Europe and great power competition: The Middle East context

Hürcan Aslı Aksoy

So, good afternoon, everyone. My name is Hürcan Aslı Aksoy from Centre for Applied Turkey Studies in Berlin, and welcome, you all, this afternoon’s panel discussion, Europe and Great Power Competition in the Middle East, hosted by Chatham House.

This event is being held in partnership with Al Sharq Forum and is part of the Europe and its Neighbourhood conference series. So, this event is held on the record and will be recorded, and the audiences are able – the audience are able to engage with the speakers through the use of question and answer function, so, please do submit your question using this function, and all this instruction will also be posted in the ‘Chat’ window.

So, the Middle East has increasingly become an arena for great power competition. While the widespread perception is that the United State is withdrawing in the Middle East, Russia has emerged as a key power broker in the region. At the same time, while China has also expanded its regional economic footprint, regional actors, such as Turkey or United Arab Emirates, are filling the power vacuum and push their agendas. But meanwhile, Europe has been little engaged with the changing dynamics in the Middle East and risks becoming marginalised in the region, although the Middle East is Europe’s immediate neighbourhood.

Against this background, we will discuss today with six excellent and esteemed colleagues and experts what the great power competition means for the Middle East. Let me briefly introduce our colleagues. First, Nader Kabbani, he is Director of Research at the Brookings Doha Center. And second, is Dr Ju Jie, Senior Research Fellow on China at Chatham House. Third, Joseph Bahout, the Director of Issam Fares Institute for Public Policy and International Affairs at the AUB, American University of Beirut. Fourth, Nikolay Kozhanov, Consulting Fellow, Russia and Eurasia Programme at Chatham House. Fifth, Ozgür Unlühisarcıklı, Director of Ankara Office at the German Marshall Fund of the United States. Sixth, is Dr Ranj Alaaldin, Fellow of Brookings Institution and Brookings Doha Center. I welcome you all.

So, in order to make, you know, this conversation very lively, I – each speaker will have, first, opening remarks, which will take around three to four minutes. Then, after all the speakers had their remarks, we will go on with a short discussion where I will raise some follow-up questions. After this 45 minutes, we will open up, I mean, I will open up the floor for the discussion and where – this is where the audience will engage with our speakers.

So, I will start, first of all, ask the question, Nader, to you. So, I already mentioned there is this global power competition in the Middle East and we observe, through the regional conflicts, be it the Syrian Crisis, Syrian Civil War and Libyan Civil War, that Russia and Turkey are on the ground and the US has withdrawn. But what is the nature of the great power competition in the Middle East? Can you give us a, you know, a brief remark on the big picture there?

Nader Kabbani

Thank you so much, Aslı, and let me begin first by thanking Chatham House and Al Sharq Forum for inviting me to participate in this important and timely event. It is truly a privilege to be sharing the screen today, with such an esteemed group of friends and colleagues.

Allow me to take advantage of – by being the first speaker, to serve as a kind of, firestarter and propose a slightly contrarian point of view. So, the hypothesis proposes that the Middle East has increasingly become an arena for great power competition between the US, Russia and China, leaving Europe at risk of being marginalised. This is certainly a popular refrain, but one might also argue that the region is far less an area for great power competition than it was in the past.

So, as was mentioned, the US has been withdrawing from the Middle East for some time and this is likely to continue. The Biden administration has focused more on domestic issues, including dealing with the pandemic, rebuilding US democratic institutions, addressing racial tensions and reversing rising income and wealth inequality in the US. However, US withdrawal is a relative concept. The US is, and will continue to be, the most heavily engaged great power in the region politically, if not economically. China’s also focusing more on domestic issues and foreign relations in its immediate neighbourhood, then on the Middle East. While it has dealt with the pandemic quite well, China must now cope with a slowing global economy by augmenting domestic demand. So – and Russia does not have the resources to expand its regional presence and so, has been using soft power and diplomacy to expand its influence in the region.

So, all this suggests that none of the big powers, I would argue, is looking to engage in the kind of competition that we witnessed during the Cold War, and this has left the arena open to regional actors to play a greater role, including Turkey, Iran, Saudi Arabia and Israel, and this is actually where the action is happening. It also leaves room for Europe to engage in the region, but its engagement has been, arguably, weak and un-co-ordinated, which is really what brings us to our discussion here today and to discuss why that is.

Now, I don’t mean to suggest that there is no engagement and competition among the great powers. The US is definitely engaging in sharp power tactics. It’s using its military string to target states and individuals on its naughty list. It is also leveraging its supremacy in financial markets to sanction countries and people, even beyond the normal. China’s offering large infrastructure projects and financing for them at favourable terms, without interfering in local politics or requiring authoritarian regimes to abide by international human rights standards.

So, the question for Europe, really, is how can it maintain its commitment to rules-based international order and remain influential and promote human rights and democratic norms, while at the same time as working with regimes in the region and governments to encourage inclusive economic growth and promote development? So, this is, essentially, the – I think the challenge facing Europe and what we’re going to be discussing today. Thank you.

