James Nixey
Right, good to go. Moora, over there in the corner, is giving me the thumbs up. So, welcome, everybody. Good evening and thank you for coming to Chatham House. Needless to say, we are on the record this evening, and you may tweet to your heart’s content, so all good.
I’m James Nixey, but more importantly, I’m joined by a trio of outstanding Russian Russia Analysts. I say Russian, but I know that Gulnaz is half American. But perhaps let me say first of all, by way of introduction, that I do feel that we are all worse off these days, poorer Russia Analysts in every sense, because of, well, we can’t go there, we can’t meet people, we can’t interview, meet people nice, not so nice. And that – I do feel the loss, and I suppose for most people, it is – you know, those people who are able to travel to Russia, and one may treat some of ‘em with a great deal of scepticism.
That said, that’s why it is to me, and I hope it doesn’t sound like a contradiction, it is all the more important that we do listen to Russians, exiled Russians, the exiled community, obviously massively burgeoned, increased in the last couple of years, by force. And I do think that their insight is usefully different. I won’t say better, because Ben Noble, if he’s listening, will kill me, but certainly, I think they bring a unique dimension to it. We have plenty of discussions inside the Russia and Eurasia Programme at Chatham House with Russians, and we do, sort of, feel this just adds to our analysis and our depth.
So, that’s the plan and this evening, we have, in reverse order, Gulnaz Sharafutdinova from King’s College London, Yulia Mineeva, actually at Chatham House, our New Generation Europe Fellow, and Maxim Alyukov from Manchester and King’s. And I will ask a few questions and then open it out to the audience online and in this hall.
So, I think we’d agreed that I’ll start with you, Maxim. Thank you for coming. You’ll notice that I haven’t yet referenced to the event happening on – in mid-March with you, and, of course we make fun of it and there’s going to be lots of satire and cartoons and jokes, and rightly so, but I guess I’ve always taken the – had the belief that the vote, the election, that it tells us quite a lot about how Russia is governed. So, that’s my question, what does it tell us about what the Russians need to do? Doing, sort of, the paddling under the water, the duck under the water. What do they need to do to maintain the illusion? What is it? Why do they have it? All of that. So, why is it important to them and what does it tell us about Russian society today?
Maxim Alyukov
Well, yeah, in order to understand the regime approach to voting and election, the upcoming election, I think it’s important to understand its approach to maintaining stability in general. ‘Cause in any authoritarian country, you have a regime which typically rests on fear, lies or economic prosperity, and this form of a world describes how Russia evolved in the past two decades, right? So, from the 2000s, when the regime relied more on economic prosperity and low intensity propaganda and violence, to 2010s, to economic decline and medium intensity propaganda and violence. And finally, the invasion in Ukraine was very important point, because, basically, the economic prosperity now is out of the question, and we see a shift towards a much more intensive use of violence and propaganda.
And even given an extremely sophisticated propaganda machine in contemporary Russia, I would say that violence is still more important, because it allowed the regime to, basically, neutralise all the most important opponents, raise the course of protest for the public and also, demolish all organisational infrastructure which could be – could have been used to translate this content into action.
And this creates – this kind of regime maintains stability, but not without tensions, alright? So, there are still tensions and I would say that the major tension right now is between a desire for some kind of stability and normalisation on the one hand and a decision to continue the war on the other, right? So, on the one hand, we see the abundance of data reference and surveys showing – repeatedly showing that people are desensitised to these economic outcomes.
There is the majority of Russians who would like to see some kind of negotiations and peace. So, it’s not really peace, I mean, ‘peace’ because for different people, this means different things. So, for some, it would be negotiations but keeping some Ukrainian territories. For others, negotiations but keeping Crimea, but still, some kind of stabilisation, and there is a sense of tiredness related to the protracted conflict.
And this sets out in the context for the upcoming election, because this is ten – the tension the regime has to address somehow, and of course, Putin himself, sort of, he’s preparing for the election. The campaign itself is so – almost non-existent. We don’t see him addressing the public. But these rare opportunities he had, he used to, basically, say that “The economy is doing great, and the war is not going to end,” at the same time, which is a trade-off. So, he, basically, noted this trade-off, by – while these ideas are clearly in contradiction.
And at the same time, we see some level of political apathy. So, even among regime supporters, you see that the election is of very interest – of very little interest for voters. They understand that it’s meaningless. It doesn’t make any sense to participate in it. So, it creates a problem for the presidential administration. So, they are aware of this discontent on the one hand and probably little interest on the other, but at the same time, there are sources within the Kremlin who say that they were instructed to provide a landslide electoral victory, with voter turnout of 70-80%. And in this context, they will obviously, have to rely on a very sophisticated system of fraud, which have been honed over the past years, right? So, the new system of electronic voting, election lasting several days and, of course, massive, tremendous use of administrative resource to force state-dependent workers to vote.
So, I think right now it’s mostly a system dependent on violence rather than on persuasion and legitimacy. Yeah, it, of course, doesn’t mean – this approach allows the regime to, effectively, maintain stability, but it’s also, too, important that the reliance of violence generates a much higher degree of uncertainty than a reliance of legitimate concerns. So, the more system is not transparent and the more it’s governed by violence rather than by rules, the more difficult is to make predictions about stability or evolution, so it might change at some point.
James Nixey
Thank you very much, indeed. Can I just follow you up? Before I turn to Yulia, just a quick follow-up. What’s the balance of pre-voting manipulation and post-voting manipulation? In other words, obviously, they prepare the population in all sorts of ways, but ultimately, there is – you know, “It’s not the votes, but it’s the counters,” as they say. So, what’s the – how – and what’s the – you know, whether it’s a ratio or however you want to say it, but – I mean, ultimately, it’s – we have to do it – both sides of voting day, we have to do it. Is that right?
Maxim Alyukov
Hmmm hmm. So, I would say, yeah, by pre-voting manipulation you mean, like, forcing people to vote?
James Nixey
Everything, whatever.
