Ben Bland
Welcome, everyone, to this webinar from Chatham House about Taiwan’s elections. My name is Ben Bland, and I’m the Director of the Asia-Pacific Programme here at Chatham House.
There’s now less than three days until polls open in Taiwan’s Presidential and legislative elections. And in this year when several billion people are going to the polls, I think it’s fair to say that this is going to be one of the most consequential elections, not just for Taiwan, but for the US-China relationship, and for stability in the future of democracy I think, across the region. This is, also, of course, a pivotal moment for Taiwan’s 23 million people, as well, 20 million of whom are going to be voting on Saturday.
We do know that Taiwan will be getting a new leader, because incumbent President, Tsai Ing-wen, from the Democratic Progressive Party, is stepping down, having reached the two-term limit in Taiwan. Her Vice President, Lai Ching-te, has been the marginal frontrunner throughout most of the campaign, followed by Hou Yu-ih, of the KMT, the Kuomintang, and Ko Wen-je of the new Taiwan People’s Party. Polls have also suggested that the DPP might lose its majority in the Legislative Yuan, as Taiwan’s Parliament is known, but because of legal restrictions in Taiwan, we won’t be discussing the polling numbers in detail today.
But I’m glad to say that I’m joined by three really insightful speakers to try and make sense of what’s happened during the election campaign, and to get some sense of how the elections might affect the future trajectory of Taiwan and Taiwan’s key relationships with the US and China. So, Dr Chun-Yi Lee is Director of the Taiwan Research Hub at the University of Nottingham. You can read about all her many accomplishments on her online biographies. Similarly, for Dr Bo-jiun Jing, who’s a Senior Research Fellow at the Taiwan Studies Programme at the University of Oxford. And last but not least, Dr Michael Reilly is a former British Diplomat, who served as the UK’s Representative in Taiwan, and now sits on the Advisory Board of the Global Taiwan Institute in Washington DC, as well as being a Non-Resident Fellow, as well, at the University of Nottingham.
So, the way today is going to work, I’m going to ask questions to our panellists for about 35 to 40 minutes and then, I’m going to open up to questions from our audience today. Please use the Q&A box to ask your questions, and we will come to them in good time. And finally, a reminder to all our participants that this session is on the record, and it is being recorded and the recording will be posted online later.
So, first off, I’m going to come to you, Bo-jiun, who’s joining us today from Taipei, and ask you to briefly set the scene for a bit about the main candidates in the election and what they stand for. And I know you’re going to share a few slides to kick us off, so thanks for that. The floor is yours.
Dr Bo-jiun Jing
Well, thank you very much, Ben, and thank you, everyone. Thank you for having me at this panel. Yeah, it’s a very timely event, and as Ben said, I actually have some slides, it’s, kind of like, help setting scene regarding the candidates’ profile. So, I’ll just do that right now. I hope it works. Okay, perfect. Okay, yeah, so, this is – this year we have a three way race, in Taiwanese we call it sann-kha-tu, means three ways race. We have Taiwan People’s Party, Ko Wen-je, DPP is William Lai, and KMT is Hou-Yu-ih. And as you can see here, the first – we talk about the Lai-Hsiao ticket, or Mei-te ticket.
So, William Lia, as Ben mentioned, is the current Vice President, and he has been the Vice President since President Tsai Ing-wen’s beginning of the second term. He assumed the Chairperson’s role of the DPP following the party’s significant defeat to Kuomintang in the 2022 local elections. In his earlier car – political career, Lai served as the Premier of the ROC and – during Tsai’s first term, and was the Mayor of Tainan City from 2010 and 2017.
Okay, so Lai’s running mate, Hsiao Mei-chin, or Bi-khim Hsiao, also AKA “Cat Warrior,” recently held the position of Taiwan’s Representative to the US, and known for her love of cats and she humorously conveys her dedication to counter China’s alleged aggressive warrior diplomacy through her distinctive approach of cat warrior diplomacy. And there’s some speculation about hi – the – Lai Ching-te’s pick, is that Lai chose Hsiao as his running mate to maintain robust ties and effective communication with the US, and the aim is to persuade the White House that this is – that he is competent in preserving a – preserving the status quo across the Taiwan Strait.
Okay, Hou Yu-ih, well, he has been in the position of New Taipei City Mayor since 2018. Actually, at this point, he’s still the Mayor, and before that, he served as the Deputy Mayor of New Taipei for nearly eight years, when the current KMT Chairman, Eric Chu Li-luan, held the Mayoral office in the highly – in this highly populated city in Taiwan. Prior to entering politics, Hou Yu-ih had a lengthy career in law enforcement, commencing as a Criminal Police Officer in 1980, and steadily rising through the ranks, to become the Director-General of the National Police Agency in the late 2000.
And Hou’s last minute running mate, Jaw Shaw-kong, is a well-known media personality. He’s very – he’s a experienced TV and Radio Host, so it’s not surprising, at all, that he’s quite articulate. He has served as a Legislator twice and held the position of Minister of the Environmental Protection Administration from the late 1980s to the early 1990s. Okay, so Hou’s selection of Jaw is arguably influenced by so-called credential called blue-blood, as – signifying his descent from the mainlanders who migrated to Taiwan with Chiang Kai-shek’s Nationalist Government around 1949. This com – kind of, complements Hou’s local Taiwanese background and may help solidify support from deep blue voters.
Okay, finally, Ko Wen-je, who served two terms as two terms as Taipei City Mayor from 2014-2022. Went on to establish the TPP, Taiwan People’s Party, in August 2019, and has been its Chairperson since. Prior to entering the Taipei political scene, Ko Wen-je gained prominence as a renowned Surgeon at National Taiwan University Hospital, and held a Professorship in Medicine at NTU, earning the – his nickname Ko P, as Professor Ko.
