The dramatic collapse of Bashar al-Assad’s regime following an offensive led by Abu Mohammed al-Jawlani’s Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) forces has presented Syria with a pivotal opportunity for change. Although the political transition must be Syrian-led and Syrian-owned, the international community – meaning here the US, EU, Turkey, Jordan and Gulf Arab states – must step up and offer support as Syria passes through a new challenging phase.
There is neither time nor space for handwringing or standing back and watching events unfold – crowing from the sidelines helps nobody. Too many lives have been lost, and too many Syrians have become displaced or refugees because of indifference.
What happens next will not only determine Syria’s future but will affect the Middle East region and have repercussions on the emerging world order. The US, EU, Turkey and Gulf Arab states must engage immediately with the emerging transitional government and help ensure that it represents a coalition of all Syrian parties and groups.
That will mean dealing with the proscribed group HTS. This will prove challenging at the outset, but failure to recognize the group’s role in the overthrow of Assad and its popularity among a segment of Syrian society will only alienate and radicalize its leadership and supporters.
Giving groups such as HTS the benefit of the doubt carries a high risk. But so does pretending that HTS does not exist and challenging its status as a legitimate actor. For the past four years, HTS has governed a significant part of Idlib province, established governing civilian institutions and distanced itself from its former association with al-Qaeda.
As such, HTS has a demonstrable track record of inclusive governance it can point to, and it has earned a degree of trust from some segments of the Syrian population. This cannot be ignored. Ultimately, the decision whether to work with HTS or not rests with the Syrian population and not with external powers.
One way of ensuring that HTS stays on track and that the transitional government is inclusive of all parties and groups – including Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), Southern Command, Free Syrian Army (FSA) and Syrian National Forces (SNF) among others – is for the international community to stay in lockstep in its support of the new governing structure.
This support can be made conditional on the interim government fulfilling its agreed objectives and goals. But there is no place for meddling or spoiling now that the chief spoilers Russia and Iran are in retreat.
It is in the collective interests of the US, EU, Turkey, Jordan and Gulf Arab states for Syria to become a success story. Washington and Brussels can atone for past wrongdoings and shore up stability – without the need to back a military strongman. Turkey can border a stable neighbour with an inclusive central government that keeps in check Kurdish ambitions. Jordan and the Gulf Arab states can work towards supporting Syria to establish the conditions necessary for refugee return, contributing to a more stable neighbourhood (Palestine and Yemen notwithstanding) and, therefore, work towards achieving their national visions.
However, this all requires one shared vision for Syria – determined by Syria – and the members of the international community to back it.
It is important to avoid repeating painful mistakes and lessons learned from earlier experiences in Iraq, Libya, Egypt, Tunisia, Yemen, Afghanistan and elsewhere. The most important one being that the process should be led by Syrians and supported by the international community and not the other way around.
In fact, Syrians both inside and outside the country have been preparing for this moment for almost a decade either by governing at the local level or developing extensive plans to revive the economy and reconstruct the country. Syrians outside the country have made a tremendous contribution to host countries and are well equipped to return and rebuild Syria. As such, there is a wealth of knowledge, expertise, experience and a highly motivated population to make the political transition and reconstruction work.
Although most Gulf Arab states would not have wished for an HTS-led interim government in Syria (except perhaps for Qatar) they now have a real chance to normalize relations fully with the new Syria. Over the past few years, Assad had taken normalization from the Gulf Arab states with one hand but offered them nothing with the other. There is now a golden opportunity for the Gulf states to shore up the political transition, disrupt Syria’s captagon trade and invest wisely in Syria’s major reconstruction programme.
Neither having an Islamist-leaning nor a democratically elected government in Damascus is ideal for the Gulf monarchies, as is a state that enjoys the collective support of the international community and can offer investment opportunities in a stable country. Good relations with the Gulf states can also ensure that Syria returns irrevocably to the Arab fold.