Dr Leslie Vinjamuri
…and relish it, and succinct questions when we get there. We all know why we’re here. We are sitting on the edge of our seats. There is a – it’s been a year of elections. We’ve all said this at Chatham House many, many times, but it really is a year of elections, leading up to one that a very significant, I would argue, we’re going to hear a range of views perhaps, consequence for Europe, for the world, and certainly for the United States and its citizens and non-citizens, and for its democracy.
So, we are here to talk about what’s at stake, where we are and where we’re heading, what’s likely to result, not that any of us know, we don’t, and what the significance is. We have a tremendous set of panellists. They are, as you know, ‘cause you will have read before you joined us, they are not pollsters. There are so many polls, we’ve read them, we all know them, we might discuss them, but we are not here to talk about the polls. You have some people who know the United States, who have worked on the United States, who understand the domestic scene, but these are deeply – people who are deeply schooled in foreign policy, in international politics, and I won’t give long introductions. I will say a word about them each, briefly.
We’re going to start with Professor Steve Walt, he is the Robert and Renee Professor of International Affairs, at the Harvard Kennedy School of Government, but he’s in Vienna. So, those are not his books, they are fabulously looking books, Steve, but they’re not your books. Very well known to all us for his scholarship across many decades, and, also, for his regular column in Foreign Policy magazine, which you can read online and I’m sure you have. After Steve, we’re going to turn to our very own Sir Peter Westmacott, who you know. He’s been Ambassador – Britain’s Ambassador to Turkey, France and the United States. He’s Senior Advisor here on the US and Americas Programme and a very well-known thinker on these issues, based in London.
Then to Sanam Vakil, my colleague, who directs our Middle East and North Africa Programme, a Scholar of Iran, teaches at SAIS Bologna, and has been having quite a year and a half – a year and several months. And Norbert Röttgen, definitely not least, but will speak last, from the German Bundestag, was the leader of the Foreign Affairs Committee from I think 2014 to 2021, correct? Is still a member of the Foreign Affairs Committee, and really the order is so that when we get to the end, we can really get the thinking that’s coming from Germany, from Europe, on what the stakes are for this election, since, after all, we’re not in the United States, we are abroad.
Steve, we’re going to start with you, because you’ve got the heaviest footprint, even though you’re in Vienna today, you’ve had the heaviest footprint in recent years in the United States, including in Donald Trump’s United States. I’m sure you were there when Harris got the nomination. Give us your thoughts on where we are and what the significance is.
Professor Stephen M. Walt
Terrific. Thanks, Leslie, it’s a real pleasure to be here, or, at least, virtually here, talking with everybody. Let me make several points, partly about the election itself, but then also, about what it means for foreign policy. The first point I’d make is this is a rather odd election, because, in some ways, it’s not about specific policy disagreements. I don’t want to overstate that, but to a large extent, not much attention is being paid to the specific proposals or plans. You know, we’ve been debating things like whether immigrants are eating cats and dogs, or whether Trump is a fascist or whatever, rather than focusing on what each side is proposing.
Now, to be sure, there are some big differences on say, human – on women’s rights, on NATO, on Ukraine and on foreign economic policy, and I’m sure we’ll get into those. But very importantly, foreign policy issues are not critical to most voters and there’s less difference between the two candidates than you might think. Not much of a gap on China, for example, and at least, in the campaign, there hasn’t been much of a gap on Middle East policy. So, foreign policy is not going to be playing a critical role in this campaign, in my judgment. It’s an election about feelings, about identity, about which tribe a voter belongs to. You know, should the United States be a mostly white, mostly Christian patriarchy where Presidents have much greater power, or should it be a multicultural and inclusive nation, where checks and balances still operate, and the President is not above the law? I think that’s the fundamental way the election’s being framed for most voters.
Second point, hardly anybody’s going to change their vote at this point. The critical issue is which campaign can get its voters to the polls. And here you should remember that Trump outperformed the polls in both 2016 and 2020, but Democrats have outperformed the polls ever since then, such as the 2022 midterms. So, each side has some reason for optimism as we go into next Tuesday. Harris has more money, Democrats have put more effort into their ground game. Trump is busy trying to energise his base, and that’s what that crazy rally in New York City was all about. It was not about broadening his appeal to other voters. It was about getting the MAGA faithful to turnout.
Third point, neither party is going to accept the outcome as legitimate, but they’re going to question it in different ways, and if you’re not going to see a landslide, which means the vote is going to be disputed, it may take days to resolve it. If Trump loses, Republicans are going to contest the outcome and claim it was stolen. They’ll replay 2020. If Harris loses, and especially if she wins the popular vote but loses in the Electoral College, Democrats are going to blame voter suppression. They’ll say Trump has no mandate, but they won’t try to do a January 6th or try to halt the transfer of power. And I mention all this because it means polarisation is going to continue in the United States, regardless of who wins. Far-right groups, like the Federalist Society, people like Elon Musk, are going to be pushing their agendas, and that matters because polarisation is going to make it harder for whoever wins to conduct a consistent and effective foreign policy.
Let me just end with one or two quick thoughts on foreign policy itself. I think Biden’s record is going to look worse and worse over time, the Ukraine War is not going to end well, no matter who wins the presidential election, and the Middle East is a disaster. If Harris wins and then doesn’t clean house and change course, those problems are going to dog her entire presidency. I think she and her closest Advisors know that, so I actually expect some important shifts in US policy if she wins. If Trump wins and does what he said he wants to do, America’s relations with much of the world are likely to be transformed, and in my view, not in a good way. I’m sure we’ll all have more to say about that, but let me stop here and look forward to hearing what my fellow panellists have to say on this topic. Thanks.
Dr Leslie Vinjamuri
Thank you, Steve. I might at some point come back to you for the one thing that you – where is the silver lining, or will there be a silver lining? But a serious one, but I’ll hold that for now. Peter?
Sir Peter Westmacott
Thank you very much. Great start from Steve. A couple of comments. First of all, on the campaign, you’re quite right, as you said, Leslie, that none of us knows what’s going to happen. It is neck and neck, the polls have been wrong in the past, and even if you do believe in polls and you look at the seven battleground states, it’s very, very tight, and maybe Trump’s a whisker ahead in more than Kamala Harris is, but it’s too close to call.