So, his pick of Cynthia Wú Xïnying, a wealthy businesswoman and current Legislator, nominated by the TPP, is the daughter of a very wealthy Taiwanese Financier associated with the Shin Kong Group, Xīnguāng jítuán. And born and educated in the United States, she has become a no – worthy addition to Ko’s political team. One prevalent theory regarding Ko’s selection of Wu is that her wealthy background could potentially provide additional financial resources for the four – for this very young, only four-year-old Party, to kind – to effectively compete on the campaign trail, which typically is very, very costly, as we all know.
So, okay, so, I’ll just briefly say this is the – I summarise the pol – main policy of the three candidates, based on their performance on the policy presentation and as well as, the Presidential debate. As you can see, actually, in response to Chinese pressure, all three candidates have emphasised the need to build up deterrence capabilities and expressed a willingness to engage in dialogue with Beijing. So, while they all publicly support increasing the defence budget, their cross-Strait policies differ. Following Tsai Ing-wen’s approach, William Lai does not accept the 1992 Consensus, as the DPP opposes One China principle component. Hou Yu-ih supports the 1992 Consensus, in line with the ROC Constitution, but rejects Beijing’s one country, two system proposal. And Ko Wen-je has been ambiguous but leans towards a critical stance on the definition of the 1992 Consensus.
Finally, fin – my final point is that, regarding their definition of cross-Strait relations, Lai argued that the ROC and the PRC are not supportive to one another, and Hou Yu-ih agrees with the concept of a mutual non-recognition of sovereignty, and mutual non-denial of governing authority. And Ko Wen-je simplifies it as “a special relationship.” So, notably, none of them are advocates for de jure independence or reunification, but they still fe – face this crucial task of persuading Taiwanese voter, if not reassuring Washington, that each of their cross-Strait standards is – stances is feasible, and can maintain the peaceful status quo across the Taiwan Strait.
Ben Bland
Great. That’s a really comprehensive, and very – a, sort of, swift look at the candidates, so thanks for that, Bo-jiun. I mean, if I can just ask a follow-up question, and I might come to Chun-Yi on this, but I mean, how significant are these differences between the candidates when it comes to cross-Straits policy? ‘Cause it seems, you know, just looking at it from the outside, they all say they want to boost Taiwan’s defences, they all say, “You need to talk to China somehow, if you can,” and no-one really has an answer for how. And they all say, effectively, they want Taiwan’s 23 million people to decide Taiwan’s future democratically. So, Chun-Yi, maybe you could give us your view. I mean, do you think, you know, there are actually substantial differences between the candidates on cross-Strait policy?
[Pause] Chun-Yi, I can’t hear you right now. I’m not sure if there’s a problem with the mic, but I might – while we sort that out, I might come to you, Bo-jiun. Maybe you could give us – you know, go a bit deeper there. So, yeah, how significant are these differences, really, Bo-jiun? Can you tell us? And hopefully we can sort out Chun-Yi’s mic in a sec, thanks.
Dr Bo-jiun Jing
Sure, yeah. Well, as you – Ben, as you said, and also, as I show in my last slide, it’s very – when it comes to defence, and having dialogue with China, they’re the same. And this time it’s a three-way race, but when you examine their policy toward US, toward China, and, also, maybe, on Japan, it’s quite friendly. It’s, like, even KMT, I think, it’s, kind of, shifting toward, like, pro-US stance, and for – be friendly with Japan and be peaceful – have a peaceful relationship with the mainland China.
So, I think, ‘cause that’s – I mean, on that level, it’s pretty similar. But just the nuance is, like, really – that’s why I showed the slight – the table about their different views on 1992 Consensus. I know it’s – we can spend an hour to talk about the history of it, but, basically, yeah, KMT, if – it’s – think that 1992 Consensus is a password for cross-Strait dialogue. And so, if Hou wins, they will, kind of, back to – go back to the Ma Ying-jeou’s era, the interaction between the two side – through ARATS and SEF, and MAC and TAO, right? There will be the counterpart on each side. So, the dialogue probably will resume. But for the DPP, because it’s – the One China principle, they are not supporting that, so there’s nuances here. It’s, like, okay, they – well, they adhere to the ROC Constitution, but they don’t support the One – the 1992 Consensus. Especially nowadays, they link that with the – Xi Jinping’s road map to reunification, and also the one country, two system, one general principle.
So, yeah, there’s nuance on – but interestingly, we have – it’s a three-way race, so we have Ko Wen-je. And Ko Wen-je has, kind of, tried to – he recently published a op-ed on the Economist, and saying that his – “Taiwan needs a third way.” But, yeah, so the third way – but whether he accept the 1992 Consensus is ambiguous. It’s not clear yet, and whether he opposes Taiwan de jure independent – he hasn’t public said that, even though he criticised Lai Ching-te’s stance on that. So, these all nuance all revolving around cross-Strait – their policy to the cross-Strait issue. Also, maybe later, we can talk about the identity issue.
Ben Bland
Yeah, great, thanks, and I think we’re still trying to sort out Chun-Yi’s mic, but I might come to you next, Michael. I mean, I guess, to answer the question, we’re going to back into the de – local detail shortly, but why does this matter to the outside world? I mean, are people in Washington and London and across Europe, sort of, paying attention, and why does it matter?
