Last year, households in Sweden and Norway received booklets prepared by their respective civil contingencies agencies. In Finland and Denmark, digital versions of similar documents were sent out via email and mobile. With straightforward language and vivid illustrations, these guides set out practical steps to take before and during a crisis. ‘How will you, your family and loved ones cope during disruptions in society?’ asks Finland’s brochure.
‘Home Preparedness’ was emailed and sent to people’s phones last year. Finnish citizens are told to stock up on medicines including iodine tablets in case of a nuclear incident. Brochure courtesy of www.spek.fi.
The guidance includes keeping a week’s supply of essentials, building preparedness locally by identifying vulnerable neighbours or joining a civil defence group, and ways to verify sources of information.
While these guidelines covered a range of crises – from natural disaster to open conflict – the most pressing threat is evident: Russia’s full-scale of invasion of Ukraine in 2022 and the intensification of Vladimir Putin’s ‘grey war’ of sabotage and subversion against the rest of Europe. ‘We live in uncertain times. Armed conflicts are being waged in our corner of the world … we must stand united,’ advises Sweden’s brochure, In Case of Crisis or War.
In Britain, the government points to its rather less publicized ‘Prepare’ website as evidence of public engagement, though it omits mention of hostile states. So, what might the UK learn from these countries to improve its societal resilience to the threat of grey war from Russia and others?
Finland and the other Nordic states are united by an obvious proximity to Russia – Finland alone shares a 1,300km border with its eastern neighbour. They pursue a ‘total defence’ approach honed by decades of the Cold War and sharpened by the resilience shown by Ukraine since 2014. National security for Nordic states is not just a matter for the state but an issue of personal responsibility.
Rising civil defence spending
In response to the threat from Russia in recent years, Sweden and Finland have made substantial investments in defence. Sweden for instance plans to double its spending on civil defence by 2027.
The threat of Russia is potent and varied. Alongside its invasion of Ukraine, Russia is using techniques below the threshold of full-scale conflict to target European states. This hybrid warfare includes disinformation campaigns, cyberattacks and physical sabotage, all designed to ‘weaken the enemy’ by exploiting societal vulnerabilities. In recent years Russian efforts have increasingly targeted European transport and communication infrastructure, including that of Britain.
During Nato’s annual conference in Washington last year, member states recognized that ‘a whole of government approach, public-private cooperation and societal resilience considerations’ are needed to ‘address growing strategic threats – including against our democratic systems, critical infrastructure and supply chains’. European Union states are seeking inspiration from the Nordic total defence model which emphasizes the active responsibility of every individual, institution and business towards the security of the state.
Some form of conscription is common to most Baltic and Nordic nations, valued not only as a way of maintaining a large, trained reserve of soldiers, but also for building societal cohesion and common knowledge of the state’s security situation. Annual polling in Finland consistently shows that over 80 per cent of the public are willing to participate in defence activities, while in Sweden similar sentiment has been apparent for decades.
National defence courses for business and community leaders in Finland act to enhance cooperation and planning for their role in a national crisis. In Sweden voluntary civil defence groups are coordinated by government agencies. These cover transport, logistics, communications and search-dog organizations, while local councils oversee Volunteer Resource Groups responsible for managing volunteers, providing first aid and support. Initiatives to promote media literacy and ‘psychological defence’ against disinformation in a crisis emphasize the security of society as much as the state.
These ‘whole of society’ approaches have limited the effects of increasingly brazen activity in the region over recent years, including the sabotage of undersea infrastructure, cyberattacks, GPS jamming and weaponized migration. Sweden, for instance, has been at the forefront of digital payments, but in the face of cyber-threats from Russia its civil preparedness brochure advises citizens to keep a week’s supply of cash on hand.
Importantly, Finland and Sweden benefit from high levels of trust in government and a culture of civic involvement in security matters. Such trust leads to better engagement with official messaging, greater resistance to malign influence and is a marker for social cohesion. And, although Finland and Sweden recently joined Norway in Nato, each has a strong tradition of non-alignment and independent defence – in Finland’s case, drawing on its experience repelling the Soviet Red Army during the Second World War.
Britain’s ‘war footing’
How does Britain compare? Since 2015, successive governments and defence reviews have outlined ambitions for greater societal resilience. Whether policy and resources have matched these aims is a matter of debate. When General Patrick Sanders, then head of the British Army, stated in January 2024 that Britain needed to follow Sweden’s example and take ‘preparatory steps to enable placing our societies on a war footing’ in response to the Russian threat, his warning was publicly dismissed by both No 10 and the Chief of the Defence Staff.
‘In Case of Crisis or Civil War’ was sent to 5 million homes in Sweden last year, telling people to keep a week’s worth of drinking water, non-perishable food, warm clothing and a battery radio. Brochure courtesy of msb.se.
More recently, ministers have acknowledged Russian hostility but sought to project a message of reassurance in the UK’s ability to deter it. Notably, domestic resilience to state threats appears to be beyond the scope of the Strategic Defence Review due to be published this spring, while the government’s civil contingencies assessment states that chronic risks ‘that erode our economy, community, way of life, and/or national security’ fall outside its remit. Unsurprisingly, parliamentary committees are seeking answers on where this responsibility lies.
Britain’s geography makes it particularly exposed to disruptions to its maritime trade routes, undersea energy interconnectors, gas pipelines and global telecommunication links. It retains no land-based air defences to protect population centres from the kind of missile strikes seen in Ukraine. The Government War Book, detailing plans for the defence of the UK mainland, has not been updated since the 1990s.
The government may be better advised to give a more honest appraisal of the state of Britain’s defences. In a 2024 poll, 55 per cent of Britons thought the UK was likely to be involved in a war in the next five years, with 40 per cent not confident in the ability of the armed forces to defend the mainland.
A mismatch between public perception and official messaging will not build the trust the Nordic approach relies on. Trust in government in Britain is half that of Finland and Sweden and has been falling for decades. Income inequality has also grown while other markers of social cohesion – volunteering rates, trust in political parties, the press and the electoral process – are in decline.
A tailored approach
Despite these challenges, aspects of the Nordic approach – particularly the focus on increasing society’s participation in security and resilience activities as a means of building cohesion – could be adopted by the British government. While it is debatable whether a return to national service would help the professional armed forces, integrating voluntary groups, universities and businesses into national civil protection efforts could deliver immediate benefits.
Given the low level of trust in politicians, thought must be given to who is best placed to communicate with the public on risk and preparedness. In general, Britons are more likely to trust fellow citizens, the emergency services, the civil service and local government.
Initiatives in London and Manchester to build community resilience are being led by the voluntary sector and faith groups with local government. London’s Communities Emergencies Partnership funds community centres and groups to build networks for preparedness and to pass on information from trusted local sources, carry out education activities and provide space to store supplies and coordinate volunteers. These offer a blueprint for a more clearly defined role in resilience for the new large unitary authorities planned by government as part of its English devolution agenda.