What I think is going to be the case, because as Steve says, everybody’s pretty much decided which way they’re going to vote, is what happens in the ground game? You know, who is going to be most successful in getting out the vote? And there, I’m hearing, but who knows whether this is right or not, that the Democrats have got a lot of money and a lot of professional people and a lot of organisation, in some of those key states, and that they are feeling, I won’t say confident, but they’re feeling – they’re better organised. Whereas the Republicans seem to be spending a lot of that resource and that money in getting ready for legal contest when they lose in certain states that they don’t want to. So, in terms of where the numbers come out on election day, it may be that there’s just a, you know, a shading in Kamala’s favour, but, you know, who knows? It’ll depend on the weather. It depends on whether there are any more bonfires of the early votes, which I saw some of them went up in flames, so what do you do about those? And we have to wait and see.
Meanwhile, the campaign itself is, you know, staggering to the end. It is somewhat extraordinary when you think that you listen to the President of the United States saying that “The only garbage” that he sees “floating around the Caribbean is that of Trump’s supporters,” and then where’s the apostrophe? Is it one supporter’s comment about garbage, or is he, as the Republicans are claiming, referring to all Trump supporters? You know, the position of the apostrophe suddenly becomes an important election issue. It’s, sort of, bizarre for the rest of us, but it’s an indication of the tightness, and I’m afraid, some of the, you know, unpleasantness of some of that campaign. The rest of us can but watch and see what is going to happen.
One little word on what’s going on in Madison Square Garden and in New York State. It is a bit odd, if you like, you’re trying to win the presidential election, and you’re Donald Trump and you go to a state which you know you’ve lost, but there’s another game I think being played, which is, what about the congressional races? And I think that he’s probably quite keen to pick up some seats in New York State which the Democrats would normally hold, and which the Republicans would like to pick up.
The expectation is that the Republicans will take the Senate and that the Democrats will actually win back the House. But if that doesn’t happen, and if there’s a majority in the House, and let us remember that the congressional changes take place before the inauguration of the next President, before he’s confirmed by Congress, there is a risk, and a lot of people in America are looking at this rather carefully, that there’ll be some kind of attempt to get the new majority in the House of Representatives to block the certification process in the event that Kamala Harris wins. If that is the tactic, and I do not know whether it is, but a lot of people who know more about it than I do believe so, then it makes sense that a big effort is being made in some of those states which Trump has lost in the presidential term, but where the Republican Party might be able to pick up some valuable seats in the congressional races. So, I think we just need to watch carefully several different layers of this electoral process.
A couple of other brief comments, I know I’ve got to be short. Foreign policy and so on, I think the only point that I would say, Steve, forgive me if I’m – if you think I’m wrong on this, is that I’ve felt for a number of months that one foreign policy issue has actually been a problem for Biden/Kamala Harris, and that has been Israel-Gaza. I don’t think there are many votes to be won or lost in terms of Ukraine. There’s a degree of, unfortunately, Ukraine fatigue, not only in America but elsewhere. But I think that whether it’s the Muslim vote in Michigan, or whether it’s the independence, or whether it’s the young on the student campus, or whether it’s, you know, the other undecideds, I think there has been a sense amongst people who would normally be either floating voters or Democrat voters, who are a bit disappointed in the way in which the administration, as they see it, has not been prepared to stand up more firmly to the retaliation, if you like, from the Israeli Government side.
The tragedy – there are many tragedies of all this, but the tragedy from Palestinians is that they start counting on the 8th of October, and Israel started counting on the 7th and, you know, there are different perspectives of that awfulness. And I think that the – despite Tony Blinken going to the region 11 times, Bill Burns going as many times to try and get a deal, a ceasefire, a hostage release, the fact is that the Biden administration hasn’t been able to make progress. And I – seems to me that that’s been a bit of a drag on their attempt to pick up votes in territory where they would normally hope to do so.
On Ukraine and so on, I think it’s a bit of a wash at the moment. Strategically, for the rest of the world, you could argue that what happens in Ukraine-Russia is even more important than, if you like, another round of appalling human suffering in the Middle East. Let’s see, we can discuss this later on, what happens in the light of a Trump victory or a Kamala Harris victory, in terms of the likely US policy towards dealing with those two crises, but particularly the Ukraine one.
So, I think foreign policy, a bit important in one particular area during the election, very important for the rest of us who care about not only those issues that I’ve mentioned, but also, management of China, also, the future of NATO, also, transatlantic relationships. And dare I say it, in the event that things are very close and there is contest going on of the sort that I was talking about, if there is a challenge to the outcome of the democratic process, and we have six months or more of, if you like, democratic crisis in America, that is bad news for the moral leadership of America and the Western world. And, potentially, it is an open door for bad guys in other part of the world to do stuff that America will not be in a position to do anything about because it will be distracted by its own democratic crisis.
Dr Leslie Vinjamuri
You’ve put a huge amount on the table, and I’m very glad that you’ve raised questions about the Middle East and about Ukraine, because I know our next two speakers will bring those into sharp focus. One comment on the Bi – President Biden’s comments about Trump supporters. It does give a moment – it has given an opportunity for Kamala Harris to differentiate herself, because it wasn’t the presidential nominee who said this, it was the sitting President. And so that is a, sort of – you know, in a campaign period where there’s been a lot of critique of Kamala Harris for not differentiating herself, and we know there are political reasons for her not to differentiate herself, her President did very well in the swing states. One big reason to be careful about how much you pull away from your President when you’re running to replace him, but that is a, sort of – an interesting comment.
The other thing I would, sort of, put on the table as we move forward into this conversation, is there’s a – in my view, maybe not Steve Walt’s view, there’s a rather bizarre debate that’s been going on for months now about whether these two candidates, Donald Trump and Kamala Harris, are really any different when it comes to foreign policy, or whether, at the end of the day, it’s really going to be more or less the same. And I’m not making this up, and some people make this argument with great eloquence, with great theory, concept and case, to marshal the argument. I think it’s fundamentally misguided and wrong myself, but it is a really important debate, whether America’s heading in a certain direction regardless of who is elected, when it comes to its international relations, with perhaps, you know, a few exceptions, like, climate change. Even there you’ll see people saying that there might not be as big of a difference as we think. But that is an orienting question for this panel that I want to make sure that we carry on throughout the conversation, and Sanam, I think you’re going to speak to it, so, your turn.
