Dr Leslie Vinjamuri
Good evening, welcome. What an honour to see all of you here for such a distinguished guest tonight. I’m Leslie Vinjamuri. I’m Head of the US and Americas programme. I think I recognise almost everybody, which is wonderful, but it means that you need to bring more friends with you, too, that I don’t recognise. It is, it’s a real honour to have Ambassador Bill Burns tonight to speak to us. I would say about his book, but having read his book, it’s really about his career, and that’s been an extraordinary career of over three decades of service in the US Foreign Service.
Ambassador Burns, as many of you will know, is currently the President of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, based in Washington D.C., but he’s had a very distinguished career, thank you so much, in the Foreign Service, and will be known to you as one of America’s most esteemed, highly regarded, valued Diplomat of not only the 21st century, but the 20th century. He was Ambass – the US Ambassador to Russia, 2005 to 2008, previously US Ambassador to Jordan. His final post was as the US Deputy Secretary of State, under President Obama, only the second career Foreign Service Officer ever to hold that post. Before this, he had been the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs. So, a very long, distinguished, and not only with respect to the posts, but certainly with the respect to the things that he did frequently Through the Back Channel, the title of the book that we’re here to talk about tonight.
Tonight is livestreamed and we are on the record, not under the Chatham House Rule. So, please do put your phones on silent, but we encourage you, as always, as ever, to tweet, because I think people are just tremendously interested, especially now, and I guess ,that’s where I will begin.
I’m going to speak with Ambassador Burns for a brief period, and then open it up to all of you to ask questions. But, I guess, you know, it is extraordinary to have you here in Europe and in the UK, not only tonight and this week, but in this period of time. As you know, you travel extensively, but even presumably, since leaving Government, you know that it’s been a difficult period in transatlantic relations, it’s been a difficult period in the UK, it’s been a challenging period for the US and the UK, and one of the questions that’s been asked not only in the United States, but certainly here by those of us who care deeply about Europe’s relationship with the United States is, you know, how significant is this, and how lasting is it? And for, I think, for a period of time, people, certainly in the UK, wanted to believe that what was coming out of Washington, what was coming out of the White House would pass, that it was temporary, but at the same time, was mindful of many of the things that you say in your book, which is that a lot of what’s been coming has been coming for a little while, America asking its European partners to take its commitment to NATO more seriously, and to reconsider a number of things. So, I guess my opening question to you is, how worried should Europe be about the changes, the very apparent changes that we’re seeing now coming out of the United States? Is this here to stay? Should Europe be fundamentally recalibrating its strategy and engaging with the United States? I mean, what is your thinking on, I guess, the biggest question for Europe right now, when it comes to the United States?
Ambassador William J. Burns
Well, I mean, first, it’s great to be with you and it’s great to be at Chatham House, an Institution for which I have enormous respect. It’s great to be with so many people in this audience, for whom I have such high respect as well. This is a challenging moment. I’m a recovering Diplomat, so I can’t lose the diplomatic. I mean, we’ve kind of picked a fine time to have nervous breakdowns, on both sides of the Atlantic, which I can assure you is true in Washington, these days as well. I think, you know, it’s a very important question that you raise, and the truth is that whomever was elected President of the United States in 2016, was going to have to come to grips, you know, with the realities of transformation on the international landscape, you know, what some people called the unipolar moment has long passed, whether you trace that back to the war in Iraq in 2003, or the global financial crisis in 2008.
So, whomever was elected, whether it was Hillary Clinton or Donald Trump, would’ve had to come to grips with a world in which we did need to begin to change the terms of engagement with allies, and change the terms of engagement with rivals like China, pushback against Chinese predatory trade and investment practices, push for some of our NATO partners to absorb, you know, more of the defence burden. And I think whomever was elected President would also have had to come to grips with a pretty deep and widening disconnect in our own society, between people like me, you know, card-carrying members of the Washington establishment, and lots of American citizens who, when we preach the virtues of disciplined American leadership in the world, don’t need so much to be convinced of the significance for Americans and our interest of American leadership and engagement, but aren’t so convinced of the disciplined part, because what they saw was Iraq in 2003, a different kind of hubris in the global financial crisis.
So, it’s a long way of saying that I think there are some fundamental transformations that have to be taken into account that reshape, in some ways, the significance of the transatlantic partnership, but having said that, I would argue a), that transatlantic relations from Washington’s point of view, are more important rather than less important in this era. You know, if you look at the rise of China, the resurgence of Russia, the continuing disfunction across the Middle East, in lots of respects, that ought to make Americans invest more in that relationship, because, after all, it’s our capacity to draw on alliances and mobilise coalitions of countries that sets us apart from lonelier powers like China and Russia. And that’s one of my biggest and most fundamental concerns about the direction of American policy in the Trump era, is diplomacy, as I tried to argue in the book, and as many of you in this audience know better than I do, ought to be the principle tool for taking advantage of those assets, alliances and coalitions. Diplomacy, in that sense, is even more important in this new era than it was for the three and a half decades that I was a Diplomat, and I fear that we’re corroding that tool, now, and squandering the asset, which it’s meant to try to manage and take advantage of for us.
So, I think there are bound to be changes in transatlantic relations, adapting the way in which NATO functions, but I think, at its core, you know, that relationship ought to be more important to us than ever.
Dr Leslie Vinjamuri
So, you named two things in particular, China and Russia. Let’s go to Russia, because, arguably, it might be easier to identify points of co-operation, certainly between the US and the UK.
Ambassador William J. Burns
It’s where most of my grey comes from, absolutely.
