Galip Dalay
Hello, everyone. Welcome to our session today on Eastern Mediterranean, conflict or co-operation, session with Chatham House and Al Sharq Forum. We have a great line of speakers today here with us. We have Valeria Talbot. She is with the ISPI in Milan. We have Ian Anthony, with SIPRI in Stockholm. We have Kadri Tastan, with GMF in Brussels. Adel Ghafar, with Brookings Doha and Brookings institution. And Cinzia Bianco with European Council on Foreign Relations.
I think the importance of the debate is self-evident, recently particularly when you look at the agenda of the European foreign policy, the Eastern Mediterranean has taken a disproportionate time, energy and endeavours. The crisis in Eastern Mediterranean is nothing new, particularly among – the one between Turkey and Greece. This is decades long, some of them goes – some of the files goes as far back as the foundation of the two states. But this crisis, what was previously seen as a Turkish-Greek conflict, turned into a regional crisis, which most – with many participation and many new different files. From the energies to the Libyan crisis, but also there was that many sustained level changes from the US withdrawal from the region, to the loss of the European framework or European anchors, particularly for Ankara.
But recently, there are many new developments of variables in this crisis. The Libyan file has entered a diplomatic process. There is this escalation. Turkey has withdrew their ships from the contestant waters and there is a truce, an ongoing truce between Turkey and Greece. There is more engagement between Turkey and Egypt, particularly. We are hearing recently new or, you know, new points of engagements. And now there is a new administration in Washington, and still a more willing Europe to take a more role on this crisis. So, are we – obviously, we have now more de-escalation in the region, but it’s still yet to be seen whether this is just a respite or whether this is the new trend and trajectory in this crisis, as we go forward.
So, without further ado, I would like to get the conversation started as much as – as quickly as possible. So, after the initial remarks of our panellists, I will be opening the session for the Q&A. So please feel free to pose your questions. You can pose your questions by yourself, but also, if you prefer, you can put it back into the chat box, we will pose your questions. So, without further ado now, I would be returning to the panellists, and the first speaker is Valeria. So, Valeria, actually, I will start with you, and with the very basic, but with the very difficult questions. So, how is the Eastern Mediterranean crisis, but also the European responses to it is evolving? At this stage, we do have some level of de-escalation, but despite this, what are the potential flashpoints and what are the potential opportunity spaces in this crisis?
Valeria Talbot
Thank you very much, Galip, and thank you for the invitation. I’m very glad to be with you and with many friends this afternoon. So, good afternoon everyone. So, it’s very tough questions and very – not easy questions. Of course, as you said, since the beginning of the year, we have seen there has been a few important signs of de-escalation in the Eastern Mediterranean after a year of high tensions. From an EU perspective, Turkey’s drilling and exploratory activities in waters around Cyprus and in Greek waters were unacceptable. The EU condemned Turkey’s activities. But while the EU member states agreed that Turkey should not engage in the unilateral action and resolved these bits with Greece and Cyprus through negotiation, the EU members disagreed on the best way to actually de-escalate. As it often happens within the EU member states, deferred over the best approach to pursue and on the best way to persuade Turkey to stop its actions. So, divisions were evident at the European Council in October.
On one side, Greece and Cyprus, supported by France and Austria, was – were in favour of a firm approach, through the adoption of sanctions as the main way to push Ankara to refrain from unilateral actions and engage in negotiations with its neighbours. On the other side, other countries, other EU countries, led by Germany, but also, Italy and Spain, were in favour of a more cautious stand, a search for a dialogue, a way out through dialogues and these divisions have prompted the EU to take for more time. And at the European Council in December, both options were on the table, both dialogue and sanctions, and the ball was sent in Turkey’s court.
And I can – we can say that Turkey didn’t miss the opportunity, and for a number of reasons that we will see, that the cadre will explain us. And at the same time, the EU put pressures on its member states, particularly Greece, to adopt a more open stance. So, something started to move, at the beginning of the year, as you already mentioned, Turkey stopped drilling activities in December, Mediterranean bilateral talks between Ankara and Athens were restarted, and the possibility to resume talks under the UN for the solution of Cyprus – of the Cyprus issues, were also resumed. And last but not least, the start of a transitional political process in Libya that should bring the country to a general election next December. All these are factors that have contributed to favour de-escalation and to create, in my view, conditions for a new diplomatic momentum.
And when I talk about diplomatic momentum, I mean not only in the relations between the EU and Turkey, but also among the regional states. In the last few months and even more in the last few weeks, we have seen a very intense diplomatic activity in the region, above all linked to Libya, yes, but also accompanied by attempts to resume diplomatic relations and I refer to the – to Turkey and Egypt. So it seems to me that the motor of the Biden administration, diplomacy first, has been effective in a certain way, this part of the Mediterranean.
So, it is in this context that the EU presented a positive agenda to relaunch relations with Turkey at the last EU Council in March, which includes a, sort of, stick and carrot approach, that is to say, both incentives and restrictive measures with – in relations with Turkey. There is awareness that the process won’t be easy. The EU has defined it a gradual, proportional and reversible. However, last week, a diplomatic incident in Ankara displayed the level of mistrust between the EU and Turkey is still high. And it even more, it displayed above all, the disunity within the EU, not only among member states, but also between the EU institutions. And undoubtedly, this weekend, the EU credibility, it’s by gaining power in negotiations and external leverage, as well as its ambitions to play as a geopolitical actor.
