India elections: What's next for Modi and India's place in the world?

Dr Chietigj Bajpaee

Hello, everyone. Thank you for joining us today for this event on India’s election and what it says about the country’s place in the world. My name is Dr Chietigj Bajpaee. I am Senior Research Fellow for South Asia at Chatham House.

So, 2024 has been referred to as the “year of elections.” We have a record number of countries going to the polls. South Africa is holding its election today. I’m based in the UK, which has just announced that it’ll be hosting elections on the 4th of July and of course, there’s the US election in November. However, I would argue that the mother of all elections is taking place in India at the moment and there are two reasons for this. First, of course, is the sheer scale. As the world’s largest electoral exercise, with 970 million registered voters, polls taking place over seven stages, across six weeks. The sixth phase took place earlier this week.

And the election is also important from a political perspective, as it’s likely to result in the third consecutive term for Prime Minister Narendra Modi, a feat that’s only been achieved by India’s first Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru. Modi’s party, the BJP, has defied the norms of Indian politics, which favour anti-incumbency and shaky coalition governments, which is what has existed for over two decades, before Modi assumed power in 2014. The election also comes at a time when there’s been growing scrutiny on the state of India’s democracy and growing attention to India’s rising global status.

So, to discuss this, we have an excellent panel of speakers with us today. Joining us from India is Ambassador Kanwal Sibal. Ambassador Sibal has served as India’s Foreign Secretary, as well as Ambassador to several countries, including Russia, France, Egypt and Turkey. He’s also served on India’s National Security Advisory Board and he’s currently Chancellor of Jawaharlal Nehru University.

Also joining us from India is Suhasini Haidar. Ms Haidar is Diplomatic Editor at The Hindu newspaper. She’s an award-winning Journalist who’s worked with CNN and CNN-IBN. And then, finally, joining us from London is Dr Pavithra Suryanarayan. She’s Assistant Professor in the Department of Government at the London School of Economics and Political Science and she was previously an Assistant Professor at John Hopkins University.

So, what we’ll do is we’ll start with a guided discussion for the first 30 minutes or so, before we open up to audience questions. So, feel free to type your questions in the Q&A box over the course of the event, and I will direct them to the relevant panellist on your behalf. This event is going to be on the record and a recording will be posted on the Chatham House website.

So, let’s get started. We will discuss, of course, the specifics of the election, but I wanted to first, perhaps set the scene by discussing “India’s place in the world.” And on that, I wanted to start with you, Profess – Ambassador Sibal. Sir, you’ve served as Foreign Secretary under the previous BJP Government of Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee. So, looking at that government and looking at this one, how has, in your opinion, India’s foreign policy changed? You know, where do you see the continuities, where do you see the changes, and to what would you attribute these changes? Is it Modi, is it the strength and mandate of the government or is it because of changes in the international system? I assume it’s a bit of both.

Ambassador Kanwal Sibal

I think you’re right, it’s a bit of everything that you mention. Foreign policy cannot be static. It has to respond to the changing global environment, what happens in our neighbourhood, the shifts of power within the global system, the conflicts that occur elsewhere in the globe, which impact on India and other countries, too. And then, of course, India’s own economic rise gives us more options in terms of our external relations and the change in geopolitics also has opened up possibilities of establishing ties with countries with which we’ve had difficulties in the past. I mean the end of the Cold War and everything else. That is one.

It – the other is that in a major – a big country like India has a certain continuity of foreign policy. I mean, small countries may be able to – because of their vulnerabilities and the security issues that they face, can make big changes in their foreign policy and align themselves to big powers to protect themselves, etc., etc. But India is not in that category at all. We have a certain image of ourselves, our role in the world, our civilisational heritage, what we feel is our right to have more say in international governance. As you know, we’ve always – we’ve been pressing quite hard for permanent membership of the next UN Security Council. Though I don’t think it’s going to happen in the foreseeable future.

So, from Vajpayee’s time and through Manmohan Singh and then, to Prime Minister Modi’s time, there has been a essential continuity, which is that India will not be a member of any military alliance. It’ll maintain what you might call strategic autonomy or multiple choices or be friends with everyone. I mean, these are different of ways of defining what we have in mind. Basically, to maintain our wide options, the only course is to have friendship with all, to the extent that it is reciprocated. Now, with China and Pakistan, this has always been very difficult, but with the others, we’ve always maintained, as far as possible, constructive, positive, forward looking ties.

But what Prime Minister Modi has done, which is different from the past, are a few things. One is because India’s economic rise has given us more options, he’s much more confident on the global state. He has been very active in terms of diplomacy. He has travelled as no other Prime Minister in the past has done. He’s had summits with the – all the global leaders, as well as regional leaders. He has put a lot of emphasis on marking the international scene with India’s civilisational ideas and the G20, actually, represented that. If you look at many of the ideas that figure in the G20 communique, these are India’s civilisational ideas.

And the other thing which he’s done, which has been a source of controversy, is that he’s not afraid or reticent about identifying himself with Hinduism, because he feels that India, as a Hindu country, can play a role on the global stage more effectively and mark the global scene more effectively with a civilisational heritage. Though there has been a consequence of this in terms of what some others think about the direction of India’s internal policy. So, he’s not apologetic about being a Hindu.

These are some of the changes, if you like, that have occurred, but essentially, there is great continuity in our foreign policy from the time of Prime Minister Vajpayee to Prime Minister, through the Manmohan Singh Government, which is essentially a Congress government.

Dr Chietigj Bajpaee

Thank you, Ambassador Sibal. We’ll pick up on some of these points, particularly the issue of the extent to which ideology matters in making foreign policy. But perhaps I can turn to you, Suhasini, on the question of how much does foreign policy actually matter in this election? So, I think historically, foreign policy has not really been a key electoral issue in Indian elections, but Modi seems to have made Indians care more about India’s place in the world. We saw this in the 2019 election, where national security was a key theme following the Pulwama terrorist attacks in Kashmir earlier that year. This year’s election, obviously, comes in the aftermath of India’s G20 Presidency last year.

