Armida van Rij
Hello, and welcome to everyone online. Thank you so much for joining us. My name is Armida van Rij and I’m a Senior Research Fellow and head up the Europe Programme here at Chatham House. Thanks so much for joining us for this event, where we’re looking ahead to the European Parliamentary elections, as well as what the implications of the elections are, and doing a bit of an assessment of what might happen afterwards.
Today is, indeed, the first official day of the elections. Voters in both Estonia and in the Netherlands have been casting their ballot today and other EU member states will follow over the next few days. And as we, kind of, think about the elections and start this discussion, it’s worth just taking a second to reflect back on the last elections in 2019, where these happened, kind of, following Greta Thunberg’s school strikes. There was lots of momentum for climate and environmental policies. The Greens, kind of, rode their green wave to their largest electoral win to date in the European Parliament and a lot of the Green Deal package was passed pretty quickly after those elections.
And then, of course, in the following five years after that, we had, kind of, crisis after crisis. We had the COVID-19 pandemic, Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the Qatargate scandal in the European Parliament, let’s not forget, pan-European farmers’ protest across Europe over the past year so. Which takes all the way back to today, where I think it’s fair to say that the mood, before these elections and during these elections, is very, very different than it was five years ago.
We are expecting, in quite a few member states, to see an increase in support for MEPs from far-right parties across the continent, and the far-right is also gaining some traction in national elections that are happening in member states, as well. The Commission has started to backpedal on some of the Green Deal policies and at the same time, there’s a very, very big focus on security and on defence.
So, with all those things bearing in mind, what we’ll be discussing today is – we’ll be looking at the rise (of the far-right) and what to expect from these parties. The implications that the elections are going to have on EU policymaking and key policy areas, such as the Green Deal, migration, enlargement and security and defence. And then, we’ll also take a look at, kind of, what’s to come in the coming months, the EU’s ability to be a security actor and some of the challenges that we continue to face within member states.
To do that, I’m absolutely delighted to have an absolutely brilliant panel with me. First up we have Caroline de Gruyter, who is a European Affairs Columnist with NRC Handelsblad in the Netherlands and Foreign Policy Magazine. We’ve got Matthew Karnitschnig, who is the Chief Europe Correspondent at POLITCO, and we’ve got Dr Nathalie Tocci, who is the Director of the Istituto Affari Internazionali in Italy. Thank you so much for joining us.
A couple of quick housekeeping rules. So, this event is on the record, it’s being recorded, and it’s being livestreamed, and then, when we come to – for our audience, when we come to the Q&A, please put your questions in the Q&A function in the chat box. We have quite a significant online audience, so I’m going to ask for a bit of your help and please hold onto your questions for now and then, I’ll signal when you can start thinking about your questions and putting those into the chat box, ‘cause otherwise, it will become quite unmanageable, I suspect.
Okay, that’s all the housekeeping. Right, I think the starting point for this discussion, really, is, as I say, is this anticipated or expected surge of support for far-right MEPs. And Nathalie, I’d like to start with you, if that’s alright. How concerned should we be about this and how much of an impact do you think they will have on EU policy in the next five years?
Dr Nathalie Tocci
So – well, let me just say, perhaps, a few things to kick off. I mean, firstly, I think there’s an interesting paradox happening at the moment. On the one hand – and we see whether this actually plays out in terms of turnout, but these elections are not only extremely important elections, but there’s a real momentum behind these elections. I suspect it may well play out in terms of the turnout, as well, but they, I think, are generally understood far more in the past as being important elections, in a way in which European Parliament elections in the past were not particularly viewed that way and that played out in the numbers. However, it is also the election, or actually because of it, it is the election in which, indeed, there is this fear of a surge of the right.
The second quick point that I think is worth noting is that the last time round, the – in a sense, we were on the downside of the curve of the first nationalist populist wave, right? That curve had, basically, gone up, starting in 2014, 2015, 2016, 17, and actually, it had started tipping by the time we get to 2018. So, when we get to 2019, it was on that downward spiral. Now, and this is the concerning element of it, it’s on that upward spiral, which is why, in a sense, there is this concern.
Third quick point that I wanted to make is that it will be – whether it is considered a surge or not will depend – so, we expect a surge, right? And, you know, the narrative of an election is often determined by what the result is compared to what the expectation is. To give two obvious examples, you know, the mid-term elections in the US a couple of years ago, there was a red wave that was expected. It didn’t quite play out that way.
Republicans actually won, right, but the narrative was almost that they lost. Likewise, just, you know, a couple of days ago in India, you know, there was an expectation that Modi would do even better than last time round. He still won the election, but the overall narrative is that Modi lost, I mean, not quite, but if you see what I mean. So, I say this because I think that the fact that there is an expectation of that surge, I think is significant in terms of what the story that we’re going to be telling in a week’s time is actually going to be.
Fourth quick point, and then I’ll – I will shut up, is even if that surge does not play out and we are as, actually, the polls are predicting, yeah, I mean, we’re going to see somewhat of an increase in the number of seats but nothing dramatic, the reason why this is dramatically catastrophic is because of the predicament that Europe is in, yeah?
If we were in ‘normal circumstances’, whatever those mean, you know, if we didn’t have war in our continent, the prospect of, you know, well, war in the Middle East, the prospect of the US turning its back on Europe, the climate crisis, this – you know, the competition with China, if we didn’t have all of this, then, kind of, having something similar, maybe slightly worse, would not be catastrophic. Having something similar, but slightly worse, in this context, is catastrophic, right? So, even if that surge does not play out, that doesn’t mean to say that we are in – you know, it should be reassuring in any shape or form.