Dr Michael Reilly
Well, I think the short answer is yes, they are paying attention. Why does it matter? Slightly different reasons, depending on whether you’re in Washington or if you’re in Europe. If you’re in Washington, this is very much about the US’s position in the Pacific, ever since the end of the Second World War, and it’s become of a higher profile in recent years because of the growing tensions between the US and China. And I think both US and China see influence in Taiwan, shall we say, as a proxy for their wider influence.
It matters to Europe not from a direct – not so much from a direct security perspective, but there are three, I would say, reasons why it should be important to Europe and why perhaps Europeans should pay it more attention. The first is we’ve seen since the pandemic just how important semiconductors are to everyday life, chips. You know, they make cars work, they make fridges work, they make our Zoom meeting at the moment work. They are to the – to this decade what oil was to the 70s and 80s. 90% of the most advanced chips in the world are made in Taiwan. So, ideally, if you’re sitting in Europe, you want to make sure that you can still get hold of those.
Secondly, there’s an awful lot of trade passes through the Taiwan Strait. So, again, if there is friction in the Taiwan Strait, that affects European commerce, European prosperity. And the third, very simple reason, is that regular surveys by all sorts of think tanks, Analysts, the media, consistently highlight Taiwan as being the most liberal democracy in East Asia, I would say in the whole of Asia, threatened, shall we say, by a very illiberal neighbour. And European Politicians regularly play lip service to the importance of values. Well, if supporting values means anything, it’s as important in Taiwan as it is in defending Ukraine.
If I could just add very briefly to what Bo-jiun was saying about the nuances. I mean, I’d very much agree with that. You find that whichever part – and I don’t think the TPP would be different to this, but you find whoever is in power, be it the KMT, be it the DPP, the substance of their China policy differs little. What Taiwanese Politicians have found, however, and whether this is good or bad it’s not for me to say, but they feel that it is to their own advantage in election campaigns to play up the differences with the other parties in terms of the China policy. I suspect that the great majority of Taiwanese voters would actually far prefer to see the election fought on domestic issues, but the Politicians feel, no, actually, we should fight it on this issue.
What I think has actually changed significantly is that since Xi Jinping came into office, the Chinese have taken a much tougher line on dialogue. Prior to the current incumbent, we had a KMT President, Ma Ying-jeou. Prior to Ma Ying-jeou, we also had a DPP President, Chen Shui-bian, who was far more radical and caused an awful lot more concern, shall we say, in Washington and in Europe about his cross-Straits policy. But even under Chen Shui-bian, there was actually a very strong, albeit discreet, two-way dialogue going on across the Straits. Under Xi Jinping, the Chinese unilaterally decided they would put a stop to that dialogue, unless Tsai Ing-wen effectively signed up to their preconditions.
Ben Bland
Great, thanks, Michael. Chun-Yi, can you hear us now?
Dr Chun-Yi Lee
Yes, I can hear you.
Ben Bland
Okay.
Dr Chun-Yi Lee
Can you hear me?
Ben Bland
Yes, great, we can hear you. So, I’m really glad that we’ve managed to sort that out. Thanks…
Dr Chun-Yi Lee
Thank you.
Ben Bland
…for doing that.
Dr Chun-Yi Lee
Apologise.
Ben Bland
Chun-Yi – that’s okay, no problem. I might come to you next, then, to, kind of, get a perspective on how is Beijing seeing the elections? I mean, we often hear that, you know, building on what Michael was saying, that the Chinese Communist Party, you know, has a lot of distrust for the DPP, in general, but maybe, sort of, learned to understand Tsai Ing-wen somewhat. But they seem to have, sort of, particular, sort of, fear or animosity towards Lai Ching-te. What’s your sense in how Beijing is seeing and feeling about this election?
Dr Chun-Yi Lee
Thank you, Ben, and thanks for all your patience. In that sense, I would say that actually, Beijing has – comparing to Lai Ching-te, probably the CCP has a little bit more trust on Tsai Ing-wen, because Tsai has been – of course, she is a DPP candidate and she is a DPP leader. However, she has been really median in a sign – in a sense of rather not to cross the Beijing’s red line.
With – comparing with Tsai, actually Lai has a little bit sending of the danger signals, because Lai has been clearly, or explicitly, to support Taiwan’s independence in the past, and to that, it’s more untolerant to the Beijing Government. Whereas if we look at Tsai, in her eight years in government, Beijing wasn’t happy, but however, Tsai has always been really – keep her line to be in the medians, rather than to be too extreme. So, it’s not happy but acceptable choice, I would say, to Beijing.
With Lai’s coming into the Government, Beijing has more of unpredicted expectation, that we don’t know what’s really happen with Lai. However, there’s another important variable we need to take into consideration, which Bo-jiun just showed in his first slide, to say, Bi-khim Hsiao, who is really a very good and capable communicator, not just with – well, I wouldn’t say with Beijing, but more of the communicator with the US. And we – I think that we would need to take into the US role, or their influence, or their expectation, if you like, into this US-Ch – Taiwan-China situation, in terms of the election results.
So, I would say, although Beijing, of course, they don’t like Lai Ching-te, and they dislike Lai Ching-te even more than the current President, Tsai Ing-wen, but they have more of a disbelief or distrust of Bi-khim Hsiao in that sense, because Bi-khim Hsiao has really good, smooth relationship with the US Government. And I think that probably put a Lai-Hsiao match in a really worse situation to the Beijing’s expectation.
Ben Bland
And I know that Lai Ching-te said the other day that there’d been “unprecedented interference in the elections from China,” and he was talking about the, kind of, military intimidation, aircraft flying around Taiwan, about propaganda and information and, sort of, hybrid warfare. I mean, what’s your, sort of, independent view on that? Is – has it been as bad as he says, and, also, what has been the impact of that on the Taiwanese electorate?