Dr Leslie Vinjamuri
China’s – yeah, China’s more complicated, and there’s a lot of really, very fascinating detail, as well as, sort of, big ideas in your book on your experience, over many years with Russia. So, we are, you know, we’re on the back of Barr’s summary of the Mueller report. We now – it’s established that Russia intervened in the US Presidential Elections 2016. It’s a very challenging relationship, over a long period of time, but much of the story that you tell in your book is really about, and maybe I’m reading it too forcedly, but it’s really about how America got a number of things wrong.
Ambassador William J. Burns
Well, I think we both have, originally, yeah.
Dr Leslie Vinjamuri
In the 2000s, or sort of didn’t really accurately read Russia’s concerns and its red lines, in a sense, but could you comment, I mean, I guess, a little bit on where we are now, how you think the current administration could – is handling, but how it could best handle, and how it could work with the UK and with Europe on Russia?
Ambassador William J. Burns
Yeah, well, I mean, I think the reality is, that in terms of US-Russian relations, we’re in a pretty bad spot. That I think we’re going to be operating, at least with Putin’s Russia, within a pretty narrow band, from the sharply competitive to the nastily adversarial. And it is true that over the course of the, you know, 20 years that Vladimir Putin has been Russia’s leader, in the course of the now almost 30 years since the end of the Cold War, I think both the United States and Russia have had their illusions about the relationship.
You know, as I try to point out in the book, I think there were times when we stayed on autopilot, from the point to the 90s, when the truth was we could manoeuvre over or around Russia’s leadership, because Russia was flat on its back in that period. Russia’s had its own illusions as well. I think the illusion that, after the Cold War, you know, that Russia would be treated as a peer of the United States and could sustain the, kind of, great power relationship, you know, that it had measured itself against, I think, for a long time. Putin has no shortage of illusions. So, I think, in particular, the notion that, you know, a one-dimensional economy and a very politically repressive state offers the ingredients for competition in the 21st century. I’m not convinced of that over the long haul for Russia.
I think, you know, we had – it took us a while, I think, to understand, you know, the smouldering aggressiveness of Vladimir Putin’s Russia, and I always thought – I served first in the American Embassy in Moscow, in the early 90s, Boris Yeltsin’s Russia, and I always thought if you wanted to understand that smouldering aggressiveness, you also had to understand the Russia of the 90s, flat on its back, as I said before. A curious mix of hope, the end of communism and humiliation, and a sense of disorder, and, you know, Putin came to power, now literally almost 20 years ago, determined to do two things.
The first was to restore the power of the Russian state, ‘cause his sense was that oligarchs had ripped off the Russian economy, which seems, kind of, a novel thought today, given the extent to which Putin and his circle have monopolised wealth in Russia, and to restore Russia to what he believes is its rightful place at the table of great powers. And he drew a straight line from that moment of humiliation in the 90s to the colour revolution in Georgia in 2003, Ukraine in 2004, through what I thought was a mistaken effort on the part of the George W. Bush administration in the spring of 2008, to push to formally open the door for NATO membership for Ukraine and Georgia, all the way through to the moment and the winter of 2011, 2012, when Putin had announced, arbitrarily, that he was going to return to the Kremlin, through elections, which were largely fixed, even though he wouldn’t have, you know, faced much competition in that period anyway. And you had tens of thousands of Russians at times from middleclass demonstrating in Moscow and St Petersburg, because they resented the arbitrary nature of that decision.
When Hillary Clinton, you know, made public comments, which we would’ve – the United States would’ve made in most societies in the world, basically, supporting people’s right to express themselves and stressing the importance of free and fair elections, he took that personally, which is his want, and that was the core, in many respects, of his animus toward her. So, with this sense that Russia had been taken advantage of, and I’m not trying to justify that, but if you want to understand Putin, and many people in the Russian political elite, you don’t have to accept that, you don’t have to indulge it, but you have to understand that, and when he saw a moment in our elections, in 2016, to take advantage of our weaknesses, the polarisation, the disfunction in our political system, he doesn’t – didn’t hesitate. And so, that’s the backdrop to the interference, and that’s why, you know, I think we’re going to be operating within that narrow band for some time to come.
Now, having said that, the last thing I’d add is, that still argues for having some guardrails in the relationship, because, you know, even at the worst of the Cold War, you know, we maintain not only regular diplomatic interaction with Moscow, but also, a set of arms control agreements that helped to regulate the relationship, and I fear, now, that we’re going to see what’s left of the old arms control architecture, with the demise, or the looming demise of the INF Treaty on intermediate-range nuclear forces already upon us, and then the reality that the New START agreement, which reduces and regulates strategic nuclear weapons, will expire at the beginning of 2021, and I see, you know, very little, you know, effort on either capital right now, particularly in Washington, to do something about that, and I think that would be deeply unfortunate, even in a relationship, which is largely adversarial.
Dr Leslie Vinjamuri
So, do you draw lessons – very different context, very different states, but this argument about, you know, needing to respect the humiliation that great powers, significant powers feel is one that we hear made about China, right? It’s not specific to Russia. The details are very specific. Do you draw lessons across both contexts?
Ambassador William J. Burns
Well, you know, much different societies, different histories, you know, China feels the wind in its sails, for understandable reasons today. You know, there’s a school of thought in Washington today, which holds that, you know, the object of the exercise should be to contain China’s rise. I’ve never bought that argument. I think, rather, the United States and lots of allies and partners around the world ought to focus on trying to shape the environment into which China rises, because there are lots of countries across Asia who are concerned that China’s rise not come at the expense of their prosperity and their security, but in order to try to manage that environment, it’s not enough just to pushback against predatory Chinese practice, as I mentioned before.