I think that there is awareness on the EU limits to play as a geopolitical actor. However, the US to push on this diplomatic moment. And what the EU is trying to do is also to look for a new alignment with the US, trying to re-engage the Biden administration in critical dossiers and critical files that issues in the larger Mediterranean and that Libya is the best example in this way as we have seen the attempt – the Italian attempt during the visit of Minister De Maio, the Italian Foreign Minister, in Washington last days.
So, there is a window of opportunity, because, in my view, something has changed in the international context and it impacts on the – also on the context of the enlarged Mediterranean. Of course, flashpoints remain, and in today, the EU alone is not in a position of strength, so a support, a new realignment with the US, could also give a further push to this diplomatic momentum. I stop here, and I leave to you.
Galip Dalay
Let me pose there a lot of questions.
Valeria Talbot
Yes.
Galip Dalay
So, if EU was a pupil at the classroom that you are teaching, and the Eastern Mediterranean crisis was his homework, what score would you have given to EU, given its management of the Eastern Mediterranean crisis in the last one, one-and-a-half years? Would it pass your class, or would you have failed it?
Valeria Talbot
I can say that as I want to be a good Teacher that encourage her students to do better, so I would say that I speak of encouragement for the EU. Because I think that the best potential, because the EU has a great potential in the Eastern Mediterranean, so the point is that the EU has to be united, it has to overcome divisions. So, if the EU understands, so it could do well.
Galip Dalay
Thank you. Well, some students need to work hard to pass the class, some students in fact need a good Teacher to pass the class. Ian, I mean, this is very much a follow-up to Valeria’s question. The Eastern Mediterranean crisis is now a crisis in Europe’s neighbourhood, so it’s a crisis very much within the European – it’s a crisis that Europe cannot ditch, because it’s effectively about the European security. So, from this perspective, what challenges does the Eastern Mediterranean crisis pose to the European security? And given the recent de-escalation, because de-escalation can means the boat can go either way. It can re-escalate, but this de-escalation can be made a bit more permanent. So, in order to make this de-escalation more permanent, what more you are – what you are need to do? And finally, given that particularly countries like, you know, Turkey and also Greece, both are a NATO member, can NATO play a role here?
Dr Ian Anthony
Thank you, Galip, and thank you to the organisers for the opportunity to participate in an extremely timely discussion. I think, to address your question, I would put what’s happening in the Eastern Mediterranean into a larger European context. We designed an integrated and comprehensive approach to security after the end of the Cold War, where questions related to human rights and democracy and governance, and questions related to economic and environmental issues, and questions related to political and military issues, were all part of this comprehensive approach to co-operative security. And now the ground is moving beneath our feet in all of these different areas. The term that’s sometimes used to reflect the discussion around human rights, democracy and governance is ‘democratic backsliding’. This is not sufficient to capture what’s actually happening, in terms of political instability, violent demonstrations across the whole of the, actually, Euro-Atlantic space. Things are happening, which we haven’t seen since, well, the early 1990s, perhaps you can even go further back than that.
In the economic and environmental basket, the pandemic is overturning what were considered to be settled perspectives on issues like the relationship between government debt, money supply and inflation, the balance of government intervention versus the free market, developments in geoeconomics, if you like, with risk of trade wars, plus concerns about supply chain security, are making us rethink what we thought we knew about global interdependence. And in the political and military context, a Europe-wide conflict, or a conflict, which could escalate to a Europe-wide conflict, is not excluded anymore. It’s now a planning assumption. That’s what you see behind the increases in military spending, the increased regular – number of exercises at scale, with more complexity around territorial defence scenarios. At the same time that we also see, at more or less six or seven-year intervals, conflicts which don’t escalate to a European level, but which are highly destructive, the most recent being in Karabakh, but we have still the ongoing conflict in Eastern Ukraine.
So the ground is moving beneath our feet in all of the things that we thought we understood about the trajectory of European security. And against that background, the relationship between the European Union and Turkey has progressively become thinner, more transactional, and instead of building the largest possible constituency behind a comprehensive approach to security, we degraded it at every opportunity. And there’s fault on both sides.
I mean, when Turkey says that the European Union now increasingly approaches every issue through a political lens, driven by the fact that Greece and Cyprus are EU members, there’s probably truth to that. When we see that the exclusion of Turkey, from the arrangements around resource exploration in the Eastern Mediterranean was completely counterproductive, this is also probably true. So, at a time when we should be building a closer partnership, we’re moving away from each other, we’re making our relationship thinner and more transactional. So, I think this is really the nub of the matter. We have to have a much more fundamental discussion about what we want our relationship to be about and to stop the process of continuously postponing this difficult discussion and, kind of, kicking the can down the road at various EU meetings and EU/Turkey forums.
What I would say, I think, as a final reflection here, is we’re also seeing the change of our perspective on the region. The Black Sea and the Eastern Mediterranean, for example, are, I think, increasingly being seen as a sort of integrated strategic space, and so, we have a very fundamental question around two countries: Ukraine and Turkey. If things go well in those two countries, we’ll be on fairly solid ground, in terms of the wider European perspective. If things go badly in those two countries, we’re all in big trouble. So, I think we need to have this very fundamental conversation, with a focus on those two countries and what we can do to build closer partnerships.
