zulu saying, “If you want to go fast, go alone, if you want to go far, go together.” I think it applies to both areas.
And then I would – you know, if we had to have a shortlist here, I would say that, despite our disagreements, our frictions on trade, and I have scars on my back to show that I engaged in some difficult discussions on trade, if we do not co-operate in changing, reforming the WTO and saving the WTO, and, through that, saving and protecting the rules-based multilateral training system, I don’t think we’re going to get there. Now, as one thing, of course, it’d be – it would be nice if we stopped trying to undermine it, but beyond that, it’s, I think, the Trump administration and also predecessors legitimately raise some concerns about how that institution is functioning. My view, though, is we are essential partners in fixing it, and together, we have much more leverage with the Chinese. I don’t think it’s naïve to believe we can actually get some important reforms done. So, let me leave the list at those three. I think the others are probably more debatable that I’ve listed, but certainly were important partners in those areas.
Dr Leslie Vinjamuri
Hans, are you persuaded, or do you find yourself sceptical of the answer as well as – knowing Hans, Hans is sceptical of the question, as well as sceptical about the answer.
Hans Kundnani
Well, it’s – I mean, it’s a real pleasure to listen to you, Ambassador Gardner, and I am often struck by the way that my American friends often seem to be more pro-European than Europeans, and certainly more than Brits, or a lot of Brits. So, you know, look, I mean, I agree with a lot of what you said about the need for co-operation and areas of co-operation, but let me maybe just, sort of, make two or three points about aspects, which I see slightly differently from – whether it’s a British perspective or a European perspective, I’m not sure.
The first is the way that you described the transatlantic relationship. You know, you, sort of, said that for 60 years, there’s been this consistent line among different administrations, and that Trump represents this dramatic break with that consistent line. I mean, I suppose I think of it as being more of a – a kind of, a, sort of, picture where there’ve been ups and downs. I think the relationship has evolved over time, and, in partic – and in – I think it’s – I think, if I had to summarise it, I would say that from very, very supportive attitude towards European integration at the very beginning, I mean, to the extent that you could say it was an American project to begin with, you know. So, in other words, from that beginning, you know, basically with Eisenhower, I think it has been on a downward trajectory, in terms of how supportive the United States has been of European integration, and I would personally argue, for some good reasons. But I think it’s not true to say that, you know, the United States has been consistently supportive.
There has also, I think, been a difference between Republican administrations and Democrat – Democratic administrations, so I think – I mean, Historians often see Nixon as a, kind of, a turning point in the American relations with Europe, that, you know, Nixon took it in a more, sort of, sceptical direction, I guess. But then, if you compare, say, the Bush administration with the Clinton administration, I mean, there are differences here, I think. And, for example, what you said about this way in which the Trump administration tries to deal with individual member states rather than with the EU, I mean, I remember being at the European Council on Foreign Relations in the, sort of, early, you know, 2010s, and, you know, certainly that was the perception of the United States from a European point of view at that time, certainly during the Bush administration, was that it precisely played off different EU member states against each other. Think, for example, of Donald Rumsfeld’s, you know, old Europe, new Europe, kind of, strategy, so I suppose I don’t quite see the United States as having been as consistently supportive of European integration as you describe.
And then, I guess, the second, sort of, issue is, you know, you talked a little about the internal problems of the EU, and I think I would see them as being a little bit more serious and more unresolved. I mean, you, sort of, suggested that the euro crisis and the refugee crisis, that the EU did deal with them. I mean, I see those as unresolved problems, but I also see them as things, which mean that, actually, Europe or the EU can’t be what America wants it to be. So, in other words, this current EU, I think, is not in the American interest in many ways. Just one example of that would be, you know, the low levels of defence spending, so, you know, Germany at the centre of this, low levels of defence spending, but also, because of the fiscal rules in the eurozone, they put downward pressure on defence spending in other eurozone countries as well. You know, so, I think there are some ways in which, you know, these unresolved problems are not good for America.