Those steps are overdue, and, you know, I support President Trump’s efforts to do that on the United States’ side. Where I think we’re making a mistake tactically, is not making common cause with lots of other players, who share those concerns, from Japan to the European Union. Instead, you know, we’ve launched second and third-front trade wars over steel and aluminium, and I also think that, essentially, defensive strategy has to be coupled with an affirmative vision of where we, at least the United States, thinks Asia ought to go. And I think there’s a web of players across, you know, Asia, from India through Southeast Asia to Northeast Asia, that probably share those concerns. They don’t want to be forced to make a choice between the United States and China, but I think, you know, you can get them to buy-in to that more affirmative vision. That’s what the Trans-Pacific Partnership, you know, the big trade agreement that was negotiated at the end of the Obama administration, which would have knit together 40% of the global economy. That’s exactly the kind of step that helps shape Chinese incentives and disincentives, you know, more than any amount of bluster, and, you know, abandoning that agreement, I think, was a big historic mistake for the United States.
So, you know, even though China poses different kind of challenges, the reality is that, you know, its economy is so entangled with, you know, American economy and, you know, economies across the world, and the reality also is that, you know, we have lots of tools that we can use to help shape the way in which China rises.
Dr Leslie Vinjamuri
So, one final question for you, and then I’m going to open it up. So, please have your questions ready. What – is there something distinctive in here, when it comes to diplomacy for the US and Europe, in responding to many of these challenges? So, we haven’t talked about values and the liberal international order, which, of course, is something we’re talking about a lot, but a lot of people also say we shouldn’t talk about the liberal international order, we should talk about the rules-based order, and I think that’s code – sometimes it’s not even code – for saying, “Set aside the values and recognise the number of transnational challenges that we have that need to be broad tent, in terms of who’s participating. But some people then say, “Well, yes, but Europe and America have a special role within that to play,” because there is a commitment, or there should be, or there can be a commitment to values that, sort of, ground that broader co-operation. And what is your thinking on that, given you’ve worked with Russia, Jordan, a number of…?
Ambassador William J. Burns
I mean, I think, as a general principle, it’s a huge mistake in American foreign policy when we check our values at the door. You know, there are bound – there are all sorts of complicated trade-offs involved, and, you know, I’ve not gotten them right, over the course of my own career, as I freely point out in this book, you know, times when you’re trying to balance human rights concerns and counter-terrorism co-operation. I wish I could say we had a pristine record over the last 35 or 40 years. We haven’t.
I do, however, think that, you know, the values which, you know, really as much as anything else, knit together the transatlantic partnership, at least at our best, and we’re not always at our best on either side of the Atlantic, are important to try to imbue in international order. Now, that’s not always possible, and especially given China’s rise. You know, you’ve got to make room for other institutions to adapt existing institutions. It’s certainly true, in terms of international financial institutions today. I think it was a mistake, for example, when the Obama administration, this goes back to 2015, initially tried to resist China’s proposal to create an Asia infrastructure investment bank, simply because I think the best answer from our – on our part should’ve been, “Yes, but.” Sure, there’s rule, given infrastructure demand across Asia, given unused capacity in China, for such an institution, but it ought to be shaped by high-end standards for, you know, how you make use of such an institution. We could have rallied, you know, lots of other countries around that notion, which is about order, but it’s also, to some extent, about values as well.
So, I guess, broadly speaking, I absolutely agree that the old international order that ran through the unipolar American moment, you know, the 20 years or so after the end of the Cold War, is in desperate need of adaptation. I just think the United States, working with our closest allies in the world, which are in Europe, you know, need to take advantage of this window. When we still have, I would argue, a better hand to play than our leading rivals in the world, even it’s no – if it’s no longer the single dominant hand that it was just after the end of the Cold War, to try to reshape those institutions and reshape that international landscape before it gets reshaped for us by the rise of other powers. And that’s the opportunity cost that I worry about in this era in Washington, is that by retreating from that whole notion, retreating behind a, kind of, muscular unilateralism, which is dismissive in large part of alliances and coalitions and international institutions, which, in a way looks, at internati – the international order that, for better or worse, we helped to shape and defend for seven decades, looks at it as a system that’s holding us hostage. You know, that, you know, America’s like Gulliver tied down by the Lilliputians, and, you know, we need to break those bonds, and that’s the way to realise, you know, our role in the world, and make maximum use of our interests. I think that fundamentally misreads, you know, this moment in – on the international landscape.
Dr Leslie Vinjamuri
It’s – but it’s not just breaking, it’s also potentially empowering. I mean, this is the argument that’s out there, and then I really will come to the audience, but there, you know, the argument isn’t just that America’s retreating, but it’s also that the language, and let’s be clear, the language that’s coming from the President, fundamentally empowers alternative actors and an alternative way of acting. So, you know, retreat and retrenchment might’ve been where America was going in any case, but it didn’t necessarily need to take this form, which – and I guess the question is, is that even more troubling for diplomacy, or do we make, you know, do we make too much of it?
Ambassador William J. Burns
No, I mean, I don’t think we make too much of it in any way, and I do think it’s troubling, because there’s a strand of autocrat envy that runs through this. There is a competition of ideas that’s going on in the world today. It’s not as if there’s a one-size-fits-all approach to authoritarian regimes, but, you know, there is a fundamental challenge to democracy today. You see it in this country, you see it in my country, you know, and it’s a challenge of governance. Can democratic systems deliver for people? Can you find a, sort of, leadership that makes that possible? And, you know, there are authoritarians around the world, a growing number of them who really do feel the wind in their sails.
Now, I think most, if not all of those societies suffer from their own internal contradictions. I’m a long-term optimist and about the possibility of renewing not just diplomacy, but the promise of democratic governance, but I recognise that it’s going to be a very rocky road, you know, in the short-term. And in that sense, this is not just about retrenchment, which, to some extent, was going to be inevitable, even though I think it’s important how, you know, you adapt your role in the world, and, you know, your approach to the international landscape. It’s a kind of active encouragement of a much more Hobbesian view of international competition and as I said, that does not maximise the advantages and the leverage that we have to bring to the table. I think it undermines people’s attitude toward democratic systems, you know, in other parts of the world as well.
