On the first day of the Gaza ceasefire deal, as millions of Israelis held their breath waiting anxiously for the release of hostages, intense political calculations were already underway in the prime minister’s office. That very morning, far-right minister Itamar Ben-Gvir retired from Israel’s governing coalition in protest at the deal. Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich warned he could follow suit if the Israeli government proceeds to the deal’s second phase.
The situation is the result of an ironic twist that few could have predicted: US President Donald Trump has emerged as a forceful advocate for peace in Gaza. Through his emissary Steve Witkoff, Trump pushed Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu hard to accept the current deal.
This stance has created an almost surreal political situation where pro-Netanyahu media outlets, particularly Channel 14, have begun expressing nostalgia for Joe Biden’s presidency, perceiving Trump’s assertive approach as a potential threat to Netanyahu’s political survival.
A clash of strategies
Trump’s motivations are clear and decidedly pragmatic. His vision for the Middle East centres on two major strategic goals: securing a comprehensive deal with Saudi Arabia (based on the Abraham Accords) and establishing a Qatari gas route through Syria to Europe.
The Saudi deal would include a normalization agreement between Saudi Arabia and Israel, as well as a defence pact between Riyadh and Washington that could inject significant funds into the US economy. Saudi Arabia has already pledged to invest $600 billion in the US over four years, and is an important customer for US-made weapons.
The Qatari gas project could provide an alternative energy source for Europe and create new economic opportunities to help bind the Gulf and Levant together.
Both objectives represent the kind of grand economic achievements Trump hopes to showcase in his new administration – but they require regional stability and cannot materialize while Gaza remains a war zone.
This creates a direct conflict with Netanyahu’s domestic political strategy. Since the beginning of the war his main focus was the survival of his right-wing coalition in order to avoid early elections.
His promise of ‘total victory’ to the Israeli public allows him to wage war in Gaza indefinitely, since the government vehemently objects to any political solution – specifically the return of the Palestinian Authority (PA) – in the territory. Thus, Hamas has remained in control of Gaza, granting Netanyahu justification to continue the war.
Public opinion polls in Israel consistently show overwhelming support for the ceasefire deal, with an astonishing 72 per cent of Israelis in favour. 69 per cent of Israel’s public also wants parliamentary elections ‘the day after the war ends’ – a prospect that Netanyahu fears. His party, and most importantly his coalition, have performed poorly in polls since 7 October.
This reality helps explain why Netanyahu has been reluctant to define what conditions would bring an end to the war. While he attempts to frame the debate around security concerns – particularly regarding the Philadelphi Corridor (the border between Gaza and Egypt) and troop deployments – the core issue seems to be fundamentally political. The departure of Ben-Gvir has weakened his coalition, and Smotrich’s potential exit would effectively end his government, likely leading to elections.
The situation is complicated by the fact that Netanyahu remains the only senior Israeli figure who hasn’t taken responsibility for the security failures that preceded 7 October. The recent resignation of IDF Chief of Staff Herzi ha-Levi, who assumed responsibility for the military’s failures, has highlighted the conspicuous absence of accountability from Netanyahu.
Playing for time
Trump’s desire for peace and stability to achieve his regional objectives therefore leaves Netanyahu in an increasingly difficult position: he needs continued tension to justify his coalition’s existence and delay elections.
He must now either risk his coalition by proceeding with phase two of the deal – and thereby face the judgement of Israel’s voters; or he must refuse to advance to phase two and defy Trump’s wishes – risking US support to Israel in a critical time.
Looking ahead, Netanyahu may hope that, rather than pick between these extremes, he can find some third way. That could mean attempting to negotiate a middle ground by dragging out the implementation of phase one and creating new security-related obstacles.
But, while that might buy time, it will only postpone the inevitable decision – either to proceed with phase two of the deal and satisfy Trump, or frustrate the process in favour of maintaining his coalition.