And then, just finally, it seems to me that – I mean, the way you put it was, well, look, the EU is still here, right? I mean, it’s survived, and I think a lot of Europeans think about it that way, too. I look at it a slightly different way, which is that I don’t think the danger is of the EU breaking up, in particular, because the costs of leaving the eurozone are so prohibitive, and the political will among pro-European elites is very, very strong, so of course they’re going to try to keep it together. The danger I see is not so much at falling apart, but, kind of, a transformation occurring. I think that’s already happened, to some extent, in the last ten years, since the euro crisis begin, where the EU turns into something different, different from what the founding fathers had in mind, and dysfunctional, in all kinds of ways. And so, even if it stays together, that’s not very reassuring for me, as somebody who is – sort of, who wants to be pro-European, at least. I could say more about the recovery fund and the response to the coronavirus and why I’m a little bit more sceptical of that – so much of a breakthrough as you do, but let me leave it there for now.
Dr Leslie Vinjamuri
Hans, thank you, that was quite a comment, and one doesn’t want to throw on what happens, if we remain with the same leader in the US that we’ve had for the last several years, but maybe you can give us your reactions to that, Ambassador Gardner. I will say we have 99 people, and Robin is tremendously good at crowd spotting, even on Zoom, so he’s recognised that we have 99 quite extraordinary people, and so we’re looking forward to your questions. I will warn the audience to be prepared to use the raised hand function, write your name in the chat function, and we will turn to you after this response from Ambassador Gardner.
Ambassador Anthony Gardner
So, another challenge, and a very effective one, but – so, let me say this. Of course, we’ve had ups and downs. Iraq war being one, but also, the Snowden, and let’s not underestimate the crisis of trust and confidence during, you know, the post-Snowden period, and I walked into that, you know, in March of 2014, and it was tough to deal with, not only in member states like Germany, but also, with the European institutions. So, of course, we’ve had our ups and downs, but I – if you base yourself, for example, on public pronouncements, which are, okay, yeah, one indicator, I think you would have to conclude that, in fact, there has been more consistency than otherwise. Whether it’s Bush Junior, Bush Senior, Reagan, I mean, we were, and certainly in all public pronouncements, supportive of European integration for – and for good reason.
It’s been also terrific for American businesses that the Single Market has taken off. You know, and yes, of course, you can point at instances where administrations have dealt with member states separately, in order to get advantage. I mean, you know, but to point out certain inconsistencies doesn’t, I think, detract from the point is that we have, until this administration, seen the advantages, the value-added, of the movement toward greater European integration. There are many aspects to this, not just economic, but also political. You know, this is a moving – this is, indeed, a moving target, and was always seen as a moving target. Those who don’t think that European integration had, at its el – at its core, a political component, are – I think, have not read the historical record.
This was not just an economic, you know, coalition of states. This was profoundly political, and, in fact, in the European treaties, it’s the union of peoples, right? The – I think either the term is a ‘union of peoples’ and not of countries, and the definition of that will evolve over time. Even under my watch, the EU was slowly getting more powers over areas that people would not have imagined, even a few years prior, for example, control of external frontiers. You know, the EU, of course, is a member state competence in the EU jargon, but the EU is slowly taking on more powers over the protection of external frontiers through Frontex, which has grown exponentially from a rather modest force.
Energy security, who would have thought that the EU actually, and gas, at least, and gas, and also in electricity, but particularly gas, would take on more powers through the single energy package, and taking more powers, for example, in pushing for greater diversification of supplying routes and infrastructure projects around Europe. But there are a lot of other instances as well, and now we have what I think is a significant step forward. It’s not what everyone had hoped, in terms of the Franco-German declaration, but how could one not define this decision by Germany as not being historic? I would not agree with any conclusion that this is not historic.
So, you – my view is that – and this is how I would summarise this as, if the EU did not exist today, what would Europe look like, and would that be a better Europe for the United States? Absolutely not. I have no doubt about it, it would be a Europe much more fragmented, much less capable of responding to regional and global challenges than the EU today, with all of its flaws, with all of its many flaws that I witnessed. So I think it’s been absolutely correct for the US administration, until Trump, to say that yes, euro is an unfinished business and is perhaps fundamentally flawed in some ways, as we all know why, but is an evolving project that we should support.