Armida van Rij
Thanks, Nathalie, and on that very positive note, I think you’ve kicked us off. Matthew, to some extent, as Nathalie was saying, it almost doesn’t matter whether or not this surge of the far-right materialises, because what we’ve seen in the past few months is that the shift of the – or the centre of gravity has already started to shift a little bit to the right. Particularly when we look at the Green Deal and the climate and environmental policies. What do you think are the prospects for the Green Deal going forward with a potentially more right-leaning, right-wing European Parliament? And also, what are some of the risks of the EU potentially losing its leadership role in tackling climate change?
Matthew Karnitschnig
Okay, I’ll take those in the order you asked them. I’m a little bit more sceptical than Nathalie, I would say, about the significance of this election. I don’t think that it is particularly significant, but that’s a separate issue. It is going to give us an indication of how the far-right is doing, certainly. But to your point, the entire spectrum has moved to the right. The entire political system in Europe has moved to the right, as evidenced by the, kind of, stomach pains people are having now about the Green Deal, because reality had set in. And in my conversations over the past couple of weeks, I’ve visited a number of countries, including Spain, Bulgaria, Austria, Germany, wherever you go this is the first thing most people brought up to me in the context of the European Union and the agenda for the coming Commission. They’re really feeling the strain that the Green Deal has created.
So, I think that we’re going to see the next Commission continue to pare it back, even if it’s von der Leyen, which is, sort of, an absurd situation if we’re honest. I mean, this is – was supposed to be the centrepiece of her entire agenda. It was the centrepiece of her entire agenda and now, she’s setting about, basically, undoing a lot of it. Including, I mean, her own party, the Christian Democrats in Germany, are pushing to reverse the effective ban on the internal combustion engine, starting in 2035. Which is not something that I think really will strengthen the credibility of either the European Parliament or the European Commission if this actually happens, if it is so easy to just reverse things.
I’m sorry, the second part of your question was?
Armida van Rij
The risks of the EU losing its leadership role, its global leadership role, when it comes to climate…
Matthew Karnitschnig
Right.
Armida van Rij
…action.
Matthew Karnitschnig
Right. Yeah, well, I mean, I don’t – I mean, again, this is probably not a popular opinion. I don’t see a lot of risks there, to be honest, because Europe is so far ahead of the rest of the world in terms of propagating sound climate policies. To the degree that, you know, many people in the business world would argue that it is doing irreparable damage to Europe as a place to do business. And ultimately, if you’re in a country like Germany, which is seeing large parts of its industry relocate to North America and Asia, you know, it’s not really going to help people at the end of the day, especially at a time – or the climate, then.
I mean, this is the sad thing, is that the Europeans think that they’re, sort of, saving the climate with everything that they’re doing, and that’s just not the case. If you look at the CO2 emissions in China and India, they’re still going up like a hockey stick. Yeah, the Chinese continue to open coalfired powerplants, as do the Indians. You know, Germany itself accounts for less than 2% of global CO2 emissions. So, whatever it does, you know, is not – unfortunately, is not going to really make that much of a difference at the end of the day, if we don’t succeed in bringing in the Chinese, in particular, but also, the Indians.
And there was this expectation, I think, for a long time. I mean, this was, you know, going back 20 years ago, I remember speaking to people in the German Greens and elsewhere, saying, you know, “This is so essential that we pursue – that we be the first to pursue this energy transformation,” the “Energiewende,” as they call it in Germany. Because they really believed that if they push forward on this, that the rest of the world would follow their example, and that just hasn’t happened.
Armida van Rij
Hmmm.
Matthew Karnitschnig
So, I don’t think that Europe, kind of, you know, kind of, putting the brakes on this a little bit, is going to spell the end of global climate policy.
Armida van Rij
Which really speaks, sort of, to a point about needing international and global co-operation to be able to address this effectively, which, obviously, is a huge…
Matthew Karnitschnig
Sorry for interrupting, but I mean, this is my point. I mean, this never comes up in these discussions.
Armida van Rij
Yeah.
Matthew Karnitschnig
This is what I find so fascinating. I mean, we’ve got people all over Europe, young people feel very passionate about this. They’re glueing themselves to asphalt, and nobody’s talking about China.
Armida van Rij
Hmmm, yeah. Caroline, the other issue where perhaps the impact of certainly, centre-right, far-right policies, as [inaudible – 13:59], is in migration and particularly immigration. EU countries face a real demographic challenge and migration’s very much needed for Europe to keep growing its, kind – its economic competitiveness. But the debate about immigration in Europe is politically extremely sensitive. So, we’ve just had the new Migration and Asylum Act passed and signed, but how might a more right-wing parliament effect, or shape, the migration discourse and the implementation, as well, of this new pact? Are far-right parties going to be happy that it, kind of, addresses our concerns…
Caroline de Gruyter
Hmmm, yes.
Armida van Rij
…sufficiently enough?
Caroline de Gruyter
I think migration has been a large issue for many years, already. There’s nothing new there, of course. But nowadays, it gets entangled in the new challenges that Europe faces, which are geopolitical, huh? It – the debate used to be on how to get grips on how our – you know, how many per – the percentages of migrants that we could absorb in our societies, inward looking, in a way, on the national level and on the European level. And this now gets a new dimension because we are, you know, forced, not to stare at our own, you know, navels anymore, but look at the world, because it’s cold out there.
And so, migration, just like defence, security, becomes, you know, a real geopolitical issue and which Europe has to find answers for. People are scared. They are afraid that we will get war in – on the continent and so on. Migrants are being used. I was told the other day that next to St. Petersburgh, there are thousands of people flown in from Afghanistan and Pakistan and far away, willing to be pushed over the border with Finland, for instance. They just wait for the buses to show up. It might be next week, it might be next month or next year, nobody knows. So, this is one more thing that is weaponised.