Galip Dalay
Ian, a question, actually, exactly on this point, because you rightly put it that there is much more into now Black Sea and the Eastern Mediterranean has, in one way or another, integrated with its own spaces. And I think you refer to the Russian presence and policies there and potential Western, also, of confrontation there as well. So, could you, please, a bit, and maybe, like, a few words on Russian presence in Eastern Mediterranean? Because this is an actor that has been less discussed, but this is an actor – that Russia is an Eastern Mediterranean countries – actor, right now, given now the deals that it has signed with Syrian regions for energy exploration in Eastern Mediterranean. Its presence in Libya, so highly likely we’ll be discussing this more and more. So, how do you see the nature of relation between Russia and the West could evolve, through the Eastern Mediterranean?
Dr Ian Anthony
Well, I think you’ve seen it in the last few years, basically since the Warsaw NATO Summit, in the attempt to bring NATO and the European Union closer and closer together, across a very wide spectrum of issues. And that’s part of an effort to develop a Western solidarity in the face of, I think, what everyone now would have to say is Russia’s defection from the European security system. I don’t think we can have any more illusions about this. I think that must be accepted as a reality.
And now, at the same time that we try and build this solidarity through, for example, NATO-EU co-operation, Turkey chooses to take – it’s described, in various ways, an assertive approach, an aggressive approach to its foreign policy, an active approach to its foreign policy, but it all amounts to decisions which are taken largely on a unilateral basis and outside the framework of Western consultations. So, I think it’s a very important issue. We’ve seen it most recently in Karabakh, an agreement, which was essentially crafted by Russia and Turkey together, without reference to European institutions. So I think this has to be part of the discussion, how to bring Turkey, basically, back into the collective Western approach to Russia’s behaviour.
Galip Dalay
Thank you very much. Kadri, I mean, as you can see also from the discussion here, the Eastern Mediterranean crisis has been discussed in a very Turkey-centric way for quite some time. So, given this, what are Turkey’s main goals in Eastern Mediterranean? And obviously, recently you’ve seen there is some, kind of, changes in strategy, so how this strategy is evolving as well, too? One of the big talking points has been, you know, as a need to deal with the crisis, has been how to integrate the Eastern Mediterranean countries into the Europe’s energy transition visions. And this has been also used as a one or two talking point, as regards Turkey as well too. So, where does energy stands in – when it comes to management of this conflict? Maybe one final remarks that you can make, recently, that has been all this outreaches or engagements with Cairo. What does Turkey want to achieve through normalisation with Cairo, in Eastern Mediterranean?
Kadri Tastan
Thank you so much. Good afternoon. Thank you, Galip, and thank you for inviting me. I’m glad, I’m really happy to be here, with this distinguished panel. Well, I will try to answer your questions one-by-one. Well, as you know, for Turkey, the issues related to the hydrocarbon in the Eastern Mediterranean are actually at the heart of the debate, concerning its sovereign territorial rights. Therefore, for Turkey, the issues are not limited to the Eastern Mediterranean, but also, include the problem in the Aegean Sea with Greece. So, two issues comes together here, and the Turkish claims – claim to territorial waters in the Aegean and the Mediterranean and the longstanding Cyprus issues are coming together here. So, by its action, actually, Turkey tries to advance its claim, related to these two contexts and not the details, maybe, we don’t have the time for this.
And then Turkey’s current political environment, legitimise this struggle for military muscles in the Eastern Mediterranean. But this dispute is over a country’s complete projections of national sovereignty and the compromises that would be required to resolve them, are really difficult and politically costly for each country. So, actually, traditionally, Turkey’s approach in the Aegean and the East Med was one aiming at freezing the issue. But the energy discoveries in the Eastern Mediterranean and the maritime energy security agreement concluded between different countries in the East Med have sounded the alarm in Ankara, and gradually, Turkey’s approach to the Eastern Mediterranean hydrocarbon has become both preventive and proactive.
These actions are actually expressions of a following sentiment in Ankara. Turkey has the longest coastline in the Mediterranean Sea and feels stuck in a very narrow area of agency. This is Ankara’s perspective. But there is also the risk of being stuck in this Mediterranean, also, because of Greece and Cyprus, and also, deprived of potential future economic wealth. This is actually the sentiment in Ankara, not only in the government circle, I may say. Therefore, beyond energy, the Turkish – beyond energy, Turkey-Cypriot rights and Turkish maritime claims, it also has to do with the Turkish regional ambitions and the power projection that Turkey’s trying to introduce in the region.
And where is it evolving, this policy? Well, Ankara, though this pressure, wanted to break its isolation in the Eastern Mediterranean and force, particularly, Greece to come to the table. The maritime agreement with the Tripoli Government also was part of this strategy, but the arrival of Biden administration, the threat of European and American co-ordination on this issue, the threat of European sanction and vulnerabilities of Turkish economy, actually, probably, pushed Ankara to stop its military and other activity for the time being. And exploratory talk between Greek – Greece and Turkey and the resumption of the negotiation maybe on Cyprus issue, may ease the tension, but they are really difficult questions. So, there is not much hope, and the tension, actually, can recur at any time.
This just led me to answer also your question on Egypt, and then I would like to go to the – to try to answer your question on the energy transition and the energy part. Well, apart from Egypt’s importance in the Arab world and in the region, in the context of the Eastern Mediterranean, Egypt takes a central place in the energy game, and Ankara has rather played a disruptive role to make its claim heard, but there are – there have been limited effects. So, with this normalisation effort, Ankara is trying to break that front that had been built up in the region, not necessarily against Turkey, but as Ankara is in political tension, with most of the countries of the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum, naturally, this front is becoming a front against Turkey, for Ankara.