Dr Chun-Yi Lee
Thank you, Ben, and it just coincidentally that it happened yesterday, all Taiwanese people received a alert, which is a national level alert, from Ministry of Defence, to say there is – in English, it – there is a missile cross southern part of Taiwan, and for people to be alert. But actually, in Chinese, it should be there is a satellite cross – the Chinese launch – the China launch a satellite and cross the southern part of Taiwan, probably people should be aware of.
So, it’s sended from – it was sended from the Ministry of Defence, Taiwanese Government. I would say, actually, of course, it is probably a mistake, the system hasn’t updated, but it’s also to indicate that the Chinese influence, or Chinese impact, its dominance in this election, even to the extent that Ministry of Defence would be panic, in a sense, to send out these national level alerts to all Taiwanese people three days before election. It was yesterday afternoon, 3pm.
So, of course, China’s impact on Taiwan is everywhere, and as Lai said, that is not just missile, but also all the perspective of the satellite launch, if you like. But I would say there are more nun – there are more influence or Chinese impact which we will not see but there’s there, which is a cyberattack, as well, the misinformation, which I think Taiwan has been suffered a lot. Although Taiwan has built the resilience to counter Chinese misinformation, but has been suffer a lot of all those misinformation, that’s one.
And then, the second thing is, I would say, China has been, also, trying to buying off a lot of legislative candidates. So far, we have focus on the Presidential results, or Presidential candidate, presidential elections, and there’s a lot to be seen on the legislative election, as well, which would happen in the same day. And China has been buying off qui – or trying to buy, attempt to buy, a lot of the legislative candidates. As far as I can see, they were – of course, KMT candidates were being alleged to be corrupt or bought off by the Chinese, or they are also TPP legislative candidates was bought off, or alleged to be bought off.
So, I think that, of course, we’ve seen the Presidential election probably quite fixed, but there’s a lot of uncertainties in terms of legislative election, which has wider or more extensive of the Chinese influence there.
Ben Bland
Thanks, Chun-Yi, and I might come to you for a slightly different perspective on this, Bo-jiun, because I guess, over the last 20 or 30 years, broadly speaking, CCP propaganda efforts towards Taiwan have not been very effective, right? If you look at how Taiwanese people feel about whether or not they want to be part of the PRC, how they feel about that identity. But what’s your sense in this election campaign? Have any – putting aside the, kind of, military intimidation, have these, kind of, information campaigns had positive impact from a CCP perspective? Have they, you know, helped to, kind of, maybe advance the KMT cause, or advance the kind of views that the CCP wants to see in Taiwan?
Dr Bo-jiun Jing
[Pause] Thank you, Ben. Sorry, it took me a while to mute – unmute myself. Yeah, so, well, I’ve been in Taiwan for about a month, and I know I’ve observed that several NGOs, or private sector organisation, they are tracking the – these – the misinformation or disinformation campaign activities, potentially coming from the mainland Chin – from mainland China, right? But attribution is always a tricky thing. I mean, it’s very difficult to say who is behind – who are behind those misinformation line messages, or social media message, TikTok, but – and other social media platforms, Facebook. So, it’s very difficult to track the source.
But I know – I mean, this time, on the ground, I think, well, interference has been always there, as we know, like, cyberattack or a misinformation campaign, or, as you said, military wise, the grey zone tactics, right? All the – in recent days we see – we saw the balloons flying over Taiwan, into Taiwan’s ADIZ, and also some of them actually flying over the island, the main island of Taiwan. So, these are all the Chinese strategy – a part of their strategy to influence Taiwan’s – Taiwanese voters’ decision to vote, ‘cause they rather – they’d rather it’s, okay, “If you vote for the ruling party, it’s a vote for war.” So, they try to influence that way.
But I think – and yeah, you mentioned about this – whether it’s been successful. I don’t really think so, ‘cause I do have a trust in Taiwan’s democracy, or democratic system, is that we’ve been democratised for decades, very, very – and for a while. And I do think it’s maturing, and so, it’s – somehow it’s, kind of, counterproductive for – if you are – from the Beijing’s perspective, is that, they’re not winning hearts and minds of the Taiwanese people. And so, it’s not actually working toward their favour, if it want to say, okay, you look at the poll about – not the poll about the election, but the polling about the identity, affiliation, right? Previously, some people – it’s okay to say, “Oh yeah, you’re both Taiwanese and Chinese,” ethnically. But ethically, I think most people think, okay, that’s fine, like, they’re a Chinese culture. But when they identify themself as Taiwanese, both Taiwanese or Chinese, that – I mean, more people identify themself as solely Taiwanese.
So, from that perspective, it’s not working towards Beijing’s favour, right? We talk about we’re sharing the same blood, and we are the descendants of the Yellow Emperor, or – yeah, it’s that, kind of, rhetoric. So, yeah, I do think that – I – anyway, my conclusion is that I – yeah, there’s always misinformation, disinformation campaign, and – but Taiwan is a open society. So, it’s open to all kinds of information. You just have to improve or increase the level of media literacy, and that’s something that I think has a bipartisan – is a bipartisan consensus, yeah. Thank you.
Ben Bland
Yeah, thanks. Yeah, and I think that’s – it’s probably something that’s true across all the elections at the moment, that, sort of, people talk endlessly about the risk of miss and disinformation, but it’s not new. And, also, social media, and a much more, kind of. fractured public discourse is not going anywhere, and there’s no rule or regulation that can, kind of, put the genie back in the bottle. So, yeah, you’re – I think you’re right, it’s something we all need to learn to live with. Chun-Yi, you wanted to add something here?
