India–Pakistan ceasefire remains shaky, with relations unlikely to return to status quo

The risk of renewed hostilities will remain in the absence of meaningful political dialogue.

Expert comment Published 13 May 2025 Updated 5 June 2025 4 minute READ

Dr Chietigj Bajpaee

Senior Research Fellow for South Asia, Asia-Pacific Programme

India and Pakistan declared a ceasefire on 10 May, bringing an end to four days of military conflict. After it was first announced by US President Donald Trump on social media, the governments in New Delhi and Islamabad confirmed the agreement, although with somewhat differing takes on how it came about.

While Trump asserted the importance of the US in brokering the ceasefire, Islamabad said several governments were involved in the process (including the United Kingdom, Turkey and Saudi Arabia). In contrast, New Delhi downplayed the role of third parties, which is in line with India’s consistent position over many decades of treating the Kashmir issue as a bilateral or internal one.

Calm before renewed storms

The situation remains precarious. Ceasefire violations have been reported. Punitive non-military actions taken by both countries, following the 22 April terror attack in Pahalgam in which 26 civilians were killed, remain in place. These include the suspension of visa services, closure of air space, a ban on bilateral trade, and closure of the Attari-Wagah border crossing. Most significantly, the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) remains in abeyance after New Delhi suspended the agreement.

In the absence of political dialogue, it is not a question of if but when hostilities resume.

The ceasefire also does not address any of the underlying grievances in the bilateral relationship. In a social media post, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio noted that both sides have agreed to ‘start talks on a broad set of issues at a neutral site’. Talks between both countries’ military personnel took place on 12 May, but it remains to be seen if this paves the way for meaningful political dialogue.

India has stated that talks can only discuss the issues of terrorism and Pakistan-administered Kashmir, while Pakistan will want to focus on the resumption of the IWT and the status of Indian-administered Kashmir. The last time both countries engaged in substantive peace talks was the Composite Dialogue process that came to a halt following the Mumbai terrorist attacks in 2008.

In the absence of political dialogue, it is not a question of if but when hostilities resume. New Delhi has stated that it will consider another attack like Pahalgam an act of war, while Islamabad has said the same with respect to any violation of the IWT. 

At the same time, the most recent tensions indicate that both countries are moving up the escalation ladder. The rules of engagement have shifted as each has adopted a more assertive military posture. 

This includes targeting civilian and military infrastructure beyond Indian and Pakistan-administered Kashmir into both countries’ heartlands. It also reflects the military platforms that were utilized during the most recent hostilities, including the heavy use of drones and the first deployment of the Indian Navy in combat operations since the 1971 war between both countries.

Both governments have denied reports that Pakistan’s Nuclear Command Authority convened during the hostilities and that the Indian Air Force struck a Pakistani nuclear storage facility. 

But such reports illustrate genuine fears of nuclear escalation. In his first speech since the ceasefire came into effect, Modi stated that India will no longer tolerate ‘nuclear blackmail’. This alludes to New Delhi’s claim that Islamabad relies on non-state (terrorist) actors to attack India, in the belief that Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal will deter India from retaliating.

International role

The agreement reaffirmed the United States’ role as mediator, albeit seemingly a reluctant one, as reflected in statements by several Trump administration officials. This includes Vice President JD Vance, who noted that hostilities between India and Pakistan were ‘fundamentally none of our business’, and Trump’s comments that both countries would figure it out ‘one way or the other’. Marco Rubio had several conversations with senior Indian and Pakistani officials over the last few weeks aimed at de-escalating tensions.

Ultimately, the Trump administration’s actions echoed the role played by previous US administrations.

Despite these early attempts to distance the US from events, ultimately, the Trump administration’s actions echoed the role played by previous US administrations. 

For example, the Clinton administration helped to bring an end to hostilities following the last major conflict between both countries in Kargil in 1999. Trump’s claim that he stopped a nuclear conflict reflects a desire to be seen as a global peacemaker, in line with US actions in other ongoing flashpoints in Gaza and Ukraine.

It also demonstrates the economic leverage that the US holds over both countries: India is in the process of negotiating a bilateral trade agreement with the US to avoid tariffs of 26 per cent that Washington announced as part of its reciprocal tariff policy (which has dropped to the 10 per cent baseline for 90 days). 

Meanwhile, Pakistan is in the midst of its 25th IMF bailout. The IMF approved the next tranche of the country’s $7 billion extended fund facility the day before the ceasefire agreement was announced. The country was removed from the Financial Action Task Force ‘Grey List’ in 2022 after being placed on the list in 2018, and Islamabad is eager to avoid facing renewed economic sanctions.

Pressure points

Both countries are projecting their actions as a win. A propaganda war played out alongside the military conflict, with both countries downplaying their losses and exaggerating their successes. 

Modi’s speech said more than 100 terrorists had been killed in India’s military operations and that they struck ‘universities of global terrorism’ – claims which Pakistan denied. For its part, Pakistan claims to have shot down several Indian military aircraft, which has yet to be acknowledged by New Delhi.

Both countries will use this period of relative calm to reassess the gaps in their deterrence posture and the efficacy of their military capabilities – including foreign-made defence platforms. 

Pakistan deployed Chinese-made anti-aircraft systems, fighter aircraft and missiles, plus Turkish-made drones. India will review the efficacy of its Israeli drones, French fighter jets and Russian-made surface-to-air missile system.

On a more fundamental level, the conflict raises questions about the tug of war between India’s global aspirations and regional instabilities. 

Last week’s tensions mark the worst period of hostility between India and Pakistan since the 1971 war – while the 1999 Kargil war had a higher number of fatalities, the scale of last week’s military operations was larger, as it extended beyond Kashmir into both countries’ heartlands. It also comes after China and India engaged in border clashes in 2020, the worst flare-up of border tensions between those two countries in more than four decades. 

For Pakistan, the conflict may have partially revived the image of the military.

For Pakistan, the conflict may have partially revived the image of the military, which derives its legitimacy (and justification for an overwhelming presence in Pakistani politics) through its well-entrenched anti-India ideology. 

The term of army chief Asim Munir has recently been extended from three to five years. Coupled with Munir’s hardline credentials – he is seen as Pakistan’s second Islamist army chief (after Zia ul Haq) – this further reduces the likelihood of a genuine reconciliation or rapprochement between both countries in the near future.