So, instead of false normalisation, the most likely scenario is that Turkey and Egypt will normalise maybe partially, but Egypt is unlikely to sign a maritime demarcation deal with Ankara anytime soon, and however, Egypt is likely to continue to be mindful of Turkish projection of its maritime borders, including the parameters of Turkish-Libyan maritime deal, when singing – signing, sorry, the deals with the Turkish companies or international energy companies.
Now, on the energy side, well, even if this crisis is more about the issues sovereignty, of course energy has been a trigger, and therefore, the issue of the energy cannot be ignored, especially since several Eastern Mediterranean countries, including Turkey, are historically gas importers. Apart from the geopolitical tension, the main challenge then, is to identify markets in which this gas can be compete actually. And some markets have been found in Egypt, Israel or Jordan, but significant power discovery will only be exploited if the cost of building the infrastructure needed to bring the gas to the new markets can be financially justified. So the investments in exploration, further development, will therefore not be made until the competitiveness of new resources is established.
So, to monetise the promising discoveries of Cyprus, I’m speaking mostly about Cyprus here, a new gas pipeline and energy export plant will be needed to connect the new fields to the existing infrastructure in the most cost-effective way. But there are many challenges that East Med gas is facing. Low-cost pipeline imports from the East, growing energy supply, and decreasing the amount of growth as Europe pursue – grow – sorry, a carbon-neutral energy system by 2050. So, the energy transition, historically low gas prices, the oversupply in Europe, make gas from the Eastern Mediterranean less commercially attractive than in the past, and for the moment, the potential market for the East Med is gas is obviously Europe. But given Europe’s objective to decarbonise its economy in line with its Green Deal agenda and the price agreement, the future of natural gas, in the European energy mix, is in doubt.
For example, this famous East Med pipeline project must prove that it can attract the necessary capital for its construction and be economically sustainable. But from a European perspective, it’s environmental viability also will be considered now. With the European Green Deal, there is not much room for the public support for fossil – sorry, fossil fuel project in Europe. But the EU can still play an important role. The EU should also engage with other European – sorry, Eastern Mediterranean countries, to foster their economy and energy diversification into the renewable energy. So, for the EU, maintaining the commitment of each country or the continent to the Green Deal, green energy transition, will be crucial for a Green Deal and the Paris Agreement objective. So, the EU would also need to convince Turkey and many countries in the region to adopt the ambitious emission reductions policy and renewable energy programme.
So, to finish, just in the Eastern Mediterranean context, the European energy transition could become an instrument for conflict management, even if it cannot become a mechanism for a conflict resolution. And I say, I will stop here, thank you.
Galip Dalay
Can we just – a point here. If – I mean, there’s all this talk of a European conference or an international conference on Eastern Mediterranean. How central would be Green Deal? Like, how central energy would be in this conference, in order to settle the crisis? And how realistic it is to incorporate European neighbourhood into Europe’s energy boats, given the countries’ different trajectory in the energy composition and different place?
Kadri Tastan
Well, hopefully, it will be huge, the energies and in the – because I have impression that we will maybe more focus on the political issues and – or the Cypress issues, the bilateral relations – sorry, conflicts between Greece and Turkey, etc. But I think it would be really smart to bring this energy dimension, and especially this transition dimension in the conference. It will change – I’m sure it will change maybe the equation. So I hope that it will be – it will take really a lot of place in this discussion.
What was your second question? I’m sorry, I know, and I forget your second question.
Galip Dalay
Well, we can come to it later. Let me go to Adel, but the second question was, given the difference in the neighbourhood countries’ energy composition…
Kadri Tastan
Yeah, sure.
Galip Dalay
…like, you know, for how realistic is it?
Kadri Tastan
Yeah, very quickly, if you like, or I can later.
Galip Dalay
Yes, go ahead. Go ahead, please.
Kadri Tastan
Right, obviously, it’s – I mean, for the Southern country it’s made it much more difficult for European Union to convince these countries, especially they are already in a, let’s say, they developed quite well, and in the Egyptian case, Israeli or, etc., they – maybe for the Europeans it would be much more difficult to convince them, when they are developing all the resources to go from very fast towards a transition. But in the case of – because one of the most important tension is here between Turkey, Greece and Cyprus, obviously, and the Greece and Cyprus, in this Greece and Cyprus case, it will be much more easier, because they are part of European Union, they will be part of Green Deal. And Turkey stays – while Turkey, obviously, the Turkish candidacy’s only theoretical, it’s frozen, but Turkey’s still a candidate country, it’s still receiving funds from European Union. And Europe EBRD or European investment banks are investing enormously in Turkey. So, it’s – through all these channels, I think there are still – it’s still feasible to do something in Turkey.
Galip Dalay
Sure, thank you. Adel, recently, there has been quite many talks around Egypt as well, too. I mean, in the end, the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum is headquartered in Cairo, so, therefore, like Egypt, Cairo is one of the major player when we discuss the Eastern Mediterranean crisis. At this stage, what are the main goals of the Egypt in the Eastern Mediterranean conflicts? And whenever there is a discussion of the Eastern Mediterranean, it seems that the Libyan crisis featured quite prominently on Egypt’s mind as well. So how does Libya feature in Egypt’s Eastern Mediterranean strategy? And finally, the same question to you that I posed to Kadri, given the recent talks or engagement between Turkey and Egypt, what should we anticipate from these talks, vis-à-vis the Eastern Mediterranean? Is any, you know, major breakthrough likely in Eastern Mediterranean, between Turkey and Egypt, or not really?