So, do India’s foreign policy accomplishments, its G20 Presidency, its space programme – does this sway the Indian voter, do you think, or is the election really dominated by more bread and butter or livelihood issues?

Suhasini Haidar

Well, you know, one would think from what the government and the ruling party did at the beginning of the election campaign, one thought that they would really be talking about their foreign policy successes, the idea that India has pushed back against the West when it comes to Russia, when it comes to Russia’s actions in the Ukraine War. The fact that India has shown a certain amount of strategic autonomy, or that Prime Minister Modi himself is respected around the world. And, you know, there’ve often being speeches about the idea that Mr Modi has intervened to stop the war between Russia in Ukraine, at least long enough to get Indian students out of Ukraine, if not for a longer period.

In fact, Mr Modi, in one of his interviews, actually referred to it and said that “Many don’t know, but I sent a Special Envoy to Israel.” I presume he was referring to the National Security Advisor who had visited Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in March, I think. And Prime Minister Modi said in this interview that “I told him to tell Mr Netanyahu that – not to fire during the” – or “to carry out the bombardment of Gaza during the month of Ramzan.” Of course, Mr Netanyahu did no such thing. He continued his bombardment regardless and the Ramzan ceasefire never really fructified.

But the fact that they are trying to get a bump off what they see as foreign policy successes, the G20 hasn’t been mentioned quite as much, that’s what we had thought at the beginning of the election campaign. But as the election campaign has moved forward, it doesn’t seem to be, and I’m going anecdotally because I’m dependent on colleagues who are in other parts of the country bringing in reports, it doesn’t seem as if these are the big issues. The economy remains a major issue, the joblessness, unemployment, the – higher prices, inflation, the, you know, the failure of certain stocks, these – of – or, you know, of grain crops. These are certainly some of the issues we’re hearing much more about, particularly in the past few weeks.

On the campaign itself, as Ambassador Sibal said, Mr Modi is certainly coming out very clearly, making it extremely clear that he is not shying away from the idea that he stands for Hindus. That he has now, in, I would figure at least 20 to 25 rally speeches that we have documented, spoken against the idea that Muslims should get any part of – you know, any extra quota from the government, and claims that the Communist Party is trying to do that. But in there, there’s been a lot of anti-Muslim, sort of, rhetoric coming out of what he is saying. And it does seem as if the communal issue is also pretty large over this election campaign.

I do think that, you know, the fact that the government thinks it’s done well in a decade on the foreign policy front is a – is something they took going into the election to show some of their successes. I’m not sure it’s been as much a part of the election campaign as we had perhaps thought, nor a part of possibly what will be the results next week.

Dr Chietigj Bajpaee

Thank you, Suhasini, and on that note, I mean, let’s get into the election. Pavithra, so, I mean, how would you assess the conduct of this election? And there’ve been some concerns about a lower than anticipated voter turnout, although I think that’s been somewhat exaggerated. There’s also been concerns about delays and discrepancies in the release of poll data, instances of some use of inflammatory language on the campaign trail and allegations that the government has, essentially, been pursuing a witch hunt against the opposition by employing institutions like the Enforcement Directorate. So, I mean, can this election be regarded as free and fair? Has there been a level playing field, in your opinion? Pavithra, I think you’re muted.

Dr Pavithra Suryanarayan

So, I want to say a couple of things. The first is, you know, going into the elections, there was a great deal more bluster from the current government than how the elections have actually played out over the past month and a half. And so, you know, early on in the election, we heard this rallying cry of “This time more than 400 seats” for the ruling party, right? And I think as the elections have gone on, we see that this is a much more competitive landscape. And in some ways, I think it’s a reversion to how elections have been fought for several decades. So, in that sense, 2019 and even 2014, might have been the anomaly, and what we’re hearing now is that these are much more being fought on a local level and state-by-state.

Now, in terms of your question about ‘free and fair’, think we have to look at it as a part of a larger piece. Over the last few years, we have seen, you know, this government really show its muscle against the press. We have a much more muted press than we did in the years preceding and these are borne out by how even the world looks at, you know, press freedoms in India today. The second is that the government has really tried to take charge of longstanding institutions. You know, universities are some, its tenuous, sort of, relationship. The Election Commission now is another. And so, all of these have made us wonder, is what is happening really free and fair, right?

And I – so, I think it’s – we shouldn’t just overtly focus on the electoral aspect. We need to think about what it takes to have free and fair elections on the whole. So, is the use of the elec – you know, Enforcement Directorate to muzzle the opposition? Is the use of force to, sort of, curtail the press? Is all of that levelling the landscape? And – but despite all that, I have to say, you know, the centre pin of the campaign right now of the opposition has been really focusing on rural distress, employment issues, economic issues, fighting this state-by-state. And I think things are going to be a lot more competitive than we anticipated and the Indian voter really takes their electoral, sort of, duty very seriously. And we see that from reports in the field.

And I have to say there’s one other thing that’s happening right now, which is it’s a very, very hot summer. So, how much of the electoral turnout is a function of weather and how hard it is to vote in this extreme heat cannot be underestimated. So, you know, we have to take the turnout figures more, also, off, you know, possibly responding to changing weather patterns.

Dr Chietigj Bajpaee

I think yeah, all very good points, but I mean, just picking up – maybe taking a step back and looking at the question of the state of India’s democracy under the Modi Government. I mean, there’s been a lot of allegations in the West of India becoming an electoral autocracy and illiberable – illiberal democracy. Even within India, you know, Congress Party President, Mallikarjun Kharge, has just said that “Democracy will end if Modi returns to power for a third term,” and that the country is in the midst of an “undeclared emergency,” so on par with, say, the state of emergency that existed in 1975, which was declared by then Prime Minister, Indira Gandhi.

So, you know, how much substance is there in such statements, in your opinion? I mean, I – it seems to me, frankly, that it’s an exaggeration of some of these claims on – that we’re seeing the death of Indian democracy. But what are your thoughts on this?