Again, I don’t mean that as a statement of American arrogance, but I do think that what the United States does or doesn’t still carries a lot of weight in the world, and right now, I think we’re doing too many things, which are going to complicate our lives, undermine our interests, and make it that much harder for a democratic system to succeed as well.
Dr Leslie Vinjamuri
Okay, and on that note…
Ambassador William J. Burns
Sorry, on that uplifting note, sorry.
Dr Leslie Vinjamuri
Uplifting note, yeah, the gentleman right in front, Sir Jeremy, right in the – do we have a mic? Right here in the front row, and do please keep your hands up.
Ambassador William J. Burns
Hi, Jeremy.
Sir Jeremy Greenstock
Jeremy Greenstock. Hello, Bill. I want to ask you to apply what you’ve been saying about alliances and institutions more specifically to NATO, because I’m beginning to feel that NATO has a shelf life, because the political alliance underpinning that high military capability has a shelf life, unless it’s very carefully nurtured. And I’m not just asking about a Trump question, I’m asking, I think, a transatlantic question. Do you feel that there is an inevitable widening of the Atlantic, in terms of the political alliance underpinning NATO? Are we pretending that NATO does not have a shelf life?
Ambassador William J. Burns
Well, you know, I mean, most institutions, at least in my experience, and you know this better than anyone, you know, have shelf lives. I continue to believe, and I don’t think I’m naïve about this, that NATO has a pretty extended shelf life, but it has to adapt, and, you know, on both sides of the Atlantic there needs to be a much more serious and determined effort to invest in, you know, the, sort of, political values that knit us together, in addition to all the focus on, you know, military modernisation and sharing the burden and everything else. But I wouldn’t underestimate, you know, the depth, the concern in America on these issues.
You know, Bob Gates, when he was the Secretary of Defence, his valedictory message in Brussels, at NATO, was, you know, don’t take for granted, you know, continuing American popular support for NATO, unless there’s a clear sense of balance, and that’s, you know, that’s very real, but I don’t think that that points to an early expiry date for the shelf life of NATO. I continue to think it’s enormously important for our interests and the interests of, you know, our allies on this side of the Atlantic as well.
Dr Leslie Vinjamuri
Female right in the middle, right – seven rows back, right there. Exactly.
Julia Moore
Julia Moore, Carlton Strategies, and a former State Department Officer.
Ambassador William J. Burns
Nice to see you.
Julia Moore
If US diplomacy is more important now than ever, how is the United States going to carry through on that diplomacy, when its career Foreign Service has never been in worse shape?
Ambassador William J. Burns
Well, there is that.
Dr Leslie Vinjamuri
We’re all curious, where?
Ambassador William J. Burns
Yeah, and, I mean, you know, several things. First, I mean, as you know very well, you know, the career Diplomatic Service in the United States has faced big challenges at different times in the past. Some of them were budgetary, you know, after the end of the Cold War, when there was a big focus on nation building at home, and the peace dividend. You know, budgets were cut quite significantly. We spent several years, in the late 90s, not taking in any new Foreign Service Officers as well. After 9/11, you know, there was a big and further emphasis on military and intelligence instruments, oftentimes treating diplomacy, the State Department, as well as development, the Agency for International Development, as, kind of, under-resourced afterthoughts.
I just think what’s happened, over the last two and a half years, has been to accelerate those trends and make them infinitely worse, and so you have a reality, today, where for three years running, the White House has proposed historic cuts, most recently about a quarter in the State Department and Development budget, while increasing budgets for the Defence Department. So, right now, and the most recent request was for $40 billion, which is a lot of money, for diplomacy and development, and $750 billion for defence. So, 19 times greater. You’re never going to get anywhere in diplomacy, unless it’s backed up by military and economic leverage, but that’s a foolish imbalance, I think, and it’s just getting bigger in this administration.
You know, you have record levels of senior vacancies in the State Department, over the last two years, you’ve had a 50% drop in the number of people applying to become members of the American Diplomatic Service. You have painfully slow progress over the course of my 35 years as a Diplomat, in greater gender and ethnic diversity. You know, when I came into the Foreign Service, nine out of ten American – professional American Diplomats were white, and only about a quarter were women. By the time I left, it was about 50-50, in terms of gender balance, although at senior level, still way too inadequate, in terms of women in those positions, but that painfully slow progress has been reversed.
You also see the pernicious practice, in my view, of going after people, Career Officers, simply because they worked on controversial issues like the Iran Nuclear Agreement in the last US administration, but alongside those practical measures, you know, there’s the, you know, the deeper disdain that you hear from the White House. So, the President, President Trump, was asked about a year and a half ago whether he was concerned about all those senior vacancies, and he said, “Not really, ‘cause I’m the only person who matters.” That’s a diplo – maybe true in Washington, these days, and Presidents certainly do matter, but that’s a diplomacy of narcissism, not of institution. So, sorry to get me going on that, but, you know, you raise a very important question, and it’s going to take a lot longer to fix than it has to break, you know, that institution. And I don’t – I do not mean to suggest in any of that that, you know, the State Department or the US Foreign Service is a perfect institution. I mean, you know, individual American Diplomats can be incredibly innovative and entrepreneurial and courageous, sometimes, but as an institution, the State Department is rarely accused of being too agile or too full of initiatives. So, you know, there’s a lot that needs to be done, which is, you know, a mark of self-criticism, in a way, but I think it’s just a huge mistake to take a tool that, as I said, matters more than ever now, and corrode it as badly as we’re doing now.
Dr Leslie Vinjamuri
And can I encourage you, when you introduce yourselves, to – and if you’ve done something that the rest of us would love to know about, just in your title, could you just tell us, because one of the reasons that we come is because we love the expertise, not only from the people who are speaking, but from the audience. So, don’t just say State Department, maybe tell us your role, ‘cause it’s really fantastically relevant to us, and of great interest to – question in the front row.
