The false economy of DOGE

Criticism of US government inefficiency is justified. But rapid cuts made by the Department of Government Efficiency threaten US resilience and competitiveness. 

Expert comment Published 2 April 2025 4 minute READ

Since US President Donald Trump launched the Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE), it has been a lightning rod for controversy. 

Under the guidance of Elon Musk, DOGE has moved systematically through agencies to remove civil servants and cancel programmes under the mantle of rooting out waste, fraud, and abuse, promising to cut $1 trillion in spending. The agency’s first significant operation, to make steep cuts at USAID, has been criticized as undermining the US’s international position and is still disputed in the courts. 

There are legitimate grounds for criticism of the US government’s inefficiency. Cumbersome procurement, Kafkaesque administrative processes, and programmes that have outlived their usefulness detract from agencies’ ability to deliver on their core missions. And the ambition in President Trump’s executive order establishing DOGE, to modernize outdated technology across government, is a sensible one. 

A useful approach to improving government efficiency would prioritize programmes where government funds deliver significant economic returns. It would rely on evidence to make decisions. And crucially, it would ensure the US government remains prepared to manage catastrophic risks that neither the private sector nor individuals can adequately address.

But expansive DOGE cuts are taking place rapidly, with what even some Republicans characterize as a distinctly ideological mission. And it is far from certain that DOGE is achieving its key objective of saving taxpayer dollars. (DOGE’s $140 billion in claimed savings is riddled with errors and obfuscations, according to a New York Times analysis). 

More significantly, its approach risks costing taxpayers – and the US – far more than it saves by cutting revenue-positive functions, diminishing crisis and risk-related capacity, and underinvesting in science and research.

Undermining revenue collection

Among DOGE’s most prominent targets are agencies that return significant multiples of budget outlays to taxpayers. Cuts of 20 per cent of headcount at the IRS have led Treasury officials to predict a 10 per cent drop in tax revenues – over $500 billion – by the 15  April filing deadline. 

Shrinking revenues risk…undermining international investor confidence in the US.

With diminished enforcement capacity, fewer Americans will file or pay their fair share. Estimates of lost revenue range from hundreds of billions to over 2 trillion dollars over a decade. 

Similarly, DOGE has targeted the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau. The Bureau has returned roughly $20 billion to consumers during its 14 years existence – with a budget a fraction of that. Efforts to effectively shutter the agency, currently facing legal challenges, would undermine a demonstrably cost-effective agency, leaving taxpayers worse off and inviting fraud and abuse. 

Further, shrinking revenues risk damage to perceptions of US fiscal management that could darken an already deteriorating fiscal outlook, undermining international investor confidence in the US and putting upward pressure on borrowing costs.

Undermining risk management and crisis prevention

Beyond revenue loss, DOGE threatens to create significant fiscal exposure for the US by reducing its crisis surveillance, mitigation, and response capacity. From cybersecurity to extreme weather to infectious disease, reducing capabilities and staffing could harm national resilience and heighten vulnerability to crises. 

Particularly alarming are deep cuts to scientific and health agencies like The National Institutes of Health and Centers for Disease Control, which have lost critical research funding, and seen experts laid off. These cuts to scientific infrastructure threaten not just public health but also national security and economic stability. And costs to government could easily exceed any funds saved through DOGE’s cuts. 

A notable example of the wider costs from healthcare cuts was seen under the first Trump administration, which eliminated a programme to track novel coronaviruses. Despite upfront savings, COVID-19 subsequently necessitated $4.6 trillion in US spending on response measures. 

The cut programme would not have prevented the disease’s spread to the US, but it might have strengthened early response efforts. Speedy DOGE reductions to public health agencies – even as bird flu spreads and mutates – raise parallel concerns.  

Equally, some key USAID activity was concerned with identifying diseases at their point of origin and preventing their spread globally. Much of that early warning infrastructure has gone, exposing the US to further risk

Constraining innovation

Beyond exogenous shocks, DOGE’s cuts also threaten the dynamism and innovation that underpin US international competitiveness. Government-backed research has helped produce technological advances like the internet, GPS, and mRNA vaccines that generate trillions in economic value, boosting the nation’s economy and security while generating substantial tax revenue. 

As top scientists consider moving abroad, the US advantage may erode.

Reductions to basic and applied science funding will impede growth and competitiveness, just as China increases its research investment in an effort to overtake the US. This forgone innovation will constrain the US economy, impeding ambitions to outgrow its mounting debt problem. And, as top scientists consider moving abroad, the US advantage may erode further – with China and Europe vying to recruit talent whose work DOGE threatens. 

A test case at the Pentagon

The Department of Defense (DoD) provides a compelling litmus test for DOGE’s commitment to efficiency. With nearly 3 million personnel and a budget exceeding $800 billion, the DoD is an obvious candidate for streamlining. DOGE has an opportunity to disrupt an ossified system and address longstanding inefficiencies and vulnerabilities. 

Secretary Pete Hegseth’s support for software acquisition reform represents a promising, though limited step toward productive cuts in tandem with DOGE. But so far, the Department has faced more incremental changes to programmes and personnel compared to civilian agencies.

Article 2nd half

There could be significant benefits in continuing to reform defence procurement more broadly, address entrenched contractor relationships, and streamline administration. Doing so is arguably a crucial step in reorienting US military capabilities toward future rather than past wars. But the task requires overcoming immense inertia – and the risks of getting it wrong, to national security and the broader economy, are significant.

A Better Path Forward

DOGE, like previous administrations’ analogous efforts, taps into a common-sense desire in the electorate for a more efficient government. But its execution is falling short of its own stated goal. It is telling that, while a plurality of US voters think DOGE is a good idea, a similar share have a negative view of it. 

This gap reflects DOGE’s prioritization of cultural, ideological goals over fiscal outcomes, which energizes the administration’s base but could be a liability as the consequences of hasty cuts emerge. An evidence-based, surgical approach would better target inefficiency without sacrificing essential and value-generating functions.

Ultimately, DOGE’s shortcomings stem from its initial premise – that the path to a more efficient, responsible government lies in cutting alone. This fails to understand the fundamental gap between government and the private sector. 

Even Adam Smith recognized that markets alone cannot deliver vital public functions like national defense and public works; rather, they require enduring public investment that looks past returns and quarterly results.

A more sustainable fiscal trajectory demands a combination of responsible reforms, investing in programmes that boost growth, and ensuring adequate revenue. Ultimately, it is much easier to break than build state capacity. The consequences of DOGE’s work may prove counterproductive to its aims for decades to come – burdening taxpayers and hampering US strategic objectives.