Dr Sanam Vakil
Yes, thank you very much. Leslie, you’ve teed up my comments perfectly, not because I subscribe to that view, but that’s very much what I see playing out with regards to US policy towards the Middle East from both candidates. But also, the anticipation from America’s partners abroad, that have really been waiting for this election, in order to define or determine or craft strategies with this next President.
So, let me just make a couple of points. First of all, I do agree, generally, with the idea that both candidates have a very ambiguous policy for the Middle East. And obviously, the Middle East is not one contiguous area that needs one policy, but we’ve had a very long and painful series of wars and crises over the past year that need urgent attention, alongside a plethora of other crises that remain neglected. Syria remains unaddressed, chaos continues in Libya, Yemen, and of course, the Houthis have been destabilising maritime shipping and global supply chains. So, you know, the hope, in an ideal world, is that the next US President, in collaboration with partners and allies, works to deliver and press for some imaginative new political settlements for the Middle East on Israel-Palestine and beyond, also including Iran and other crises.
But I don’t see either candidate actually presenting any platform or policy that speaks beyond the generalities. And in watching both candidates over the past year, you know, I can read into them whatever I want, really, however I see it. One day JD Vance says, you know, “We need to have a deal with Iran,” the next day, Trump says, “Go for it.” So, you really don’t know what to expect from either candidate and I think that’s a reflection, of course, to both candidates trying to play to the base, divisions in America, obviously. The war, October 7th has polarised America, alongside other countries, played out in campuses and nobody wants to alienate voters going into next Tuesday.
I think, also, both candidates are seasoned. It’s important to remember that it’s President Trump and Vice President Harris, so they know that what you say as a candidate and what you do as a political leader are two different things. And both candidates want the latitude, if not pragmatism, to be able to address Middle East policy once they come into office, having not really subscribed to a key set of issues. And I would say that perhaps we’ve also seen it in other capitals, including here, but we can get to that later.
More broadly, I think it’s important to note that American Presidents for a number of years, over a decade now, have been consistently articulating, despite their political allegiances, that the United States is seeking less US engagement, part – burden sharing with partners and allies across the world, including in the Middle East. And this has continued despite it being a Democratic President or even being also articulated by President Biden and President Obama before that. So, I fully sucsp – except that whoever wins, and however long it takes to get that victory, that the next US President will also continue this policy.
The US has domestic problems, you can’t have missed them, but also, geopolitical ones that have overtaken that of the laborious Middle East, and there are no quick settlements, there is no quick peace plan to impose. And certainly, you will have noticed that the past year the United States has, of course prevented the broader spread of a regional war, but also, has demonstrated that perhaps it doesn’t have the same influence in the region that we might have hoped, or that perhaps it had in the past. So, I think that’s important to remember.
More broadly, if we talk about states across the Middle East, and again, the Middle East is not monolithic, my programme looks at North Africa all the way to Iran, down to Yemen, and across. The region is very divided as to, you know, who would be the best President for the Middle East, and I think that reflects, of course, shifts in the region, disappointments in their relationships with the United States. There is an impulse among the Gulf states, and perhaps also Israel, to think that a President Trump is going to be better for their national interests. I tend to think that that’s a bit shortsighted, because President Trump also didn’t deliver, let’s say, quick or, sort of, dynamic defence and security policies that many of those states sought.
On the other hand, of course, for Vice President Harris, there is a bit of concern that she isn’t going to, you know, go far enough in pressing for some of the security arrangements or negotiated settlements, be it between Israel and Palestine or in Iran, that’s needed. And so, we’ll just have Band-Aids, continuing to Band-Aid crises after crises, which will have consequences for Europe and the UK, perhaps less so for the United States, but we can talk about that later.
I think final note and then I’ll stop, the Middle East I think is now at a sense of maturity that they’re willing to work with whoever is elected in Washington. Certainly, there’s been election interference from countries like Iran, Russia, China and the like, but I think that there is a new level of pragmatism that, regardless of the outcome of October 7th – November 7th, sorry, I’ve been waiting for this for a while, like most of us, is that we have to work with Washington regardless, and that is very clear, whether it is a Trump or a Kamala Harris administration. So, I think we will see that, certainly.
Dr Leslie Vinjamuri
I’m glad you put that on the table, as you came to the end of your initial remarks. We travelled with a team of experts from Washington, former high level US national security experts, Chatham House colleagues, to Latin America, to Mexico, Brazil, across Asia and then across Europe, and we met with Norbert. And we heard, much to our surprise, actually, especially to our surprise in Mexico and in parts of Asia, the same thing, a level of phenomenal pragmatism. “We know Donald Trump, we can work with anybody, we will work with anybody. We have experience, and we’re prepared.”
And, you know, we had some questions as to whether there were assumptions being made about, you know, whether a second Trump administration would be the same as a first Trump administration. I think we sometimes wondered whether we were carriers of the message that was to be delivered back to say, “It’s okay, America, we still want you in the game, and maybe we’re afraid that you might not be.” But the pragmatism was really, kind of, consistent, certainly across Latin America and across Asia. You’re up, Norbert. Tell us about Europe. Europe feels…
Dr Norbert Röttgen MP
Not that much, huh, yeah.
Dr Leslie Vinjamuri
…right there, Europe feels really like this is where it’s really tough.
Dr Norbert Röttgen MP
Absolutely. So, I will accept your orienting question, does it matter, at all, who wins this election? And from a European perspective, certainly it matters. It matters absolutely, and it – what is at stake from our perspective is European security. Not in the way that if Harris gets elected, we can relax and lay back and America will then come back as the European security power, it’s not going to happen. What will be the major, but very, very politically important difference, is the time factor. If Trump gets – so, the time factor regarding the time the Europeans are left to adapt to a new security challenge, which is, that Europeans have to become the primary organiser of our continent’s security. This is what is going to shift, to change, and this will happen.