Maxim Alyukov
Yeah. I think it’s more important than post-voting falsification.
James Nixey
Absolutely.
Maxim Alyukov
‘Cause you have this very sophisticated machine, which is designed to provide the desired result, and then, when you provide some numbers and you see that you do not get desired result, then post-voting, you can change something, falsify. But the most important part happens before and during the election.
James Nixey
Just one final thing. I can’t help myself. A thought experiment. If Russia were to hold a genuinely free and fair election, what would that look like?
Maxim Alyukov
It’s quite difficult to imagine, yeah.
James Nixey
Yes, it is hard to imagine, but a thought experiment. Absolutely.
Maxim Alyukov
Yeah, well, by a fair election…
James Nixey
If there were to be no manip – what I mean is if there were to be no manipulation.
Maxim Alyukov
Yeah, yeah, well if you mean no manipulation from the very beginning, right, so different candidates are allowed to run and gather support, then, yeah, I think it can be quite chaotic process with many people participating.
James Nixey
So, you can’t give an answer. You can say it will result in chaos. Okay, that’s interesting in itself. Yulia, can I turn to you? So, I’ve got two things for you. Well, the first thing is I’d like you to talk a little bit about elites, if you wouldn’t mind, who’s in, out, up, down. What might happen in a post – what might happen with the elites after the election, if that’s any kind of watershed. So, I’d love you to say a little bit about that, and it’s – and just, you know, for the audience here, I mean, your research here is about reaching back in, the Russian diaspora, the new Russian diaspora, the – as we – as I mentioned at the beginning. So, I’d like you to talk a little bit a – frankly, about your research here, I think that would be interesting to people, and what effects they’re having, what motivations they have. I there’s – they’re not a monolith by any stretch of the imagination. So, something about their div – the diversity of the diaspora.
Yulia Mineeva
Yeah.
James Nixey
Please.
Yulia Mineeva
Okay, perfect, thank you. So, we are talking here before the Russian elections and even though we already know the results, in the runup to any elections, even the one that we see in Russia, there is usually tension in the air among the elites. And so – and despite the fact that we haven’t seen any major reshuffles since 2020, when Mishustin was appointed Prime Minister, the new presidential term is usually, kind of, associated with reappointments or maybe some major reforms. And also, some of the – just a technical thing that some of the contracts of Ministers or people from presidential administration, they’re also, kind of, tied up to the presidential term. So, in this sense, it’s impossible to predict whether this contracts will be prolonged, let’s say. So, there is a little bit of room for intrigue and some speculations.
So, in the end of 2022, a lot of experts were saying that “In 2023, we are expecting some” – so, “The year’s going to be marked by repressions against the – against some members of elites.” And that would make sense, because it would, one hand, allow to show the population that there is a, like, a scapegoat that we can blame for our failures in the war. And at the same time, it would be a sign for elites that there will – there is no place for dissent or criticism anymore. But at the same time, we haven’t seen much arrest that may suggest that actually, the stability for the regime at the moment is more important than its renewal.
At the same time, it doesn’t mean that we shouldn’t expect any renewals in the elites. Quite recently, last week, President Putin during his speech said that “The word elite,” by which he mean those who got their fortune in the 90s in Russia, “has discredited itself, and the new elites of Russia should be those fighting Ukraine” and it’s them who should take the ministerial and some high positions in the government or in different, like, social and state services. So, by saying that, Putin also sends, kind of, two signals. First, for the population, that the special, so-called special military operation, is the main social lift in the country, and the second is probably to the elite, that the ‘old elite’ meaning the top of Russian Forbes, basically, are at risk now and shouldn’t take their privilege for granted.
So, what we see these days is it’s not the arrests, actually, but rather the revision of the privatisation seems to be the main instrument of elite management in current Russia these days. And as Transparency reported today, there was around 180 companies that are now being nationalised by the government and not all of them are defence related. And so, they’re probably going to be taken – like, passed to some competitors, or maybe they’re going to be passed to this emerging new class of Russian establishment, basically people who took over the control of Western assets in Russia.
So, I would say that for business, the recipe of how to survive in Russia, the rules are it’s, basically, not to be too bold, not to compare about sanctions and if you can, publicly support what’s going on in the country. But not many people are doing that because of obvious sanction risks. So, basically, I feel like the idea of the formation of this new elite from those who fought in Ukraine looks much more interesting, because this elite is, basically, just brutal and loyal to people – to Putin military servicemen, would just naturally conclude the process of so-called siloviki state. But at the same time, there is a risk, because they are now trying to second guess what Putin wants and usually, such executors that say they can go too far and actually harm the regime by maybe creating some black swans that the government will have to deal with.
James Nixey
Fascinating, and I’ve got – I’d love to follow-up, but I did ask about the diaspora. What are yours – and…
Yulia Mineeva
Yeah.
James Nixey
…your research?
Yulia Mineeva
So, what’s your question about? What’s the question about diaspora?
James Nixey
How they reach back in, what their motivations are, what they want, what they don’t want.
Yulia Mineeva
So, at the moment, it’s hard to count, but at the moment it’s said that there is about 500,000, or up to 1.3 million, of Russians who left the country after the full-scale invasion, and – for complex reasons. And during these two years and emigration, Russians have managed to create more than 100 grassroots initiative projects, that is mostly trying to aggregate resources and work directly with Russian populations.
There aren’t many, kind of, avenues they’re working on, but I would say, first, it’s, like, Journalists and projects that are fighting propaganda. The other, kind of, leg is people who are helping Russians on the ground. I don’t know, like, let’s say it’s Lawyers who help to – who help Russians to avoid military service or defend their rights if they were fight for their anti-war stance. Let’s say there are Sociologists who are trying new different methods to actually measure the sentiment in Russia, like IT specialists who are trying to circumvent the Iron Curtain and so on.