So – but what strikes me, it’s that in the past couple of years – you know, there was always a standoff between the cosmopolitans, who wanted the borders open, and the nationalists, so-called, who wanted them closed. And that has converged a little bit. I think by now, the cosmopolitans also see that, yes, we do need a lot of guest workers on all possible levels, but we cannot leave the borders open. So, I think there’s – the consensus is growing. Hence, also, the agreement on the Asylum and Migration Pact after 12 years of negotiations. What happened, too, is that central – you know, Western Europe is always talking about integration, Central Eur – Central and Eastern Europe, they are ethnically rather homogeneous countries, without colonial experience. So, for them, the issue was never integration, but now it is, with all the Ukrainians. I was in Prague a few weeks ago. There are, like, 100,000 Ukrainians there. It’s not small deal.
So, in a way, there’s no agreement, there’s never agreement in Europe. We should also not expect it, because you will always be disappointed, but I think there is a little bit more consensus about it.
Armida van Rij
Yeah, that’s really interesting what you say about the way the migration discourse has shifted over the past 12 years or so, and…
Caroline de Gruyter
It has.
Armida van Rij
But also, to your point about the weaponisation of migrants and how migrants are now just pawns in Russia’s hybrid…
Caroline de Gruyter
Hmmm.
Armida van Rij
…war for tactics against the EU.
Caroline de Gruyter
And one more thing, if I may?
Armida van Rij
I think – yeah.
Caroline de Gruyter
What struck me is that all the populists are – and others, too, by now, are using migration during the election campaign. But if you looked at certain polls, they asked people in different countries, “What is your main issue?” It wasn’t migration. Migration was only the biggest issue in Hungary, of all places, not even in Italy. It was in Hungary, was the only place. For the rest, it is security, the cost of living, that kind of thing. Migration number three, at most. So, it also means that people are perhaps a little bit less hysterical about it than most Politicians are.
Armida van Rij
Yeah. No, I completely agree with that.
Caroline de Gruyter
Hmmm hmm.
Armida van Rij
Sticking with this point about security, Nathalie, coming back to you. A big priority for the next European Commission, if von der Leyen is re-elected, which is an if at this point, is going to be security and defence, very, very clearly. What’s needed to really move the needle on these issues? Would a Defence Commissioner help, for example? What’s the future of the Defence Industrial Policy?
Dr Nathalie Tocci
Well, the short answer is money, in the sense that, you know, you can have a Defence Commissioner, you can have a Defence Emperor, you could have a Defence King, you can have a Defence Tsar, but it’s more or less the same as, you know, sort of, what Thierry Breton has been doing over the last five years. Unless there is a significant new instrument in place that not only is there for – you know, basically, a next gen EU for defence, like, which is to be managed by the Commission. Now, that would make – you know, that would make for something, you know, categorically different and meaningful, and far more meaningful compared to what we’ve had.
Now, who knows whether this is going to happen? Because I think, you know, there are obviously external and internal forces pushing in opposite directions. The external forces are fairly clear, our continent is at war, and especially if, you know, things play out in a negative way in the United States, we’re going to be at war and alone, right? So, there’s going to be that very strong external imperative. However, there is also the internal dynamics, yeah, that we’ve been talking about now.
And this is what I was trying to get at earlier when I said, you know, even if there isn’t a radical change compared to what we have now, and it’s just a little bit worse than what we have now, politically speaking I mean, yeah, in the sense that a little bit more Eurosceptic, a little bit more nationalist, a little bit less integrationist, well, can we imagine that EU, hmmm, right, I mean, the EU that will emerge as of Monday, agreeing on a big new thing on defence at EU level? Unlikely, yeah?
So, it could be that the right/far-right, yeah, is happy to talk about security and defence, but that the right/far-right, is not happy to do defence at European level. And unless it is done at European level, and it’s fairly clear how only ‘the necessary optic in defence spending’, which has been having and it will continue to have, alone, will be insufficient to, you know, address the challenge that we face, particularly vis-à-vis Russia.
Armida van Rij
Yeah, and that really speaks to the point of how Eurosceptic parties have moved from wanting to leave the EU, perhaps, following the Brexit debacle, to really focusing more their efforts on hollowing out the EU from within.
Dr Nathalie Tocci
Surprised, but they – it’s become far more dangerous.
Armida van Rij
Yeah.
Dr Nathalie Tocci
I mean, if they leave, they leave, goodbye. I mean, a terrible – okay, here we are at Chatham House, web sphere, my heart still bleeds, but yet, yeah, we have survived. We do not survive with a hollowing out.
Armida van Rij
Hmmm. Caroline, the second priority for the Commission would be enlargement. Von der Leyen’s made that very clear, you know, it – enlargement was, kind of, put in the waiting room during the Juncker Commission for five years. We can debate whether that was a strategic mistake or not. We’re not going to do that today, but it’s definitely back on the agenda and it’s very high on the agenda. Does this, kind of – to what extent does this Euroscepticism and opposition of many far-right parties threaten enlargement, bearing in mind the discussion we’ve had so far of the extent to which they may or may not have influence within the European Parliament?
Caroline de Gruyter
Hmmm hmm.
Armida van Rij
And perhaps also just talking a little bit about the national level implications there.
Caroline de Gruyter
I think the dis – the debate about enlargement is changing fast. When Europe was still looking at itself as a market, you know, the UK and the Netherlands, together, they were always pushing enlargement because it was good for the com – for our companies, and it was, actually. The British and Dutch companies were always the biggest, with the Germans, the biggest investors in new countries.