Dr Leslie Vinjamuri
Wonderful. I like your answer, I have to say. I hope that – I hope we get there, but ques – if you put your name in the Q&A, and then I can call on you. If you really – if you have noise or children or cats and dogs in the background and you’d rather write in the question, please do. But I really would love to hear some of your voices, so if you write your name into the Q&A, that would be great. I’m going to start with Alex – a question from Alex Foulkes, who’s said “Is NATO doomed if President Trump wins a second term? Will there be a European alternative in such a case?” Why don’t we begin with that?
Ambassador Anthony Gardner
Well, I’d be interested in your – Leslie, in your thought, and Robin, and Hans, you know. Well, look, I’m not a NATO expert, and it was my colleague, Doug Lute, who was a terrific guy, who was Ambassador at NATO. No, I don’t think so. I think, despite a lot of the bluster, I suspect this – you know, in a second term, even Trump would say NATO, for all its flaws, you can complain about lack of defence spending, it’s an institution actually we need to preserve, and he’ll continue to rattle the cage and get – hopefully, get defence spending on the right trajectory. There is no alternative. That’s my view, at least. There is no alternative, and I never saw the emerging quest for greater European autonomy, which is the – another jargon in the EU as being complementary and not competitive with NATO.
They’re doing different things, and, in fact, I consider the emerging identity of Europe and EU defence and security as helpful, and whether it’s in Africa or in the Balkans, and this is something, you know, I go into detail in my book, even the US military sees as complementary and not competitive. As long as it doesn’t build up a large bureaucracy, which I don’t think it’s going to do, spend a lot of useless money on pen pushers, and suddenly decide they’re going to take away – you know, fighting capability away from NATO and make it purely for European uses, then, I think this is a positive thing.
Dr Leslie Vinjamuri
Okay, I’m going to come to Dee Smith, and then I’m hoping that Jamie Shea will…
Ambassador Anthony Gardner
Ah.
Dr Leslie Vinjamuri
…give us a comment. I think you – you’re not off the hook, Jamie, we know you’re there, but we’ll come to Dee Smith first. Dee, if you unmute and go ahead and ask your question.
Dee Smith
Thank you very much, a really interesting conversation. Can you hear me?
Ambassador Anthony Gardner
Sure.
Dr Leslie Vinjamuri
Yes.
Dee Smith
Okay, good. One never knows. So, my question has to do with a bit of crystal ball gazing, if you might indulge in that, which is to ask, where do you think the EU will be in a year, five years, maybe a bit longer, in terms of the attitude towards China? And obviously, that relates to where the US may be, but do you see a coherent approach evolving in Europe, vis-à-vis its attitude towards various aspects of Chinese activity, you know, from technology, to Belt and Road and all these different things? There seem to be different strokes for different folks in different parts of Europe at the moment, I just would love to have your thoughts on whether that will become more coherent or not.
Dr Leslie Vinjamuri
And let me add, before you answer, we’ve – we have two other questions that have come in on a, sort of, related topic, one from Dillwyn Griffiths, “Is the EU doomed to be squeezed in the US China cold war?” Chris Gallet, similar question, “Do you think that Europe will be forced to choose, you know, China or the US?” So, a lot of, as we know, concern for what China means, not only for the EU, but for the US and the EU.
Ambassador Anthony Gardner
Alright, well, we need you to also answer this, ‘cause I know Chatham House has probably written, you know, libraries of stuff on this topic. Look, and just from my perspective, I’ll be hopefully brief, I’ve seen a sea change in the EU’s perception of China, and the member state perception of China, so let’s maybe differentiate. But in terms of the EU, a great deal more scepticism about China, and it’s reflected in a lot of papers, you know, the External Action Service, White Paper on China being one example, but played out also in practical ways, and particularly on the trade in commercial front, the tightening of rules proposed with clearly China in mind on foreign direct investment, on anti-subsidy rules, on rules for, you know, free trade agreements, and in the focus on labour and environment and intellectual property protection, and a change in the competition rules that are being proposed.