Dr Adel Abdel Ghafar
Very good. Thanks, Galip, and it’s a pleasure to be here with many friends and colleagues. I think when we think about the Eastern Med now, it’s the perfect intersection of geopolitics and geoeconomics, and the Egyptian position or Egypt’s goals in the region really, are focused on both of those. I would really focus on two things here: Libya and the energy, as you mentioned.
In terms of Libya, Libya is very, very important for security of Egypt. Egypt and Libya share, of course, a border that is 1,115 kilometres, a border that’s been very porous, especially after the 2011 period, where weapons and sometimes militants were actually pouring into Egypt and heading towards the Sinai. So, policing that border is very, very important for Egypt, and also, not just policing it, but creating a bit of a buffer zone within Libya. So, we’ve seen, over the past years, Egyptians actually being murdered in Libya, and we’ve seen lots of major security incidents across the border. So, policing that border is very important for Egypt. That’s one context, the security context.
The other, of course, is Egypt’s perception of a potential Muslim Brotherhood base happening in Libya, so there’s an ideological component as part of this. So, over the past couple of years, Egypt has moved to secure the border. There’s a new military base there, near the border, and has supported, of course, Haftar in the East to act as that buffer zone. And when we mentioned Haftar, I have to say, lots of articles say Egypt has supported Haftar and so on. That’s of course 100% true, but Cairo’s perception of Haftar himself, that he’s irrational, is also very true. So Egypt’s ambition has always been to secure the border and that Western flank.
Of course, where – with the failure of Haftar’s assault – ill-fated assault on Tripoli and the Turkish involvement and support there of the government in the West, the game has sort of changed in Libya, but now, I think, Egypt is, with the new government, is optimistic and has opened channels with the new government and is looking to co-operate with it and is playing a wait-and-see game, with regards to the elections at the end of the year. Of course, things got a bit hairy last year and there was discussions of a military intervention, and the government spoke about a red line from Jufra to Sirte, but as Valeria was mentioning, there’s been a de-escalation, it’s been very welcome. So, I think from Cairo’s perspective, Cairo is waiting to see how the transition unfolds in Libya.
So, on the second component of your question, in terms of energy. So, after years of economic turmoil, again, since 2011, the economy in Egypt is back on track. There are, of course, many challenges, not the least of COVID. But energy is going to play – is playing a very big part of Egypt’s economic development. So, for the first time since – in eight years, the energy stations in [inaudible – 43:08] are fired up and operating, and Egypt has ambitions to become a regional gas hub. It has a huge domestic market. It has gas transportation and liquefication infrastructure, and it has a prime location to play that role of an energy hub. And it’s also worth noting that this energy – Egypt’s role as an energy hub is not solely focused on gas. Also, Egypt has invested a lot in its renewable energy, in terms of its solar in upper Egypt as well as its wind, and there are some forecasts that there’s going to be some energy surplus or electricity surplus by 2030 to 2035, which could also be exported. So the idea is for Egypt to be an energy hub.
And of course, as you mentioned, the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum, driven by Egypt, is very critical, because it brings all of the countries in the region in a regional grouping, of course, except Turkey. And it’s also worth mentioning that the grouping also has the Philia Forum, which is – could be seen as the political arm of the Eastern Med Forum, which allows members to co-ordinate on issues beyond gas. So obviously, this – the formation of this forum has been viewed by alarm in Ankara, because, potentially, it reduces the impact of Turkey’s Trans-Anatolian gas pipeline, and Turkish Stream pipelines, and potentially marginalises Turkey from gas exploitation and investment in the Eastern Mediterranean. Of course, from the Turkish side, they’ve moved to sign the agreement with the previous Libyan Government, the GNA, and of course, Egypt has signed an agreement with Greece. So, this is where the picture stands on the gas, and as well as Egypt’s gas ambitions, and it’s important for its economy.
In terms of your third and final question, the Turkish-Egyptian talks. So, this is really what I spoke about, is the context of the recent Turkey-Egypt rapprochement. Libya and energy, and I think both governments are adjusting to the incoming Biden administration. So, there’s been some positive signs most recently that both Egyptian and Turkish Foreign Ministers spoke two days ago, congratulating each other on the month of Ramadan, and there is potential for rapprochement, but there are three key issues here.
The first issue is a political issue, how Turkey is hosting the Muslim Brotherhood and allowing the media channels of the Muslim Brotherhood to operate in Turkey and giving them passports and so on, and there has been some movement on that front.
The second issue is on Libya. So, Egypt is, in my analysis, is okay, is understanding of Turkish investments and Turkish influence in Libya to an extent but does not want a major presence or a military presence on its Western flank. So again, how Turkish involvement in Libya evolves is very important for Egypt. And of course, on a related note, the third issue is the maritime border. There’s been – obviously there’s in the North with Cyprus and Turkey and Greece, there are issues there. There are issues within – between Egypt and the Libya and the Turkish border.
So all of these can be formed, in my opinion, if Turkey joins this Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum and begin to work out – to work on many of these issues. For those of us who follow the Eastern Med, every time we discuss, it’s either going to be a potential for co-operation or for conflict. I think now we’re in a mode of co-operation, which is excellent, but always in the background, the drivers and the potential for conflicts lies in the background. So, hopefully, over the coming year, there should be some fruits from this rapprochement, but it remains to be seen. Thank you.