Dr Pavithra Suryanarayan

So, I think one way to think about this is how much is the field tilted in the favour of one party? So, if we think about electoral bonds or press or the use of federal institutions to reinforce and show their muscular power, the current party has been quite successful. So, all of those are indeed alarming signs and we should not underestimate them.

Having said that, I think India truly is a federal democracy, so the answer to this question will depend on whether you’re a voter in Tamil Nadu, West Bengal, Delhi or Uttar Pradesh or Maharashtra. And if you go to each of these states, you’ll probably get a slightly different picture of how vibrant the opposition is, how hopeful voters are in terms of being able to truly decide who they want in power, right? So, I think India’s federal politics have been somewhat of a bulwark against the, sort of, weakening of some of these longstanding institutions, but I would not say that these are exaggerated and that these institutions truly do matter.

I think it’s important to not just have one party in town, but to have multiple parties that are well funded and able to give us alternatives in an electoral landscape. That there has been a misuse of institutions in trying to bully the opposition and there has been a muzzling of the press, right? And so, I think each of these things should be taken seriously, but they should not be a way for voters and parties to give up and, sort of, you know, clear the field to make one party even more powerful. And so, to that extent, I think the elections underway are very competitive, and I think, you know, we learn next week just how competitive they have been. And, you know, you started this talk by saying it looks like they might have a third term. I would say let’s wait and see what the Indian voter has to say about that.

Dr Chietigj Bajpaee

Oh, well, that – on the question of checks and balances, perhaps I can come to you, Suhasini, and we’ll come back to the question of – around the possible election outcome. But, you know, there has been concern, as Pavithra has noted, about the degree to which we see, you know, self-censorship setting in in India’s media landscape. The latest report by Reporters Without Borders noted violence against Journalists, internet shutdowns, the concentration of media ownership in companies that maintain close relationship with the government. You know, as a prominent Journalist based in India, you know, how would you assess the media environment? Is the scrutiny justified? Do you – you know, do you find yourself having to, say, pull your punches or hold back on certain issues?

Suhasini Haidar

I think Ambassador Sibal will attest to the fact I don’t pull my punches. The truth is that, you know, this is a difficult question. It’s a time in the world where India is one of several countries where we are seeing the press going through a very, very difficult time. It’s – you know, there are countries across the world, and the US included, where we hear Politicians, people in positions of power, really denigrating the press and are really cutting off access, prosecuting Journalists on the smallest of issues, putting them behind bars, threatening them with raids and all the rest. I don’t think that – you know, I don’t think India has, you know, been any different from all of those countries, and certainly, in the last ten years, we have seen the Modi clampdown in various ways on the press and making it very clear that they believe that the media has been unfair to them. That they believe that the media is not the only way they intend to reach out to the Indian public. And, you know, in general sense, you know, keeping access as a great leverage, in a sense, to ensure that the press ‘behaves itself’.

I think there’s a larger issue here, and since we are discussing foreign policy and what will happen in the world. I honestly don’t think these concerns, as they are expressed, whether they’re by international ratings agencies or other governments, are, in themselves, going to change India’s foreign policy or change any country’s bilateral ties with India. We’ve certainly not seen them change in the last ten years. But I think there are other aspects of what is called democratic erosion or the decline of democracy, because obviously, we’re not just talking about democracy being elections, but how government behaves after the – they have won those elections.

And I think that there are three or four areas where we are seeing a definite impact of the decline of democratic values inside the country on foreign policy. One is on this idea of shared values and coalition of democracies. Although, frankly, it’s not like there are a lot of countries out there that are in any position to judge anymore. There – you know, the double standards of various countries when it comes to dealing with one democracy over another seems to have become quite evident, particularly in the last few years. Even the idea of the rule of law principle, which used to be sacrosanct in many Western coalitions, we don’t see so much of that anymore. And I think post-October 7th, and the way the West has really turned a blind eye to much of what Israel has done in Gaza, compared to the kind of noises that we’d heard out of the West when it came to Russia’s killing of civilians in Ukraine or, you know, the rule of law question, or listening to the UNGA and all of that, I think a lot of those moral positions have been done away with, particularly in the last few months.

Where I think they’ll make the difference is on things that happen in terms of India’s declining democracy that has an impact on other countries internally. One would, of course, be, and I think you mentioned the NGO sphere. The idea that in the last ten years, practically every international NGO that used to function and operate in India has now been shut down. Basically, through using the Foreign Contributions Regulations Act, the idea that they can’t get funding from abroad or that funding is suspended.

So, you can name it, you know. Whether it’s Greenpeace, whether it’s Amnesty, whether it’s Oxfam, whether it’s Human Rights Watch, all of them had offices and, you know – well, Compassion International, many, many other NGOs, had – were working out of India. In the last ten years, they have, basically, shut shop in India. You can’t name a single international NGO in that sense that works on the issues of climate change, that works on the issues of child labour and many other Christian charities, that now actually operate in India. So, I think those have a certain impact in their origin countries. The US Government, for example, has raised the question, one on Ford Foundation, on the National Endowment for Democracy, on the strictures over CDC, over the strictures over the DoDs, DTRA, or that sort of thing.

So, that’s one area and then, the other, I think is what we have seen in the last year, the growth in concerns from certain countries over attacks on their citizens who are of Indian origin, essentially. Khalistani Sikh separatists wanted on terror charges in India, such as the killing in Canada and the accusation that Indian agencies were behind, somehow, the targeting of a gentleman in the US, as well, who’s of U – who is a US citizen. Now, he’s wanted for terror charges in India, but because he is a US citizen, the US has taken this up quite strongly. And I think it is having an impact on – in the relationship itself. We’ve seen many very high-level visits perhaps being put off for the moment over that.