Now, just like migra [audio cuts out – 23:17], enlargement becomes entangled in the bigger geopolitical story and enlargement becomes a geopolitical tool. It’s about – you know, it determines what our place in the world is. And it’s very interesting to see how this is already – this realisation has arrived in Brussels. There’s, like, this big Directorate-General, like a ministry, but in Europe they call it DGs, of enlargement. It’s called DG NEAR. I know – I mean, it’s large, because you had the Kosovo desk, you had the Montenegro desk and so on. And all these people, for years, had the instruction, “Go slow, don’t be political, be technical,” you know, and, you know, “There’s no hurry, don’t be creative.” Now, it’s exactly the reverse. They are told to be political, to go fast and to be creative. So, if something is blocked here, you know, you try to get past it via another route.
And I think if you look at the – before, we let countries – we negotiated with candidate countries forever. You know, they were sitting in that waiting room forever, ‘til all the boxes were ticked and then, they were – and we would let them in. Now, with Ukraine, they are already in the – on the electricity market. They have joined roaming because of the Association Agreement. They’re already part of our single market in certain respects. So, they are – you know, we’re doing it in phases, and guess what? The EU is not [audio cuts out – 25:04] on this, because it’s so geopolitical, they are becoming flexible. They are talking about, you know, circles of membership so that a country can be partly member and partly not member, depending on the issue and, you know, where they were at the negotiations.
So, this shows how fast, actually, the view from Brussels and the capitals is changing. It’s very interesting to see it. It’s not like – but it’s not what it used to be.
Armida van Rij
One of the – Matthew, one of the concerns that’s sometimes levelled is – at accession countries is the extent to which there is foreign influence within them. But, of course, we also have foreign influencing within the EU. To what extent do we need to be concerned about that for the elections and trying to influence the elections, particularly when it comes to Russia and China, but also on positions in the EU Council and in a Parliament we’re broadly going forward? I mean, just, kind of, remembering Qatargate over the past few years. How big of a concern should this be and is there anything we can do about it?
Matthew Karnitschnig
I think it should be a huge concern, a much bigger concern than it is, because most people, you know, just, sort of, ignore the problem, unfortunately. Qatargate’s a good example, although that was fairly small boar at the end of the day in terms of the sums involved and the number of people, at least of what we know of that. But it feels to me like that was just a – the tip of the iceberg, probably.
What I would be more concerned about is what’s happening in the individual countries, themselves, rather than at the EU level, because I think that’s where they can really, kind of, you know, get under the skin of a country, really get into the system. And, you know, if you look at a country like Slovakia, where, you know, I think most of us thought Slovakia was on a good path.
For those who don’t know, I mean, they had this, sort of, upheaval a few years ago following the murder of an Investigative Journalist, which led to, kind of, the overthrow of the peaceful, sort of, as it were – of the government. And more, you know, seemingly liberal forces then came into power, and well, a couple of months ago, they basically, did a 180 and have now headed back in the other direction. Including with the same leader, Robert Fico, who was unfortunately, just shot a couple of weeks ago, but he survived and is on his way to recovery.
But the point is, though, is that this is an example of a – it’s a small country, there are five million people or so, that has just been lambasted with Russian propaganda for a very long time, through Sputnik, through RT and so forth and on social media. It’s a country that, obviously, has a history behind the Iron Curtain and a lot of older people there, in particular, were educated in that system and still have a, I don’t know if affinity, or they give the Russians, sort of, the benefit of the doubt, let’s say. And the Russians have used that to great effect, which is crazy when you think about it, because, you know, it’s done pretty well economically, Slovakia has. There’s a, you know, booming car industry there. There’s, sort of – they feed into the German car industry, which is invested there in a big way, and they’ve been quite successful. They’re members of NATO, members of the EU, members of Euro, and yet, you know, we’ve seen them tip.
So, I would be very worried about it in countries that are already members of the EU. Bulgaria is another one. They’ve got an election this Sunday, which is – their national election is actually the much more important election, I think, than the European election, precisely because of what you’re mentioning. There are a lot of pro-Russian forces there trying to play on the cultural and historic links and that resonates, still, unfortunately. And I don’t see the EU, the West, really doing much to combat that. And it’s hard, but I just don’t see it, which is, you know, why taking on enlargement, you know, if you’re talking about places like Bosnia, Serbia and so forth, is so tricky. Because the EU is incapable of dealing with the situation as it is right now.
And I would just add, finally, I mean, you know, everyone knows the situation in Hungary, but, you know, even in a country like Germany, very advanced, obviously, but the degree to which the Russians have succeeded in pushing their narratives, especially in the East through the AfD, the degree to which these parties are working together with the Russians we don’t really know. Austria’s another example. But it’s pretty obvious that there’s a lot of co-operation behind the scenes that we just don’t know about.
Armida van Rij
And I think it’s worth, kind of, pausing on this front and just because you’ve mentioned Hungary and Slovakia. Nathalie, you know, we’re talking about democratic backsliding in these countries. We’re talking about, you know, attacks on the judiciary, undermining media freedom, all those kinds of things. Hungary is about to take over the rotating Presidency of the EU Council from July 1st, of course, and Hungary in and of itself, is a difficult country, but it’s not the only one within the EU. And that’s part of the problem, which I think, Matthew, is what you’re saying. It’s not just Hungary, it’s these multiple countries that we’re seeing this.
So, Nathalie, you know, how – what are, kind of, the – what’s the future of these illiberal or growing – increasingly illiberal democracies within the EU? And wha – just thinking with your policy hat on, what kind of levers does the EU really need to start thinking about quite seriously when it comes to addressing these democratic backsliding countries? I mean, you’ve mentioned, Matthew, Austria and Germany, as well, but, of course, there’s also Italy with what Meloni is doing there, as we were talking about in the – before the event. So, yeah, Nathalie, your thoughts?