The time factor will be different and time is, of course, crucial in politics. If Trump gets elected, of course, you have to say, firstly, you never know, he is unpredictable, but if you – if we take him what he has said about European security and about Europe, it would be a total surprise if we were not to see the immediate stop of any support for Ukraine. So, this would mean that immediately, Europe would have to provide and organise European security. We are not prepared for that. We are to blame for that, for a lack of preparation, but this is the situation. So, this is very much about European security.
If Harris gets elected, I think she will be very clear from the first moment to the Europeans that this has – that a process has to start which will not endure so long, and at the end of this process, Europe has to secure its own – sec – it has to provide for its own security. Because America is approaching its limits, there are so many domestic challenges. Of course, China, the comprehensive, overall challenger of the international role of America, which really attracts and absorbs the focus of American foreign policy, I would say the only one more or less bipartisan perception of foreign policy, then America is drawn back into the Middle East, against all intention. So, it’s beyond, I would say, even the capacity of the most powerful country of the world to be present and to police and provide order in all these scenarios.
So, the Europeans have to do it, and this will be a historic choice for the Europeans. This will mean for us that we have to bring our act together. This has been said for a long time. Now we are und – would be under pressure to do so, because this war in Europe, this war against – from – of Russia against Ukraine, of course, the battlefield is Ukraine, but this war is about European peace, European peace, European security. So, it’s about our own security, it’s about our own interests, and we have to live up to provide for our own interests.
There is one difference and one worst case scenario that cannot be excluded, that would go beyond the matter of time, and to underline it again, time is extremely crucial. It would mean a lot to immediately jump into a role to secure – to provide for our security. There is a worst case scenario that cannot be excluded, and that is a deal between the biggest, greatest dealmaker of the world in history and Vladimir Putin. This deal could only be done at the sec – at the expense of Ukraine and security. It could only – this would mean it would – could only be done at the expense of European security.
And if the President of the leader of NATO and the West were to engage in a policy, in a foreign policy, at the expense of European security, then and in this moment, NATO would not be what NATO was during the decade of the Cold War. Because NATO was invented and created to – for European security, and if NATO and the leader of NATO, the – of the most powerful coun – member state of NATO were to act against European security, this would not imply, of course, a formal abandonment or – of NATO, but then, of course, NATO would be damaged. And the lifeline, and the very – the ratio why NATO exists would be damaged and threatened and jeopardised.
And this then would, of course, mean – this would then affect the West and the political presence of the West, at least for years to come, and would put the West as an organising power in this interim period in history, we have. The Cold War, as a big historic cycle, is over. A new international order is yet to emerge, is still no – is not yet there. So, we have this power struggle about new international order. If the West were to be weakened from within in such a fundamental way, it would have long-lasting fundamental consequences for world order that is emerging and evolving.
Dr Leslie Vinjamuri
And it’s a level…
Dr Norbert Röttgen MP
…So a lot of sta – a lot at stake.
Dr Leslie Vinjamuri
A lot at stake. You’ve put it very clearly. You’re clearly on one side of the fence in terms of this not being a choice that is in any way convergent. Of course, the consequences of the very grand things and very important things you talk about are very human. And the most extraordinary thing about this election is whether you think it’s a domestic issues election, which it is for voters, or a foreign policy issue, which is it for the rest of the world when somebody’s actually chosen, the range of issues is extraordinary. There are women in states that are just wondering whether their daughters and themselves are going to be able to access healthcare should they be raped, and there are people in Ukraine on the streets that are wondering whether they’re going to…
Dr Norbert Röttgen MP
Yeah.
Dr Leslie Vinjamuri
…have their lives fundamentally and radically changed. So, it’s a very, very high stakes election for people, whether it’s domestic issues or foreign policy issues.
Dr Norbert Röttgen MP
Yeah.
Dr Leslie Vinjamuri
But, Steve, I want to come back to you, and – because you’ve very – you’ve been listening, and I know you have a lot that you’ve said and a lot to say in these issues. Do you think – and I do want you to answer the silver lining question, but let me pose another question, as well, that you maybe integrate your answer into. Do you think that a Harris administration or a Trump administration will get back to – is there any prospect that they will get back to that overriding imperative, so we are told, of American foreign policy, which is the China challenge? Do you see a scenario in which this election leads to an American leadership that is singularly focused in a strategic way on, you know, the greatest challenge of our time, so we’re told? And how do we…
Professor Stephen M. Walt
So…
Dr Leslie Vinjamuri
…how does that happen, or is it just not possible?
Professor Stephen M. Walt
I think it’s possible, though, you know, many Presidents have wanted to focus almost entirely on China and make that the top priority, and they keep getting dragged into other problems. They can’t seem to avoid suddenly getting dragged into a focus on, say, Ukraine, or dragged back into the Middle East for the umpteenth time, with no real prospects for success.
Well, I think both Trump and Harris will view China as a competitor, as a rival, and will take a relatively hardnosed approached. But I think the approach they take is going to be strikingly different. Harris is going to continue, basically, the Biden policy of trying to build multilateral relationships in Asia, which is the one thing the Biden administration has actually succeeded at. And while attempting to, you know, sort of, put focused restrictions on Chinese hi-tech development, but not broadbrush attacks on the Chinese economy. Of – to listen to Trump, he would do something of the opposite on both. He wants to impose tariffs broadly on lots of different countries, especially China, but not just China, and that means instead of building multilateral partnerships in Asia to help deal with China, he’ll be conducting trade wars and having fights with our allies in Asia. So, I think both of them will see China as a problem to be addressed, but they would address the – that problem in very different ways.
There are other places where they’re going to differ, too. I mean, foreign economic policy I think is just fundamentally different, if Trump is sincere about wanting to impose, you know, upwards of 100% tariffs on goods from a variety of places. You know, I think Martin Wolf’s column in the FT last week was quite persuasive on saying just how revolutionary that would be and what a disaster it would be for the world economy and for the United States.
As Norbert and others have already said, their approaches towards Europe are going to be fundamentally different, as well. I have believed for a long time that both Harris or Trump would want to bring the War in Ukraine to an end, as quickly as possible after the election, but they would do it in rather different ways. I think there’s a real risk that Trump just walks away from the problem, and I think Harris would try to do it in a way that gave Ukraine the best outcome it could reasonably expect at this point. I do think there is a growing consensus in Washington that the idea of Ukraine getting back all of its territory, including Crimea, is just unrealistic and not going to happen, and therefore, we’re going to have to take a different approach to the problem. But again, how you do that, or how you address the problem, and how you try to end the war, and what the post-war security arrangements look like, I think would be radically different under a Trump administration or a Harris administration.
