For years, Israelis have learned to live with being unpopular. Governments have come and gone, wars have erupted, condemnations have been issued at the United Nations and protests have broken out across university campuses. Israelis absorb the criticism, complain about the double standard and move on.
But something has changed. The erosion of Israel’s standing is increasingly visible in the United States, in almost every European capital and even among parts of the American right, once considered the last bastion of support. Israelis themselves are told to be careful about speaking Hebrew abroad or revealing where they are from. Given that, it would make sense that Israel’s diplomatic isolation would be a big issue in the general election campaign in the run-up to the vote on 27 October. Instead, it is barely discussed.
hat is being talked about is the following: the incumbent prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, likes to say that he has changed Israel for the better despite the failures that led to the Hamas invasion of 7 October, 2023, for which he continues to avoid any personal accountability. As proof, he points to the degradation of Hamas, the weakening of Hezbollah and the two wars against Iran. That these wars remain unresolved is a detail he swats away.
The opposition, led by former prime minister Naftali Bennett and Gadi Eisenkot, the former Israel Defence Forces chief of staff, talks about the need for accountability for the political failures that led to 7 October, the hostages and the ransacked communities. They also promise to solve a huge domestic issue – the inequality in the Israeli Defence Forces draft – claiming that, unlike Netanyahu, they will not bend to the ultra-Orthodox parties.
Yet, there is one subject almost no one is contesting, and it is no less important: the country’s deepening international isolation and, above all, the erosion of its standing in the United States and Europe. It is not that Israelis are unaware of the campus protests, the arms embargoes, growing European sanctions and recognition of a Palestinian state, and the International Criminal Court arrest warrants against Netanyahu and Yoav Gallant, the former defence minister. They know that antisemitism is on the rise across the globe and that at least some of it has been fuelled by a war that does not seem to end.
Hardening views
The numbers are striking. A Pew survey published in April found that 60 per cent of American adults hold an unfavourable view of Israel, up from 53 per cent a year earlier. Since 2022, favourable views have fallen by roughly 20 percentage points. Among Americans under 50, unfavourable views are around 70 per cent. Among Democrats, they are close to 80 per cent.
Even among Republicans, 41 per cent now report unfavourable views. British public opinion is even worse. Half of Britons believe that what Israel did in Gaza amounts to genocide, while a poll taken in August found that nearly half of the public would like to see fewer or even no further Israeli immigrants allowed into Britain.
The impact of this change in public opinion is real. Politicians in Britain and the US are increasingly calling for arms embargoes on Israel. In America, some on the far right echo the progressive left, arguing that Israel manipulates American policy, drags the US into other people’s wars and pursues interests fundamentally different from America’s. The Iran war has intensified this trend.
Israelis know something has changed but do not believe that any of the candidates running for office can change the situation. More importantly, almost none of the candidates claim they can.
The opposition promises to lower the cost of living, establish a commission of inquiry into 7 October and draft members of the ultra-Orthodox community. But break the diplomatic isolation? Restore Israel’s standing in Europe? Reverse the erosion of support in America? There is barely a discussion.
Dismissing criticism
Part of the reason for this is that Israelis do not believe the isolation can easily be broken. The 7 October attack has shaped public opinion in Israel to such an extent that when a foreign government criticizes Israel, the criticism is often written off as ‘anti-Israeli’, ‘anti-Zionist’ or even ‘antisemitic’. There is little room for nuance.
On the one hand, the Israeli response to criticism since 7 October is understandable. A country that suffered the worst single-day massacre of Jews since the Holocaust, watched its citizens dragged into tunnels and then spent almost three years fighting on multiple fronts is not particularly interested in receiving lectures.
Israelis also remember how international sympathy disappeared swiftly after 7 October. In some places, demonstrations against Israel began as the kibbutzim were still burning on the border.
What this creates is an inability to understand that there are allies around the world who have legitimate concerns. Instead, Israelis see only two viewpoints: that the criticism is either antisemitic or it is ignorant.
But there is a third possibility. A country or political leader can be a friend of Israel, recognize the horror of 7 October, understand the threat posed by Hamas and still disagree with Israeli policy. Israel does not have to accept that criticism, but it cannot pretend that all criticism is the same.
Which brings us to another difficult truth: even a change of leadership will not dramatically alter the situation. Netanyahu’s departure would probably lower the temperature in some capitals. But the differences between Netanyahu and his two main opponents on the core security questions – including in Gaza – are far smaller than many outside Israel imagine.
Bennett and Eisenkot are not going to accept Hamas remaining in power or retaining weapons. They are not going to suddenly support policies that endanger Israel simply because it might make them popular in Washington, London or Brussels.
New partners
Yet, instead of thinking about how to repair ties with its allies, Israelis are increasingly looking elsewhere, to India, the Persian Gulf, Asia and even places like Somaliland.
Israel should always strive to diversify its relationships. But if a US administration decided to stem the flow of spare parts for Israeli combat aircraft, no Asian partner would be able to fill the gap – not in five years and maybe not even in ten. There is no substitute today for American military assistance, intelligence cooperation, diplomatic backing and strategic support.
And here is where Netanyahu’s political talent comes into play. Over his nearly two decades of leadership, Netanyahu has managed to embed within much of the Israeli electorate a belief that he is the only person who can derive strategic benefits from a president like Donald Trump or stand up to a president like Barack Obama.
It is a formidable political case, and for many voters it is convincing. Netanyahu has a familiarity with Washington and international politics in a way few Israeli politicians do. His warnings about Iran’s nuclear programme, dismissed for years in many capitals, proved largely correct.