Dr Nathalie Tocci
Yeah, they – actually, I can start in a similar way. It always, kind of, boils down to money, or a project when it comes to the EU, in the sense that, in principle, so, you know, there are two sets of available instruments, right? I mean, one is the legal route and that hasn’t been particularly effective, and the other is the economic route. Now, that isn’t a silver bullet, but, you know, one could argue that provided there is a domestic dynamic in favour of change, AKA Poland, that economic conditionality, as I said, in and of itself, is insufficient. But interacting, and together with a domestic dynamic, can actually bring a country back on track, yeah?
So, you know, I think that the economic conditionality route is the only route available. The problem is precisely the one that, Armida, you point to, right, which goes back to the discussion that we were having about hollowing out. Because that economic conditionality, provided it can be a partial, bit – a, you know, a bit of the answer, not the entire answer, presupposes the political will to use it. And it pres – therefore, supposes that these are the exceptions, they are not, increasingly, the rule. But if, of course, alongside Orbán and Fico, you have Meloni, you have Wilders, you have, you know, the FPÖ in Austria, and the list, kind of, grows, yeah? I mean, you know, God forbid Le Pen in France, right? But then, although it is in principle an instrument that you can use, there’s no political willingness to do so. And that’s where the hollowing out really – you know, you can see it happening, in a sense, coming before our eyes.
So, I would say, you know, up until now, the EU has, you know, very clearly moved out of the world in which it actually thought – which wasn’t, by the way, only an EU world, it was a general world, yeah? I mean, the liberal international order, the assumption was that once you reach the Holy Land with democracy, there’s no turning back. We now know that divi – and this is why there was no – there were no forms of internal conditionality in the Union, ‘cause no-one would’ve dreamt about becoming an authoritarian state once you had reached the stage of being a consolidated democracy. We now know that that is rubbish, and it doesn’t work that way.
And so, in a sense, you know, we’ve already moved into this stage of saying, “Ooh, what shall we do about it?” And we’ve tried one route, then we, kind of, tried another route and, you know, okay, not perfect, but it can be worked on. But, of course, it can be worked on so long as there is the will to work on it, and if those authoritarian trends overtake the development and the use of the instruments, then it’s, kind of, too little, too late, right?
Armida van Rij
Hmmm, yeah. No, absolutely. I mean, and speaking of difficult leaders, we touched on this very, very briefly earlier, but Matthew, what are the implications of a potential second Trump Presidency for the EU?
Matthew Karnitschnig
Well, that’s a big question.
Armida van Rij
You’re a master.
Matthew Karnitschnig
‘Cause it’s obviously, the existential feel – fear of everybody in the EU. I mean, the likelihood is that he would divide and rule, and it would further erode the EU. I think there are a lot of countries, especially in the East, for whom the links to the United States and the security guarantees of the United States are more important than the links to Brussels, quite frankly. So, he could certainly use that. I’m not convinced that he would pull out of NATO tomorrow, or that he may never pull out of NATO. I think what he wants to do is sell American military equipment and would use that threat in order to do that. To be able to say back home, you know, “Look how many Eurofighters” – not Eurofighters, but “F-35s the Germans have bought and submarines,” and what have you. I think that, at the end of the day, is really the only thing that he wants because of the, kind of, transactional way in which he operates.
But it would be a far cry from the values, that values, sort of, inspired approach that we’ve seen since 1945, in the way that the US has approached Europe. And with all of these other figures coming up that, you know, we’ve just been talking about, the ones who are already here, new ones coming along – Orbán is, obviously, a big ally of Trump already. But I could imagine that Meloni would get along with him very well, certainly Le Pen. You know, it would, sort of, suggest that he would seek out, you know, certain figures who are on the same page as him to try and, you know, push the others into a corner, be it in Germany or in Scandinavia, or what have you.
So, I don’t – you know, I don’t think that the whole thing would collapse. I just think that it will be much more a quid pro quo, sort of, system than what we’ve been accustomed to.
Armida van Rij
Hmmm, and for the divide and rule approach that Trump might employ/deploy, what we really need is a very, very strong EU Council President who can, kind of, keep member states in check as much as possible, as well as a strong European Commission. So, we’ll see what the, kind of, top job allocations will do.
Matthew Karnitschnig
But I would just say one word on that. The problem with that is that we’ve never seen either of those things.
Armida van Rij
Yeah.
Matthew Karnitschnig
I mean, we’ve had stronger European Commission Presidents, but there’s never been – there haven’t been that many of them. But it’s not typically an office that, you know, is given to very strong figures, and he will use that, certainly, to his advantage.
Armida van Rij
Do you mean the Council or the Commission?
Matthew Karnitschnig
I mean the Council. I think that is – you know, and that would be his natural counterpart. I mean, you saw that Tusk, for example, I think, established a rapport with Trump. But it was mostly, kind of, you know, trying to, you know, tell him how great he was and to keep him from going off the deep end completely. It’s not – he’s not a – he didn’t act as a real counterpart, if you see what I’m saying. It’s not somebody who has the same, sort of, gravitas. Well, not like Merkel. I think a lot of people felt like Merkel was, you know, Trump’s real counterpart in Europe at the time, the only one who could really stand up to him. And that didn’t really work out for the Germans that well, to be honest, and I don’t think that it will be easy for the Germans if he returns, because especially on the security front, as we were talking, they just haven’t made the kind of progress that he was demanding of them.
Armida van Rij
Hmmm. Okay, we will come to the questions in a second. So, I can see that some are already starting to put their questions in the Q&A function, which is great. But Caroline, this is all very doom and gloom. Is there, kind of – can you – is there a note of optimism in all of this, somewhere?