Let me make two other quick points, and then I will stop. Another issue that people should not lose sight of is simply the question of foreign policy competence. One of the things that the Trump administration wants to do is go after the Deep State. They want to be able to put their own people in as many places as possible and unlike 2016, now they have a list of people that they want to install. The problem is most of those people have never done a lot of these jobs, they’re quite ideological and they’re being chosen for their loyalty, not necessarily for their competence. So, you could expect to see an American foreign policy machinery that simply isn’t very good at operating that machinery.
And let’s remember that the first term demonstrated that Donald Trump is a terrible judge of talent, right? He went through several Secretaries of State, several Secretaries of Defence, several National Security Advisors, and had the highest rate of turnover in White House history, including among his own appointees, people who were loyal Trumpians. So, you’re not going to get an American Government that works very well. The only consolation prize is, in my view, with a few exceptions, the Biden team hasn’t been all that competent either, and therefore, I – again, I hope we see a changing of the guard should Harris win the election.
Last point, let’s also not lose sight of the fact that Donald Trump is not a young man, and his – the difference in just the level of clarity, engagement and energy from 2016 to today is really quite striking, if you look at videos from back then and look at his performance today. So, if he turns out to be the next President, you have to expect a presidency that will be led by a possibly erratic and increasingly unfirm – infirm US President, precisely the thing people were worried about with Joe Biden.
Dr Leslie Vinjamuri
There’s a lot there. I’m glad that you talked about the question of competence. You know, we frequently hear, and it’s an important comment, that America’s democracy is at stake, not everybody believes that, but it looks like a very large number of people do. But nobody really breaks that down and there are a lot of different components: rule of law, foreign policy, competency, the executive branch, civilian control of the military, free and fair elections, civil and human rights. You know, the democracy category is so big that breaking it down, I think, really starts to help us understand what might change, and not in a way that most of us think would be for the better.
But I want to come back to your question about the post-war arrangements, you know. So, either future President would likely look for a deal, or just walk away, but the post-war arrangement would look very different. Norbert, I want to give you a moment to respond to that and then I’m going to come to Peter and Sanam on another point, before we open it up.
Dr Norbert Röttgen MP
Yes. I think the outcome and the end of this war will be fateful for the future of Europe, without any doubt. And the question, in my view, is not that much about territory, but the question, which has a historic dimension and which has to be decided in one direction, is will war become a success, even a limited one, or are we going to see the failure of war? Because this is, in a way, what Putin tries to do. He tries to reintroduce war as an instrument of European foreign policy again. If he succeeds to some degree, it would imply that Ukraine would not become a stable, viable, sustainable state. It would be a country of instability, without any perspective of a) joining the Western institutions, both the European Union and NATO, and it would not attract viable investments to flourish economically.
So, what we have to make sure is to make this war a failure. This does not mean, to say it again, that Ukraine will be able to reconquer all its own territory, but it has to be enabled to make the war a failure, to stop this war. It has to be clear to everybody, including Putin, he will not achieve anything by applying the method of war. If we can achieve this point, then Ukraine will be in a position to negotiate a viable future for itself. And this is the crucial point for European security. If it’s – if this is not achieved, instability, warmongering, the attacks on the global – on the democratic institutions within different countries, both East and West, in Europe, will go on, and we will see this for years, perhaps even longer, to come. This is the crucial question, it’s a European question, but I think it’s definitely a question for the West and for international order, because this European lesson, “Can you achieve with war political success?” of course, will also be closely observed, for example, in Beijing, and in other places of the world.
Dr Leslie Vinjamuri
I’m going to come to Sanam with a Middle East question, but did you have a comment on this, please?
Sir Peter Westmacott
I just want to add two little points to what Norbert says, and I think he’s right. The first is just to say that when some of us talk to oligarchs and other Putin cronies, people who know what’s going on in his mind, what you hear from them is, point one, do not assume that even if there is a very Russia-friendly deal that is put together by an incoming President Trump that Vladimir Putin would necessarily accept it. Because it would, by definition – even that would be less than he had promised the Russian people, and there is an ex – there is a sense in which perpetual conflict, in which he believes that time is on his side, is something that he is content with, because that is a distraction from a number of the other problems that are going on in his country.
Second point I would make, which is, if you like, the other half of that argument, which is that I think it makes it all the more important that we have to equip Ukraine with the wherewithal so that when there is – there’s not going to be a political settlement anytime soon, but we can hope for some sort of a freeze of the conflict, that when it comes to that, that the Ukrainians have got sufficient chips on the table, sufficient military capability, that they can push back and insist on a frozen – a freeze of the conflict, or whatever it is, a Korean type status quo, while you look for a political settlement which is not totally in Russia’s advantage. That was the point that David Cameron was trying to make to Donald Trump, which was, “I know you are the great Negotiator-in-Chief, but you do not want to be a Negotiator-in-Chief if one of the parties which you are trying to bring together doesn’t have any chips left on the table. So, do not cut off military assistance to Ukraine at a time when Ukraine is at its greatest need.” I think that’s very good advice. Who knows whether the incoming President, should he win the election, will listen to it?
And we all know that within that, if you like, circle, there is a sense that, you know what, European security’s for Europeans. We’re more interested in geo-strategic, Indo-Pacific and China, so if you guys want to sort out Russia and Ukraine, fine, but, you know, don’t expect us to do it. I think it’s a fundamental misreading of where America’s national interests, and indeed, global security, lies, regardless of right and wrong and the survival of democracy and rule of law and, you know, values we hold dear, and so on. But I think it is a very important point. We do need to ensure that Ukraine is in the game, right up to the point where there is, if you like, some sort of a ceasefire, in advance of a political settlement. If we do not do that, then it’s not only bad for poor Ukraine, which will show that a big bully next door can get away with invading a sovereign state and destroying, occupying, whatever it is. It is also a very, very important signal to the broader question of European security, as Norbert was saying.