In terms of opposition political actors, obviously, we’re going to touch on Navalny here. I would say there are mostly now not the leaders of opposition, but the leaders of opinion, and they’re usually communicating with their audience through YouTube and social media. But unfortunately, this category is quite divided and at the moment, is a bit important. So, I feel like with the death of Navalny, there is a window of opportunity for the opposition to, kind of, rectify the situation, if that makes sense.
James Nixey
It does make sense, interesting. I’m sure we’ll get into, you know, the perennial question of whatever happened to Russian opposition in the question and discussion session, but for now, let me move to Gulnaz. Couple of things, Gulnaz. First of all, I mean, maybe you’d like to comment on that and see, in the sense that, have you noticed any changes in Russian Government strategy? I mean, this is an election, the first real wartime election we’ve had in Russia.
Gulnaz Sharafutdinova
Hmmm.
James Nixey
So, what changes have you seen there? And then, I’d also like to take you back to what I know your real expertise is, and so – which is in city province divides. We often hear about it, you know, that they’re different. I often wonder if it’s overegged, but you can tell us in terms of viewpoints, who’s being mobilised, in terms of support for the regime. What the differences are there between the cities and the countryside, effectively.
Gulnaz Sharafutdinova
Hmmm hmm, yes, thank you, James. Hello, everyone. So, on the issue of the changing strategies, I think, of course, the Russian Government, the Kremlin, had to adapt and think about adapting and adjusting to the next context of war. But the adaptation kept the same principles in mind and was more of the same in terms of ensuring control on governance structures and predictability of political outcomes, especially the electoral outcomes. And – but this orientation towards control and predictability have been there for the past two decades and more. And how this adaptation happens and how they ensure control and predictability in a war situation differs somewhat, given the sanctions regime, the shock on the economy, the psychological shock on the society, and the need to reorient economic and development strategies. And, of course, it’s not about economic development strategies anymore. It’s about ensuring that the economy doesn’t collapse.
And, of course, at the beginning of unprecedented sanctions, the expectations of most Analysts, of many Analysts, was that there would be an incredible contraction of the Russian economy. That did not happen and that that created a big puzzle for why it didn’t happen. And very respectable Analysts, Political Economists, Economists, are coming up with their explanations, one of which, that I agree with, that resonates, is how, you know, Russian economy has been going through a number of different crisis and adjusting – learning to adjust to the sanctions regime in 2014. Learning to adjust and adapt to COVID crisis and economic actors, with many market actors, had to adjust. And the crisis-focused crisis context is not a new one in post-2022 and so, many of those mechanisms were worked out. Many of those mechanisms were based on, sort of, mutual communication and co-ordination between market actors and the Government Officials, and these mechanisms proved resilient in this new shock, as well.
But of course, besides that, the flexibility of Russian economy is also – and why I’m talking about flexibility of Russian economy, of course, this is the very basic structural important element for, you know, adjusting your governance strategy, for maintaining stability and control and predictability of political outcomes. And, of course, we need to bring into account, and again, something that Putin was very much pounding on in his federal address was how the global or world economy is changing in terms of its structure and how the Western role in the global economy and the global GDP is going down. And the rise of the Asian countries and the BRICS and China and India and Brazil, and others, in – as a share of global GDP is rising.
And so, to the extent that the sanctions are coming from the West, but not from China, not from Turkey, not from India, that creates a big leeway for readjustment of important exports, and therefore, we do see this gradual readjustment happening and therefore, enabling the Kremlin to maintain not economic prosperity and development, but economic stability that might be losing the dynamism and might be going down slowly. Or, in comparison to economic crisis in Western countries, might allow even the opportunity for the propaganda and opinion leaders in Russia to suggest that “Look, Russian economy is growing.” And indeed, in 2023, the economy has, sort of, overshoot in terms of predicting GDP rise, and so, you know, the – that helps.
And of course, putting incredible resources into the military production is what drives some of this industrial and manufacturing growth. And, you know, it could be discussed in terms of how long it could be maintained and how – where is it going to? And in the long-term, whether this is a sustainable strategy at all, you know, probably not. But in the short-term, it works to pacify a population. It works to give psychological and cognitive resources to people, to suggest that we’re doing alright here and we are recognised by many other countries in the West, and we are taking advantage of sanctions to develop our many sectors of the economy and substitute imports.
And when people are looking for such justifications, because they do not have choices to exit, to go into exile, to leave and use their talents and skills in other countries, they look for those justifications and they are given. And plus, maybe the final big resource that’s given out is not symbolic and not propaganda, but actually social benefits payments to families with children, to pensioners, sort of, a very attentive policy towards adjusting the payments with the inflation, or beyond the inflation. And doing this especially in the months coming up to the election and announcing a lot of attention and announcing a lot of social projects to develop, you know, schools and families with children and youth and mortgages and housing and construction. And so, that gives, from the government’s perspective, a sense to the population that things are going not so bad as people expected in the situation or the shock. So, there’s a lot of this PR, of course, that’s going on.
But in terms of coming back to the government’s strategy, it is adapting to the situation, both economically, in terms of – but in a way, the whole strategy of the West as an enemy, the strategy of focusing on social benefits issues and, sort of, combining economic and propagandistic narratives and discourses, has stayed the same. Hasn’t changed in dramatic fashion.
James Nixey
Very interesting. A little bit more about the city/rural divide.
Gulnaz Sharafutdinova
Yes. So, in 2011, Natalia Zubarevich offered this very useful idea, concept of Russia consisting of – that there is not one Russia, but there are ‘Four Russias’, where she really juxtaposed the social development levels and, therefore, political leanings of urbanites who live in very big cities versus those who live in smaller cities, more industrial. And at that moment, in 2011, there was no industrial push, but there was more of a stagnation type tendency starting, and then, the very small rural and very small towns, so under 50,000, and then the very marginalised and poor regions in the Caucasus and a few others in Siberia, in the Far East. And so, basically, suggesting that the – because of the political structure – because of the economic structures, the social development and political orientation are really, really different.