Caroline de Gruyter
Well, I see some kind of silver lining and it’s probably going to send – not to send people home too in a – too depressed, you know, and the silver lining is this. Europe was seen by citizens, for many, many decades, as, you know, that bunch of technocrats talking about fishing quota, chemical directives. Probably very important, but, you know, couldn’t care less. This is changing and the prediction is that tomorrow, for the second time ever, the turnout will go up and it has to do with that.
I think there are two reasons. The first reason is that there are a – you know, next to the chemical directives and, you know, yea – very long negotiations on how much sugar a kilo of muesli on the single market can contain, very political because you have the sugar producers and the grain producers and they all want to push the numbers. Now, we talking about defence, we’re talking about health, we’re talking about security, all these issues that national leaders never wanted to make European. Too sensitive, you know, we keep this national. They can’t any longer.
Now is it [audio cuts out – 40:24] negotiating table it is being discussed and people, you notice it. I mean, I do a lot of lectures and so on and people ask me about it. They relate to these subjects much more than to the, you know, the technocrats’ jargon discussions.
Second, with the populists, and we discussed it before, the populists, not advocating exits any longer, you know, after Brexit, because of Trump and Putin, they’d rather stay in. Somebody who’s explaining this very well is Viktor Orbán. His speeches are interesting. But because they now, instead of railing against Brussels from the national podium, they jump on the European podium, super scary. I mean, I hope we have an answer on the European level that we didn’t manage to provide on the national level, you know, with the centre-right rolling out the carpet for them. But they bring their drama with them. They insult people, they start in-fighting. It has started already. This is, I think, the second reason why people sit up and say, “Hey,” you know, “something is happening there in Brussels.”
I think the democratic deficit is evaporating a little bit because of all this. That’s my silver lining.
Armida van Rij
That’s perhaps a very thin silver lining in all of this. Thanks very much. Great, so, we’ll now come to audience questions. We’ll take a couple at a time, if that’s alright, because I am conscious of time. So, Leik Ludolf asks that “Some have suggested that the EU needs its own nuclear deterrent,” which is very interesting, “which would help Trump proof European security policy. Who would actually have the decision-making power if it was implemented, and is this actually being discussed?”
So, that’s the first question. Second, Adam Farhan is asking, “How does the EU improve its image with the Global South?” Really, really important issue. “Will it stop taking countries for granted?” And “Trust is at a low given the ripple effects of European policies on developing countries and failure to produce climate finance, etc., double standard accusations, etc.” So, we’ll address that too, and then, third, Kennedy Kidd is asking, or rather, Nathalie, he’s addressing you directly – he said that “Everything boils down to the money. If the far-right’s voice in EU leadership increases, do you envision this impacting the EU’s economic relationship with China?” And “If the US” – or sorry, “If Trump wins the US elections, do you envision the EU-Chinese link growing stronger?” Which is something I’ve heard a few times now. I am sceptical, but I think it’s a very interesting question.
Caroline de Gruyter
Hmmm.
Armida van Rij
Nathalie, shall we perhaps start with you?
Dr Nathalie Tocci
Oh, okay, yeah. So, on the nuclear deterrent, very briefly, what I would say to that is that, you know, on and off, this topic has come up, yeah? And on and off, basically, France has thrown a trial balloon, basically, to Germany. Germany didn’t really react and then, it, kind of, died away, right? I mean, it happened a few years ago, it happened, actually, quite recently, again. I can’t see the traction behind this, yeah? And to be honest, especially if this is understood in terms of the broader Trump-proofing conversation, I think getting serious on the conventional side would probably be a, sort of, not only more feasible, but more serious signal, basically, that we understand where things are headed.
And that seriousness on the conventional side, you know, a couple of months ago I came across, I can’t remember what paper, that, basically, said, you know, “Forget 2%, 3% and 4%. If the – if Europe were to have the convent” – you know, “the conventional means of defending itself, it would, on average, need to spend 5%,” right? So, before we even touch nuclear, I think there’s so much more that we need to do on the conventional side.
On the question of, you know, the image vis-à-vis the Global South, you know, in a sense, Ukraine was the moment of awakening, right? But we were actually in a fairly strong position. We were with the global majority on Ukraine. We understood that that global majority didn’t necessarily want to, you know, pay the price for international law, whatever, supporting Ukraine, sanctioning Russia, whatever it was, that we stood with the majority.
Now, obviously, that situation has been reversed, catastrophically reversed on the Middle East, and I think what’s interesting and so disastrous about the whole Middle East situation and Europe’s, basically, credibility, is that whereas the U – you know, the War in Ukraine is actually not a Global South story, right, it’s a Global West-Global East, alright, if you want to look at it in global terms, kind of, confrontation. It’s a Russia-China, you know, West, sort of, story. The Middle East, although the war itself has far fewer global repercussions, it is a Global North-Global South story. It is felt in the Global South, because, of course, it connects to so many other issues, injustice and double standards and all the rest of it.
So, what to do about it? I don’t know. I mean, you know, at times, I really wonder whether we just haven’t, you know, gone too far and whether that damage/credibility is almost irreversible. However, that’s not a good reason not to do something about it. So, there’s obviously plenty that we should be doing on the Middle East, which I don’t think we will do. But let me actually connect to a point that was mentioned, actually, in the question, which is climate.
If there’s one thing that we could do which is not principled in the way we literally used to be principled in the past, you know, the, sort of, finger wagging on whatever, human rights, that it is still principled, but principled in a way which is compatible with the world we live in today, it is actually doubling down on climate finance. Climate may not be that popular for the reasons that Matthew was mentioning, you know, sort of, inside the European Union, but it doesn’t mean that that even more right-leaning EU may not be more willing to put more money in climate finance externally. So, that’s, in a sense, the one thing.