Dr Leslie Vinjamuri
Thank you. Sanam, do you – can you paint a realistic scenario where you can see Trump’s thinking out of the box 2016 strategy towards the Middle East can be reinvented in the current context, in a way that would serve US interests and also serve the interests of the broader question of peace? Can – is there any – I mean, you think long and hard, I know, about the ideal and realistic strategy for US foreign policy after this election. Can you – do you have any scenario in which you think one of these two candidates can realistically, given the constraints that they face and the world that we live in, deliver something, and what would that be?
Dr Sanam Vakil
That’s a big question, and I’m conscious of the questions that are in the audience. So, just very quickly, I think that sadly, the state of play is that neither candidate has perhaps innovative thinking that we haven’t seen before. So, more likely than not, with the War in Gaza and the answer for Israel’s security, you know, that is going to be addressed through what we’ve already heard them talk about. the panacea box of normalisation will be dusted back off and there will be, depending on the candidate, an attempt at trying to fudge, an attempt at addressing Israel’s security and trying to bring in broader buy-in from Saudi Arabia and other Arab states.
The key and the – you know, the key variable is how they’re going to answer the demand from Saudi Arabia, and more broadly, from across the region, to address the issue of Palestinian self-determination, and so that, again, is the ambiguity. I’m not convinced either candidate can deliver it. Much of it depends on Congress. Obviously, there are dynamics in Israel that also have be considered, reform within the Palestinian Authority. So, there is a – there are a lot of knowns and unknowns that, you know, can be spoilers in this, but I think that’s the only space that they can try.
But if the US wants to de-escalate and deprioritise and focus on its own issues, and if we want to support the dream of regional integration, and if we want to support the Gulf being the area of connectivity, as well as prevent Russia and China’s, sort of, wedging strategies in the Middle East, the answer always comes back to addressing conflicts, not just by stopping the military dynamics, but also, thinking more broadly about the political dynamics. And puncturing ideological extremism really comes through getting the Israelis and the Palestinians to sit down together, and that’s a hard thing to think about.
Dr Leslie Vinjamuri
Thank you. Okay, questions, please. Hands up, hi, and keep the answer – the questions really focused would be great. We’ll come right here. If you stand up so they know where you are. Please tell us who you are, too, if you can.
Seve Loudon
Hi there, thank you all so much, really engaging conversation. My name is Seve Loudon. I’m a Political Scientist, from Louisiana. I guess I’ve voted already. It did not go up in flames. I just, kind of, wanted to circle back towards the conversation around European security, if, say, for example, Trump is elected. So, we’ve talked about how the onus of security needs to move from NATO onto the European Union. And I’m just wondering, given the fact that the UK, as opposed towards the last Trump regime, it wasn’t – it was still in the EU, how does that affect EU-UK relations moving forward, especially when it comes to security, if it has to move outside of NATO?
Dr Leslie Vinjamuri
Okay, I’m going to take a few. So, thank you very much for that. Hands up, the person right here with the white shirt.
Iona Allan
Hi, thank you very much for that. My name is Iona Allan. I’m with The World Today magazine in Chatham House. So, my question is somewhat related, but if Trump were to win the election next week, how do American allies, including the UK and Germany, how do they engage with a Trump 2.0 administration, knowing what they know now and knowing the disruption of a Trump in the White House? And then the second, kind of, related part of the question is, do you think the rules of engagement have changed since 2016? And do you think there’s more or less space for allies, like the UK and Germany, to constrain and potentially influence Trump foreign policy? Thank you.
Dr Leslie Vinjamuri
Great question, and then we had one right back here in the blue [pause].
Tom Nurcombe
Thank you. I’m Tom Nurcombe. I’m a Researcher at the Coalition for Global Prosperity. The current Biden regime has tabled a few ideas to counter China’s economic influence in the world and counter, particularly the Belt and Road Initiative, Build Back Better World, and its successor, the PGII. Does the panel think that there’ll be a difference between Harris and Trump in trying to combat China’s global economic influence and particularly, combatting the Belt and Road Initiative?
Dr Leslie Vinjamuri
Great question, great questions, and one at the back, sorry. We’re going to get four, and please, if I’ve – if the panellists all choose one, not all four.
Shuhra Koofi
Hello, everyone, thank you so much for the great discussion. I’m Shuhra Koofi and I’m from Afghanistan. I’m a UCL alumni. We have all heard about the foreign policy of the candidates about the war in Palestine, the conflicts in Middle East and in Ukraine. But my question is that – would the candidates – they both have different foreign policy stances? Can we expect any commitment or actions in regards to the Afghan women’s rights to education and other rights that have been violated, and the rise of terrorism in Afghanistan and other conflicts? So, is Afghanistan a priority anymore to the US? Thank you so much.
Dr Leslie Vinjamuri
Thank you for asking that very important question. Norbert, can I come to you first?
Dr Norbert Röttgen MP
Yeah, thank you. So, I think there is one possible influential European policy after the election, and this is really to build up European strengths, and this is military strengths. I would say this is the only argument for Trump where we can try to achieve anything. And it is also in the case of a Harris presidency, the one thing we have to do, out of our own interests, but also, to make the camp strong that wants to stay in NATO and wants to preserve NATO and wants to keep the Americans in Europe. I think this case is not lost, at all. I expect a large majority in Congress to stay to the Western institutions, to stay to NATO, to uphold NATO, but we definitely have to do more. It will only – NATO will only endure and sustain if there is a fair burden sharing when it comes to European security.
And this is true in both cases, and in this regard, of course, Britain plays a major role. We see now a different approach of the British Government towards Europe. There is now a negotiation ongoing to strike a treaty, to agree a treaty, a security treaty, between Germany and Britain. I think these are approaches and moves that are very much appreciated and they go into the direction what Europe has to deliver. I have to say, of course, it would be better Britain were a member of the European Union. However, when it comes to European security and Ukraine, Britain has played a formidable European role, which is appreciated, which is recognised, and I think we have to pursue this path.
And this is also true, if I may briefly come to that, when it comes to China. I think in both cases, the Europeans and particularly, Germany, as the largest European economy, is going to get squeezed on our China policy. It will not be accepted any longer in Washington that there is a continuity of not derisking but risking, continuing with overinvestment of German industries in China, because this has a major geopolitical implication. We have to change course, again, from our own perspective, our own interests, but if we want to come to something that resembles a Western strategy vis-à-vis China, which I would very much be in – would support very much, and which I – which will be much influential and impactful vis-à-vis China, then we have to adapt to a policy which recognises the dangers stemming from China. And we have to reduce our economic dependencies in order to reduce our vulnerabilities.