Since then, right, we are now 13 years after that argument, what do we see? We – you know, that – probably that argument doesn’t apply anymore and, you know, 1.3 million that Yulia mentioned have left are, sort of, young, most skilled, most talented, most resourceful, most cosmopolitan, most Western-oriented, most educated. And, sort of, the promise for Russia’s future development is not there anymore. And still, even with the shifts that have happened over the past ten years, which have not been for the good of social development in Russia, we still, of course, see the rivers of urbanites in Moscow going to Borisovskoye Cemetery. And we do not necessarily see a very widespread attitudes of that nature of support for Navalny in many other smaller cities in Russia. And hence, there is a difference that is still there in terms of, sort of, adaptation strategies, depoliticization and – that works for many people who live in an environment that is different from Moscow environment, that has gone in the direction of Moscow, St Petersburg, other cities with million and more population, that have gone in the direction of more, sort of, post-industrial, more cosmopolitan direction.
And so, there is a big divide there and in that sense, society is fragmented in terms of their attitudes towards Putin and the system, in terms of their attitudes towards the West, in terms of their willingness to have an active civic position. And that divide, you know, I don’t want to overestimate it, but I think it shouldn’t be underestimated either, because these – especially given very strong, now, educational, propagandistic efforts from the regime’s side to raise children in specific views and in specific patriotic discourses, that divide, unfortunately, might not go in favour of, again, the rivers of people who mourn Navalny and who represent, and whom many people in the West have – I think it’s resonated a lot and gave hope.
So, I think the reality is difficult and complex and I don’t want to take any position, whether – not a pessimistic position to suggest that, you know, this – the people that we saw in the past days is really a minority. But I think, coming back to a very important question of what would have happened if elections were taken in a free and competitive environment? And so, the environment, the context is really important. We saw a glimpse of what might have happened with people voting – not voting, but signing for Nadezhdin, and this happened in the absence of free media, in the absence of open channels of communication, right? And now, imagine if these channels of communication open up. How long will it take for bringing the more depoliticised population, you know, into more progressive politics, is a question, but I think those shifts could happen quite quickly and dramatically if the context changes.
Therefore, I wouldn’t go in the direction of focusing on, you know, some, I don’t know, some deep-rooted mentality of individuals, etc., but I will talk about the importance of context, about the importance of structures, structures of propaganda, structures of incentives, that individuals face. And in the shift of these structures and the environment, I think people could change their behaviour and their attitudes and their political preferences, too. So, if we saw thousands standing up because of the anti-war stance of Nadezhdin, imagine if the media structures and information flows were different, how it might have affected the results.
And we saw that Nadezhdin was not allowed to run and so, that shows that the Kremlin is worried that if Nadezhdin was allowed to run, what that – it might have been a little too competitive for the Kremlin, even in the absence of all the structures that would allow for the creation of civil society and public opinion. That we can talk about public opinion that exists in a different environment, because what we call now public opinion in Russia, it’s not public opinion.
James Nixey
I think that’s right, Gulnaz, that Nadezhdin was just getting a little bit too popular for comfort. Probably Navalny, too, in a different sense. So, it literally shows the extreme sensitivity of a regime that they can’t, even in the tightly controlled conditions that they have, they can’t allow a Navalny, they can’t allow a Nadezhdin, in the different ways.
One thing that’s – thank you very much, by the way. One thing that has struck me in what all three of you have said is, actually, the degree of resilience that Russia has, with its ability to change, adapt, ‘regenerate’ you were saying, Yulia. I mean, my colleague, Orysia Lutsevych, in the front row, works on Ukraine’s resilience, and we talk about that a lot, and rightly so, important bolster to it. But there is, and it’s not just confined to Russia, but there is a great deal of autocratic resilience, if you like, or resilience amongst autocracies, and I think we underestimate that. And we’ve been predicting the end of a Russian regime, I think, since 2007, if I’m not mistaken. You can pick your own date. And I think we – whilst, obviously, you can con – there is a mistake in considering Russia to be ten foot tall, overegging, overestimating Russia’s strengths, then I think we also underestimate its ability to survive, regenerate, change, adapt. And that’s probably an analytical failure on many of our parts.
I just – before I go – there’s half an hour left, already, only, but I just can’t help coming back to the issue of violence. Maxim, but anybody really, I mean, I don’t want to put it as bluntly as this, but it works, right? I mean, so, I mean, seriously, I mean, do you think – I mean, the regime must think it works and therefore, can we assume that if a regime thinks it works, then in the slightly more – in a post-election situation, in order to maintain control, it will resort to more and greater violence?
Maxim Alyukov
Well, I think the regime will resort to more and more violence, just because this is how repression works, right? So, there are many, for instance, theories about why and how repressions continue, right? So, give more power to siloviki and they implement repressions, and the importance for the government is – increases, and that’s why they exaggerate threats and that’s why the government gives them even more power. So, there’s no way – it’s like a repression trap. When you set on this course, it’s going to continue and it’s going to increase.
James Nixey
Any thoughts on violence? I mean, Yulia, you’ve been in Russia sin – you were in Russia, you know, I remember during the protests in 2011. Were you at Bolotnaya, I can’t remember, Yulia, in the – in Bolotnaya Square? I can’t remember, but you were…
Yulia Mineeva
I wasn’t there.
James Nixey
You weren’t there, okay, but when you…
Yulia Mineeva
I had my exams in the university.
James Nixey
But you have been associated with the – with opposition movements. You know the people. You’ve interviewed them. I mean, what’s your sense of the Russian regime’s resort to violence?
Yulia Mineeva
I mean, it’s not going to be something new to say that it’s easier to reign through fear rather than through love, and obviously, I mean, it works. And – but the thing that we’ve seen with Navalny’s funeral, that so many people actually came knowing how much risks it actually carries, was actually really impressive. Because, like, let’s say in a lot of independent media, as well, they were publishing instructions, like, “If you want to go to Navalny’s funeral, this is what you should be – this is what you should know. This is what you should do if you get arrested,” and so on. And at the same time, Navalny actually gathered one of the biggest protests with his funeral, and that’s really impressive that – how many people actually not scared of the – and decided to go out.