The list is long, and the tightening, by the way, already now a couple of years ago, of the anti-dumping rules, not specifically against China, but certainly with China in mind. So, a great deal of concern, for sure. Now, China has been very astute, and why wouldn’t they be? You know, they also are trying to achieve maximum advantage, through very targeted investments, in a couple of states, who they perceive to be particularly needy of foreign indirect investment, and through that, they, arguably, have achieved a – changes in the public pronouncements of some member states, with regard to Chinese policies, regard to human rights, and the South China Sea, and so forth. So, they’ve been playing their cards very, very well, but I do see a change and I do see a tightening. I think this is a medium to long-term trend that will persist.
So, in the United States, as we all know, this is an area of bipartisan agreement, one of the few ones, by the way, China, China and China being the real challenge. So, I think the US and the EU are more and more aligned that we do need to work together on everything from standard setting, setting the rules of the road and free trade agreements around the world, rules, for example, on everything from artificial intelligence and internet of things. You know, the list is long. There’s a long list of areas where we need to work together.
Dr Leslie Vinjamuri
Okay, let me come to Bart. Bart’s got a question there, I guess I can read that out, which is – it’s related – it’s not – it’s actually on a different track, so I don’t know if anybody else had a comment on China. I guess I want to say one thing before I come to Bart’s question, which is, you know, it’s become very commonplace to say, you know, there’s a bipartive consensus on – bipartisan consensus on China in the US, and that there’s more agreement than disagreement, and that the difference is that if Vice-President Biden were to become President, that there would be – you know, we’d work – that the US would work with its partners, but that’s really the chief difference. But I wonder, you know, things look one way when you’re in the middle of unprecedented protests, the COVID-19 crisis, and an election, and maybe they look different when you’re through those things. And I – part of me wonders – you know, I don’t know what that means for America’s position with respect to China, but I suspect it doesn’t mean that everything remains exactly the same, so maybe that’s something to ponder and to get your thoughts on. But I’m going to ask a different question now, unfair, but Bart Gumbard has said “What is the single, most important reform that the EU needs to be more effective?” And I – and maybe I would add, and if you were to end up back in Brussels, you know, what would you ask? Where would you leverage your ask on that dimension, from a US perspective?
Ambassador Anthony Gardner
Wow, that is the first time I’ve been asked that question. That’s a fascinating one. There’s so many things the EU needs to do. By the way, just yesterday, I think, they published an interesting – another wisemen’s report. EU’s great at many things, but it’s absolutely a world leader in wisemen’s reports. And this one – I mean, I shouldn’t be flippant, because this was an important piece of work on deepening the Capital Markets Union, which has really been a disappointment and is very necessary, especially now, with the leading financial centre going to be in the country and it’s going to be out of the EU. And it’s – the report was led by Thomas Wieser, who has just – who is part of the Eurogroup. So, they’re clearly going to have to understand that capital markets reform is essential.
I would add a second thing, and similar to the first thing, it’s not a – it’s not something that the US can influence. We don’t have, you know, directly a dog in this fight, it would be inappropriate for us to be active or trying to influence, and that is the way that the EU makes decisions. You know, it’s interesting because in TTIP, we actually try to make this part of the dialogue, you know, the transparency of regular Tory decision-making, and our message was basically to the EU, you know what? You should make rules like we make rules, under the Administrative Procedure Act, whereby, drafts are issued, they’re published, and everybody, absolutely everybody, can make comments, and, in fact, they have to be responded to in the round, not each one individually.
And, as we all know, EU decision-making is still quite opaque. Without getting into the horrible detail of the trialogue decision-making procedure, it is rather opaque, and when – and ask any businesses, by the way, they would agree with you, European or American. When proposed legislation comes out of the sausage factory, it’s often very difficult to influence that proposed legislation. So, I think, you know, it was legitimate to point out, along with European critics, that the EU should be more transparent and open to outside comments on proposed legislation, but I feel uncomfortable with lecturing the EU about what to do.