Dr Chun-Yi Lee
Well, just a note to say that, actually, Taiwan has been, as I said, have been resilient in terms of, like, disinformation, misinformation. And if you notice, actually, Lai. DPP’s lear – by large nomination of the Legislator, the first, number one, nominated by large Legislator is a Professor called Shen Pao-yang. He is very famous in terms of counter-disinformation or misinformation, which also showed the potential of the governing candidates, governments that would see, like, this is important, and this they would take into the consideration to take – to tackle it.
And I probably would say that because of all this bomb of Chinese disinformation or misinformation, there are quite a lot of the civil society also working against that. Taiwan might be able to share some successful experience, because misinformation are globally phenomenon, every country – every democracy suffered. So, maybe that’s also Taiwan’s future soft power, in that sense.
Ben Bland
Yeah, thanks, Chun-Yi, and I mean, on that point, Michael, I might come to you, because I think a lot of Taiwanese Politicians say, and people outside, that Taiwan is almost a frontline of this global battle for democracy. But do you think there’s actually anything that the UK, Europe, the US, can learn about China, from Taiwan’s experience, or is it really quite a different case, given the history and the tensions between Taiwan and China?
Dr Michael Reilly
I mean, it is a very different case, as you say, for the historic reasons, but that doesn’t mean that Western Politicians can’t learn from it. Clearly, in recent years, in the UK, but the US too, and to a larger extent, Europe, there has been a – the development of a much more hawkish attitude towards China. But prior to that, certainly, I think a lot of Western Politicians were rather starry-eyed about China, and frankly, very naïve about China. You might argue it’s perhaps the pendulum’s swung a bit too far the other way at the moment.
I think the main area in which they could potentially learn from the Taiwanese experience is in what we’ve been talking about, the whole, sort of, misinformation campaigns, which in Taiwan, frankly, have been pretty heavy-handed for very many years. But part of the reason for that is that we have to remember that the Chinese leadership is sending its message to its own domestic audience, first and foremost, and it needs to show its own domestic, not electorate, but public opinion, that it has taken a hard line on Taiwan.
But having said that, the Chinese have spent considerable amounts of money on trying to buy influence in Taiwan, and that’s something which I think we’re only waking up to now in Europe, the extent to which they have been doing the same sort of thing here. And in the UK, we’ve had a case highlighted, there’s been a very recent case highlighted in Belgium. So, we should, at least, perhaps be comparing notes with Taiwan as to how they’ve handled it. Although, I would say that, actually, the Taiwanese have had difficulty handling it, for reasons that both Bo-jiun and Chun-Yi have mentioned. I think particularly with its authoritarian past, Taiwan is very, very sensitive and cautious about trying to take too hard a line on freedom of the press and this sort of thing, which actually makes it easier for China to try to manipulate public opinion.
Ben Bland
Thanks, Michael, and Bo-jiun, I might just come to you for a flavour of how people are feeling on the ground. I mean, we know that typically, yeah, Taiwan has really high election turnouts, you know, much higher than in many established Western democracies. Yeah, have people been excited about this election, and, also, what issues are people interested in? Because from the outside, we often talk about China and the US and cross-Straits issues. That’s been a big feature of the, kind of, debates between the candidates, but yeah, what about voters on the ground, what are they, sort of, most concerned about?
Dr Bo-jiun Jing
Well, thank you, Ben. Also, thank you, Chun-Yi and Michael, for sharing your views, and I agree with them. I think the – for – you know, for your question, on the ground, it’s been – I mean, walking down the street, people don’t talk about politics, yeah, but – because it’s quite sensitive. People have different views and probably will ended up in argument. But I do see – I think from TV sho – TV news programmes and also – very vibrant, very vibrant. You see the rallies are full of people, and it’s good that, kind of, passing – you know, like, post-COVID scenery is that people are not afraid of going out to rallies, so – which I think it’s a good thing. It’s, like, okay, it’s – people participate in the rallies and share – show – willing to show their – to voice out their views, so it’s good.
And regarding a turnout, it just, - I mean, yeah, usually, it’s been – there’s always high turnout for Taiwanese elections. And this time we have about close to 20 million voters, and among them there will be – among us, actually, one – I’m one of those voters, will be one million new first-time voters, ‘cause voting age in Taiwan is 20, right? So, we’ll see – yeah, and young voters, I mean, based on the previous data, it seems like Ko Wen-je is quite popular among the young voters, so we’ll see if that will be a game changer.
But yeah, as you, kind of, related to that, what – is that – domestic issues. ‘Cause I think young people care more about domestic issues, like high – very high pri –pricey housing is a issue, so talk – people talk about housing justice a lot on the campaign trail this time. And other issues such as energy transition, there’s a debate about nuclear power and also, the wind farm and renewable energy. And education, cost of living, housing rise, I said, this – as I mentioned. And elderly care, since Taiwan is quite a – is ageing society, and become, maybe to some extent, like, a aged society already. So, these are all the social issues that people are talking about, and the Presidential and Vice Presidential candidates, they are debating on the televised policy presentation and debate.
So, I just want to share one more thing, is that I think in particular, young voters, they – I think they typically don’t have strong party affiliations. And so, arguably, they care more about who can offer solution to the longstanding issues, like low wages compared to other countries in the region, and as we discussed, the high housing prices. In Taipei is just so difficult to buy. It’s almost impossible, you got, like, a salary job, you got to – you can buy a house, it’s very, very difficult.
