This section analyses the pro-Kremlin and ‘neutral’ roles that Belarus has played in the past or continues to play today. These two roles are examined in detail, as they hold the greatest practical relevance. Our analysis reveals that the Lukashenka regime has typically allowed for a degree of ambiguity in its actions, thereby minimizing risks to its own stability.
In its discussion of potential roles, our paper excludes an explicitly pro-Western role for Belarus – i.e. one in which it is integrated into Western security institutions in general and NATO in particular – for three reasons. First, there are no significant external actors currently advocating such a role. Second, no major Belarusian politician will raise the idea, as it is unpopular in Belarus for a variety of reasons. And finally, to imagine Belarus fully exiting Russia’s sphere of influence requires envisioning Russia in a state of weakness that seems highly improbable.
Belarus as a platform for Russian aggression
Under Lukashenka, Belarus has been a consistent and close ally of Russia, with security integration between the two states developing almost continuously since the collapse of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s. Belarus hosts two long-standing Russian military facilities, and has permitted the development of additional shared-use military sites across the country. As a result, Belarus is often described by analysts as a ‘balcony’ from which the Kremlin can project threats towards neighbouring countries in Eastern Europe, with these facilities and Belarus’s geography providing the Kremlin with strategic opportunities to undermine Russian opponents’ capabilities and will.
The period of Belarus’s greatest use for Moscow’s interests coincided with the onset of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in early 2022. Lukashenka’s key contribution during the first months of that invasion was to provide Belarusian territory and infrastructure for Russian military training and operations.
Given that preparations for the invasion, such as the transport of ammunition, fuel and equipment, continued after the Russia–Belarus military exercises held on 10–20 February 2022, it is almost certain that the Belarusian authorities were aware of the impending Russian offensive. The Russian army made extensive use of Belarusian military facilities, particularly airfields, logistics networks and hospitals, which were guarded by Belarusian troops and other security forces. Even after Russia’s withdrawal from the Kyiv region of Ukraine that borders Belarus, some Russian units remained stationed in Belarus and continued shelling Ukrainian territory from there until October 2022.
While the Russian withdrawal from the Kyiv region can be attributed to the failure of the Kremlin’s initial invasion plan, the Ukrainian military leadership has publicly linked the subsequent cessation of large-scale Russian military activity on Belarusian territory to Lukashenka. Since the withdrawal, Russian troops have on several occasions been sent to Belarus for training before being redeployed to the front. However, shelling from Belarusian territory has not resumed, which has meant an increase in missile flight times and, accordingly, the time available for Ukrainian forces to react.
The Ukrainian military leadership has publicly linked the cessation of large-scale Russian military activity on Belarusian territory to Lukashenka.
If the conflict escalates further and the current trend towards the de-sovereignization of Belarus continues, it is possible that the Belarusian army could be used in support of Russia’s military interests. It is commonly argued that the Belarusian armed forces are ill-suited for offensive operations, due to limited equipment and a lack of combat experience. But Belarusian service personnel appear significantly better trained than Russian army recruits and could still be used in support roles. Even if the Belarusian army is not formally deployed, close military integration with Russia enables the Russian defence ministry and Russian private military companies to recruit Belarusians to Russian forces – as has been the case since 2022.
The growing Russian military presence on Belarusian territory has significant political and strategic implications without the direct participation of Belarus in the war. The actions of the Lukashenka regime in allowing the Russian presence in Belarus have forced Ukraine to divert part of its military resources in anticipation of an attack, with troops being held in reserve to guard Ukraine’s northern border with Belarus rather than participating in combat operations against Russia in the eastern regions.
The expansion of Russia’s military footprint in Belarus also shapes political perceptions among NATO member states. It serves as a demonstration of Moscow’s enduring power and compels Western societies and policymakers to reassess their threat perceptions. The deployment of Russian Iskander-M missile systems in Belarus, the likely stationing of tactical nuclear weapons and the deployment of Oreshnik systems serve military purposes, but also function as instruments of psychological pressure on NATO decision-makers.
Another category of risk stems from hybrid warfare – most notably, the orchestration of irregular migration across Belarus’s western borders. The impact of this form of pressure has been felt primarily by Poland, which shares the longest land border with Belarus among EU member states. In 2020, Polish border services intercepted just 129 attempts at illegal crossings of the Belarusian border. That number rose to nearly 40,000 in 2021. These figures have stabilized since, but remained elevated at around 30,000 per year in 2024. Further north, the launch of inexpensive weather balloons carrying contraband from Belarus towards Lithuania has repeatedly forced Lithuanian authorities to halt operations at Vilnius Airport. At the time of writing, it appears that the Belarusian authorities are not counteracting such activities, thereby demonstrating how easily Belarus’s proximity to Vilnius can be exploited.
