The three key priorities new NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte must get right

Focusing on three fundamental priorities to help safeguard European security will put NATO in a better position to tackle the many other challenges it faces.

Expert comment Updated 2 October 2024 4 minute READ

Armida van Rij

Senior Research Fellow, Europe Programme

When Mark Rutte takes over from Jens Stoltenberg as NATO secretary-general on 1 October, he will have big shoes to fill. Taking office in 2014, Stoltenberg led NATO during a turbulent time and stewarded the alliance through many challenges. He also oversaw NATO expansion as four countries joined during his tenure, and helped the alliance redefine its purpose in the face of a resurgent threat from Russia, as evidenced through its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022.

When Mark Rutte takes over from Jens Stoltenberg, he will have big shoes to fill.

Stoltenberg now passes the baton to former Dutch prime minister Rutte. Nicknamed ‘Teflon Mark’ because of his ability to shake off any political crisis, he is broadly seen as a consensus builder and coalition maker, having governed with broad ranges of political parties as prime minister.

As NATO secretary-general, Rutte will face a different set of challenges. Externally, there is a revisionist Russia and an assertive China. Internally, there are challenges to democracy within the alliance and depleted military supplies. The alliance has just undergone a period of transformation and developed new regional plans through a new force model, which still need to be adequately resourced.

In his new role, Rutte will have three key priorities to help safeguard European security.

Maintain US and increase European support for Ukraine

Rutte takes office just over 2,5 years after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine began – and there are few good scenarios for an end to the war. There are no guarantees Putin would uphold his end of any kind of negotiated peace deal. In the – currently unlikely – event of a Ukrainian victory, Putin would continue to harass not only Ukraine but also other countries in its immediate neighbourhood, with Moldova especially at risk. He would also likely directly test the territorial integrity of NATO states like the Baltics.

The cost of a Russian victory to Europe would be inconceivable. There would be direct security threats to NATO’s eastern flank. There would also be huge numbers of refugees fleeing Ukraine, a country of 38 million, to seek refuge across Europe – at a time of rising anti-immigrant sentiment in many European countries.

This means Rutte must find ways to up military support for Ukraine. The US challenge in this regard is two-fold. First is the risk of a second Trump presidency and the possibility that Trump will try to force Ukraine to capitulate to Russia. 

Trump would also not be as isolated in Europe as he was in 2016. He would find friends in the governments of Hungary, Italy and the Netherlands, among others, who are also sceptical of support for Ukraine – and close to Russia in Hungary’s case – making the challenge all the greater for Rutte.

The second is a Harris presidency and a White House that wants to continue support for Ukraine but is, yet again, unable to pass aid packages through a divided Congress. In either scenario, voices calling for the war to end may become louder – indeed they are gaining traction in some European policy circles too.

Some initiatives have tried to blunt the impact of the US election outcome. The creation of the NATO Security Assistance and Training to Ukraine (NSATU), which coordinates weapon deliveries, training programmes and the future development of Ukrainian armed forces, put a US-led initiative under NATO control, thereby helping to face off any potential challenges from a Trump White House.

As secretary-general, Rutte will also chair and set the agenda for the North Atlantic Council meetings, another avenue to exert pressure on European allies to maintain and increase support. This leads us to the second challenge.

Keep the US engaged in Europe, while Europe learns to fend for itself – fast

Regardless of who wins the US election, neither candidate have transatlanticism in their DNA in the way Joe Biden does. While clearly the prospects for US engagement in Europe are better under Harris than Trump, there is a bipartisan focus on China which could see US resources diverted away from Europe in the medium to long term.

In the event of a Trump presidency, in the short term Rutte will have to navigate the return of an ‘America First’ foreign policy. Depending on which foreign policy camp within the Republican party wins Trump’s favour, Rutte could either be dealing with a US that focuses fully on China or one that disengages from NATO and transatlantic security altogether.

In the event of a Harris presidency, the prospects are better for Europe. But nonetheless, Europe must learn to stand on its own two feet. Rutte will need to carefully balance supporting continued US engagement with Europe, while pushing NATO allies to increase their defence spending.

Rutte’s experience as prime minister means he understands the trade-offs involved in decisions about public finances. He also understands the dynamics at play at the European Council. Rather than focus on the potential duplication of NATO structures, as Stoltenberg did in his final public speech, Rutte should encourage the development of a European defence industrial base to help ensure European NATO allies are able to fend for themselves.

Implement the new force model

Ensuring European NATO allies can defend Europe is one of the biggest policy challenges for Rutte.  

In 2020, NATO allies agreed a new framework called the Concept for the Defence and Deterrence of the Euro-Atlantic Area. This paved the way for the adoption of a new NATO Force Model at the 2022 Madrid summit and subsequent agreements on new regional plans at 2023 Vilnius summit.

Rutte’s experience as prime minister means he understands the trade-offs involved in decisions about public finances. 

Ultimately, these plans underpin NATO’s credibility when it comes to defence and deterring adversaries from engaging in its area of operations. But without adequate staffing and resources, which remains a challenge, this credibility can be questioned and allies put at risk. Major gaps include the air defence of the eastern flank where estimates suggest NATO only has 5 per cent of required air defences. The NATO defence planning process – whereby allies are set capability targets stemming from the regional plans – is ongoing but not likely to conclude until autumn 2025.

Part of this is about defence spending. 23 of the 32 NATO members currently spend the target 2 per cent of GDP on defence but it has become clear this is not sufficient. To meet NATO capability requirements, laggards need to catch up and those already at 2 per cent need to increase defence spending even further – a politically sensitive decision in countries such as Germany and the UK where public finances have been squeezed.

To complicate matters further, the Achilles heel in European security continues to be EU-NATO cooperation. As the EU increasingly pushes into defence, and NATO moves into areas of resilience and civil defence where the EU has traditionally had more expertise, the need for better cooperation is clear. 

Stoltenberg’s final speech made clear how he feels about EU defence initiatives – but neither Rutte nor Europe can afford to share this view.

EU funding mechanisms, such as the European Defence Fund (EDF), could be used to close NATO capability gaps among EU member states – something which is in the interest of both NATO and the EU. Stoltenberg’s final speech made clear how he feels about EU defence initiatives – but neither Rutte nor Europe can afford to share this view.

Of course, Rutte will have to deal with NATO’s other challenges too, including an assertive China and increased Russian greyzone warfare. But getting these three fundamental priorities right will put NATO in a better position to tackle them.