The third area, I would say is the image of India. You know, I don’t doubt for a moment that India is intrinsically a democratic country. It is a – democracy is truly in the DNA of Indians. You can go across the length and breadth of the country and there is nobody, you know, of any economic strata, there is nobody who’s willing to give up the idea of their right to vote or their idea of their right to change a government or to hold a government accountable. Even so, it isn’t just a democracy that India has built its reputation on in so many decades. It is a democratic, pluralistic and rule abiding power. If it seems as if it is training on any of those fields, the democratic part, the pluralism that India has been so well-known for, as well as for being a rule abiding power, and if you go by some of these allegations, that would also have come into some question, I think that’s where you might see an impact.

Dr Chietigj Bajpaee

Excellent points, and I should add that this is a good promotion for a research paper that Chatham House recently put out, looking at the link between India’s status as the world’s largest democracy and its foreign policy and relations with the West.

I do want to get onto foreign policy and return to Ambassador Sibal, but I just have one more question to you, Pavithra, on, yeah, I agree that we are not fond of engaging in crystal ball gazing, as – particularly as we’re not going to see any exit polls until the 1st of June. But as I said at the outset, it does seem to me that, you know, a third term Modi Government is a foregone conclusion, and really, the key watchpoint will be the strength of the mandate that the government is about to secure. My question is, do you concur?

I mean, do you see any possibility of, say, of a repeat of the shock result that we saw back in 2004, when the previous NG – BJP-led India Government was defeated? Or alternatively, you know, what are the implications of the various scenarios where the BJP does return to power? So, for instance, coming in with over 272 seats to form a government, but less than the 303 that it currently holds, or above the 303, but less than the 370 that it’s – target that it’s set for itself? You know, could the Modi brand be tainted, to a degree, if it’s fulfil – if – of – if it fails to fulfil its pledge of, you know, “Iss baar charso paar,” “We will,” you know, “get 400 seats”? Would it make it more beholden to coalition partners within the NDA or par – members of the Sangh Parivar?

So, you know, how do you see – again, for – with the understanding that we don’t want to engage in too much crystal ball gazing before we get the election result, but how do you see the likely outcomes of this election at this stage?

Dr Pavithra Suryanarayan

So, I want to reiterate, I’ve just been in India. I spent six weeks, sort of, travelling through the country and again, the election really seems to be a state-by-state question, right? So, in states like Maharashtra and Hariana, there seems to be quite an anti-incumbency, sort of, sentiment. And if these are states that the BJP underperforms in, then it stands to lose quite a sizeable number of seats.

Same is true for even people walking through Uttar Pradesh and Bihar and Rajasthan and Madhya Pradesh, where they’ve done reasonably well in – and in UP, they’ve done really well in recent years. And here, again, the big issue seems to be rural distress. You know, there seems to be reports coming in from the ground about the lack of employment and what the ruling party’s solution to that has been to really lean into welfare schemes that do direct transfers to voters, with Prime Minister Modi being the key, sort of, giver of these welfare schemes. And it seems to be that that has, sort of, reached its potential. Voters are looking for jobs and they’re looking for investments into public and merit goods, like education and health and opportunities to really use their skills, right? And – but how much of that will translate into anti-incumbency, is the big question.

So, let’s say there are – I think there are three scenarios, some which are more likely than others. So, I think there is a scenario in which you have a coalition government, but one that’s not helmed by the BJP, which would be, like, the surprise of what happened in 2004. There’s one where there is a weakened BJP and a coalition government, and then, there’s one where you have a repeat of something like 2019, where the BJP comes in on its own mandate and greatly strengthened by its NDA partners.

Now, what happens in that in between scenario, right, where the BJP comes back, but it’s somewhat weakened, could go in two ways. You could see the BJP come back and try something even more draconian, thinking that it hasn’t gone far enough in trying to consolidate its power and really using that opportunity of being back in power, even with a smaller mandate to really consolidate. Or it could mean a BJP that actually listens and says, “Okay, maybe we have gone a bit far out. We really need to listen to some of our coalitional partners and revert some of the things we have done.”

My sense is the more the former than the latter, because of who helms the party, right? The party really has been remade in the image of Prime Minister Modi and his right-hand man, Amit Shah, and how they will be willing to delegate and dole out their power is a big question, right? And the more institutions have bent to their will, the more difficult it’ll be for them to accommodate to what others want and what others within their own party might want. So, this really will get into, you know, the weeds of how the party organisation functions, who the other people are who might try to be checks on them.

But like I said, it’s a big question depending on the mandate. And it’s this in between scenario, I think, that’ll throw up a lot of questions of whether the party, as an organisation, has been fundamentally remade in one person’s image, or whether other parts of the party can, sort of, come in to act as a check to them, you know.

Dr Chietigj Bajpaee

Thank you, Pavithra. I can see several excellent questions have come in on the chat, but I wanted to squeeze in one or two or more – of my own, before we move to the audience questions. Ambassador Sibal, if I can return to you and some of the points you said at the start. I mean, there does seem to be a high degree of policy continuity between governments across the political spectrum, at least from a foreign policy perspective. But my question is, to what degree does the BJP’s Hindutva ideology matter from a foreign policy perspective?

I mean, we’ve seen, under the current government, there’s been more of an effort to promote India as a civilisational state. These references to India as a Vishwamitra or a friend to the world, a Vishwaguru, teacher of the world. The BJP manifesto refers to India as a Vishwa Bandhu, as well. But, you know, to – my question is, to what extent does the nature of the ideology of the government matter in the formulation of India’s foreign policy?

Ambassador Kanwal Sibal

Well, you know, earlier on, you said that you would like people to give short replies. But I find that they are giving such lengthy replies that no space has been left for me to give my views, even on the subjects – on the questions that you asked the two other panellists. I think they have reflected very well, especially the lady from the LSE, the views of the opposition in India, and she’s entitled to do so. If she thinks that in six weeks in India, she was able to take the pulse of the voters and come to very definitive conclusions, so be it. We will know on June 4 what the actual results of the elections would be. But with regard to all the points that she mentioned, not that they’re irrelevant, but this is precisely what the Congress is saying. And then, we will see how the public reacts to the charges that the Congress and the opposition are making and how they will finally vote.

