Why the US–India relationship needs a healthy dose of realism

While the US–India relationship will continue to deepen whoever wins the US election, the two countries must become more realistic about its limits.

Expert comment Published 8 October 2024 4 minute READ

Policymakers in New Delhi are likely to be among the least worried about the outcome of the US presidential election in November. There is a high degree of bipartisan consensus in Washington on deepening relations with India and viewing it as a long-term strategic partner – arguably as much consensus as there is on viewing China as a long-term strategic rival. 

The US–India relationship has gone from strength to strength over the last three decades with increased cooperation in strategically important sectors, from defence to technology, and a range of bilateral and multilateral initiatives. During Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s visit to the US last month, President Joe Biden referred to the relationship as ‘stronger, closer and more dynamic than any time in history.’

While US–India ties will continue to deepen, the overly optimistic view of the relationship needs to be toned down in favour of a more realistic approach.

With the US presidential election fast approaching, there are some differences in the two candidates’ approaches towards India. Donald Trump would likely pursue a more transactional approach with greater scrutiny of the trade imbalance and (legal and illegal) migration. He recently referred to India as an ‘abuser’ of the global trade regime, while also praising Modi. 

A Kamala Harris presidency would likely have a high degree of continuity with the Biden administration, with a more value-oriented foreign policy. While this may result in more scrutiny of areas such as human rights and the state of Indian democracy, there will be continued support for initiatives such as the Quad.

Three pillars of engagement

Three key pillars have defined US engagement with India in the post-Cold War period: India’s status as the world’s largest democracy; India as a bulwark against the rise of China; and India’s potential as an engine of global growth.

Pillar 1: India as the world’s largest democracy

There is a strong value-based component to US engagement with India. Unlike the West’s relations with other countries, such as Vietnam or Saudi Arabia, which are more transactional and rooted in shared interests, there is a perception that relations with India are rooted in shared values. Central to this is an established narrative of affinities between ‘the world’s oldest democracy’ and ‘the world’s largest democracy.’ Their common democratic heritage is also the basis for claims that India and the US are ‘natural allies’.

But despite the rhetoric, their views on democracy differ. New Delhi rarely employs democracy promotion as a foreign policy tool, meaning it often appears out of sync with the US. 

While India is certainly not the only democratic state to place pragmatism above principle, its position on non-democratic and weak democratic regimes is often more aligned with China than the US. This became evident following Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina’s recent removal from power in Bangladesh, which raised concerns in New Delhi but was lauded in Western capitals. 

There have also been concerns about the state and trajectory of India’s own democracy, although its 2024 parliamentary elections have reaffirmed India’s democratic credentials to a degree. 

Pillar 2: India as a bulwark against China

Deepening US–India relations have also coincided with a deterioration in Beijing’s relations with New Delhi and Washington. India has become less apprehensive about participating in US-led bilateral and Western multilateral initiatives, where it would have previously worried about offending China. There has also been deepening US–India defence cooperation and a more collaborative approach to regional security and global governance, and both countries have voiced concerns about China’s behaviour. For instance, India has become more willing to call out China’s actions in the South China Sea and the Taiwan Strait.

However, there are limits on the extent to which India would side with the US in a potential disagreement or conflict with China. This is rooted in India’s longstanding commitment to strategic autonomy in its foreign policy, which involves engaging all major poles of influence in the international system. 

This means that while India will align itself closer to the US, it will remain well short of an alliance due to New Delhi’s strategic constraints – including its economic reliance on China and military reliance on Russia. This introduces a degree of ambiguity over what role India would play in a potential US–China conflict over Taiwan for example.

Pillar 3: India as an engine of global growth

India is seen as a potential beneficiary of the push to decouple or de-risk supply chains away from China, particularly in areas with critical and emerging technologies. Amid growing emphasis on friendshoring supply chains by working with ‘likeminded countries’ and ‘trusted geographies,’ the US sees India’s democracy as a better option than China’s one-party state.

This is underpinned by India’s economic potential. It has emerged as the world’s fastest growing major economy, surpassed China as the world’s most populous country and is on course to become the world’s third largest economy by the end of this decade. It also has a strong digital ecosystem and an IT-educated workforce.

Despite the hype, India is unlikely to catch up to (or replace) China in terms of the size of its economy or centrality to global supply chains anytime soon.

However, despite the Modi government’s pledge to transform India into a ‘trusted global manufacturing hub’, manufacturing as a share of GDP has stalled at about 17 per cent. At the root of this are structural challenges that continue to plague the Indian economy and inhibit its ability to reach its full potential, including issues related to infrastructure, labour, and well-entrenched protectionist sentiment.

This means that, despite the hype, India is unlikely to catch up to (or replace) China in terms of the size of its economy or centrality to global supply chains anytime soon.

Future trajectory and potential fault lines

Latent risks to the US–India relationship are exacerbated by India’s pursuit of a more assertive and muscular foreign policy. This is not a problem in itself, especially as India seeks recognition of its status as a responsible global power. During India’s G20 presidency, it sought to offer so-called Indian solutions to global issues, such as climate change and global health.

However, its pursuit of a more assertive foreign policy could become problematic should India start seeking exemptions from global norms and rules because of its self-perceived special status as a ‘civilizational state’.

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Evidence of this include allegations of Indian complicity in recent assassination plots in the US and Canada, which demonstrate India’s growing proclivity to retaliate to actions that challenge its sovereignty or status. Indian foreign policy elites have challenged this criticism on the grounds of hypocrisy, noting that the US is itself increasingly abandoning the global order it helped establish.

There are challenges on the horizon arising from a mismatch of expectations and misperceptions about each other.

Whoever wins the US election, US–India relations will continue to deepen for the foreseeable future. However, there are challenges on the horizon arising from a mismatch of expectations and misperceptions about each other. India remains committed to strategic autonomy in its foreign policy and solidarity with the Global South, while the US remains committed to alliances and the liberal international order.

Ultimately, there is a need for greater realism in the US–India relationship. Recognizing areas of convergence and more openly acknowledging the limits of engagement will help avoid misperception, misunderstanding and a potential escalation of future tensions.