And then, you know, the – on the question of the economic relationship – well, more right-leaning EU, what are the implications vis-à-vis China? It can go in two very different directions, right? A more right-leaning EU is a more protectionist EU, right? It’s an EU that takes economic security more seriously. So, you could imagine that EU actually going further along the line that, in a sense, we have already been on over the last few years. But then, we come back precisely to the money problem, right? So, it may be a more protectionist EU, but is that more right-leaning EU willing to put real money behind industrial policy at European level, or no, right? So, I’m not quite sure how that circle, kind of, can be squared, basically.
Armida van Rij
Hmmm. Just because there’s a second question about the Gaza issue, or the – rather “Israel’s War on Palestine” and “the extent to which that’s dividing the EU,” from Victor Nigoska, can I – Caroline, can I just ask you, what’s the impact of the divisions we’re seeing within the EU on the Israel-Palestine issue, particularly when it comes to the EU being a global actor or trying to be a global actor? Is it helpful, unhelpful, that its member states are, kind of, following their own national lines?
Caroline de Gruyter
Helpful on the situation in the Middle East.
Armida van Rij
Helpful for the…
Caroline de Gruyter
In…
Armida van Rij
…EU and the way it presents itself…
Caroline de Gruyter
Ah.
Armida van Rij
…as a global actor?
Caroline de Gruyter
No, of course not, no. The EU – I mean, there is no Europe when we talk about foreign policy. It’s [audio cuts out – 48:46] ooh, it’s for – during the 1990s, when there was still hope, and lots of it in the region. And you always had France being pro-Israel and other countries leaning more towards the Palestinian side, or the other Arabs. And it was relatively easy to – always took a while, but it – they always ended up somewhere in the middle, with everybody being unhappy, but there was a declaration, nevertheless, and a lot of money, usually. That was our own leverage on the region, the money, the bag of money, not political.
Now, what you see is there are more countries in the EU supporting Israel. Most countries, for instance, in Central and Eastern Europe are pro-Israeli. We buy a lot of weapons from Israel, apart – among other things, for Ukraine. So, the – it’s much more difficult to find common ground at the moment, and this is why it took six months for the EU to come up with a policy. And, you know, this – we are seen as inefficient, as pro – as unjust, violating our own principles and all those remarks are true, actually. So, it dep – it’s – you know, while the EU is having to find its voice in the world, for instance, Hungary vetoing just – almost every statement on the Middle East, is just – it looks very badly. You know, we have 70 – 27 governments behind the wheel. Meanwhile, the situation is getting worse. So, not helpful.
Armida van Rij
Matthew, do you want to come in on any of those questions? You’re muted.
Matthew Karnitschnig
[Pause] Sorry, I had to mute, otherwise you would’ve heard me guffawing in the background, sorry. No, I think the problem here is that you – you know, we shouldn’t expect too much of the EU. And I personally, listening to Josep Borrell, I’m very happy there isn’t a common European position on Israel and its efforts in Gaza. I know other people would disagree with that, but I just think that the EU is in no position, really, to play a serious role here. And I don’t think that either the Palestinians or the Israelis really expect them to. They really look more towards the US. The EU, as Caroline said, is obviously, the big funder of the Palestinians and has been for quite a long time, including the schools and all of that kind of thing, the medical care, the hospitals, that unfortunately, have been destroyed.
On the nuclear deterrent, I think it’s a fantasy. I mean, just look at the numbers. You know, it – France has 300 operational nuclear warheads. The Russians have about almost 4,000, I think, so does the US, 3,700 if I’m remembering correctly. The French arsenal is not a deterrent and this question of, you know, who would get to decide to pull the trigger is a central one, very difficult in a bloc of 27. And I think that’s why, instinctively, so many countries in the East, be it in Poland, the Baltics, etc., will continue to look to the United States and do whatever they can to ensure that they remind under the American nuclear umbrella.
Caroline de Gruyter
Can I come in very briefly on this point? Are you…?
Armida van Rij
Hmmm.
Caroline de Gruyter
Do you allow me? On Trump and NATO, I hear many people saying, “Trump will take America out of NATO once he becomes President again,” if that happens. I am not so sure, actually, because Trump wanted a better deal for America, and he got a better deal for America. The Europeans are investing, it’s not a contribution to NATO, it’s a contribution to their own defence. They – the – Poland is now paying 4% of GDP and it will soon by 5%, I’ve understood. So, they got the message by now.
Second, we’re buying weapons like crazy, and where do we buy those weapons? Mostly in America. So, Trump can be very happy and claim big victory and stay in, which I think is what he will do if he becomes President.
Armida van Rij
I mean, that would be the positive outcome…
Caroline de Gruyter
Yeah.
Armida van Rij
…if there is a positive outcome from Trump becoming President again.
Caroline de Gruyter
Yes.
Armida van Rij
There’s two – we’re starting to come up to time, but there’s two quite interesting questions that I do want to put to you all. One is a, kind of, classic question that only EU nerds like us would find interesting, which is about the budget and the multiannual financial framework. What’s – you know, “How do you assess the impact of the new, potential, European Parliament configuration on the negotiations for the next budget?” from Gabrielle Popa. And the second I want to put to you is about the differences between the EU and NATO at the moment, where, you know, “The EU is moving slightly more in the defence and security space. NATO is increasingly moving more, actually, in the energy, critical infrastructure space. What’s still the difference between the two and are they co-ordinating closely enough in Europe’s interest?”
We – if we could – kind of, two minutes each, max, and your – any final thoughts that you might have. Caroline, do you want to start?
Caroline de Gruyter
Okay, fine. I think the – well, listening to all [audio cuts out – 55:05], everybody’s short for money and the game has always been to try to pay as little as possible into the EU budget and get as much of it – as much out of it as you can. And I think this will increase, especially with a – the more right-wing governments and MEPs.