The other is that – the point is being made that we – some argument that democracy is in danger of some sort, but at the same time, there is this contradictory view that has been expressed that the election is going to be very competitive. Now, you can’t have it both ways. If the election’s going to be very competitive, then the fact that the press has been muzzled and the institutions have been muzzled and institutional takeover and everything else, there is an inherent contradiction in this.

With regard to the protests on Reporters sans Frontières, I – first of all, let me say – let me tell you that there are 148,000 registered newspapers in India and 300 magazines. I would like the panellists to mention one country in the world which has such a large base of media. But other than that, it is ridiculous that anybody should quote the Reporters sans Frontières because I looked at their report and they rate Iraq, Egypt, Mozambique, Togo, Burkina Faso, Mali, Syria, Ethiopia, Pakistan, Sudan, North Korea, Congo, as having more press freedom, and Myanmar, of all countries, as having more press freedom than India. So much for the objectivity of these Reporters.

So far as restrictions on funding from foreign organisations are concerned, I think the government is doing very well, because this is the standard tool that the West has used for regime change elsewhere. And we have been very cautious in a highly diverse society where we have a lot of social and religious fault lines, that we do not allow foreign funding to come in and make things worse and more difficult for us. You see what’s happening in Georgia. I mean, the law that they have made is actually much softer than the US law itself. That only if a foreign organi – Indian – if a Georgian organisations gets more than 20% of its funding from abroad, then it has to be declared a foreign agent. And you find there is such a massive upsurge prompted by the – by others, including three European Foreign Ministers ending up in Georgia, to agitate against the law, with sheer interference in the internal affairs of Georgia. So, we have to be very careful about these things.

And now, with regard to the press, now, Suhasini Haidar’s own paper, The Hindu, or the Indian Express or The Caravan, or so many other magazines, they’re lashing out at government day after day. They’re abusing Prime Minister, even Rahul Gandhi himself, the kind of things that he’s saying about the Prime Minister. You mentioned [inaudible – 35:32]. All these things are being said openly. In fact, Rahul Gandhi is determined to provoke a social conflict, a caste conflict in India. This has been the scene of his press statements and his very public statements all over the country, and he is saying it. And Prime Minister answered this question about using the agencies, and he said, “Well, only two or 3% of the people who have been targeted by these agencies are Politicians. The rest are not Politicians.” And if Kejriwal is implicated in some kind of a scam, well, why should he go scot-free? Anyway, leave that aside.

To ask – to come back to your question about whether Hindutva is going to affect India’s foreign policy. In fact, the biggest success of India’s – of Modi’s foreign policy has been with the Gulf States. These are Islamic states, traditionally very conservative. He went there and actually inaugurated for the first time, a magnificent Hindu temple in the UAE. Now, the Gulf States are not buying this propaganda, which has been made internally, although I might say that there may be some element of truth in this in terms of some sharpening of religious tensions in India, but that’s a different debate. But in terms of foreign policy and how the Islamic countries are looking at India, this is – a key Islamic country, this is not an issue at all in terms of our foreign policy.

Bangladesh has a lot of extremist elements in the country, but yet, you see our relations with Bangladesh are probably the best that we have ever had with Bangladesh. In terms of our general neighbourhood, I don’t think there’s any problem. Whether it’s Nepal or Sri Lanka, I think they relate very well to the cultural connections between the two countries, to the religious connections between the two countries. There’s no problem there, at all. In the case of Maldives, I think the China factor is far more important, though there is an Islamic factor there.

With regard to the West in general, if you see the kind of relationship Modi has built with Western leaders, whether it is Biden himself, whether it is Macron in France, whether it’s the Nordic states or any of the countries that he has visited where he has been feted, I don’t think this – it’s the press, yes. Is the press, the Western press, that is consistently targeting India, constantly targeting India, and it’s the same theme. It’s an orchestrated thing, because they all say the same thing and they say what the Indian opposition is saying against Modi and the BJP. And this – as you’ve seen in recent months, the kind of orchestration that is in the Western media against India and Hindutva and everything else.

So, I – look, there’s a lot of talk about this human rights and this and that and they had to go on maltreatment of Muslims in India. Look at what the West is doing. How many Muslims have they killed in Iraq and Libya and Syria, how many? I mean, they should really look on – and how many Muslims are being killed in the Gaza Strip? And the West is totally supporting Israel, at least the United States is. And here, they pick up issues in India as if their own hands are very clean. I think that we have to have a little more objectivity when it comes to criticism like this.

All is not well in India. Of course, it can’t be, 1.4 billion people, such diverse society and so many fractures within the country. Managing the country is extremely difficult, but all governments try and do their best and the problems cannot be totally, totally, totally addressed, fully addressed to the satisfaction of everything. You’ve seen what’s happening to democracies in United States and in Europe, they’re in big trouble. They can’t even manage the small minorities. In fact, now I read somewhere that after Iraq, the worst place in terms of social strife is Sweden. They’re not able to absorb their minorities. Look at the right-wing elements, fascist parties that have grown in Germany and elsewhere. So, I think we have to take a holistic view, rather than be carried forward by personal prejudices and propaganda.

Dr Chietigj Bajpaee

Thank you, Ambassador Sibal. I see we’ve got lots of questions that have come in, so I’m going to see if I can try and respond to some of these. There’s one question that’s come in on, you know, the situation that we see in the world today of rising global blocs. And so, I wanted to ask, you know, India’s really been very much in a geopolitical sweet spot of sorts. It’s been a beneficiary of tensions in the US-China relationship, to a degree, given the push to derisk or diversify supply chains away from China. It’s managed to have relations with both Moscow and Washington, despite the War in Ukraine. Despite – able to maintain relations with both Iran and Israel in the context of the conflict in Gaza.

So, my question, is this really sustainable, you know, in a world of growing geopolitical rivalry and polarisation? So, perhaps you first, Ambassador Sibal, and then…

Ambassador Kanwal Sibal

Yes, yes.

Dr Chietigj Bajpaee

…Suhasini.