And now, we see that, as were predicted a bit, that they are now arresting some of those who participated in that, just because it was a question, like, how Russian authorities would actually let such a thing happen, so many people gather in Moscow to commemorate Navalny. But now there’s – we see that some of them are being arrested and it’s probably for the purpose to teach the rest of those who actually went to that protest, saying, like, “Probably,” you know, “it was one of the last opportunities for you to do so.” So, yeah, I feel like there’s going to be some, probably some innocent public criminal cases and, like, trials for those who actually came to say goodbye…
James Nixey
I’d expect so, yeah.
Yulia Mineeva
…to Navalny.
James Nixey
Gulnaz, any thoughts on the regime’s comfortableness with violence, its attitude to violence?
Gulnaz Sharafutdinova
Comfortable?
James Nixey
How comforted it…
Gulnaz Sharafutdinova
How comfortable it is?
James Nixey
How…?
Gulnaz Sharafutdinova
Yeah.
James Nixey
Yes, what I mean is, do you – I’d like that – any thoughts on how at ease is, how it uses violence with impunity, how it doesn’t…
Gulnaz Sharafutdinova
So…
James Nixey
…shirk away from it? It…
Gulnaz Sharafutdinova
Yeah, let me talk about the effects of violence, which I think are very important and which we have seen specifically in rise over the past year or two, and the effect is atomisation of a society. Because the way that this signalling works, right, protests are there and participating in protests gets you imprisoned or into few days, into [mother tongue], so that signalling works. But it doesn’t work at – it works in a sense of leading people to just disconnect and not talk about political issues, about grievances and really, sort of, enfolding into their own little worlds even further.
So, if depoliticization strategies worked through different means over the past years because of propaganda and that politics is about business and, you know, just the – everyone is lying, everyone is corrupt, etc., etc., but now, the repressions against those who take an activist position lead to quite extreme forms of atomisation of Russian society. Where you have formerly existing small groupings of people who have studied together, who go to clubs together or work, any type of little groupings on WhatsApp, on chats, on telegrams channels, they stopped discussing politically important issues. And I’ve had several conversations myself about how information gets exchanged about Navalny, about, you know – and the way that was described to me was, “Have you heard about Navalny?” “Yes.” Period, silence, that’s it.
So, this silence effect, this deafening effect of violence, is what I am observing and find socially quite, of course, depressing, because, you know, the disempowered society gets yet further disempowered through this silence and atomisation.
James Nixey
Thank you. I have massively overextended. I’m very sorry. I shall now open it out to you, ladies and gentlemen in the audience, and online. There’s some brilliant questions online. So, I will take as many as I possibly can and apologise again at the end. So, lady, centre, centre, roughly speaking. Yes, yeah, that’s it. Yeah, you’ve got the right one, Eliza, yes, correct.
Dr Christin Nadeau
Hi there, I’m Dr Christin Nadeau, Consultant, United States Air Force. We’ve been talking a lot about how the current government is structured and managing the population and the economy of Russia. I was wondering if the panel could talk a bit about other influences on how Russia is governed, for example, the Russia Orthodox Church, their trading partners? How – what are the – what role – as Russia, you know, struggles to maintain, logistically, their supplies, they’re going to need to look outside to some extent, and how that might influence how Russia’s governed.
James Nixey
I’ll take a couple at a time, then, hey? Gentleman right at the back, middle back. Yeah, you have your hand up, white lanyard, I think. Yeah.
Nick Fow
Yeah, I was just wondering…
James Nixey
And could you introduce yourself? Can you introduce yourself, please?
Nick Fow
Sorry. Oh, yes, my name’s Nick, Nick Fow, sorry.
James Nixey
And affiliation?
Nick Fow
A new member.
James Nixey
Okay.
Nick Fow
Essentially.
James Nixey
I won’t…
Nick Fow
Sorry, I’m new to all this business.
James Nixey
It’s okay.
Nick Fow
Essentially, when the bodies come home to all the rural areas from Ukraine, will that undermine the support for Putin and change the metric through which they view the regime?
James Nixey
Thanks, and gentleman right at the front here. Sorry to move you around a little bit, Eliza. Just here at the front.
Robert Walter
Thank you very much, indeed. Robert Walter, I’m a former Member of Parliament and one of the first British Politicians to be sanctioned by Russia after the…
James Nixey
A pleasure.
Robert Walter
…invasion of U – [applause] – of Crimea. I wanted to ask the panel really about the effectiveness of what we do in respect of enabling the opposition to work in Russia. Russia has been kicked out of the Council of Europe. It’s still a member of the OSEC, but that’s pretty meaningless. It’s a member of the UN Security Council, where it can block anything which it doesn’t like. But my question really is this – and I mean, I was sanctioned because of what I did on sanctions on our side, but is – are they counterproductive? A Russian Politician, Senior Russian Politician, said to me once, after I’d been sanctioned, that he would probably do the same as I did if he was in my position. But he had to tell me that everything I did “made Mr Putin ever more popular.”
James Nixey
Interesting, and just on the sanctions question, I know the UK is coming out with its own sanctions. I don’t know whether you want to call it a white paper or a strategy, really, and we’ll be discussing that soon, so we must get in touch. I think it’s easiest if I let you respond to what you would like to respond to, but we’ve got here, other influences on Russia, the effects of what is coming home and the effectiveness of enabling the opposition and sanctions being counterproductive. Gulnaz, let’s go in reverse order.
Gulnaz Sharafutdinova
Yeah. Quickly on the bodies coming home. Depends on where they come to. If there are many bodies that come to big cities, Moscow, St Petersburg, those cities where you have the most active population, then that’s a different story, but many bodies come to rural areas where – and a lot of contract Soldiers were driven out of very remote regions, where collective action opportunities are very small to non-existent. And so, at this point, it doesn’t quite have an effect that it might have in different circumstances. So, that will be probably the quickest answer.