Dr Leslie Vinjamuri
Robin, did you want to add anything to this before I come – I have several questions here, but before I come to the next one, and then to Alice Eckman, who I know is also in the audience, and always has a brilliant question?
Dr Robin Niblett CMG
Well, just – I mean, you’ve got a lot of questions, so I’ll be very quick, I suppose, if you’re inviting me, Leslie. You know, the big question, if the EU’s going to be an essential partner to the US is where does it have power? And I think you alluded to a number of those areas. It’s been sadly lacking on the financial side because of the absence of a Capital Markets Union, but that, in a way, has prevented the EU from being as powerful in its capacity to grow, to create deep markets for start-ups, etc., deep liquid capital markets for start-ups. So I’m wondering whether you thought the rise of the euro, looking, again, further to the front, if the euro rises, as, over time, it may do, if not an alternative to the dollar, certainly as a credible both reserve currency, trade currency, etc., is that good? Does that make it more of a partner, or is it something that administrations in the US are going to start to worry about, given the great latitude given to US financial policy by the rise of the euro? So, I’m just trying to think almost the other side of Hans, if the US should get stronger, if it gets its act together, round the Capital Markets Union, round the capacity for greater fiscal co-ordination, as you noted through the German decision to back the French on the big recovery fund, is this the beginning of the EU becoming more of a competitor to the US? And it’s lovely having an essential partner when, in a way, it’s number two, but when it becomes a little bit more of an equal, it’s a lot tougher, isn’t it?
Dr Leslie Vinjamuri
I’m not going to let you answer that question yet, I want you to reflect on that, ‘cause that’s a big question. And, so, I’m going to come to Alice Ekman, who’s going to ask even a bigger question, and then you’re going to have two to grapple with all at the same time. Alice.
Alice Ekman
Thank you, Leslie, do you hear me well?
Dr Leslie Vinjamuri
Yes.
Alice Ekman
Yes, sorry, I don’t have the image because I’m on a iPhone, but anyway, thank you so much, Ambassador, for these great comments. I’m a China expert, working for EU affiliated think tank so, of course, I have a China question for you to follow-up with the previous one. You notice more scepticism about China, that’s for sure. At the same time, is the evolution of strategic, I would say, analysis in Brussels is to say that, in light of the growing rivalry between Washington and Beijing, EU is also feeling pressure and regarding China. So, what would you say would be an ideal transatlantic co-operation on China, not only on the contents of the co-operation, but also on the methodology about co-operation? How concretely EU and the US could work together? I’m thinking also about technological issues. Of course, there is a big debate around 5G, but there is also strategic and security questions surrounding surveillance cameras, AI, that you mentioned, drones, data centre, blockchain and many other technical – technological issues.
The second question I would have is about global governance reform. Would you expect that the election might, to some extent, change a US approach to what global governance and yeah, to realism, to a direction that would give more opportunity for Brussels and Washington to co-operate on this or to reshape the current block on governance system, in a way that is in line with the transatlantic interests? Thank you very much.
Ambassador Anthony Gardner
Well…
Dr Leslie Vinjamuri
So, now you have three questions, and I should say that that second question from Alice has been echoed by a few of our…
Ambassador Anthony Gardner
Yeah.
Dr Leslie Vinjamuri
…few other of our panel participants.
Ambassador Anthony Gardner
Well, that’s – that is so interesting. Look, let me maybe start with the second, this is just my view, is that yes, there would be a dramatic change if Joe Biden wins. I recount, in the last chapter of my book, the conclusions, on two speeches, one given by John Kerry, in Brussels, in the last weeks of the administration, 2016, at the Concert Noble in downtown Brussels, and a speech given two years later, also hosted by the German Marshall Fund, by Secretary of State Pompeo. And if everyone wants to, kind of, see, in two speeches, the polar opposite views of the Obama and the Trump administrations about Europe and multilateralism particularly, it’s those two speeches. They are night and day.