Ambassador Kanwal Sibal

Of course it is. Of course it is sustainable. I don’t see any problem in that. I mean, you know, look at United States of America. It has never really chosen between India and Pakistan. It has fluctuated very, very supportive of Pakistan then supportive of India, but now going back to supporting Pakistan. They’re keeping their options open.

With regard to China, they are keeping their options open. The largest state partner is China and they’re engaging China at a very high level. So many high level US leaders have gone to China. Shultz with his business delegation has gone to China. Macron has received Xi Jinping, this and that. It’s not as if they are worried that they have to choose between India and China. No, we also understand that they have to protect their interests. They have certain needs, certain national interests which they have to protect and it’s perfectly alright.

I mean, we – Russia has become very close to China. We are not objecting to that, because we feel Russia has been pushed into the arms of China because of the folly of the West. But that’s no reason for us to move away from Russia. We are an Asian country. We have stakes in Asia, we have stakes in Eurasia. We just cannot withdraw from Asia just because we are worried about Russia becoming close to China. We’re keeping our doors open to China. Look at our trade with China, $130 billion. We’ll not clamp down on it, but we have restricted Chinese entry into certain sensitive and critical areas.

With Iran, we are maintaining our dialogue. With Israel our relationship completely altered. We became part of ITU2 and also, the India part – India-Europe-Middle East-Europe economic corridor. We’ve been doing that and we continue to do that, and as we rise economically, as we grow economically, as we become stronger, we will be able to pursue this policy even more, rather than less. We don’t have to choose between this side or that side. We have to look after our national interests, which we will do.

Dr Chietigj Bajpaee

Thank you, Ambassador Sibal. Suhasini, I’d also like you to comment on this and there have also been several questions that have come in on China, which I’d welcome your thoughts on. I mean, relations – the relationship seems to have been in a – been put in a new normal since 2020, since the Galwan Valley clashes. I mean, do you see any possibility of a return or a reset to the pre-2020 status quo, where both sides, essentially, agreed to shelve the border dispute and work and deepen relations in other aspects of the bilateral relationship, or has that ship really sailed, in your opinion? You’re muted, Suhasini.

Suhasini Haidar

I think, honestly speaking, the situation in 2020, regardless of whether the government admits it here or not, was created when the Chinese moved troops into areas claimed by India. Essentially, there are seven spots at which the Chinese – our troops were mobilised, and of those seven, five have seen some, kind of, a detente already in the last four years. Two remain. In this point, we have heard many tough statements coming from the External Affairs Minister or the Defence Minister. The Prime Minister has not said it. The Prime Minister began in 2020 by saying, “No-one’s come inside Indian territory, no inch of Indian territory has gone to anyone and nor is any military in Indian territory.” So, of course, the question has been, well, then, why, you know, has India taken the tough stand it has in terms of not keeping any high-level meetings going?

But despite all of this, I do believe that what the Prime Minister has been trying to do is push for a détente. So, whether it was his desire to step – you know, put his hand out to Mr Xi Jinping in Indonesia, on the sidelines of a G20 dinner, or whether it was in BRICS in South Africa, where there was some kind of an informal meeting between the two, although they deferred on what they had agreed about. There has been that, kind of, desire, possibly both in Delhi and Beijing, to try and see some kind of a détente. I have no doubt that when the elections are over, the new government will – or the newly elected government will, of course, want to try and take this bad situation somewhere.

If Prime Minister Modi is re-elected, he has, himself, said in an interview this month, that it is an ‘important relationship’, that he does not – that he thinks that this is a ‘serious situation’ between the two countries, and that he hopes to see a ‘very speedy resolution’ to the problems India and China have. So, I’ve no doubt that if he is re-elected, there will be some kind of push for some kind – for a détente. Obviously, right at the start, there has to be the rider that until Chinese troops move back from where they are, it will be very difficult for any government in New Delhi to sell to the rest of India any kind of a, sort of, peaceful settlement with China.

Dr Chietigj Bajpaee

Thanks, Suhasini. I also see several questions have come in on the UK-India relationship, and perhaps I can use my prerogative as Chair to try and answer this question. I’m happy for others to also weigh in. So, I think Foreign Minister Jaishankar said it best when he was visiting London last Diwali. He referred to “unrealised potential in the bilateral relationship” and the “need to seek new convergences.” I think there has been far too much emphasis on the historical bonds of a common language or legal system, or the so-called living bridge of the diaspora community, and I think there’s need for seeking new areas of convergence. So, whether it be in the areas of education, defence, technology, India’s interest in playing a leadership role in the Global South or, you know, the complementarity of the UK’s special relationship with the US and the India’s deepening strategic co-operation with the US.

I think the key watch point will, obviously, be the UK election. I think there will be a high degree of continuity under a potential Labour Government. And the other, of course, important watchpoint, is the FTA negotiations that are ongoing. The 14th round of negotiations, I believe, are take – have been on hold, but they have been ongoing, and I think consensus has been reached on most of the 26 chapters. But I think the, you know, the UK’s engagement with India also needs to be looked at through the broader prism of the UK’s Indo-Pacific tilt towards – I mean, yeah, they’re – towards the Indo-Pacific. When on that front, there’s also challenges, fiscal constraints on the UK Government. There’s obviously, other foreign policy priorities, the wars in Ukraine, Gaza and reviving relations with the EU. So, yeah, so I think, yeah, that was my two cents on the UK-India relationship.

There is a – there’s been an interesting question that’s been posed on the role of the diaspora community. So, I think perhaps, Pavithra, as the sole member of the panel who’s sitting outside India, it would be interesting to get your insights. I mean, it seems to me it’s a double-edged sword. We’ve seen a very warm welcome that Prime Minister Modi has received from overseas Indian communities when visiting place – you know, US, Australia, the UK, elsewhere. But also, the flipside of that is what we’ve seen in the India-Canada relationship over the last year, that when groups are engaged in activities that challenge India’s status or sovereignty, that it can be a, you know, a thorn in the bilateral relationship. But I, yeah, welcome your thoughts on that.