Ambassador William J. Burns
Hi, Cathy.
Catherine Ashton
Hi, Bill. Cathy Ashton, and I was the EU High Representative, and I had the privilege of working with you from the first day to the last day of my five years.
Ambassador William J. Burns
Thank you.
Catherine Ashton
And it really was a privilege, but one of the things, Bill, in the years that you and I spent locked away with the Iranians, was that we had the ability to talk to China and Russia. You had the P5 locked together for weeks on end, and that gave us an interesting back channel, in a sense, to be able to talk about other issues, one example being the Ukraine crisis, which was happening at the same time as we were locked away with the Deputy Foreign Minister of Russia. And it’s something I say in Washington a lot, when I’m speaking, is that we’ve lost that, we’ve lost that ability, and it’s as important to me as the, sort of, red telephone. And I just wonder where you think and where you see the capacity is to reinvent those kind of discussions?
Ambassador William J. Burns
Well, it’s – I mean, first, it’s a great pleasure to see you again, and I enjoyed so much working with you over the years. I think, you know, I think that is one of the virtues of multilateral diplomacy, which is a nice phrase, but in this case, you described some of the practical benefits of that, that, you know, even in the worst of the Ukraine crisis in 2014, we were able to sustain, you know, a fair amount of co-ordination on the Iranian nuclear issue as well. And I think it’s difficult in this era to recreate that, because you’ve got to find issues on which there’s a common stake, and at least from Washington’s point of view, we tend to be, you know, retrenching on so many of those issues. I mean, climate change, the biggest existential threat that any of us faces today, ought to be one of those issues. The same should be true, in broadest terms, at least, of trade agreements, as well. The same ought to be true on armed proliferation issues. I suppose on the North Korean nuclear issue, it, you know, it ought to be possible to recreate some of that, given the reality that China, to a lesser extent Russia, and in particular, Japan and South Korea have so much at stake there. So, that’s one issue on which I think Washington and Beijing, you know, talk pretty regularly as well, but the broad dismissiveness of, you know, of the significance of that kind of international co-ordination, I think, is costing us, and that’s a really good example.
Dr Leslie Vinjamuri
I think you had your hand up for a little while, gentleman right here in the second row.
David Pollock
David Pollock, Member of Chatham House. Thank you, Ambassador, for your very thoughtful insights. What are your thoughts on the issues raised by China’s increasing assertiveness in the South China Sea, its investment in enhancing its naval capacity, its continuing ambitions, with regard to Taiwan, and the concerns raised by some Analysts that this could ultimately lead to some kind of confrontation?
Ambassador William J. Burns
Well, I think you’re right, it is a subject of concern in the South China Sea, it has been for some years. I think, you know, it’s a classic example of the importance of, sort of, wider regional diplomacy, of working with a number of countries across Southeast Asia who share a concern about Chinese practices, as well. It would certainly help the United States, if we had ever ratified the law of the Sea Treaty, ‘cause it would put us in a better position, at least in terms of international law, to pushback. But it’s a classic example where looking at that challenge purely in terms of US-China relations is inadequate. It doesn’t take advantage of, you know, a lot of the other concerns, partnerships, alliances that we can draw on, as well.
Taiwan, as you mentioned, I think, is, you know, a particularly – is a source of, you know, real worry and potential conflict down the road, as well. There are a few issues that I think this Chinese leadership takes more seriously than that, and it wouldn’t take much, whether – out of Washington, for example, to, you know, to test that as well. So, I hope, very much, that, you know, people aren’t looking to test that beyond the bounds of current policy.
Dr Leslie Vinjamuri
I’m going to come back to this section of the room, but I noticed those – and right here, in the third row, the lady on the – Mary and, again, if you say who you are and where you’re – what you do. Not just Chatham House Member, unless that’s the most important thing, which, for some people, it is.
Mary Dejevsky
Of course it is. I’m Mary Dejevsky, I’m a Journalist and I’m former Correspondent in Washington and Moscow. I’d like you to – to invite you to train your experienced diplomatic eye on the UK, with special reference to something you said about a contest of ideas going on at the moment, including a challenge to democracy, including in the UK.
Ambassador William J. Burns
Hmmm hmm. Yeah, well, I mean, I preface it with two things. First, you know, Americans live in, kind of, a glass house these days, in commenting on other people’s political disfunction. But, certainly, you know, as a friend, as a long-time friend, not just as an American Government Official, but as someone who, you know, have studied in the UK as a postgraduate on a Marshall Scholarship, which was the British Government’s effort and generous effort to acknowledge the Marshall Plan and what the United States did for the United Kingdom, after the end of the Second World War. And as someone who, you know, through the course of my diplomatic career, literally, as some of my colleagues in the audience know, the first inclination of American Diplomat, when faced with a challenge, when faced with a subject that you just wanted to commiserate about, or something where you were looking for partnership on, the first instinct was to call your British counterpart. And so, I worry that, you know, the outcome of Brexit is going to produce a situation where the special relationship becomes less special, in some ways.
And I’m not naïve, I know relationships change over time, but I think at a time when, as I said before, I think the transatlantic relationship ought to matter more, rather than less, to the United States, and I would argue also on the other side of the Atlantic, if you have a situation where Britain’s influence on the Continent is less than it was before, and I say this with no satisfaction at all, you’re inevitably going to take a toll in the way in which official Washington looks at that relationship over time, and I think we both suffer as a result. And I think, in many ways, our shared interests on this international landscape suffer as well. So, I return to my first comment about humility, if you’re an American commenting on other people’s politics these days.
Dr Leslie Vinjamuri
Straight at the back, gentleman at the back. Put your hand very, very high, there you go.