Despite becoming one of the most heavily sanctioned countries in the world after 24 February 2022 and losing 4.7 per cent of its GDP that year, Belarus has nevertheless benefited from its position regarding the war, with the economy growing by 4.1 per cent in 2023 and by 4.0 per cent in 2024.
The role of Belarus as a Russian ‘balcony’ also has an important economic dimension. Despite becoming one of the most heavily sanctioned countries in the world after 24 February 2022 and losing 4.7 per cent of its GDP that year, Belarus has nevertheless benefited from its position regarding the war, with the economy growing by 4.1 per cent in 2023 and by 4.0 per cent in 2024. This level of growth has been made possible by extensive support from the Kremlin and by the absorption of market niches freed up following the withdrawal of Western companies from Russia since 2022.
Against the backdrop of the war against Ukraine, Moscow’s demand for Belarusian defence capabilities has reached unprecedented levels. Hundreds of Belarusian enterprises are currently engaged in fulfilling Russian defence contracts. Key firms include Integral, MZKT and Peleng, which produce microchips, chassis and fire-control systems, respectively. A joint Belarusian–Russian drone manufacturing plant is under construction in Minsk, and Belarusian facilities are actively used for the repair of Russian military equipment.
Domestically, the alliance with Moscow manifests itself in repression and propaganda: hundreds of Belarusians have been convicted for supporting Ukraine through acts ranging from railway sabotage and sharing intelligence on Russian troop movements, to direct service in the Ukrainian armed forces.
The political dimension of Belarus’s ‘balcony’ role is the least significant. While Lukashenka remains the foreign leader who spends the most time with Putin, publicly supports Russia and aligns Belarus’s voting record with Russia’s in international organizations, he retains some standing in China and several developing countries, lending this support for Russia limited diplomatic weight.
Belarus as a ‘buffer’ state
Despite the Lukashenka regime’s complicity in Russia’s war against Ukraine, it continues to seek an alternative role to merely serving the Kremlin’s military interests.
Within the Belarusian political class, there is a deeply rooted conviction that the best way to achieve this is by positioning the country as a platform for peace negotiations between Russia and Ukraine. Even in the early stages of Russia’s invasion in February and March 2022, Belarus hosted three rounds of Russian–Ukrainian talks, placing its official flag between those of Ukraine and Russia as a symbolic gesture intended to suggest that Belarus was not party to the conflict.
Lukashenka regularly organizes conferences on Eurasian security and presents himself as a mediator capable of conveying arguments to Putin – which, to some extent, is how he has come to be perceived by the Trump administration.
His rhetoric likewise takes a pacifying tone: he consistently calls for a swift end to the war, in line with public sentiment within Belarus. In a conversation with Ukraine’s president, Volodymyr Zelenskyy, in 2022, Lukashenka reportedly apologized and claimed that he had urged Putin not to start the war. Although Ukraine’s leadership publicly expresses scepticism about this rhetoric, they are also keen to avoid further weakening Lukashenka in his relationship with Putin. That is why, for instance, the Ukrainian authorities were once reported to have lobbied for the EU not to impose sanctions against Belarus.
Lukashenka is not yet seen as a credible mediator and Ukraine has other intermediaries, but he has nevertheless provided certain ‘good offices’. For example, Belarus has been used as a venue for prisoner exchanges between Russia and Ukraine, and for the return of Ukrainian children forcibly taken to Russia. Following an incident in September 2025 in which Russian drones entered Polish airspace, the Belarusian Ministry of Defence hastened to announce that it had shared flight data with its Polish and Lithuanian counterparts throughout the night. In a similar vein, Lukashenka presented the limited format of the Zapad-2025 exercises to the West as a ‘de-escalatory’ gesture. Significantly, Lukashenka is keen to keep communication channels with Ukraine and Europe open. A small number of Ukrainian diplomats continue to operate in Belarus, and Belarus was the last country to suspend its participation in the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe.
Although they may meet with scepticism, these steps indicate that Lukashenka’s flirtation with neutrality is part of a deliberate strategy and an attempt to signal to the West that Belarusian interests are not identical to Russia’s. Lukashenka is trying to show that he retains a degree of autonomy – something that could be useful for neighbouring states seeking to bolster their security.
