Russia has lost prestige after the fall of Assad. It has also been freed of a difficult partner

Events in Syria have undermined Moscow’s claims to be a reliable security guarantor. But Russia’s position in the country remains secondary to the war in Ukraine.

Expert comment Published 13 December 2024 4 minute READ

Nikolay Kozhanov

Consulting Fellow, Russia and Eurasia Programme

The fall of the Assad regime has damaged Russian interests far beyond Syria. First, the collapse is a serious blow to Russia’s reputation as a reliable ally capable of guaranteeing the survival of its partners. 

Since its military intervention in 2015, Moscow’s propaganda machine has been positioning Russia as a guarantor of stability and protector of (usually dictatorial) regimes from external pressure and internal threats. This propaganda has always drawn parallels between Assad and the fates of American allies, primarily Hosni Mubarak – trying to set the Kremlin off against ‘unreliable Americans’. 

The loss of Assad will undermine the confidence of potential allies in Russian guarantees. At least, it will be difficult for Moscow to claim that ‘we leave none behind’. 

The Khmeimim airbase was an important element of Russia’s global logistics operation, facilitating the transfer of forces to Africa.

Russia has also lost its investments – and not just the millions of dollars in loans provided to the Assad regime. Military and diplomatic efforts to preserve Assad were simply wasted, and will not bring dividends. The total has yet to be calculated. 

However, there is another wasted resource that has no price: the lives of Russian soldiers and Wagner mercenaries. In a free and more politically active society than Russia, Putin would be asked: ‘what did their sacrifice accomplish?’ Yet, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has provided Putin with cover, overshadowing the Syrian adventures of the Russian military. 

The Russian military presence in Syria has long been a symbol of Moscow’s political weight in Middle Eastern affairs. Moreover, it was Russia’s military presence in Syria that largely gave rise to its current alliance with Iran. 

With the fall of Assad, Moscow has lost this leverage. But it has also been clearly shown that it is too early (or perhaps too late) for Russia to position itself as a world power. 

Despite statements by some Russian experts, the US, Trump, or Biden are not to blame for Russia’s losses in Syria. Its losses were determined by the actions of regional players – Turkey and Israel – as well as the serious weakening of Iran.

Finally, Moscow’s African ambitions have also been called into question. The Khmeimim airbase was an important element of Russia’s global logistics operation, facilitating the transfer of forces and heavy weapons to Africa. Now, Russia will urgently need to restructure its support routes. That is possible, but it will require money, time, and effort.

Don’t overestimate the losses

However, Russia’s losses are not catastrophic. The country’s war economy, created by Assad, was a toxic environment where even Russian and Iranian businessmen struggled to operate. Assad’s stubbornness, his refusal to compromise with the opposition and his neighbours, and the never-ending balancing act between Moscow and Tehran made him a difficult partner. 

Assad himself saw no reason to accommodate Russian calls for change. He was mired in domestic political games, destroying or weakening the positions of those who fought on his side at the beginning of the civil war. 

For the Russians this meant a choice: to repeat the fate of the USSR in Afghanistan and take full financial, economic and military responsibility for Assad’s Syria…or to step back. 

By 2024, the Syrian economy, supported by the illegal drug trade and corruption schemes, showed signs of impending collapse. Despair among the population and demotivation in army units reached a maximum, turning the regime into a ‘hollow’ state. All this was in stark contrast to the opposition enclaves supported by Turkey, creating the possibility of an alternative to Assad’s regime. 

For the Russians this meant a choice: to repeat the fate of the USSR in Afghanistan and take full financial, economic and military responsibility for Assad’s Syria, fully financing its economy and fighting for the Syrian army – or to step back. Given Putin’s ‘main’ war in Ukraine, the first option was unrealistic. 

The fall of Damascus, though an undoubted blow to Russian ambitions in the region, has enabled the Kremlin to get out of a protracted conflict it didn’t need.

Russia can stay  

The change of power in Syria could have been worse for Moscow. The opposition forces have shown a willingness to negotiate with the outside world, and left state mechanisms intact. That is important for Russia: Moscow usually prefers dealing with state institutions rather than with non-government actors. 

The image of Russians in the eyes of the Syrian population is not always as negative as that of Iran or Assad’s people. 

In general, there still may be a place for Russia in post-Assad Syria (although Moscow’s chances of preserving control over the Khmeimim and Tartus military bases are extremely low). The image of Russians in the eyes of the Syrian population is not always as negative as that of Iran or Assad’s people. 

Moscow’s forces also constituted a shield between the Iranians and the regime, on the one hand, and the regions that signed ceasefire agreements with Damascus on the other. Russia maintained channels of communication with Syrian opposition forces and even periodically tried to find a replacement for Assad. 

Syria’s opposition forces well understand that the country’s future is uncertain. They want Russia, if not as a friend, then a neutral party. 

It is even possible that some agreements between Russia and the opposition were concluded on the eve of or during the march on Damascus. The Russian embassy in Damascus acted calmly to unfolding events, while Moscow established diplomatic relations with the opposition with notable speed. And the opposition agreed not to touch – for now – the Russian bases in Khmeimim and Tartus.

Lessons learned

After Assad’s fall, Russia will likely adopt a ‘wait and see’ strategy, trying to understand how a new order will emerge in Syria. Moscow’s main goal will be to maintain at least a minimal level of influence through a military presence, for example, at its existing bases, or through contacts with other regional players, such as Turkey. 

At the same time, Moscow will seek to minimize costs and reorient itself to more promising areas in the Middle East, such as the Arab monarchies of the Persian Gulf. Syria will remain important, but will no longer be a priority element of Russian strategy in the region.

The situation in Syria may, however, have a critical impact on Ukraine. One of the conclusions Kremlin strategists may draw is that Assad’s fall was the result of making too many concessions to opponents, allowing the civil war to become a protracted frozen conflict, and failing to take back enclaves under enemy control. 

In Ukraine, this could manifest itself in a rejection of ceasefires or negotiations. Russia will likely take a harder line, believing that only force and imposing its own conditions can ensure positive long-term results.