Pompeo spent most of his speech ridiculing multilateralism, as basically undermining sovereignty, and we should just throw it out the window, ignoring, again, 60 years of American foreign policy, where we built, together with Europe, after all, we built these institutions, whether it’s the World Trading System or the UN and other things. So, we would go back, we, to the bi administration, would go back, I think, to the concept that, you know, multilateralism isn’t somehow an affront to sovereignty, something that some Brexiters believe is the case, I don’t think is the case, multilateralism actually can magnify your security and your prosperity, but, admittedly, now needs to change, and be reformed, so we can’t go back to, like, the days of, you know, of a few years ago and pretend nothing has happened. There’s scepticism about free trade and how the WTO functions and so forth. So, we need to reflect on that, and we need to work with the EU, on many areas, and I think Alice, was it, mentioned a few of them.
You know, there’s a terrific book that came out, also called The Brussels Effect, by Anu Bradford, and often people belittle the EU, but the EU is a superpower, in a couple of ways, and a superpower on trade and superpower on regulation. It loves regulation. People make fun of it, but it’s an important standard set around the world. Together, the [inaudible – 47:47] and the EU can help write the rules on important things, and mentioned by the speaker, artificial intelligence, writing the rules about what we consider is appropriate use of AI, facial recognition, internet of things. When we write the rules, we can actually promote our values around the world and the emerging technologies, of which those are some, and through free trade agreements.
Now that’s also a way for us to promote our vision of the future, protection of the environment, labour, and intellectual property protection being some of them, right? All of those are hugely important. Working together, we can ensure, very importantly, that standard-setting bodies like the ITU, International Telecommunications Union, or the WIPO, for protection of intellectual property, are not dominated by certain countries that do not share our values and our beliefs, particularly on human rights.
Now, it’s interesting. Human rights are words that I don’t think are ever used in this administration, ever, I don’t recall them ever being used. Or how about anticorruption, or good governance? We used to believe in these things. The EU believes in these things, and, for those who think these are floppy words without meaning, they’re hugely significant, ‘cause when we no longer believe in them, areas that are turbulent become even more turbulent, and bad actors, in the Balkans or Northern Africa and elsewhere, become more influential. We had a tremendously effective agenda together on all of those things. So, I would work with the EU on those topics.
You know, on the rise of the euro, it’s int – it’s an interesting topic, but let me – can I be blunt and maybe provocative, Robin? And I’ll tell you, I think I’ve said – told this story before and even in the book, when I arrived in 1994 at the White House, my first question I posed to the Treasury Department, actually I rang up the Chief of Staff, to Larry Summers, I said, “What’s our policy on the single currency?” The answer was, “We don’t need to have one ‘cause it’s never going to happen,” and, of course, it happened a few years later. But I think the view is, even today, that, you know, is the euro really going to be a challenger to the dollar? I don’t see – you know, assuming Biden wins, I don’t see a lot of ink being spilled about an issue which is academically interesting, and a phenomenon that could occur at some point, maybe, you know, 20/30 years hence, I have no idea, but it’s not something I think that administration’s going to be hugely focused on.
What I do see as more relevant in the short-term is this. When we abuse our privileges, as the world’s financial centre and the role of the dollar, to uni – you know, impose unilateral sanctions around the world, there’s going to be a reaction. That reaction will take some time, right? Whether it’s an alternative to our Terrorist Finance Tracking Programme, or an alternative to non-dollar payment systems, we’ve seen a rather modest – very modest EU effort in that regard, the INSTEX programme, but, you know, there will be a reaction, and we do see efforts of the EU to promote the euro, in certain areas of world trade, like oil, but not just oil. So, you know, I think the question is obviously very important, but I don’t see it as a major threat.