So, these issues, I mean, the problems which have not significantly improved over the past either DPP or KMT’s administration. So, this could be one of the main reasons that TPP as the third way, as he branded himself, has been popular among young population, and who hope to have this non – this, kind of, like, you know, like, non-traditional Politician can come up with some new strategy or policy to improve their lives. So, I guess that’s a key factor in this election.
Ben Bland
Great. Thanks, Bo-jiun, and…
Dr Bo-jiun Jing
Thank you.
Ben Bland
…Chun-Yi, on – I mean, in terms of this election, I mean, I think it’s the eighth Presidential election that Taiwan has had. Is this the most unpredictable one so far, with a, kind of, three horse race, and, you know, only a very narrow, sort of, margin of lead before polling stopped, sort of, ten days before the election? So, is this the most unpredictable race in recent history for Taiwan?
Dr Chun-Yi Lee
Thank you, Ben. I think the unpredictable factor will be the three-horse race, that is true. I think Taiwan hasn’t been seeing a significant third party rising, and this is the Presidential election that we’ve seen TPP is the third party. But, also, aligned with what Bo-jiun say, that TPP is more of attracting the young voters. And – but so far, I still think that’s – it’s predictable of the result, in that sense, but it’s very exciting to see there would be a third party. I think as a observer, Scholar, we always wanted to see there would be more of the challenging of the existing party, because that is healthy for democracy. So, with the new voice TPP to join in, I think that is good.
It’s, also – just to say that, hmmm, I think for the reason that the predic – whether we can predict or not, is to see whether the vote – whether we will be able to see the voters to get what they want. I think for more majority, if I could say, although I’m not based in Taiwan, but I can say that the majority of the Taiwanese people still care most of the democracy, the sovereignty that Taiwan has. Therefore, even though China has already intimidated not just missile or disinformation, but economic sanction, if you like, like China has already say that if DPP, Lai Ching-te, Hsiao Mei-chin, would win, they would cut off the ECFA, which is the semi-free trade agreement with Taiwan. That it would be impact on the economic development or output, or the young people’s working opportunities.
However, even so, Taiwanese voters, I would say, think still probably draw more into defence, democracy, certainly that have been strived for so long that Taiwan deserved. So, it is unpredictable and predictable. I think I haven’t really answered your question, Ben, but I provide what I observed, and I think that it probably would be the case, yeah.
Ben Bland
Thanks, Chun-Yi, and before I get to questions from the audience, Michael, I might just come to you on, sort of, what happens the day after? I mean, what – especially when it comes to China’s, sort of, attitude towards Taiwan, and the increasing pressures that we’ve already spoken about, I mean, do you see that pressure relenting under any of the potential candidates as President?
Dr Michael Reilly
Well, in the sho – let’s assume, just for the sake of debating it or discussing your question, let’s assume that the KMT wins the election. Then, in the short-term, I think, undoubtedly, the overall – the atmospherics, the optics, will improve. Chun-Yi mentioned that China has threatened to suspend the trade agreement. They won’t do that if the KMT wins. In fact, they wou – they may well then move on to sign a further agreement on trade and services.
But the fundamental issue is that, ultimately, China wants to take back con – or take control of Taiwan. They call it ‘reunification’, the Taiwanese would say ‘unification’, because it’s never really been part of China. And whereas prior to Xi Jinping, Chinese leaders were always content to, sort of, just play this long, bide our time, time is on our side, don’t rush it, Xi Jinping has – is much less patient. And it’s pretty clear that whoever wins, let’s assume the KMT wins, they will then be under pressure after the honeymoon period, to start moving towards some sort of political agreement with China. And the fundamental problem that China is unwilling to face up to is that the Taiwanese electorate, as a whole, bar a tiny min – majority do not want that. So, whoever wins the election in Taiwan, the room for manoeuvre, if you like, is actually quite constrained, and it’s too constrained to meet the expectations of the CCP under Xi Jinping. That’s the fundamental issue.
So, as I say, short-term – I mean, certainly, as I think Chun-Yi said much earlier, if Lai Ching-te wins, and the last polls we saw suggested he had a narrow lead, then we might well see China in a fit of, sort of, spite, take some, sort of, retaliatory measures, might insist there has to be compromises. I would also think it very likely that, not straightaway, but before he – the inauguration in, I think, May, China will just try to test – provoke the new Taiwanese leader, with some sort of actions in the Straits, just to see how they respond. So, that will be the worrying period if the DPP wins. But as I say, fundamentally, at the end of the day, the objectives of the two sides of the Straits are incompatible.
Ben Bland
Yeah, thanks for setting out that clear, but quite depressing, picture, Michael.
Dr Michael Reilly
Sorry about that.
Ben Bland
Yeah, that’s okay. It’s good to say it as it is. We’ve had a couple of questions from our audience about the legislative elections. And I guess, yeah, the polls are, sort of, forecasting – were forecasting that the DPP may lose control. I guess, you know, it seems quite likely, one way or another, the President may not, you know, have – his part – their party may not have control of the Legislative Yuan. Bo-jiun, what do you think that would mean if that does turn out to the case, you know, for the next four-year term, if you have a, kind of, hung parliament effectively and – or a President representing a different party from that which controls the Legister? What does that mean for Taiwan’s politics and stability?
Dr Bo-jiun Jing
Right, thank you for the question. Yeah, that’s a very important one, ‘cause it seems like we’re on track to be – to have a, like, hung parliament. And TPP’s par – as a third party, probably will get some seats. I mean, they already have five seats right now, so they probably – I mean, if you consider the party list system, they – the party probably will garner more seats this time. And you have – the KMT will increase some seats, by estimation, and – but none – it seems like none of them will have more than 57, which is the – ‘cause the total is 113 seats, right? And if you want to be a majority party, it’s – you have to win more than 57 seats, and it doesn’t look like anybody will do – will have the luxury of that.