Anthony Dworkin
Thank you. I’m Anthony Dworkin, with European Council on Foreign Relations. I work on human rights, international order and various other things. So, my question is about the domestic basis of US foreign policy, and I wonder whether the kind of globalist vision that you have essentially argued for continues to have a domestic political basis in the US? You know, things like trade agreements, the, kind of, globalist vision, a, sort of, engagement in a worldwide security set of alliances. You know, is that still there, or are we essentially seeing a shift to a different kind of vision in the, sort of, centre of gravity of the US, and what does that mean for US foreign policy after Trump? You know, if you look at the emerging contenders on the Democratic side, they also seem to, you know, not be particularly invested in that kind of vision.
Ambassador William J. Burns
It’s a really good question, and I would be the last person to suggest that, as an American, seeing the back of Donald Trump is the solution to all those problems. As I mentioned before, there is a pretty big and widening disconnect to the United States. It’s across party lines, between the Washington establishment and lots of Americans who, you know, wonder about whether, you know, our leadership in the world, our engagement in the world has been as productive for their interests as they should expect. And so, I think any leadership in Washington needs to be honest about that, needs to understand the depth of those concerns, and address them, not just in the way in which we usually do it in Washington, which is, kind of, patronising, “Trust us,” but is quite direct.
In other words, we always make the argument that smart American foreign policy begins at home, strong political and economic system. But we have to do a better job of making the argument that it ends there, too, in better jobs, in a healthier environment, in more security, and that’s going to take a lot of effort. It’s going to take time. It’s going to involve a focus on some very real domestic interests. For example, on trade agreements, as you mentioned. You know, we spent years and years in Washington, through administrations of both parties, talking about what were called trade adjustment acts. You know, ways in which you could address the problems of workers who would be disadvantaged by, you know, by open trade or free trade agreements. None of those worked very well, and that added to people’s not just frustration, but genuine anger, and their lack of conviction that trade agreements produce things.
I happen to believe that, you know, more open trading arrangements actually do benefit the United States, but they have to be balanced with an honest approach to dealing with some of those challenges, and leaderships, which aren’t going to indulge people’s fears, or indulge their illusions that somehow you’re going to bring the American coal industry back to life any time soon. You’ve got to be honest with people, I think, difficult as this is to do, about the ways in which artificial intelligence and automation are going to transform large parts of our economy, and yours as well.
I think, you know, that’s the challenge for good leadership, and – but I do think, to answer your question, that with a sustained effort by American leaders, across party lines, to do that, with the sustained engagement, not just of Washington, but of Governors and Mayors across the United States, who understand the values of American engagement, of attracting foreign investment, of competing on an international landscape, in which 95% of the world’s consumers live outside the United States. I think it’s a winnable argument, but the starting point for that is to understand how big that disconnect is right now, and Donald Trump did not invent that. He’s ridden it. He’s, in my view, anyway, made it worse, but it’s a huge mistake to think that somehow this is all about Trump. It’s not.
Dr Leslie Vinjamuri
So many questions, goodness, where to begin? We haven’t been on this side, so the – three rows back, the gentleman here, and then to the middle row afterwards. Just, yeah, very good.
Ron Bornstein
Hi, Ron Bornstein, a Member of Chatham House, and International Lawyer, who’s worked all over the world. What do you do about Putin? I mean, we – almost every democratic society has had a problem with him. Had it in the UK, had it in other parts of the world, and, you know, now we have this situation in Venezuela, where there are two aircraft carriers going there. You’ve got problems with Iran, Syria, all over, and, you know, you probably know more than most of us about Russia and Putin. What, I mean, what is the answer? And to say we should all get together and stop him is not an answer.
Ambassador William J. Burns
Yeah. I mean, no, it’s not.
Ron Bornstein
I mean, what is the practical solution?
Ambassador William J. Burns
Yeah, well, I mean, my – I spent five, I guess, six years of my life living in Moscow as an American Diplomat, and it’s a long exercise in humility, so I got a lot of things wrong as well. I mean, I think the short answer, with Putin’s Russia, anyway, as I said, is first not to operate with illusions. There’s – you know, we’re going to be operating within a pretty narrow band, I think and, you know, Putin is going to threaten – Putin’s Russia, I think, will pose a challenge, and oftentimes, a threat to our interests and the interests of lots of countries around the world. So, I think it’s important, in the broadest of terms and then I’ll try to be more practical, you know, not to give in to Putin in that sense. But it’s also important, I think, over the medium-term, not to give up on the possibility, not to give up on the Russia that lies beyond Putin. And I say that for the following reason: there’s a middleclass in Russia that’s emerged since the end of the Cold War that’s restive, I think, today. It’s not revolutionary, but it’s restive in the sense that, you know, its standards of living have stagnated, and I think over time that’s going to build pressure for healthier relations between Russia and Europe, and ultimately, I think, the United States.
Second, I think, over the medium-term, as you look out over the next decade or so, I think Russians are going to chafe at being China’s junior partner just as they chafed at being the junior partner of the United States.
Ron Bornstein
What do you do about Venezuela? What do you…?
Ambassador William J. Burns
On Russia?
Ron Bornstein
Yeah.
Ambassador William J. Burns
Well, I wouldn’t – first, I wouldn’t…
Ron Bornstein
What do you do about Syria?