Dr Pavithra Suryanarayan

You know, I want to go back to connecting this to something that Suhasini said earlier, which is, you know, the world is in a funny place right now, with strongman dynamics emerging in multiple countries around the planet. And there was a very interesting report over the past couple of years, done by Sumitra Badrinathan, Milan Vaishnav and Devesh Kapur, that studied Indian Americans’ views on both domestic and international politics. And here, you see a very interesting trend. In the United States, the Indian community, the second generation that can vote, or those who have gotten the vote, tend to be overwhelmingly democratic and anti-strongman efforts by then President Donald Trump, while at the same time, appreciating that same strongman tactics back in India, under Prime Minister Modi.

And so, there are some tensions here about what the diaspora abroad really is. Within its own context, like the United States, the diaspora tends to be extremely liberal and tends to be very, sort of, liberal leaning in its proclivities for voting, and yet, have very different views on what it must be – what it should be back home in India. And these are interesting emerging contradictions in how the Indian diaspora thinks.

Having said that, I think there’s also been a, sort of, diminishing of the support for the contemporary BJP as it stands, over the years. I think there was much more, you know, ra-ra change in 2014 to 2019, to now. I think there’s a, sort of, a fatigue that this government now has had ten years and that we could see different things, right? And the campaign itself, I think, over the last few weeks, with the, sort of, rhetoric that’s been happening in the electoral field, you know, so as we mentioned, the number of times the Prime Minister has gone on the offensive against minorities, I think these kinds of things don’t really sit well with the diaspora.

And so, I think there’s a mixed bag here of a diaspora that wants to see India thriving and develop and wants to see it take its rightful place in the world, while, at the same time, being a little bit cautious about the rhetoric of the contemporary government, which sits, oddly, with its own political choices, in its new environments, like the United States or UK.

Dr Chietigj Bajpaee

Thank you, Pavithra, and just perhaps staying with you. There’s also been a few questions that are posed on the issue of constitutional changes, or possible constitutional changes. Obviously, that will very much depend on the degree of the mandate that the – if the BJP returns to power. So, I think, yeah, welcome your thoughts on that. I mean, there’s been talk of a – potential concerns of a growing centralisation of power, this “One Nation, One Election” slogan that’s been – we’ve heard from the government. So, what are your thoughts on the issue of potential constitutional changes that we could see in the pipeline?

Dr Pavithra Suryanarayan

Yeah, I want to say a couple of things about this. The first, just to connect it back to what Ambassador Sibal said earlier, how is it possible to have competitive elections and yet, have democratic backsliding? And I think, you know, this is something I teach my Intro to Comparative Politics students, that you can have a thriving electoral autocracy without any of the checks and balances that go with an effective functioning democracy, right? So, what would an overwhelming majority in the contemporary BJP lead to? Well, they’ve wanted to, very clearly, push on, you know, this idea of One Nation, One Elections, which was to synchronise federal elections with state-level elections. And the idea there is that you would – that would give an advantage to national level parties. So, if I was a national level party wanting to consolidate my power, that’s exactly how I would be thinking, right?

The second is, you know, this idea of how to think about who the redistributive, you know, beneficiaries of the state are. And here, I think, at least from what I understand from recent pieces in the press and from reports on the ground, the idea of constitutional changes have really rattled some of the new groups that have given their support to BJP in recent elections. So, if you think about, you know, scheduled castes and OBCs who have come on board to support the BJP in recent years, have gotten rattled at the idea that constitutional changes might mean an abandoning of longstanding reservations for some of these groups.

So, I think the constitutional change possibility is actually filtered into electoral politics this time round and again, we’ll see whether that has really worked or not in the coming week, when the results are out. But I think there are three things to watch for. The first is, you know, we have not done a census for the first time since 1871. Even after partition, we managed to do a census, right? We have put a census on hold and when the census comes back, it will be the basis of a new electoral delimitation exercise, which could now greatly privilege the Hindi heartland compared to some of the other states in the country. And if that does so, that would be a strategic move on the part of the party to consolidate power in pla – parts of the country where it is already powerful.

The second thing to watch is how much a renewed mandate or victory for the BJP might incline it to go after reservations. And the third thing to watch out is how much does some of the changes it’s already brought in, you know, in terms of the Citizenship Amendment Act, or changes to Kashmir, how it alters what it means to constitutionally be an Indian in a pluralistic, secular society. So, I think those three things are open questions and again, will depend on how big a mandate this government achieves in the coming elections.

Dr Chietigj Bajpaee

Thanks, Pavithra. I actually wanted to pick up on a point that you said towards the end and it – again, linking it to the issue of foreign policy, and that’s on Pakistan. So, all – you’ve mentioned the special status of Kashmir being revoked, Article 370, but I’ve been surprised by how surprisingly stable the relationship between India and Pakistan has been. Of all the countries that Pakistan actually shares borders with, the border with India has been the most stable in recent years, arguably, yeah. You could see – we’ve seen the recent border skirmishes with Iran and Afghanistan, while a ceasefire along the line of control has largely held in place, despite the increasingly confrontational rhetoric that we see coming from both countries.

So, perhaps, you know, both to Ambassador Sibal and Suhasini, I’d welcome your thoughts on, you know, how do you see the relationship evolving after the election? Do you see any potential, well, de-escalation pathways, for instance, the reinstatement of statehood for Jammu and Kashmir, National Assembly elections? Ambassador Sibal, if you’d like to go first and then, Suhasini, I’ll turn to you.

Ambassador Kanwal Sibal

Well, I think the Prime Minister and other leaders have been saying that at the right time, they will reinstitute the statehood of Jammu and Kashmir. It said that and they will do it. When they’ll do it, I can’t say. Maybe after he wins the elections, he might do it.