And so, yes – and so, in the future, I guess, the – for the new government, if it’s TPP, will face opposition parties in the Parliament, and probably will block – will challenge a lot, challenge DPP’s policies a lot, through the legislative branch. If it’s KMT, then Hou Yu-ih has said many time that he will – he’s still willing to form a coalition government with Ko Wen-je. The – although the six-point consensus they signed previously fell apart, but it seems like it’s still – I mean, he’s – the KMT is still willing to work with the white camp, and so, there’ll be a blue-white coalition on government. And well, if the – Ko Wen-je wins, then – if Ko Wen-je wins, then he still will have to work with the KMT, either in the Parliament or in the Government.
So, I guess – so two scenarios, right? TPP versus – DPP Government, administration, Lai Ching-te’s administration versus a Parliament con – a Legislative Yuan controlled by the KMT and the TPP, or the other way around. It’s – that’s the likely scenario, and that would be, for the first time. I think, last time was during Chen Shui-bian’s era, we had that hung parliament. So, we’ll – well, right now, 2024, I don’t know, actually, I don’t what to expect with that. What – I think that would be very different with the previous, ‘cause that – I remember that time, it was very intense, very tense, the – very, very – they fought with each other a lot, they boycott each other. So – I mean, yeah, so it was very divided, very divided, the country that time. So, the new – in the next, I mean, President and the Parliament, I think that will be a new – totally new scene, yeah.
Ben Bland
Great, thanks for that. Sticking with the domestic politics question, Chun-Yi, I might come to you on this. I mean, a few people have asked, why – given that the candidates don’t really differ that much on cross-Strait policy, and given that voters are so upset about lots of economic issues, low wages, high housing prices, you know, egg shortages and the rest, why haven’t the candidates spent more time campaigning and fighting with each other over domestic policy? Why have they spent so much time talking about cross-Straits questions, rather than domestic economic policy, given that seems to matter more to voters?
Dr Chun-Yi Lee
Very good questions. I think we should actually advise the candidates to focus more on the domestic issues, and this is what I feel that in the Presidential campaign, and – or in their debates, it’s really focused on their China policy, rather than domestic issue, or the personal attack, whether there’s corruption of rights from house or lands, rather than the actual domestic issues. Which I think, this is – this has been the situation, unfortunately, of the Presidential campaign, really just to look at the China factor, rather – or the pitch for personal attack on the corruption or the misbehaviour, whatever, rather than look into the actual policy.
I haven’t really gets the actual policy out from either of the parties Presidential candidates, apart from, I think, Lai in his debate, Presidential debate, he mentioned about the housing, he mentioned about to provide young people more working opportunities, and energy, in that sense. But apart from – I would like to hear more, as well. So, this is the point I would think that all the Presidential candidates should focus on.
But to answer the question why they don’t, I would say it’s because there’s a really big elephant in the room for all the Presidential candidate to look into China and to imagine how it would be, as bleak as Michael just set out earlier, the consequence after they became the leader of Taiwan. But again, it doesn’t really mean that it’s the way it should be. It should really focus on how the economy should reform, how should – the Government looking into increasing the wage and also, the high inflation. It’s unfortunately not really yet to be well debated or well explained of their policies.
Ben Bland
Thanks, Chun-Yi. Michael, you wanted to add something?
Dr Michael Reilly
Yeah, just to say – I mean, I agree with Chun-Yi. The cynic that I am says that part of the reason is it’s much easier for the Politicians to talk about China because they know that, actually, there’s not much they can do about it, at the end of the day. Whereas, if they talk too much about domestic issues, there’s a real worry that they will be held to account on them, which is something that few Politicians want to go down that road.
And another factor, you know, memories are short, but not that short. At the last Presidential election four years ago, China really helped Tsai Ing-wen enormously with its behaviour in Hong Kong. Prior to the actions it took there, the KMT was very confident it was going to win the election. Basically, China lost it for them, and I think since then, the Politicians certainly feel, “Look, China – our position on China can make a difference. Let’s focus on that.”
Ben Bland
Thanks, Michael, and if people are interested in Taiwanese – what Taiwanese politics would look like without talking about cross-Straits, it’s worth watching a series called Wave Makers, on a leading streaming service, which is quite fun, and I think there’s no mention of China, basically, in the whole thing, or the US. But it’s pretty interesting and weirdly, one of the actresses did end up briefly as a vice Presidential candidate in, sort of, classic art imitates life. So, yeah, that’s definitely a good watch, I think.
We have a question from Danila Galperovich of Voice of America, I might direct this to you, Bo-jiun, about Chinese propaganda, and “Do you see any similarities between China’s propaganda to Taiwan and Russia’s propaganda towards Ukraine?”
Dr Bo-jiun Jing
Well, thank you, that’s a very important question. Well – but I – to be honest, I’m not the expert on this, I mean, the – regarding Russia-Ukraine relation – also, I – the – about their approach towards Russia. So, I cannot much find any similarity with that, but – sorry, can you hear me? Yeah, ‘cause my – I think my AirPods just – the batteries just ran out, but anyway. Yeah, so, regarding that, maybe I’ll leave Chun-Yi or…
Ben Bland
Okay, fine, yeah.
