What are you looking for from the NATO summit in The Hague?
NATO is crucial for European security. We in Europe became lazy over recent decades regarding defence – we thought we didn’t need to invest or make much effort and that the United States would defend us. That was wrong. NATO must show that the West is strong enough to defend member states and prevent aggressive authoritarian regimes from destroying the global order. It’s not just about the implementation of NATO spending requirements, it’s about showing the strength of western democracy.
So, we hope NATO will agree on a new defence spending target of 3.5 per cent of GDP for member states. This is based on a crucial job NATO is concluding – new capability targets for all member states. This determines what capabilities each ally needs to defend the entire NATO community, and that really demands additional investment. Clear capability targets and agreement to spend much more to implement those targets are exactly what NATO needs.
How can EU–NATO cooperation be improved under European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte?
We have very practical, pragmatic relations with NATO. I’ve had several good conversations with Mark Rutte. Since I was confirmed as Europe’s first Commissioner for Defence last year, I’ve been clear that we’re not competing with NATO. We bring added value to what NATO and member states are responsible for. NATO defines defence plans and capability targets; we, with our industrial policy and EU instruments, assist member states and European industry to produce what’s needed to implement those capability targets.
The fact that I’m the first Commissioner for Defence shows a clear understanding of the threats Europe faces. One is short term and urgent – intelligence services predict Russia may be ready to test Article 5, NATO’s mutual defence pledge, in the next three to five years. Our most important task is being ready to defend ourselves in this short term.
The longer-term challenge is understanding that our transatlantic partners will shift more resources to the Indo-Pacific region in response to China’s rising power, diminishing their European presence. With the SAFE [Security Action for Europe] regulation passed last month and regulation that allows EU member states to borrow more for defence, we expect around €800 billion will be spent on defence over the next four years. Defence investment on such a scale, with the potential to assist national industries and job creation, is something totally new for Europe.
What is the most important capability Europe gains from the EU–UK Defence Pact announced last month?
The pact is similar to agreements we have with Japan and South Korea and are in talks with other countries about. It opens doors for the British defence industry to be part of the €150 billion SAFE loans facility. Procurement from British defence contractors will be considered as procurement from European industry. Knowing the strengths of the British defence industry, this cooperation will be useful for both the EU and Britain.
Ukrainian soldiers from a drone unit prepare to mine the grey zone between the Ukrainian front and Russian lines. Ukraine’s ‘remarkable ecosystem’ of drone manufacturing has been a crucial part of the war effort, says Kubilius. Photo: Jose Colon/Anadolu via Getty Images.
What lessons are there from Ukraine’s defence procurement innovations?
Integration of the Ukrainian and European defence industries is crucial. We opened a Defence Innovation Office in Kyiv to assist and learn from the Ukrainians. Sometimes I say, quite seriously, that it’s not clear who should integrate with whom. Recently, I went to Kyiv and visited all the drone manufacturers to see the remarkable ecosystem they have created. Learning to produce drones isn’t difficult, it’s the ability to modernize them. The Ukrainians know immediately why some fail – because Russians are successfully jamming, for instance – and what needs changing. Teams of engineers, digital systems experts and operators work together, allowing quick innovation to maintain drone capabilities.
On the 1,200km front line, they have created what they call ‘Death Valley’, a 10 to 15km-wide zone where nothing can move without being hit by drones. Around 80 per cent of hits are by drones – a regular tank entering the zone survives an average of six minutes. But the Russians know how to use drones too, which is why Ukraine calculates that it will be producing four million drones this year to cover that front line.
I started to calculate what EU or NATO states would need for what I call ‘Day X’, the day Russia attacks. Lithuania, my country, has a 200km border with Kaliningrad and a 700km border with Belarus – we would need around 3 million drones a year. But I also learned from the Ukrainians that drones need updating every few months.
How does that work with a defence industry that operates on long-term contracts and predictability?
It’s a challenge we’re discussing with NATO – what new warfare means and how capability targets should be modified. When Ukrainians advised what countries like Lithuania or Finland should do, they said: create teams of engineers, constructors, digital system experts and operators who can work together; keep stockpiles of drone components, but don’t produce drones in advance because you don’t know what kind will be needed.
I saw another surprising part of this Ukrainian ecosystem on my recent visit: a bonus system for drone operators, based on targets hit. Destroying expensive Russian systems brings 200 points compared with 6 points for hitting a soldier. Operators compete for pride, and the winners get the best available drones. This isn’t only about drones, they aren’t the only weapon we will need; it’s about doing defence in a way that’s really different from traditional warfare. It’s impressive.
Given their financial restraints, how can the EU incentivize countries like Italy and France to invest more in defence?
It’s difficult to predict how extensively member states will use SAFE loans. Some are quite ambitious – around 14 requested the ‘escape clause’ allowing an additional 1.5 per cent of GDP spending on defence without being included in deficit calculations. We understand from conversations with defence businesses that they’re anticipating a lot of money coming their way – I say that because that also encourages economic development, which is a further argument for member states to spend on defence.
The European Council asked us to look into additional financial mechanisms if necessary. But we don’t want to give the impression to member states that something better is coming down the line because they will hold on for that instead of focusing on what’s being proposed. During the pandemic, the Commission borrowed €850 billion which it distributed as grants. But around 20 per cent of the multiannual financial framework, the EU’s next long-term budget, will need to be spent repaying that pandemic debt, meaning some EU programmes will be cut. Whether it’s loans or grants, if we take on more debt for defence, someone pays – either national budgets or reduced EU programmes.
Some states are turning to South Korea to get weapons fast. How do you balance growing Europe’s defence industry base against the need for rapid procurement?
If Europe is really preparing for war, I think it needs the following four resources: stockpiles of weaponry; trained military personnel; infrastructure to be able to move troops to where they are needed; and a developed defence industry to maintain, repair and produce new equipment. Some defence ministers I speak to haven’t given much thought to this last point.
I read recently about an American military exercise which considered how 15 heavy brigades, with tanks and artillery, would manage in a war like the one in Ukraine. It calculated that only two brigades would remain fully equipped after 10 months due to losses exceeding production capacity.