Let me just finish, sorry, I’m taking too long, but I wanted to say something at the very beginning, because we’re living in a COVID world, right? And I didn’t even mention COVID. I did some archaeological digging. I went back to a document I was involved in in 1995, the New Transatlantic Agenda, signed in Madrid at a US-EU summit, and guess what I found in this document? I found the following sentence, “We will establish an EU-US force – taskforce to develop and implement an affective global early warning system and response network for communicable diseases,” and we promise a lot of things in the document, which I helped to draft. Said we would work with the WHO, right, on emerging and remerging communicable diseases. What did we do? Almost nothing. Even though, in 2015, we did effectively – belatedly but effectively, deal with the outbreak of Ebola in West Africa. So, that’s another area where the absence of US-EU collaboration on coronavirus, to me, is just bizarre. There’s so many aspects of this, trade, and health, and others.
Dr Leslie Vinjamuri
I think bizarre and bizarre is putting it lightly, and dangerous, perhaps, and possibly even devastating, but I want to say one thing, and then I want to come to one last question and a last comment perhaps from Robin and Hans to you before we wrap up. On this question of human rights, I mean, it is interesting, as you know, Secretary Pompeo appointed a commission on unalienable rights, which was due to release its report, which is, in effect, on human rights, chaired by Mary Ann Glendon, I believe, and the third part of that, as I understand it, was to be – I don’t know if it’s now on hold indefinitely, I’m not sure, but the third part of it was on the surveillance state, which I think really was going to take this question of China, obviously surveillance and human rights, in one form or another, quite seriously, in what direction we don’t know. But I think that question of human rights certainly has been on the agenda of the State Department in a way that perhaps some people have been worried about what it would mean. But to say it’s not there, I think it was there in one way, we think – you know, I think the – you know, the question of how the Biden administration would talk about values and human rights might seem much more familiar to a European audience, but I think the question of rights is there, you know, in a certain kind of way, for the Trump administration.
I want to just read out a question to you from Kieran, there’s so many good questions, so we’re going to have – we’re going to come back to this conversation quite a lot, especially since you live here in London, but from Kieran, I guess it raises a really fundamental question. I’m going to ask the Trump part of it. “Will the US with – well, he says with either President Trump or Biden, seek to deal with individual EU countries, as opposed to with the EU as a whole? On the case of Trump, will this, in the event of a – you know, of a re-election, will this lead to Trump to divide the EU?” And even with Biden, would he just seek to look for stronger individual allies? Before you answer that, I want to give really just one minute, Hans, and Hans and then Robin, and then back to you to close up.
Hans Kundnani
Thanks, so, I want to come back to this question, I think from Bart, which I thought was brilliant, about what – you know, what’s the one reform that you would make, you know, from an American point of view? I thought this was quite fascinating because, to me, it links to something that you said, Ambassador Gardner, earlier on about how, you know, the US should support the European project, right? I think the question for the United States should be not should we support it or not, but what kind of European Union do we want? What kind of union would be in the American interest? And I thought this question got to exactly that point, that, you know, and so I – you know, you were, sort of, saying we don’t really have a dog in this fight. I would, sort of, almost encourage you to, sort of, enter this fight, as it were, as the United States, ‘cause I think Europeans actually need the United States to do this.
So, I would like to see a clearer idea from the United States of what kind of EU is in the American interest, you know, and that could be a more capable EU, with military resources, or it could be, as you suggested, Ambassador Gardner, a more transparent, democratic EU, right? That could also be a way of thinking about what kind of EU is in the American interest? My own personal answer to the question of the one reform that needs to take place would be the fiscal rules, and here, for example, the Italians would love the United States to give them a bit more of a – sort of, aggressive support, in relation to the Germans. So I guess what I’m trying to say is, I would love to see an – you know, when Biden is President, I would love to see the United States actually having a dog in this fight, not to undermine the EU, but to save it.
Dr Leslie Vinjamuri
And Robin.