Apart from that, I regard Biden’s China policy as consistent and impactful, coherent, as I perhaps would not expect a Trump China policy to be. I would say Xi Jinping can rely on he – Trump will have many more – many conflicts with his allies in Europe, so there will be much more infighting, due to his tariff policies. And perhaps he has an inclination, also, to deal with China and not so much to contain China in that – in the consistent way the Biden administration has done that.
Dr Leslie Vinjamuri
Peter, would you like to add?
Sir Peter Westmacott
A couple of points on these very good questions. On the first one, you know, EU-UK, European security. Of course, almost regardless of the outcome of the election on the 5th of November, Europeans are going to have to assume greater responsibility for their own security. Burden sharing, Norbert has talked about, this is not a new subject. I used to get my head scrubbed by President Obama when I was in Ambassador in Washington about the UK’s declining military capabilities and why the Europeans were not doing a better job on the 2%. But more than just the spending, you know, what we’re actually doing with that money. So, this is a legitimate, in my judgment, American complaint. It’s not just a Donald Trump issue, of the Europeans.
I think we’ve moved quite a long way to try to address it. the new British Government is also very keen on defence capabilities. There’s a strategic review going on in this country which is looking at all those issues, better value for money, but also, engaging with our European partners. Now, both the European Union and the UK, in their own different ways, have got certain, you know, a ghastly phrase ‘red lines’, for where they can to improve their relationship. But I think, already, we are reactivating the UK-French relationship, Saint-Malo agreement. There are – is now a negotiation on a UK-Germany defence agreement.
The UK is absolutely willing to play its part in European security. We are, as you – Norbert was saying, we are pretty prominent in terms of the Europeans in trying to help Ukraine stand up against the illegal aggression from its next door neighbour. And I think that broader area, defence, intelligence, pulling together at the European level, leaving aside for the time being the question of what institutions. You know, do – is there going to be a European Union defence capability which is going to duplicate or get in the way of NATO? I mean, let’s park that for the moment, because we’re outside the European Union. But we do have significant capabilities. The UK and France are probably the two most significant European defence powers. And I think it is not really even a political issue anymore in the UK that we should be a part of the European response to the threats to our security, particularly given that America, regardless of who wins, is a bit more America First in terms of its defence priorities. America for Americans, rather than solving everybody else’s problems.
So, I’m, kind of, optimistic, that the UK is moving in that direction. I would like to see us moving in other directions. You know, I’m personally disappointed the government can’t do something a bit more on youth mobility, for example, but, you know, maybe in a package where other things are – become possible, then we can go slowly, incrementally, towards a better pragmatic, incremental relationship between the United Kingdom and the European Union, but we can’t do everything all at once. But I think, on that, the UK will absolutely be up for playing its role in strengthening the European security capability, at a time when America, for understandable reasons, is saying, “This isn’t entirely our problem, and we have been shouldering too much of that burden.”
One – I’ll just say a word on Afghanistan. We can’t cover everything, and I’m very sensitive to the question asked at the back, you know, the Zan. Zendegi. Azadi. movement in Iran about women’s rights I think applies also in Afghanistan. It is a horror story. The sadness is that other countries which have got involved in Afghanistan and in Iran have got other things to think about, do not feel able to get directly involved in making a difference there. In Washington, people have largely walked away from Afghanistan, after the rather chaotic withdrawal of August 2021, and that’s probably true, also, of the United Kingdom.
The interest now is more of a humanitarian nature. There’s some tentative attempts to engage with the Taliban and vice versa, but there are going to be conditions around that area. So, I would love to think that the rest of the world – I would like to think, also, other parts of the Muslim world would be taking a more forward position on women’s rights in Afghanistan, but also, to some extent to Iran. And, actually, on that, I think the position taken by the new President Pezeshkian on women’s rights is moderately encouraging. You know, let’s at least be encouraged where we can be. But in Afghanistan, I think it is very difficult. You raise a very important question, I’m not terribly optimistic, but I very much hope that we can move forward in that direction, especially on the humanitarian side.
Dr Leslie Vinjamuri
I’m going to have to come to Sanam before I come to you, Steve, because Sanam’s first book was on, I believe, women’s rights in Iran, and has thought a lot about this question across the Middle East. So, Sanam, over to you.
Dr Sanam Vakil
Just very quickly, I think the better outcome, of course, for Afghanistan, is a Harris presidency, because I think she has shown or foreshadowed some impulse to think about humanitarian issues in a different way. So, I’m hopeful there. More broadly, I do believe there are going to be increasing levels of engagement to counter extremism and, you know, certainly the externalities of this past year will come in increased terrorism and radicalisation. So, there will be more engagement in that area. I know that regional states, while maybe not at the forefront of supporting some of the human rights issues more broadly in the region, will be taking more proactive – and need to be taking a more proactive role, quite frankly, because it’s their geography that is, you know, more closely impacted. So, I do think that this will be a priority, but perhaps not in the way it should be needed.
And just quickly, Leslie, very quickly, on the role of the UK and the EU going forward, with a Trump can – President. I do think that there is a greater urgency for a different level of engagement with, let’s say, a next Trump administration, really because regardless of the policies in Washington, particularly in the framework of the Middle East, there is a geographic imperative for Europe and the UK to be front-footed and more active on Middle East conflicts. The strategy of the past year of waiting for Washington, or collaborating with Washington, certainly isn’t working for Europe or the UK. And in fact, we are watching politics in Europe and in the UK be influenced by impulses that I’m against with regards to migration, that I think are very dangerous, and it requires real leadership to stop those impulses and to lead on that, sort of, narrative.
So, I’m hoping that the UK, alongside Europe, will work to address their security needs in the Middle East, and they’re quite different from those of the United States, and that needs to be digested.