Ambassador William J. Burns
Well, first, on Venezuela, I wouldn’t exaggerate Russia’s influence. You know, Russia does not – you mentioned an aircraft carrier. Russia’s one aircraft carrier doesn’t operate right now. So, it’s sitting in dry dock. So, you know, where the Russians could project their power in Syria, and they did very effectively, and it wasn’t a huge military deployment, it was about three dozen attack aircraft, no more than a couple of thousand boots on the ground at any one point, but Putin did that in a very telescoped way. He did it in September of 2015 decisively, by contrast to what the United States did in Syria, over a long period of time, for reasons which are incredibly complicated, a very, kind of, grudging and incremental application of American power. Putin got a lot bigger diplomatic and political bang for his buck that way. So, Venezuela, I think a lot has to do with an effort that the United States makes, and here I think the Trump administration has been basically on the right course, which is to build solidarity with a lot of countries in the western hemisphere, to build economic and political pressure against the Maduro regime, which richly deserves to, you know, move out of power. But it’s going to take time, and I think that also means resisting the urge to think that there’s somehow a military solution, ‘cause given the baggage that the United States has, in the western hemisphere, that, in my view, would not be a really smart idea.
So, Putin loves, you know, gestures, he loves to demonstrate with, you know, sending a couple hundred or so, you know, Russian military personnel to Caracas recently. He is doing a lot, as are the Chinese, to help prop up the Venezuelan economy, by helping to support the energy sector right now, but I wouldn’t exaggerate the influence that Russia has right now. A lot has to do with whether we can stick with the painstaking work of mobilising a coalition of countries that can continue to sustain an increased pressure against Venezuela.
Syria, our leverage, honestly, is very limited right now. I think the best we could hope to do right now, and it does involve talking to the Russians, is to limit the dangers, first to stop the bloodshed, to the extent that anybody can contribute to that. Second, to limit the dangers of escalation, ‘cause Syria’s a pretty crowded and combustible landscape right now, where the dangers of whether it’s Israelis bumping into Iranian Revolutionary Guards, or Turks and Kurds, are quite real. And I think, you know, that’s the business of diplomacy, is to talk to the Russians and other players, to try to limit the dangers of escalation, and that we can do.
I don’t think we have a lot of leverage over the whole notion of political transition in Damascus right now. Arguably, we could hold out, you know, the prospect of greater reconstruction assistance for Syria, and try to use that to lever, you know, some kind of even very modest opening in the Syrian political system, but I don’t know how realistic that is, nor do I think, you know, Americans and the Trump administration is containing its enthusiasm for large-scale reconstruction assistance there anyway. So, I think there are real limits to our leverage in Syria, and the way in which we can counter Russian influence there.
I mean, I don’t think Russian and Iranian interest in Syria, for example, are identical, and there may be opportunities over time to try to, you know, widen, you know, that gap, but I wouldn’t exaggerate our leverage in Syria right now.
Dr Leslie Vinjamuri
While we’re coming to Amy, right here in the third row, with a mic, could I just ask you to say, just, another line, perhaps, about Venezuela, ‘cause you said, you know, the Trump administration, in your view, is basically on the right track with pressure. Can you say, just – can you just say something specifically about the decision to recognise, and whether – Guaido, and whether you think that – not only that choice, but what, sort of, followed on from that choice, if, you know, from the point of view of, sort of, the package of diplomacy is heading in the right direction, or having the effect that you would’ve anticipated?
Ambassador William J. Burns
Well, I mean, I think, you know, first, you have to be careful about your assumptions, and we got some of these assumpti0ons wrong in Syria as well. You know, going back to your earlier question, the assumption that, you know, that the military in Syria and the security establishment was going to crack and turn on Assad. Many regimes, and Venezuela is like this right now, where the armed forces seems to be pretty firm, at least up until this point, in its support of Maduro. It’s important not to exaggerate, you know, in your assumptions about how regimes like that operate and how easy it is to crack that kind of solidarity. Having said that, I do think it’s the right thing, to bring greater political and economic pressure to bear. I think working again, not just with countries in the hemisphere, and that’s actually been pretty impressive, but also with the European Union and others, is the right course to take. It’s going to take time. I do think, as I said before, it’s really important to resist the temptation to think that there’s a military option, and, you know, I’m not filled with confidence when you had John Bolton, the American National Security Adviser, with his yellow legal pad, and, you know, “5,000 troops to Columbia,” written on it, which I suppose was meant as a message to somebody. I mean, you just have to be careful with regimes like Maduro, just like with Assad, not to bluff on things like that.
Dr Leslie Vinjamuri
Just here, Amy.
Amy Pope
Amy Pope, I’m the former Deputy Homeland Security Advisor in President Obama’s administration.
Ambassador William J. Burns
Nice to see you.
Amy Pope
Nice to see you, and a Fellow here at Chatham House. I want to take you to North Korea. Obviously, this one looks like the President has been very actively engaged in trying to find a solution. How would you evaluate his efforts, the future of those efforts, how the North Koreans see it? I’ve heard some people categorise this as a success. How would you frame it, and what are the next steps?
Ambassador William J. Burns
Well, I, you know, was not one of those who opposed the President’s effort to engage Kim Jong-un directly. You know, it was, in some ways, an unorthodox approach, but, you know, as I was saying before on some other issues, it’s not as if any of us, over the 30 years or so before had a pristine record in dealing with North Korea. I think the problem now is, after the second of those summits in Hanoi recently, it’s become pretty clear that Kim Jong-un has no intention, in the foreseeable future, of fully denuclearising, simply because he sees the position of nuclear weapons and long-range missiles as being too essential to his security, to his stature, ultimately to his survival.
I think, as an aspirational goal, that’s a useful thing for the United States and our partners to retain, but the practical question is, what can you do to reduce the dangers in the meantime? And that’s where, and again, in one of life’s ironies, I think, actually, the interim agreement, the Joint Plan of Action, JPOA, that we and our partners, under Cathy’s leadership, reached with Iran at the end of November 2013, is actually not a bad model for a diplomacy. Now, you have to set aside the rich irony of that statement, given the venom with which the Trump White House has viewed the nuclear negotiations, but if you remember that agreement, that interim agreement, it froze the Iranian nuclear programme, it rolled it back in some significant ways, it imposed quite intrusive verification and monitoring provisions, all in return for very modest sanctions, really, of preserving the bulk of the sanctions’ leverage for the later comprehensive negotiations.