Galip Dalay
Thank you, a great point. Just one actual follow-up questions, because you said, “If Turkey joins the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum.” How likely and how feasible is this? And what are the, basically, stumbling blocks?
Dr Adel Abdel Ghafar
Well, I think the three stumbling blocks that I mentioned to you. The political issues between Egypt and Turkey, Libya and the energy and the demarcation of the Turkish-Libyan border. So, I think right now, Egypt and Turkey are having talks, and they’re going through all of these point-by-point, and I think some of them are surmountable, some may be insurmountable, but I also have to mention, and I know Cinzia will reflect on this, that Egypt’s relationship with Turkey has to be viewed within the context of Turkey-Arab rivalry, especially with the UAE and Saudi Arabia. So, I don’t see Egypt moving too close, without having some sort of co-ordination between its allies and its partners. And, as you know, the Gulf actors are increasingly moving, and we have a joint military agreement between – sort of a joint defence between the UAE and Turkey, we have Saudi Arabia increasingly involved in Cyprus as well. So, Egypt-Turkey relations also has to take into consideration the broader Arab-Turkey approach in the region.
Galip Dalay
Thank you. Cinzia, now to you. I mean, as Adel mentioned, the Gulf has become right now quite an active – played quite an active role in Eastern Mediterranean. You see all these military exercises between countries like the UAE, Greece and Saudi Arabia. So, the question is, what were these goals actors – such activism in the Eastern Mediterranean? And now can we talk about what do countries like UAE as a player in Eastern Mediterranean in its own way?
Cinzia Bianco
Thank you very much and very interesting, intriguing questions, and thank you to my co-panellists for thought-provoking interventions. So, let me go straight to it. I think we have mentioned already the United Arab Emirates or UAE and Saudi Arabia. There is some more – quite more marginal involvement by Qatar in the Eastern Mediterranean complex on different levels. I think we have so far been able to flesh out the different dimensions. And the East Med complex basically started off as an energy issue and then developed into an issue of demarcation of borders and exclusive economic zones. So, adding a layer of more general economic interest to that, and then once you get to the demarcation sort of area, things get political very, very quickly.
And so that’s what we are seeing now, and we have heard from our co-panellists that some of the initial issues though, the more technical questions about energy, about sort of business and economic interests, have now even become less relevant, much less relevant than the political and even geopolitical layer. And I think that only if we sort of see this transition, this chronological evolution of the East Med conundrum, we can understand why and how the UAE and Saudi Arabia in particular became that involved. Because the moment – when it was an energy and technical issue, there wasn’t any entry points basically, for non-regional, non-local actors.
But the moment that you – that it developed a political and geopolitical layer, a bunch of other questions came into being. And so, first the Europeans tried to address the political and geopolitical questions in a European setting, by themselves. And we have heard from Valeria and others that they weren’t really able to find a common view, and that was the moment that they expanded their sort of perceptions and horizons and thinking, and some of the more anti-Turkey players started basically looking at the Eastern Mediterranean conundrum as part of a larger regional rivalry and conflict that was very geopolitical in character, and so, Turkey firmly on one end of the spectrum, and who was on the other end of the spectrum? A few Gulf countries, including – led by the UAE I would say, and then very closely together in a partnership with Saudi Arabia.
We’re talking in – about a sort of the pre-Biden time where we have seen a lot of escalation between these two fronts on different regional settings. And we have heard that in Libya, for instance, Turkey was very – quite – very active supporting the Western government and Egypt was actively supporting the Eastern government. However, it’s the UAE’s intervention and support that I would argue was particularly crucial for General Haftar in Libya and we have seen this dualism is so many other different theatres. We have seen it even in complex realities, such as the war in Syria, for instance, where you have the multi-polarity and the involvement of global actors including Russia, but you also have, in a way, Gulf players that had an evolution in the way that they looked at the Syria problem. And some of them, especially the UAE, came to view the Syria issue most clearly through their Turkish perceptions, so perceptions of Turkey and so you start seeing some co-ordination with some groups within Syria that are more clearly anti-Turkey.
So where am I going with this? I’m going to basically say that the involvement of Gulf actors in the Eastern Mediterranean scenario was basically a way of signalling that the Eastern Mediterranean was gradually being absorbed and sucked in by dynamics and the rationale that has characterised the rivalries in the region in the wider Middle East and North Africa region. So, today, when we look at geopolitics of the Eastern Mediterranean, we see dynamics that are more closely traditionally reflected with Middle Eastern conflicts than with European issues. And this was also due to the lack – to the fact that the Europeans were unable to, sort of, deal with this issue as a more – in the more traditionalist European political line, but instead, when they felt that the European front was too weak, they turned to anti-Turkey regional players, especially the UAE and Saudi Arabia.
And so things developed slowly in the beginning, but we saw an acceleration in 2019 that was unprecedented. The number of diplomatic visits between Saudi, UAE, Cyprus and Greece in 2019 alone, was much, much higher than the previous five years combined. We have seen trilateral meetings in the – hosted in the UAE and in the region and then we have seen the inclusion of the UAE, Saudi Arabia and Bahrain in the Philia Forum in Greece. The participation of the UAE in a multinational military exercise that is hosted every year in Greece under the name Iniochos. A number of bilateral exercises between the UAE and Cyprus, and the UAE and Greece, and Saudi Arabia and Greece. The signing of a defence pact between the UAE and Cyprus and the UAE and Greece. And so, we are now at a point where, albeit I do see, I take the point that my co-panellists made, that there are clear indications for de-escalation in the Eastern Mediterranean on different, let’s say, bilateral tracks.