With regard to Pakistan, Prime Minister said in a recent interview that he’s not really interested in focusing on Pakistan, that he’s locked up his mind on this issue and that Pakistan do what it seeks to do in terms of managing its own internal issues. That India is not going to pay too much attention to Pakistan. So, I don’t think that there’s going to be any particular move in favour of some kind of restitution of dialogue with Pakistan. And Pakistan, also, is not giving any indications that it is willing to change some fundamentals of its policies. And Prime Minister has said that “Look, we are moving far ahead of Pakistan, and we don’t want to get,” essentially, “bogged down in this India-Pakistan issue.” So, that is one aspect.

The other is with regard to the stability of the moderators, more is out of Pakistan’s own domestic – its very serious domestic issues, whether they’re economic or political and what you rightly mention, the problems with Afghanistan, which has been a huge setback for Pakistan’s foreign policy. There has been actual violence on that border. So, for Pakistan to open a second front on the India-Pakistan border in these present circumstances, when they’re looking for, also, IMF assistance and everything else, would be suicidal. So, I think it is more a function of the situation in Pakistan and the difficulties Pakistan is in, rather than any substantive change in mindset in Pakistan, which would then be reciprocated by India, and which should be reciprocated by India if that really happens.

But I want to say something about the CEA. I don’t know why even experts who are looking at India persist in giving false information with regard to the CEA. CEA is not atten – not amended the citizenship, and so far as Indian citizenship is concerned, it’s only expediting the acquisition of Indian citizens, Indian citizenship by refugees from the neighbouring countries. And there is a cut-off date for that and after that, even those people will not get any advantage in terms of an accelerated path to citizenship. But yet, the propaganda has got so deeply ingrained in the minds of people who are – diaspora people who are studying India, that they just don’t want to recognise the reality of situation with regard to one election at the state level, at the national level.

Why impute these kind of motives? Actually, people like us feel very frustrated that India is in election mode all the time. One state after another state and the Prime Minister is running from one state to another. The election machinery is getting involved. So much national resources are being wasted in this, wasted in this. There are other things that the Prime Minister and the others have to do, rather than fighting elections all the time, all over the country, but there has to be a consensus on this. It just cannot be done because the BJP wants it. Constitutional amendment in India is extremely difficult. For heaven’s sake, look at the manner in which India’s constitution can be amended. It’s not as simple as it’s being made out. We have to have a majority in Rajya Sabha firstly, and secondly, of course, your two thirds of the states, or three fourths, whatever it is, also have to vote in favour.

And insofar as the census is concerned, it was explained that because of COVID, it wou – could not take place, and the Prime Minister has addressed this issue. I mean, the BJP is not foolish. That is going to create a north versus south divide in India. He has been going – bending backwards, actually, showing enormous respect to Tamil Nadu, in various ways, in order to stamp the tendencies that we see in separatist tendencies in Tamil Nadu in the past and the policies of the present government. So, he is bending backwards to make it – the southern part of India is part of our national ethos in every possible way. He is not going to – we are not going to – he’s not going to do something which actually sharpens the north-south divide and then, leads to a potential breakup, a breakup of India.

So, I think some of these canards about what the BJP may or may not want to do is just deeply felt anti-Modi feelings which parts of our diaspora have.

Dr Chietigj Bajpaee

Thank you, Ambassador Sibal. I want to give you the final 30 seconds, Suhasini. We are just about running out of time, but on the Pakistan issue, I mean, could we, potentially, see a – is there any possibility of an “Only Nixon could go to China” moment on the India-Pakistan relationship? You know, if we have Modi come back with a strengthened mandate and his Hindutva credentials, does that offer any opener – or – you know, opening for any outreach or rapprochement in the India-Pakistan relationship?

Suhasini Haidar

Actually, Chietigj, I would say I would disagree with Ambassador Sibal. I think this government is already in touch with the powers that be in Pakistan in terms of what can constitute some, kind of, a détente post-elections. After all, both countries have gone through elections this year, and the truth is, when we talk about the Yellow Sea ceasefire of 2021, that came together at a time when India felt very vulnerable. It was just six months after that terrible clash with Chinese troops, in which at least 20 Indian Soldiers were killed, and we had to move, India had to move battalions across from the line of control with Pakistan to the line of actual control with China, in order to deal with the situation.

So, at that time, the Yellow Sea ceasefire that came through, that has been consistent since then, more or less, came at a time when both countries needed it. Subsequently, there was this missile misfire that went from India, and we saw backchannels being able to stem any kind of response to what could’ve been a much more con – bigger conflagration between the two countries. I think Pakistan has its hands full dealing with its internal crises, you know, whether it’s the politics, whether it’s the economy, whether it’s its own – you know, all its indices that are really in trouble and its problems with its other neighbours.

So, I think that there are small off-ramps, as you were talking about in terms of restoring the High Commissioners of the two countries, which have not been there since 2019. Possibly moving something on trade. We’ve heard noises from the Pakistan Foreign Minister on that subject. I don’t expect any big breakthroughs, however, with Pakistan, and it really remains to be seen. You know, in this election, we have heard something new in terms of the Defence Minister, the External Affairs Minister, the UP Chief Minister, speak very, very strongly about the possibility of India reacquiring that part of Jammu and Kashmir that is under Pakistani control. What’s called “Pakistan occupied Kashmir” here in India. And if there was some, kind of, a movement to destabilise the Yellow Sea in that sense, then, you know, it’s anyone’s guess where that would go. It’s certainly been quite startling to hear those comments being made at election rallies in India during this particular campaign.

So, I would say there’s certainly a chance of some kind of opening between the two countries. I wouldn’t hazard a guess about how far that could go, though.

Dr Chietigj Bajpaee

Thank you, Suhasini. So, I think on that note, we will need to call this event to a close. We will, of course, continue to monitor the Indian election, with analysis on its outcome and the implications. If you’re interested in the work that we’re doing on Asia, please keep an eye on the Chatham House website or sign up to the Asia-Pacific Programme newsletter. Thank you all for joining us today and thank you to our excellent panel of speakers: Ambassador Kanwal Sibal, Suhasini Haidar and Dr Pavithra Suryanarayan. Thank you, all. Have a nice day.

Ambassador Kanwal Sibal

Thank you, bye, bye.