And on the issue of effectiveness of sanctions, I would say that there is always an opportunity in the context of sanctions for the country against which sanctions are oriented to – for the government of that country to build the patriotic line and to have a more positive spin that it allows for import substitution. And that, of course, it proves that the West are the enemies that want Russia’s end and fragmentation. But in the end, the sanctions are directed at undermining Russian economy in the longer term. I know the intention was for more short-term, but I think now the thinking is evolving that in the longer term, in terms of technological advancement and developmental opportunities for Russia, that’s where the sanctions come in. They will not allow Russia to think in developmental terms of taking economy somewhere into a new place that the Russ – that the Kremlin was promising and thinking about before the war started.
James Nixey
Thank you. Yulia, you can answer what you wish, but I notice the first part of Robert’s question was about the “effectiveness of enabling the opposition.” That’s very much what we’re trying to achieve of your research here.
Yulia Mineeva
Yeah, can I just quickly say about the – answer the Nick’s questions about bodies coming, as well?
James Nixey
Yeah.
Yulia Mineeva
So, yeah, I think that Gulnaz made a good point about that the attitude is different in Russian regions and in cities, so that this money, that so-called groba [inaudible– 47:08] [means ‘coffin money’], yeah, the, kind of, money for funeral, is actually, I don’t know, also some kind of – provides some kind of help. And in some sense, is a social lift for some of the families, which is obviously not a good thing to know. But at the same time, we see now, from this very little opinion poll that we have, that people in Russian regions, there is a growing number of those who are actually not in favour of so-called special military operation, and they are more in favour of actually moving to some peace talks. Meaning that these people affected by the economic situation, to a bigger extent, but at the same time, because they probably see more coffins coming back to the – to their villages.
And also, I think the other thing that is also scary is not the – that the bodies coming back, but is also that the people from the war are coming back, because we are now seeing many stories in Russian media about the person going to prison – like, committing crime, going to prison, signing a contract with Ministry of Defence, or let’s say Wagner, as it was in the past. Serving their six months, coming back to their villages, kill again, going to prison and it’s going on and on and on. And so, I feel like this is one of the things that Putin probably doesn’t want to deal with this year and the next years, basically, to solve these problems of this combatant men. So, yeah, I feel like this is – might’ve been even the bigger issue…
James Nixey
Thanks.
Yulia Mineeva
…than the coffins are coming.
James Nixey
I’m afraid, you’ve, Maxim, you’ve been left with a question of “other influences on the Russian Government.” But I mean, the question was – mentioned was the “Russian Orthodox Church” as an example, but what else?
Maxim Alyukov
Okay. Well, I’m, myself, an expert, actually. My focus is propaganda, so I don’t – can’t say much about other external influences. So, Orthodox churches are obviously important, right? So, at some point, it is a power which legitimises throughout the Russian Government, and that the church, sort of, engages in the war, right? So, we see people from the church participating in the war. You see the – and the public, a symbolical level, yes. So, that they do definitely, yeah, try to mobilise their communities, religious communities, to safe perceptions of world, and to an extent, mobilise resources to donate to buy drones and stuff like that.
So, definitely, the regime has been trying to exploit this existing leverage, right, so, in the religious sentiment of some parts of Russian population. Yeah, I don’t know. What else can I say about other…
James Nixey
And anybody…
Maxim Alyukov
…influences.
Gulnaz Sharafutdinova
On trading partners…
James Nixey
Yeah.
Gulnaz Sharafutdinova
…of course, the role…
Maxim Alyukov
On trading partners, yeah.
Gulnaz Sharafutdinova
…of China, India, Turkey, United Arabic Emirates, for the money to come in. Chinese cars replacing all the Western cars and becoming the biggest – Russia becoming, sort of, a really big market for Chinese cars, those lengths are incredibly important. Therefore, China’s position is really important, and that strategy of, you know, cat – for catering and developing good relationships is key to Russia’s medium-term economic and social survival.
Maxim Alyukov
Yeah, just…
James Nixey
Hmmm, yeah.
Maxim Alyukov
…a quick addition. So, I think that it, sort of, works, to an extent, and it helps to an extent to state military production. So, you see that they rely on these partners from Iran and China, but for instance, if I look at data about the population, how people, you know, think about what Russians call substitution, import substitution, whether it actually are developed enough and whether they feel the effects of import substitution in their lives, obviously, it’s not enough, right? So, probably they can rely on those external partners to compensate military production to an extent, but it does not really translate into population levels. So, people complain about, you know, instead of having import substitute, they just don’t have enough goods. So, it doesn’t work for the civil…
James Nixey
It maybe translates at a popular level, but it does seem to me that the war economy is driving the war now, and if he was to turn it off, then Russia would be in a lot of trouble, so he can’t turn it off.
Maxim Alyukov
Yeah, yeah, yeah.
James Nixey
There’s two – yes, Yulia, sorry, absolutely.
Yulia Mineeva
Yeah, can I make a point about the sanctions…
James Nixey
Yeah.
Yulia Mineeva
…that all, kind of, lucked out in that? So, I have to say that I cannot talk about what kind of sanctions should we implement it against Russia, because being a Russian citizen and advocating for sanctions can turn into a criminal case for me. So, I’d prefer not to say that, if I may. But just to mention, like, after the death of Navalny, the sanctions that were seen from the UK is sanctioning the prison bosses, but I’m not sure, like – and freezing their assets in the UK. Like, first of all, I’m not sure they’ve ever been to UK – to the UK and have any kind of assets and probably won’t be even given a visa to travel, and so, those sanctions looked a bit, hmmm, I don’t know, impotent, maybe even pathetic, as well.