At the same time, we are, I think, at a stage that it is quite hard to undo quickly what has been built over the past few years, and we mentioned the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum. The UAE has acquired service starters there and we have mentioned the Philia Forum. The UAE, Saudi and Bahrain, once again, they are full participants to this forum. So, I would say that, indeed, the UAE is a player in the Eastern Mediterranean, in particular, and it is quite difficult to imagine that, you know, in the future, that they will give up and renounce whatever they have started to build, in terms of their economic presence, political relations, and even in some limited case, security partnerships in the area.
Galip Dalay
Thank you, Cinzia. Cinzia, may I also ask you the following questions against this – the Europe’s idea of holding a conference. So, if the Europe holds this conference, should it also invite the Gulf players to this conference?
Cinzia Bianco
So, I don’t think that it would necessarily be that constructive to have the UAE or other Gulf players at the core table of the Eastern Mediterranean conundrum. But as I said, I find it also very naïve to think that you can quite quickly reverse the kind of involvement that we have seen building over the course of years. So, if you exclude the UAE in particular, but also other Gulf players, entirely from the conversation, you’re basically pushing the UAE and other Gulf players to resort to their existing bilateral and trilateral channels and privileged relations, with some key European Member States, in particular France, Greece and then also Cyprus. So – and if you push them to the bilateral and trilateral levels, this is where you, kind of, see that less constructive outcomes can develop.
So, I would say that there has to be some kind of involvement into the multilateral setting for the UAE, in relation to the Eastern Mediterranean. But we can imagine concentric circles where you have a central circle of core players that are literally at the heart of the issues, and then an external – a second external circle that is wider and also includes players that are not physically bordering the East Med, but still are quite involved.
Galip Dalay
Let me actually pose you a last question. I mean, given the centrality of the Libya, particularly to the Gulf countries, the fact now we are in a diplomatic phase in Libya or political phase, how did this also impact these countries’ Eastern Mediterranean policies?
Cinzia Bianco
So, we are – so, what – in particular, what I have described is mostly before Biden and I think that some of – as Valeria also mentioned, what we call sometimes the ‘Biden momentum’, what I have, sort of, characterised it as a strategic pause in the regional rivalries, and encouraging diplomacy as a way to tackle regional crises. And I would say that Libya is – like, the final mile of the Libyan agreement was, in a way, triggered by this momentum for diplomacy. And Gulf actors are very, very aware that there is this momentum for diplomacy, so all of them are in what, again, I have called a strategic pause on all fronts, on most fronts. I would say there are maybe, like, some exceptions, but on the larger fronts, including the Eastern Mediterranean, there is definitely a strategic pause going on, which doesn’t, however, mean that we should consider these questions solved. On the contrary, given that we have a strategic pause, this is a great time to actually plan some concrete actions to cement that diplomatic openings that we are seeing.
Galip Dalay
Well, thank you very much. We have already a few questions as per the audience, so I will be briefly combining them and asking different people. One of the question points is – that was interesting, that even though both Syria and Lebanon are part of the Eastern Mediterranean, because of the special circumstances, we haven’t made much reference to them. So, where do these countries feature in this Eastern Mediterranean dispute, if anyone would like to take on this front, they are welcome, if anyone would like to respond to this? I’m sorry, I guess, like, Ian, I saw that you are…
Dr Ian Anthony
Well, you probably have to nominate somebody, Galip.
Galip Dalay
Yes.
Dr Ian Anthony
But, I mean, I think it’s an indication, which has also come out in all of the presentations, that when we talk about the East Mediterranean, we’re not talking about a security crisis or a situation, we’re talking about an enormously complicated integrated set of issues. And when you bring onto the table the issues associated with Syria and Lebanon, you also expand the scope of the countries that need to be involved. It would be very difficult to have that conversation, for example, without considering an Iranian perspective. So, it also goes back to this question of a kind of subversion of geography. I mean, given all what’s been said, I would say you also see, in addition to what I said about an integrated space, East Mediterranean, Black Sea, you also see, to a certain extent, an integrated space, Eastern Mediterranean, Red Sea. Some of the issues in Saudi Arabia around national development focus very much on urbanisation projects along the Red Sea, which have the potential to be, to a certain extent, cross-border integrating projects, so geography is being subverted, and I think this is just an indication of the complexity of the problems. A conference on the Eastern Mediterranean would actually be much more interesting if it was a Turkish initiative than an EU initiative.
Galip Dalay
Absolutely, but given that right now a conference is likely, at least this is, like, what the EU has spoken of it, Turkey also had spoken of it. So if, when this conference is set, what do you think should be the priority on the agenda of this conference? Ian, to you.
Dr Ian Anthony
To me?
Galip Dalay
Yes.