Dr Leslie Vinjamuri
It was an important question about have the rules of engagement changed since 2016. I mean, we’ve been working quite hard at Chatham House to ensure that we host and convene leading thinkers on the conservative side of the aisle who we anticipate might be in a Trump administration when it comes to foreign policy. Many of you will, if you’re following the US foreign policy debate will know Bridge Colby and his work, I know Steve knows it very well. He was one of our first speakers. We hosted the Chair of Project 2025 before most people knew what it was, and then several people who had contributed to Project 2025. We have Nadia Schadlow speaking on Monday.
So, I think one thing, you know, in terms of rules of engagement, is try to work with the ex – there are experts and we don’t know what way – what lens they would get in were Trump to be elected, which is as likely not to be the case, or marginally less likely to be the case, than it is that we’re talking about President Harris in another seven or ten days, or even maybe less. If you follow the polls, that’s what we know. So, you know, we don’t know, but we are trying to think about this.
Steve, I wanted to come you last, because I also want to bring in a question that is – that came in online about immigration. “The United States is an immigration nation, a country of immigrants,” this is from Karim. “We might have the next female President of the United States of America who’s a daughter of an immigrant. What will happen, regardless of who’s elected?” What will happen on the question of immigration? Will the new President – how will they act? Will the world become a more peaceful and diverse multicultural structure? And maybe rather than, you know, what – we might all be very sceptical and cynical, given the rhetoric around immigration in the United States right now, on both sides, not the rhetoric, but the policies are tough on both sides, but if you think about the medium term. In the medium term, are we heading towards a more multicultural, more open, more immigrant friendly nation? And maybe you could, kind of, respond to that, along with whichever part of the other questions you’d like to take.
Professor Stephen M. Walt
Alright, let – that’s great. Let me try to briefly touch on some of the other issues, then I’ll end with the immigration question, which is a really vexing one. I mean, obviously, as the others have said, for Europe, security is actually the bridge back for the UK after Brexit. Lots of reasons to collaborate and we’re already seeing a movement in that direction.
As for the question of how Europe should deal with Trump, I mean, from the first term, we know that step number one is flatter him shamelessly. He responds to that, and I will question the characterisation of Trump as an ‘ace dealmaker’. He’s actually a terrible dealmaker. Tom Friedman once said, you know, “His negotiating style is really the art of the giveaway, he gives things to others and doesn’t get much in return.” So, that’s perhaps good news for Europe, as well.
But Europe’s problem is more fundamental and more structural. 30 years ago, Europe was 28 per – the EU was 28% of the world economy, and it was larger, as a share of the world economy, than the United States. Today, the EU is about 14% of the world economy, substantially smaller than that of the United States. And that means Europe’s potential leverage and influence is a lot lower than it used to be, and so, it, sort of, doesn’t matter what the diplomatic tactics are, to some degree. Unless Europe can solve its economic productivity problem, as Mario Draghi and others are pointing out, its influence in the world is going to continue to decline.
There was a question about our res – well, the American response to the Belt and Road Initiative, this has been a huge bipartisan failure of American foreign policy to not be able to develop an effective economic counter to that. And that’s largely because, right now, protectionist sentiments exist in both Democratic and Republican parties, and that means giving other countries market access, which is what they most want, is almost impossible to do. The good news from an American perspective is the Belt and Road Initiative and China’s economy are not doing swimmingly either. So, it perhaps – it may not be as big a challenge as people suggest.
But on Afghanistan, I agree with what Peter said, and others, that we’re not likely to see a big initiative, which is unfortunate. I think things will be marginally better under a Harris administration, at least, rhetorically. Remember, Donald Trump is not someone who cares about women’s rights in the United States, so it’s hard to believe that he would ever lift a finger for women’s rights in other countries, as well.
And that, finally, brings me to this question of immigration. I mean, this has been the basis of Trump’s entire political campaign, going back to the – 2016, and the promise to build a wall and get Mexico to pay for it. And I think it’s one of the areas where Harris is still vulnerable, because she, like all Politicians before her and Politicians in Europe, as well, have not figured out a reasonable answer that balances the needs and the benefits of immigration with the concerns that it is happening too rapidly, in too large a numbers, and with insufficient management and regulation. This is, in fact, a global problem that is going to get worse for economic, demographic and climate change related reasons, and there is no global consensus on how it should be addressed in any part of the world.
It’s quite ironic, right? We have very well-developed regimes for managing the movement of goods and for managing the movement of money, and we have no global consensus on how we manage the movement of people, because every country reserves for itself the right to decide who can come in and who can stay, right? And until there is a greater understanding of how to manage that particular problem, this is going to, I think, continue to vex Politicians, but also, warp the political process in many democracies.
Dr Leslie Vinjamuri
So, not a lot of silver linings there. I will say that we have a former Fellow, who’s now the President of the International Organization for Migration, and one of her strategies to innovate on this very fundamental problem of migration is to link – to be very pragmatic, to link employers and countries in need of workers to migrants in need of jobs. It’s tough, there are a lot of politics in between that linkage, but it’s a smart strategy. There are a lot of countries, especially in Europe, that nee – but also around the globe, that need people to do jobs, and there are a lot of people that need jobs. So, let’s not be completely lacking in optimism.
This has been a tremendous panel. We have six days to go – we say November 5th like it’s forever away, partly because we’ve been talking about this election for so long. We’re all pretty worried, I think, there’s no doubt about it. this is an – this is not an easy moment for anybody that cares in any way, shape or form about the future of the United States, the future of Europe, the future of the world. The stakes are really high. It’s really hard to argue that they’re not, but it’s incredibly important to have a conversation that looks before the election, because I think in a couple of days, we’re almost already there, we’re just going to be deep in it.
We are going to reconvene on November 6th, the day after Guy Fawkes Day, which happens to be the US election day, and a great tit-for-tat. Britain held its election on America’s Independence Day, so, you know, there you go. We are going to be back here, 6pm, the day after the US election to consider where we are, to consider what the result looks like it is, or maybe we will have a result, and we will continue to have the conversation until we know where things stand. We will be writing about it, we will be talking about it, and then once we have clarity, we’ll begin to think about the transition, the first 100 days, and what it does mean for the things that we’ve really clearly put on the table. But make no mistake, as analytical and rational as we try to be, I think we all know that the – that this is a really significant election. Thank you for joining us. Thank you so much for the panellists, [applause] and there you go.