Now, in terms of the help, I feel like – think Germany is giving a good example of how to support Russian anti-war grassroots initiatives, and unfortunately, this is what my – this is the topic of my research. Unfortunately, what I’m seeing is that UK doesn’t do much in this front. Because the horizontal links between those grassroots initiatives, they’re very strong and it’s now really important to focus on them and support them, and – because they are, in fact, they are, kind of, laying the foundation of Russian civil society and they are, basically, the minimum infrastructure that those in exile and those who are inside Russia rely on at the moment. So – and unfortunately, most of these project, they are very underfunded and are very – in a very difficult financial situation and they really need the support from the international community.
And no, they will not make – I don’t know, they will not overthrow Putin, right, but they are, essentially, just fulfilling the roles of institutions that we don’t have in Russia and that are actually protecting the rights and freedoms of Russians. So, I feel, yeah, that their importance shouldn’t be overlooked or underestimated.
James Nixey
Thank you. I’m going to take a couple online, if I may. Just had a couple of very enticing questions. First of all, and it may be back to you, but of course, anyone can answer it, Yulia, Serem Adeel Abdel-Munim writes – basically, he is saying that Putin is afraid of his elites, but – and it might – I mean, he’s asking, you know, that – “Will it create a – in his creation of a new elite, does that allow for possibilities of a coup?” So, he’s saying, in the conditions of international isolation, Putin is actually afraid of those around him. Just I’ll leave it out there and you can think about that one.
And then, Yihol [inaudible – 54:32] and Stephen Hall have asked a very similar question. It’s this, “How should the West react to Putin’s election?” Very interesting question, yeah. Normally, of course, there’s congratulations afar. Well, how should – what should they say? So, whilst they’re both very difficult questions, but Yulia, is – do you think it’s a credible theory that Putin is afraid of his own elites?
Yulia Mineeva
It depends who we’re taking for elite, right? Because there are different kinds of elite. There are – as we usually talk about Russian politics, we usually mention some, kind of, bureaucrats and technocrats, let’s say. Yeah, let’s put it this way. To be honest, my position, I’m not sure that he actually is afraid of his elites, because he can always substitute the existing elite for the new elite, and not to be afraid of them, if Putin is, shortly.
But if we’re talking about – going a bit deeper about these technocrats and bureaucrats, so saying that, basically, just turn into something like, let’s say peace policy and the war party, technocrats, they just prefer – I feel like they just prefer not to read the news, not to talk about – like, not to expose their opinion about what’s going on in Ukraine and going on in the country. So, just, basically, turned into some kind of keepers and maintainers of the regime. And obviously, they have – they cannot even quit their job, right, because they are just terrified. So, I feel like they are just trying – they’re just living jus – they’re just living one day, basically. They do not know what’s going to happen tomorrow because they’re so distanced from Putin now. So, after COVID started, there is not many direct communication to the Russian leader. So, people are just, kind of, second guessing.
And in terms of those bureaucrats or a war party, I feel like they feel more comfortable because they have a clearer vision of what political steps should be done, where the country should be moving, which direction, and I feel like it’s just because they frame their reason to Putin in geopolitical, rather than economic, categories. It just occupies Putin more. That’s why they have, like, a closer access…
James Nixey
Fascinating.
Yulia Mineeva
…to him, and at the same time, just opportunity to curry favour and increase the influence.
James Nixey
Yeah, okay. Maxim, two weeks today, say, what should Western leaders say and do?
Maxim Alyukov
I don’t think that – I don’t really think that they can do much, right? ‘Cause the elections right now, they have different functions. Before that, one of the functions was to legitimise Russia’s political system in the eyes of external Western observers. It’s no longer, sort of, a function, right? So, we know that, especially in the West, people do not really consider it as a legitimate institution. So, it’s mostly for internal purposes, for legitimising the power in the eyes of the people, and also, for disciplining elites, right? So, for showing that you are in full control, you can run such a large-scale operation without any problems.
So, in this sense, you can’t do much. So, you might, sort of – maybe it’s worse not considering this election a legitimate election, because again, according to Western standpoints, it’s not a legitimate election. There will be no external observers. So, there is a reason to not consider them legitimate. But it will not have much impact on the Russian system, yeah.
James Nixey
Hmmm hmm. Yulia’s nodding in agreement, but Gulnaz, what do you think?
Gulnaz Sharafutdinova
We should remember what was the Western reaction to Soviet election [applause]?
James Nixey
Hmmm, hmmm hmm.
Gulnaz Sharafutdinova
Why should we call it elections, yeah?
James Nixey
Yeah. Yevgenia Albats always admonished me here in this building, in this room, I think, saying, “Why do you call it an election, James?” It’s not an election as we know it.” But I’ve had the discussion with [Nikolai – 58:30] Petrov and with Ben Noble, who say, “You know, there are different kinds of elections.” So, maybe we can argue the point, it might be semilogical.
Go back to the room. There was a gentleman in a blue shirt behind Orysia. Actually, go – more or less behind Orysia.
Harry Williams
Well, yes, so, my…
James Nixey
Do you want to just take the microphone, please, and introduce yourself?
Harry Williams
Good evening. So, I’m Harry Williams, I work for ORB International, and we do primary research in Russia. So, we ran some focus groups recently and gently probed on the elections, and we found, you know, people going through the motions, they’re not really engaging in the process, which I guess, you know, hammers home the point that they’re not really elections. But I guess what I want to know is from an internal perspective, how is that managed to ensure that they’re still legitimate if there’s disengagement? And how important is it to manage that they’re legitimate?
James Nixey
Okay, understood. Let’s see, lady here in the red, please, here in the scarf, lanyard, yeah.
Isabel Taylor
Hi, my name is Isabel Taylor from EBRD, and I have a question. What sort of grievance mechanisms do you see available to the Russian people that are not in favour of the regime?
James Nixey
Okay, interesting and yeah, gentleman at the front, right in front of me here, red tie, blue shirt.
Eliza
A red tie?
James Nixey
Right – yeah, just middle, middle, yeah.