On the differences between EU and NATO, I will leave that one for Nathalie, gladly.
Armida van Rij
That’s fair enough.
Caroline de Gruyter
That’s more her specialty.
Dr Nathalie Tocci
Okay.
Armida van Rij
Nathalie?
Dr Nathalie Tocci
So, on the budg – so, European Parliament and budget, how does it affect the MFF negotiations? I would say – well, the – I guess the, kind of, ex-ante question is does the European Parliament – you know, if, in a sense, you know, the worst fears play out and it becomes a more, in a sense, Eurosceptic Parliament, does it actually change the dynamic between institutions in which traditionally, the European Parliament was the most pro-European of the institutions, right? Yes, the Commission is, obviously, integrationist, because the more integration that is – there is, the more power it gets, right?
So, it has, in a sense, an interest. But in terms of the commitment to the, you know, European project, this really came from Parliament. So, I think, you know – which meant that then, on a number of issues, including the budget, they were forward-leaning in the sense of, you know, a greater European budget and more EU own resources. So, a number of aspects which are related to the MFF. So, I guess one question is, does that change? I suspect, actually, the answer’s no, but I think it’s a legitimate question and we will just need to exactly see what the numbers are.
The second goes back to this question of – so, the second point concerning the first point, really goes back to this question of, you know, what are the priorities going to be? And if the priorities, regardless of who wins, are actually, and they might be, they are determined by the external context, so, basically, they fall into the box of, you know, defence, geoeconomics, yeah, and hence, as it connects to, for instance, industrial policy, enlargement and hence, as it connects to cohesion and agriculture policy.
Now, all of these things have one thing in common, and that’s that they require more money. And so, in a sense, you know, there is this question of if a – if the Parliament is as now or maybe worse, is it going to play a constructive role in an EU that actually needs to be doing more on these things that have a budgetary implication?
On EU and NATO, I probably don’t have time, but just, I guess, in a – in just one word, we have moved beyond the age of, “Ooh, you know, who does what, and hard/soft blah, blah, blah?” that’s over. And we have even moved beyond the world of, “Ah, you know, the world’s become more complicated and so, we need to co-operate.” Now we’re at war, yeah, and when you’re at war, you don’t have time to, kind of, you know, do a number of things. So, NATO’s there. I think especially if there is a progressive disengagement by the United States, I don’t believe in pulling out of NATO, but progressive disengagement of the United States. You know, dusting off the shelf and giving meaning to the European pillar in NATO and what the EU contribution to that is, I think is the way to go.
Armida van Rij
Hmmm, great, thank you very much. Matthew, the final word is to you.
Matthew Karnitschnig
Thank you. Yeah, just to follow up on what Nathalie said. I, you know, I wou – personally would love to see the European pillar strengthen, but I just don’t see it, realistically, because there are all of these budgetary pressures on everybody. And as long as the United States is there, it’s always going to be easier to rely on the United States than to actually spend the money. Just to cite one figure, the German – after everything that’s happened over the past several years, including Trump, the German defence budget, this is including the special fund that they set up, but the German defence budget is about €52 billion. That compares to 377 billion in Russia, which is an economy less than half the size of Germany’s. So, it doesn’t seem that, you know, despite everything that we’ve seen recently, that the Germans really have gotten the message there.
In terms of the far-right and its effect on the budget, or whatever’s going to happen out of these negotiations, I mean, I would argue that they would push for more money, because this is what people like Orbán need from the EU. I mean, this is the only way that Brussels managed to, kind of, you know, knock him back into line, as we were discussing earlier. Is, this is the leverage that Brussels has over these guys and, you know, I think something like 70% of the EU budget is agriculture and regional development aid, which is – you know, these are the voters. These are the people that the Orbáns and the Ficos of the world need to vote for them. I mean, I thought it was interesting recently that Macron, I think last week when he was in Germany, proposed doubling the EU budget, which was met with silence in Germany. So, I don’t think we’re going to see a big jump here. I think the total budget is about €1 trillion over several years.
Just one final thought. I do think that migration is going to remain the dominant issue. I think in some countries it is now the top issue. There was a poll in Germany saying, “This is what is going to drive people to the polls this weekend.” It is also the one thing that unites the far-right people. You know, we tend to, kind of, lump them all into one category, but the – what we call the far-right is actually a pretty diverse group. Migration is the one issue, especially migration from Muslim countries, is something that unites them on other issues, like the transatlantic relationship or Russia. There’s a lot of divergence. You’ve got, you know – Vox in Spain, for example, is very pro-NATO, pro-US. Whereas, you know, the German AfD and FPÖ in Austria and so forth, tend to look more towards Russia. But migration is the one thing that they can agree on, and I think that we’re going to feel that at the European level, too, in the…
Armida van Rij
Great.
Matthew Karnitschnig
…coming years.
Armida van Rij
Thanks very much, Matthew. I mean, I think the – certainly, there was a couple of themes that reverberate throughout this discussion, and one is that these elections will absolutely be determined by the external security environment we find ourselves in, both Russia’s aggression of Ukraine, but also, others. And I think this point around the threats to the European project and how we – that will play out over the coming weeks and coming months, which is certainly cause for concern. But perhaps I’ll just leave you with Caroline’s, kind of, more optimist note of, at least there’s interest in the EU again, after perhaps several years/decades of slight apathy.
Okay, thanks very much to our panellists for joining us. Thank you very much to our online audience and for your excellent questions. We will see what happens with these elections results. Here at Chatham House, we’ll be publishing, or uploading, a podcast tomorrow, looking ahead of these elections and then, next week we’ll also be publishing a longer piece looking at specific policy areas and the results of these elections. So, do keep an eye out for that, but for now, thanks very much for joining us. Have a good evening.
