Looked at one way, since February 2022 the West has performed to an unprecedented degree over Ukraine, delivering previously unimaginable support to Ukraine’s military, imposing stronger than ever sanctions on Russia, and presenting a largely united front.
Remarkably this alliance is still in place after 18 months, despite serious depletion of Western military stocks and rising energy bills for European voters.
Strong US leadership has been crucial, supplying some 70 per cent of Western military support to Ukraine. In contrast to his predecessor, President Joe Biden has trusted his intelligence services over Russian narratives. His visit to Kyiv in February 2023 was an act of personal and political bravery.
However, Biden’s administration has always been determined to carefully calibrate its support. The US has delivered enough to prevent Russian victory, but not so much as to allow Russian defeat (and the subsequent potential – in its view – for nuclear escalation).
Now, as US presidential elections loom and US voters’ interest in the war wains, talk of negotiations in US policymaking circles is no longer confined to Trump and his supporters. Even some of Ukraine’s friends, though far from the kind of reckless, isolationist position taken by Trump, are discussing preparing the ground for talks.
But signalling interest in a negotiated settlement will help neither Ukraine nor Biden’s electoral prospects. The counteroffensive has not stalled as some say, but Ukraine would have made more progress had the US not displayed such timidity over supplying it with a technological battlefield edge.
Weakening support now will only make Ukraine more vulnerable (with consequences for wider European and global security), threaten the gains made so far, and give Putin leverage he does not currently possess – especially in view of Russia’s internal tumult over recent weeks.
Worrying signs in the US
From the outset it has been striking to note what most Western governments do not say about the war. Many do not say that Ukraine needs an unambiguous victory. The majority do not say that Ukraine’s full territorial integrity must be restored.
They certainly do not say – even though it is the corollary of the previous two statements – that Russia needs to suffer a clear defeat.
Instead, many in the US appear to measure Ukrainian success in terms of its survival: suggesting they are quite willing to accept the prospect of Russia dragging the conflict out to the point of exhaustion, but unwilling to entertain the idea of Russia being defeated.
Biden’s administration asked Congress for $24 billion in additional funding for Ukraine in August and has relented on Ukraine’s use of F16 fighter jets.
Yet, as a recent research visit to the US revealed, resolve within some (though not all) areas of the US government is wavering. This ranges from at best, reluctance to give Ukraine what it is asking for to – at worst – contentment with the idea of territorial concessions to Russia.
In the end, it comes to the same thing.
Beyond the US
By contrast, Eastern European support for backing Ukraine to the full remains strong in both words and actions. But these front-line states’ advice is largely ignored by major aid and weaponry provider countries, despite their strong track record of correctly analysing Russian intentions.
This division was clearly displayed at July’s NATO summit in Vilnius, where Germany and the US prevented a statement that clearly articulated a clear path to Ukrainian membership while Poland and the Baltic states favoured a concrete commitment.
Even in the UK, acknowledged by President Zelenskyy as the de facto leader of weapons support for Ukraine, some serious and no doubt well-intentioned voices are telling us that now is not the time to negotiate – but it is time to start preparing for negotiations.
However, there is no discernible deeper thought as to precisely what this might entail, while Russia has not offered any indication that it is prepared to concede anything at all. In fact, Putin’s opening position would likely be that Ukraine ought to concede more territory, based on the ‘legality’ of Russia’s annexation of new regions.
Not the time for talk
The urge to find an end to the conflict is understandable, ostensibly reasonable and often well-intentioned. But no part of Russia’s argument contains reasonable grounds for compromise.
