Former Russian deputy defence minister Pavel Popov was detained by a military court on fraud charges on 29 August. This marks the latest in a series of moves by Russian law enforcement against high-ranking defence officials.
The senior leadership of the Russian Ministry of Defence has been in a fever since April 2024, when the decision was made to remove Sergei Shoigu as minister. 10 people have lost their posts, with eight of them having been arrested.
The officials targeted are accused of illegal activities relating to conducting ministry business for personal purposes or for receiving bribes as part of the defence contracting process.
One factor linking at least three of the cases relates to the construction of Patriot Park, including the main cathedral of the Russian Armed Forces. The park was built in a hurry – and so the Kremlin initially turned a blind eye to illegal activity, prioritizing completing construction swiftly. Now that the building is finished, there is time to carry out investigations. One of those arrested is Vyacheslav Akhmedov, the park’s director.
These are the types of charges that could be levelled against any high-ranking military official involved with business, so the singling out of individuals must be for reasons beyond their alleged guilt for these specific crimes.
What are the aims of the purge?
First, Putin is dissatisfied with how the defence ministry has performed during the war on Ukraine. This requires punishment.
Second, rather than simply replacing Shoigu at the very top, there is clearly an ongoing effort to replace his entire team.
The purge began with former deputy minister Timur Ivanov and has ended – for now at least – with former deputy minister Popov. Both worked with Shoigu before his appointment as minister of defence, the former since 2012 and the latter since 1996.
Third, the removal and arrest of senior defence officials is meant to help blow off steam among both citizens and the military following battlefield frustrations and failures in Russia’s war on Ukraine. The purge is therefore a form of populism, with arrested officials serving as scapegoats.
And fourth, the purge is meant to instil fear and maintain relative efficiency in a system without genuine impartial enforcers of the rules (e.g., courts) and lacking the oversight provided by real public political competition.
Keeping corporations in line
As a general approach, there is nothing really new here. The Kremlin has a track record of keeping groups – or ‘corporations’ – under control by replacing their leader and senior members.
This has been the case particularly following Vladimir Putin’s return to the presidency in 2012 – and especially after the annexation of Crimea, when Putin’s dependence on the elites sharply decreased, and their dependence on him increased.
Such disciplining of corporations is particularly evident in those relating to issues of defence and security, since they are most important to the Kremlin for maintaining power.
For example, Anatoly Serdyukov was replaced as minister of defence in 2012 by Shoigu; Evgeny Murov was replaced as head of the Federal Protective Service (FSO) by Dmitry Kochnev in 2016; and Yury Chaika was replaced by Igor Krasnov as prosecutor general in 2020.
The main purpose is to ensure that the corporations serve the interests of the Kremlin and do not turn into the personal enterprises of their bosses.
The appointment of Andrey Belousov means that the Kremlin has a new minister of defence without his own team – and is therefore more controllable and unable to shape the corporation as his own fiefdom.
Shoigu himself, however, is not likely to be arrested. He is in a golden cage: he occupies a high-status position as secretary of the Security Council but does not have the opportunity to recruit people from his former team or exert much influence.
Shoigu fell out of favour with the Kremlin, but that is not enough to arrest him; dispersing his team neutralizes him sufficiently.
Who is coordinating this purge?
Ultimately, Putin – but he is not the only one.
Within the presidential administration, three people are responsible for personnel decisions: Dmitry Mironov, Anton Vaino, and Maxim Travnikov. When we talk about the Kremlin helping to coordinate this purge, these are the individuals involved.
The FSB is also involved. The Ministry of Defence wants the Federal Security Service to bear some of the responsibility for military setbacks in Ukraine. But, naturally, the FSB does not want to share the blame. The Service routinely collects kompromat on military generals in case pressure needs to be applied, and it looks like such material has been used in this purge to push back against the ministry.
There is also fierce competition within the ministry for positions and resources. The weakening of Shoigu’s team has likely been compounded by this competition.