Dr Bo-jiun Jing
…Michael to answer, but can I…
Ben Bland
Chun-Yi wants to come in…
Dr Bo-jiun Jing
…just add one more – sorry, I think my previous – the previous question I didn’t answer well, but I just want to add one more thing, is that I think either for the KMT or the blue-white gov – for the KMT Government or the DPP Government, or even the TPP’s Government, it would be very difficult for them to push forward their policy, also, the budget planning – plan. For the DPP, the budget plan will be checked as cyclic – by the Parliament. So, it would be very different way of – than the past eight years, ‘cause the past eight years they control the Parliament, as well, the Legislative Yuan. So, it’s very easy to, kind of like, to have budget plan and also spend money, to have some project going on.
But for the KMT Government, it would be super difficult to promote anything related to China. So, the, kind of – you know, the – whether they want to start negotiating more agreement again with China – ‘cause during Ma Ying-jeou’s era, both sides signed like 21 – 23 agreements, right? And for the future KMT or TPP Government, they both want to have this Supervisory Act. Bit difficult for them to push forward for that, anyway.
Ben Bland
Okay, thanks, Bo-jiun, and Chun-Yi?
Dr Chun-Yi Lee
Yeah, just to say that with Ma Ying-jeou’s Government, with that passing the bill, and then that’s result into the Sunflower Movement. So, they learned the lesson, they wouldn’t do that.
But answer the question, I would – just to help out in that sense, that I think the propaganda China is using now to Taiwan is different from what Russia is using to Ukraine. I think, I would say, again, I’m not the – exactly expert of Russia-Ukraine relations, but I’m working on a paper to compare of China-Taiwan, Russia-Ukraine with real Russia experts of my colleagues. But from what I can observe is the – Russia’s campaign to Ukraine was more on the culture and come back to a nation, it’s kind of compared – correct me if I’m wrong, but China knew that has not attract the Taiwanese voter. It probably was the strategy 30 years ago when Deng Xiaoping – well, 50 years ago, 1979, when Deng Xiaoping published the letter to Taiwanese compatriots, “to welcome you back to motherland.” That strategy has not work out, or end up very badly on Taiwan. So, I think China’s strategy or propaganda to Taiwan is very different from Russia to Ukraine.
Ben Bland
Thanks, Chun-Yi. Michael, I might come to you with the next question about Korea and Japan. Because yeah, we’ve talked a lot about US and China, but we’ve got to remember, Japan is one of the closest neighbours. I think the island of Yonaguni …
Dr Michael Reilly
Hmmm hmm.
Ben Bland
…is just, what…
Dr Michael Reilly
Yeah.
Ben Bland
…70 off miles off…
Dr Michael Reilly
Yeah.
Ben Bland
…Taiwan, and when those, sort of, miss – Chinese missiles were fired over Taiwan after the Pelosi visit, I think some of them ended up in Japan’s exclusive economic zone.
Dr Michael Reilly
Hmmm hmm.
Ben Bland
So, what – yeah, what’s Japan, in particular, and maybe Korea, if you had anything to add, thinking about these elections?
Dr Michael Reilly
Yeah, I think it’s a very good question, and Japan’s relations are very often overlooked, and yet, actually, they are critical, as you’ve just pointed out. Taiwan is far more critical to the defence and security of Japan than it is to that of the USA, so Japan’s got a very big vested interest in this. It tends to behave much more discreetly in its relations than, say, the US does. But it’s always been the case that Japan feels much more comfortable with a DPP administration in Taipei than it does with a KMT administration. That’s partly the whole history of China-Taiwan relations, going back, sort of, over two centuries or so now.
So, I think – and just as an example, after Tsai Ing-wen won the election back in – eight years ago, 2016, but before she took office, she visited Japan, she had a private meeting with the then Japanese Prime Minister, Abe, but this was kept discreet and quiet, and so on. So, I think you can be confident that if Lai Ching-te wins on Saturday, the Japanese will be pleased, will be relieved. If the KMT wins, then they will be more concerned, but they will take a cautious position to see how it actually plays out.
Korea is a very good question. I mean, Korea was one of the last big countries to switch diplomatic recognition from Taiwan to China. It only did so in about 1992 – well, in 1992. Partly because it was so late, partly because of the history of the relationship beforehand, and partly because of the way the relationship was abruptly broken, a lot of bitterness was created in Taiwan about the switch, in a way that didn’t happen, for example, when South Africa switched relations a few years later. And that’s – there’s still a little bit of background to that.
Korea is also very, very – or attaches great importance, I should say, to its relations with China. It is very, very wary about doing anything to upset those relations with China. So, it tends to stay very quiet, indeed, on relations with Taiwan. I think – but I think given the way things are going, they may feel they will – at one sta – sooner or later, may have to take a choice. But I think they will be privately pleased if the KMT win, because from their perspective, that would mean, in the short-term at least, a more stable relationship between Taiwan and China, that helps them in terms of just access to the Straits for commerce and trade, and so on. But it won’t be a big difference. It’s much less critical for them than it is for Japan.
Ben Bland
Thanks so much, Michael, and with that, we are out of time for today. But I just want to thank everyone for joining us in our audience, and also, thank again, Michael, Bo-jiun and Chun-Yi. This is, as I said at the start, a year of many, many elections. In the next few weeks we’re going to have events upcoming on Pakistan elections, if they go ahead, and the Indonesian elections, and many more, too. So, keep an eye on our website. But thanks again to our speakers, thanks everyone for joining us, and see you all again soon. Thanks.
Dr Chun-Yi Lee
Thank you, Ben, thank you.
Dr Bo-jiun Jing
Thank you, Ben, and thank you, everyone, thank you, Chun-Yi, thank you, Michael.