Dr Ian Anthony
I personally find it quite difficult to understand what the agenda would look like for such a conference. I mean, there are so many issues that could and should be on the table, and I’m not quite sure what the outcome of such a conference would be, in terms of making significant progress on any of this basket of issues. I think the value of the conference would be if it’s the starting point for a process and we understand that it’s not an event, it’s a process. No, I think that would be the main contribution it could make. But designing the agenda of – especially if you want to do this at a high level, bringing together people at a high level to have a very general discussion on such a complicated set of issues, I’m not quite sure what you would expect the outcome to be. So, as I say, it would much more interesting if it was a Turkish initiative, with the objective of engaging the countries in and around the region in a dialogue. I think it also links to one of the questions in the Q&A about regime change in Turkey. I can hardly imagine that that language would be used, but the focus from the European Union perspective, I’d guess, is almost certainly going to be on what can be done to promote democratic development in Turkey? This would be the question, rather than promoting regime change.
Galip Dalay
Valeria, I mean, Italy is quite active. I mean, this is trying to be, like, you know, be quite active. Right now, from the Italian perspective, what are the priorities in Eastern Mediterranean? Particularly, Italy also has quite an active role in Libya as well, too.
Valeria Talbot
Yes, I think that priorities from an Italian perspective are, first of all, stability in Libya, for sure, and a recent visit of the Italian Prime Minister Draghi showed the importance that Italy gives to Libya, to stability for several reasons: security, migration, and the energy relations. We know the role that energy plays in Libya, has played in Libya since decades. And I think that the Italian Government sent a very clear message to all the Mediterranean states, even including the recent visit of Di Maio to the US in trying to re-engage – sorry, to re-engage the US in Libya. So, first of all, a priority for sure is Libya. A second priority is the migration and third, also, from an Italian perspective, there are important interests in energy exploitation in the Eastern Mediterranean, in – around Cyprus, in Egyptian waters. We know that any develop the biggest gas field offshore, Zora and stakes in other offshores and gas sites. So, I think that these three are the top priorities.
Galip Dalay
Thank you. Kadri, the question that was in trade, so if there is any change of actors of change of power in Turkey, would this really change Turkey’s Eastern Mediterranean policy?
Kadri Tastan
Well, I don’t think so, and in the end, the – because the question is asking also, how the relations with the different Eastern Mediterranean countries will change. First of all, on the East Med policy, I don’t think that there would be a huge difference. Yeah, maybe the method can change potentially, but don’t forget – you shouldn’t forget that Greece and Turkey, they came close to the war in – at the beginning of 90s, exactly – there wasn’t the energy issues, but it’s maritime issues there. So, these problems are really old issues, and the Turkish, let’s say, that how we call it, old establishment, let’s say, pre-AKP establishment, is also – has a quite similar opinion on that, let’s say, and we shouldn’t forget that sometimes the military establishment or the naval forces are much more hawkish than the AKP Government on this East Med policy, and the Blue for Homeland doctrine and also is coming from actually the naval forces, let’s say.
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Turkey is not really promoting officially – efficiently all the time, often, this policy, let’s say. But then to the relations with the individual countries in the East Med, obviously it can change, yes. And then with Israel, surely, because the priorities for a new government, let’s say, would be if it’s CHP or IYI Party coalition, let’s say the nationalists and Kemalist coalition, their politics on this, on the Israeli politics, can change. With Egypt, obviously, it can change radically, I may say. But there will be also, we shouldn’t forget that all these differences, tensions between ATP Government and other Arabic countries are not all the time ideological, because I have impression that we are mentioning a lot this. It’s also – became also a, kind of, geopolitical competition sometimes. It’s – I mean, it’s increasing, this part, on these tensions. So – and Turkey’s incredibly integrated on these many tension in the Middle East or in the East, this region. So, it means that even if government change to just leave the theatre won’t be easy, so those governments, they should tackle all these issues, and there will be still a lot of problems, really.
Galip Dalay
Thank you, Kadri, that, to some extent, I would say was my perception as well, too. I mean, it seems like that is one of the few policy continuity that you see, even though – if the means and method has changed significantly, but in terms of policy, from the centre left [inaudible – 71:35] in 1974, to centre right pro-Western [inaudible – 71:40] and to [inaudible – 71:42].
Now, Adel, to you. There has been all these talks about a gas pipeline to Europe, and according to many studies, this gas pipeline is quite – is not feasible financially. They argue, I think, if I’m not mistaken, the projected cost is around €6.2 billion, and given the Europe’s energy transition goals, etc. So, this is not seen as a very feasible project. So, if the gas pipeline, a) from your judgement, is the gas pipeline project is a feasible project? And if not, if the gas pipeline is off the table, how this shapes the energy debate of the Eastern Mediterranean crisis.
Dr Adel Abdel Ghafar
Well, I’m not an energy expert in any shape or form, and I – but I do understand that there’s varying opinions on the feasibility and infeasibility of this gas pipeline. So I – without commenting on that, I would still say that Egypt’s position can still work for its advantage to become a gas hub, not just to export to Europe, but also to export towards Asia and so on. So, if the pipeline does not happen, there are still methods to export, and as well to get the gas from neighbouring countries and have it processed in the Edco and Damietta plants. So, the brief answer is, I don’t know, but it’s not just about the gas, it’s also about the other infrastructure that Egypt has, to its ambitions to become a gas hub.
Galip Dalay
Well, thank you very much. With this, we are pretty much on time and at the end of the panel. I would like to thank everyone for joining us and posing the questions, and I would like to thank our speakers for being very insightful, but also, being a bit more policy prescriptive. So, I very much enjoyed the conversation, and hope to see you in the next event.
Cinzia Bianco
Thank you very much.
Kadri Tastan
Thank you, Galip.