Henry Jones
Hi, Henry Jones, an Associate Director at HIGHGATE, a strategic advisory firm. Much was made of Navalny’s return to Russia following his treatment in Germany, and of the context of the, kind of, use of violence that we’ve discussed on this panel, how – from a practical point of view, how viable is it to mount an effective opposition campaign remotely, i.e., from outside Russia, from the relative safety, I’m going to use, in inverted commas, thinking of the Skripals? But how viable is it to do that effectively from a safe-ish third county in terms of information dissemination, media campaigning? Can it be done?
James Nixey
Thank you, Henry. Yes, that question also came in online, as well. Okay, let’s take that one to you first, Yulia, if I may. How viable is an effective opposition campaign remotely, from abroad?
Yulia Mineeva
Phew. That’s actually really hard to say, and I feel like this is the – what puzzles the Russian opposition these days. I’m not sure, to be honest, because let’s say, I don’t know, if we take – so, until the war started and until Navalny went to prison, I would say that Navalny’s team and Anti-Corruption Foundation of Navalny, FBK, was, kind of, the main opposition power. But they were not so – but Navalny was, kind of, wearing, you know, kind of, many hats. He wasn’t only a Politician that is participating in, like, electoral cycles, say, as he tried to do in 2018 and did in 2013. He was also doing investigations, also being a Blogger and being – doing investigations, and the other leg was, kind of, organising the street protests. So, I feel like this – these three things made Navalny successful. So, not only, like, you know, the political direction.
Now we see that, like, I don’t know, to my opinion, Anti-Corruption Foundation, Navalny team, for the last two years, they’ve been in a bit of a crisis, because they only published an investigations. They cannot do the other two legs, and yeah, I feel this is very tricky and yeah, that’s a good question. I don’t have an answer to that, to be honest, because they are not able – like, you cannot only do investigation and then, expect people to, I don’t know, to go on the streets, as it was, with an investigation about Viktor Medvedchuk, let’s say.
James Nixey
Yeah, interesting. Be fascinating to see how they manage to continue and the way – ‘cause obvi – it seems to me that Navalny’s organisation was superb at organisation, and that’s one thing, but on the other hand, they did very much rely on that central figure there. So, I’m not quite sure which way that’ll go.
Maxim, can I ask you the legitimacy question? I mean, I’m not – you might dispute the premise of the question, but the question was, just to remind – “How do we ensure legitimacy?” Which is weird in an illegitimate election, but there you go.
Maxim Alyukov
Given the – given little interest, right, so limited…
James Nixey
Yeah.
Maxim Alyukov
…engagement? I think you mentioned focus groups, and…
James Nixey
Yeah.
Maxim Alyukov
…I just – I remember some colleagues of my ran focus groups couple of months ago and there was a question about election. And there was a very funny discussion when there were, like, five participants and the moderator asks people, “What do you think about the upcoming election?” And the first one says, “Ah, I don’t really care much. You know, it will not make any difference.” And the second one says, “Oh, I completely forgot about the fact that we’re having elections here,” and the third person says, “I’m very much interested in the Russian elections – in elections happening in the US. So, I’ll really want them to remove Biden.”
I mean, it’s a funny story, but yeah, I think that there is a sense – what I see in reactions, in data and during these, kind of, interest focus groups, is the sense of, sort of, forced consensus, in a sense. It’s like I know this run – that this person is running for, like, fifth time or something, but at this point, we have a war and all this crisis, and I know that it’s a foregone conclusion, but I don’t see any other alternatives. So, probably, it’s, like, the best possible option because we don’t have any alternatives and there is this forced feeling and sense of crisis. So, it’s like I don’t have a choice, but I also justify not having a choice by myself – for myself, but to – by referring to the circumstances of war and crisis. So, in the sense that it’s the – it becomes a little bit more legitimate when you can find justifications.
James Nixey
Thank you. Gulnaz, bad luck, this leaves you with the grievance question. “What grievance mechanisms” are open, still?
Gulnaz Sharafutdinova
I’m going to connect a few questions.
James Nixey
Great.
Gulnaz Sharafutdinova
So, there are not many grievance expression mechanisms available to those who are not happy and who have an active position. And the fact that the Kremlin has left the door open, so to say, to leave and those who left were able to leave, was probably the number one mechanism available, right?
Now, having said that, I will move to the issue of effective opposition strategies and link it to the grievance mechanisms, as well. Because the opposition that is outside the country – the war is the best political strategy to delegitimise any opposition that is abroad. And so, in terms of effectiveness, there is this Catch 22, that the Russian opposition outside of the country faces, of having a very hard time, very minimal influence onto people who live inside. However, do they have an alternative, and how can we think about this issue in the absence of any alternatives? And in the absence of any alternatives, and we also know that the 1.3 million, or whatever hundred thousands that have left, are – do not take up all Russians who are anti-regime. There are many people who are anti-regime in Russia.
So, for the opposition to, sort of, give up and not do anything and not reach out to these people, not engage with them, not to try to talk to them, not to try to engage and not to try to use certain resources that are inside Russia, would be a damning effect on any anti-regime people inside. So, the opposition that is outside could be also seen as one potential grievance mechanism and mechanism for some sort of active doing of something for those anti-regime inside Russia, as well. So, I think those linkages are very important, and in the absence of alternatives, the conversation about the ineffectiveness or impossibility of effective opposition is really a bit disruptive.
James Nixey
Thank you, Gulnaz. It strikes me that we – Russia is nothing if not contradictory, and we know from, say, Jade McGlynn’s research, for example, that Russia – the Russian people are complicit. There is a great deal of, whether it’s Stockholm Syndrome or absolute nationalism, but there is a lot of support for a war. But at the same time, we also know that the war is not popular in certain areas and it’s very con – it does present a, sort of, a confusing picture.
Ladies and gents, they dock my salary if I go on too long, so I think I’d better keep it clo – keep – bring it to a close right there. This is how we deal with the Russian elections in Chatham House, with appropriate scepticism and a lot of analysis, not least from Russians, as I say, themselves. But please join me in thanking the panel this evening [applause].