Now, the two situations are not perfectly analogous, not least because the Iranians didn’t then, and don’t today, have nuclear weapons. The North Koreans have dozens, and even as the negotiations with the US have gone on, have continued to expand their capacity to make more. But I think that’s the kind of thing that strikes me, anyway, would be a significant and tangible diplomatic step forward, and I worry that if we continue to, kind of, tether our North Korean diplomacy to triumphalist rhetoric and love letters between leaders, you know, that we’re going to set ourselves up for a fall. So, this is – you know, there’s an opportunity, in a sense, to reset, you know, diplomacy on North Korea right now and as I said, setting aside the irony. That strikes me as being a practical approach to take.
Dr Leslie Vinjamuri
Right at the very back and standing up, not to be missed.
Hanif Adeel
Thank you very much, Leslie. Hanif Adeel, former Advisor, British Government, British Parliament. It’s a privilege and honour to be speaking to you, Ambassador Burns. My question is, to what extent has recent American foreign policy, diplomacy been successful? When you talk about, Ambassador, the leverage that the US don’t have in the US, isn’t that down – isn’t that a failure of American policy? Putin, however bad he is, has shown if you intervene, particularly at an early stage, if the US had intervened, they may have got the same similar result. Assad wasn’t going to give up power easily.
Secondly, in terms of Iraq or Afghanistan or the recent spat between the quartet in Qatar, American diplomacy hasn’t delivered solutions. So, to what extent has it been successful recently, and how does that bode for the future? Thank you.
Ambassador William J. Burns
Well, I mean, I think the honest answer is that the record of American diplomacy, you know, looking back since the end of the Cold War, has been mixed. You know, I mean, we made some big mistakes, and I tried, at least, to acknowledge my part in some of those mistakes here. Iraq, in 2003, was the biggest and most obvious, you know, but there are others as well. I think even in the turbulence of the Arab Spring, we got some things right and other things wrong. It’s hard to describe Syria and American policy and Syria today as anything other than a policy failure. I think at Libya we got some of our assumptions wrong about how easy it would be to restore sense – some sense of security in a post-Gaddafi era.
Egypt, I think, on balance, I think the President and the rest of the administration got it more right than wrong. I mean, in the sense that, you know, many of our partners in the Gulf, you know, later accused us of throwing President Mubarak under the bus, and, you know, the truth is, the political bust, at least, was partway over his prone political body by the time we pronounced ourselves. You know, and then there are other things where I thought we, working with allies and partners, got things right.
I think, on the Iranian nuclear agreements, I believe that was the case. I think it’s true in the Paris Climate Agreement. You know, and if you go back to the 90s, I think in Dayton, you know, that was an example of not a perfect diplomatic agreement to bring an end to the war in Bosnia. Perfect is rarely on the menu for Diplomats, but I think it was an important step forward, which was accomplished in significant measure by energetic American diplomacy. So, it’s – the honest answer is, it’s a mixed record. I hope we learn from those areas where we made mistakes, but I hope we also take some solace, as we look out at the future, at those instances where, you know, diplomacy really did produce something.
Dr Leslie Vinjamuri
We’re coming to the end. Could you just – before we finish, ‘cause it is a challenging time for foreign policy, so I’m going to make sure we end up in a good place, just tonight. You know, if you, sort of, look at – where’s the one – the bright spot or the place where you see, you know, things are going forward, and depending on, you know, what happens or where we put our energy, diplomatically, and there’s a potential gamechanging moment? You know, where do you, sort of, where do you invest in your hope?
Ambassador William J. Burns
I mean, I think if you look for all – I’m glad you asked that question, because I think I’ve ruined everyone’s digestion for dinner this evening.
Dr Leslie Vinjamuri
Not at all.
Ambassador William J. Burns
No, I mean, I think if you look around the world, at the history of the last 20 years, you see enormous reason – promise and reason for optimism. The hundreds of millions of people in important parts of the world, who have been lifted out of poverty, and into the middleclass, in lots of growing economies around the world, enormous progress in science and health and technology, and, you know, and that leaves us with challenges, as you look ahead. You know, the challenge of trying to ensure that you can create workable rules for the road to deal with the revolution in technology, so you maximise its benefits and minimise the dislocations as well.
I think even a continent like Africa, today, where people tend to focus more on the challenges and the hardships, you know, there are models of success in Africa today, which deserve not only attention, but deserve investment from outside the region, ‘cause the reality, even though, you know, Africa’s never gotten the attention it deserved in American foreign policy, across many years, you know, the truth is that, you know, Africa’s a continent that’s going to double in population by the middle of this century, and so it pays to try to invest in leaderships and societies that are getting things right, in terms of governance and fighting corruption.
I think one of the smartest things the George W. Bush administration did was the PEPFAR initiative, which invested in, you know, in the fight against HIV-AIDS, and has made enormous progress in partnership with, you know, courageous leaderships and civil society activists across Africa, and it’s helped bring not just that continent, but most of the rest of the world, to the brink of an AIDS-free generation. So, there’s lots of reason for hope out there, and I don’t think there’s anything inevitable – of course, great power rivalry, for which we’re a little out of practice in the United States, is going to be an important feature of the international landscape, but that’s what diplomacy is about. It’s managing the grey area between peace and war, and you can manage great power relationships and rivalries, whether it’s with China or even, you know, the creepier and more complicated phenomenon of Putin’s Russia, but it takes a, sort of, sustained effort, and it takes, you know, attaching some priority to diplomacy, I think.
Dr Leslie Vinjamuri
Thank you. Please join me in thanking Ambassador Burns for joining us tonight [applause]. That was tremendous.