Dr Robin Niblett CMG
Just a great conversation, Tony, thank you very much for spurring it and driving it, and for putting the book together, which has captured all of your wisdom on it. So, I suppose my closing comment would be to say that it strikes me, both from this conversation and other things, that the biggest challenge to the US, in the coming years, is the rise of China. It is a strategic challenge to the US. There’s no doubt that, if the US and Europe are united in managing that rise, and it doesn’t have to be confronting it, but managing it, we will both be stronger, and I think it would be best probably for all three, to be honest, but Europe is divided, internally within countries more than it is between countries. I think the biggest challenge for the EU is the future of Sub-Saharan Africa, and this is a topic, which maybe – well, you tell me, I think the US maybe relatively indifferent to, but it’s one that Europe may have to grapple with by itself, and it will influence its relationship with China on how it does it and how it doesn’t, and China will play that a little bit to engage the Europeans. So, I just throw those two random thoughts out at the end, just to add to the menu. Thank you very much.
Dr Leslie Vinjamuri
I think the final comments are from you, Ambassador Gardner.
Ambassador Anthony Gardner
Well, I know that people probably have to leave, it’s the top of the hour, but this was just terrific. It made me actually think about quite a few things I hadn’t thought about before. Let me just get back to one thing you said, Leslie, about human rights. You know, why was I so definitive? You know, when we have a United States that embraces Hungary and Poland in a way that it has, despite its obvious undermining of EU charter fundamental rights, it makes me uncomfortable. We have promoted Euroscepticism with a – in an effort to undermine the EU, which I think is counterproductive. I think we should be outspoken, that when – you know, obviously it hasn’t happened under this administration, but we should be outspoken that when the media is under pressure, or when judicial independence is under pressure, that’s not a good thing.
So, it’s – to me, it’s been rather sad that that it’s occurred. I do agree, so, Hans, absolutely, I would agree with what you said, we should be outspoken about some things. We want a European Union that’s open, transatlantic, not protectionist. Also, not only ‘cause it’s good for us, but ‘cause it’s – you know, that would be a good for Europe. We should not draw the wrong lessons from the COVID crisis to say suddenly we’re going to become autarkic, we’re going to build up national champions, we’re going to disrupt supply chains, we’re going to walk away from free trade, and so forth. But that would be the wrong kind of Europe, and it should be a Europe that believes and protects on fundamental values and human rights, and it is – actually, if I had to point to one major threat to the EU, it’s that the EU’s unable to make all of its member states actually live up to those core standards in the Charter of Fundamental Rights. And if it can’t do that, what is it actually good for? That is a really big question.
You know, on the fiscal rules, you know, how many times did prior administrations actually make this point? Every year, practically, we told the Germans, “Use your fiscal space. You’ve got fiscal space, you use it,” and they yawned, right? Basically. So, we’ve been lecturing Germany for years and years about this, without much success, but now it’s actually occurred. So, I’m – you know, I’m hopeful that there’s movement. Again, thank you, again, to Chatham House for hosting me, a wonderful institution. I actually wrote my thesis at Oxford mostly in what was then known as the Cuttings Room, I believe, the Press Cuttings Room, so, thank you for that.
Dr Leslie Vinjamuri
I think on that note, Robin’s going to have to say a last word, since he will know where that was and what that means, and I wish everybody a glass of champagne. If you were in the building, we would be heading upstairs for a reception, and that will happen, it just isn’t happening today, but it’s been wonderful. Robin, I don’t know if you want to say a final farewell.
Dr Robin Niblett CMG
Well, all I can say is we can’t guarantee champagne. I don’t know where that came from, Leslie, but never mind, it’ll be out of your programme budget, I suspect, but maybe for – to celebrate the book, we might be able to find it somewhere. I think the Press Cuttings Room is in part of what we’ve regained in our SNF wing, so we lost that space for a while, but it has been regained, so maybe that’s a positive thing to look forward to. But any case, Tony, thank you again, on behalf of all my colleagues at Chatham House, Leslie, Hans, for being part of it, and, as Leslie’s handed to me, am I meant to say farewell, then? I’d say thank you to everyone who joined us this evening, a great group of people from all over the world. I was looking through all of those participants, and I would expect nothing less for Tony Gardner. Good friend as well as one of those Americans who understands the EU. It’s a rare thing, and I can say that as a Brit ‘cause it’s pretty rare in the UK, as well. Thank you very much, Tony. See you everyone, bye. See you at the next time. Unmute, we need to unmute.