Hürcan Aslı Aksoy

Thank you, Nader. So, I will now come to Ju Jie and we have already heard from Nader that China is also an important actor in the Middle East, but we mostly hear about China’s economic interest and, also energy resource, interesting the energy resources. But what does, actually, Middle East mean for China? What kind of a role China plays in the Middle East, you know, if you look from that perspective?

Dr Ju Jie

Well, thank you so much, firstly, to Al Sharq for having invite me and also thanks my colleague, Kamil Hussain, to put this altogether. To answer your question, short answer is, if we are experiencing the great – so-called the great power competition between China and United States, and Middle East perhaps is the only place that – where this power competition has not really happened yet. Partially, it’s because China’s interest in the MENA region, purely and simply, so far, it’s more for economics and geography. In terms of economics, obviously, was that enormous energy supply, was that enormous energy demand from China, in order to regenerate its domestic growth. So, Middle East, many of the Middle East economies, where China’s constitute, has a really secure line of energy supply, that’s the first reason.

Now, the second reason is more to do with the geography. As many of you know that China has recently launched this Belt and Road Initiative in the last seven years. And given so many debates and discussion has already happened about the BRI, but how successful has been so far, we don’t really know. But what we do know is that the Middle East has certainly settled as being a very modern transiting – transition point between China and vis-à-vis African continents and many other parts of the world. So, purely and simply, the function for MENA region for China it’s more to do with the geography, not linked back to economic growth and linked back to what Nader just talking about, China’s under enormous pressure to regenerate its post-pandemic economic recovery. So, that bring me the new – latest point is recently, China issued its 14th five years plan, and that five years plan, it strikes so different from the economic plan China had in the past. Purely and simply, China’s now beginning to focusing on its domestic demand and supply, which means that most of the resources that in the past has been given to China’s investment abroad, you know, the outbound investment, we have to shift it back and scale back to the Chinese domestic economic driver. So, that would put China in the engagement of MENA region, somehow become more timid, rather than more bigger scale.

And then, China, also, very much interested in – really behind American security umbrella, you know, that existing security umbrella, provided by Washington, and letting the Washington doing the heavy lifting on security, where China will be able to just benefitting commercially and not really get engaged with much of the domestic affairs of another country. I mean, that’s really the standard line for China has been run for the MENA region for many years, and by no means that China’s interested in some kind of alliances or competition with Russia, even, within the MENA region, because China know it’s got its own limitation within the MENA region for itself.

Now, the most interesting and latest point and the latest development for China involving – in the Middle East, is on the so-called vaccine diplomacy, and obviously, as we know so far, there are different type of vaccines available, but there seems to be the Chinese vaccines, the two Chinese vaccines available in many of the MENA region. And, also, China intend to expanding its vaccine production, within the region, is a way of conducting diplomacy, but is also a way of that China treating vaccine as a very crucial source of export to manage the balance of payment, the balance account of the foreign reserves for the Chinese currency. So, all that together, added, most of the key elements, most of the key drivers for China to get involved in the MENA region, is more about economics, is more about commercial gains, but far less about security and far less about geopolitical ambition. So, I end it in here and look forward to hear your questions and comments.

Hürcan Aslı Aksoy

Thank you, Ju. It was excellent, really, both Nader and Ju. So, now I will like to turn to Joseph, to ask you about Europe. Europe seems to be the missing link, actually, in the Middle East and we mostly talk about the role of US, Russia and China with the economic, but what about – what are – what about Europe’s role beyond the humanitarian aid? So, how can Europe be taken more seriously in the region? Can you maybe talk about this one?

Dr Joseph Bahout

Yes, thank you, Aslı, and thanks for the co-hosts of this event, the Chatham House and the Sharq. I’m very happy to be there with some good friends. The way you put the question is already a bit controversial. I mean, how can it take – how can it be taken more seriously? It’s a bit ironic. Yes, I take it and I accept it, but I would try to put it, maybe, in a longer perspective. This would be my first point. Oh, the paradox here is that we are talking about rising powers in the Mediterranean and in the Middle East, I mean, China, Russia, okay, the US is in question. Why Europe is, in fact, a former power in this region and is declining since the 50s.

Europe has a very long history of power and influence, both in the Mediterranean and in the Middle East and it has, as we know, all been put to a halt after the turning point of the 50s and the 60s, mainly the Suez Canal War, and then it has become a second player, let’s say, with regard to the US, I mean, in the wake of the Cold War and within what we can call the West, in general.

Point two, Europe has been, in a way, forced to re-enter the Middle East. It’s not exactly, it’s not very true to only characterise it as a humanitarian power, especially after the 2000s, and then, if you take Libya, if you take the Sahel, if you take other places, Europe is a military actor, and here we have the big question. I will probably get back to that and we’ll get back to that. Are we talking about Europe as such, or about European actors? France, Great Britain, today Italy, maybe Germany sometimes in the East Med and, etc., in the South of Lebanon, are military power – are powers, are hard power powers. So, we cannot only restrict it to humanitarian.

However, and this is point three, yes, you are right, if you pick it in context of the nexus of Europe and America, so far, we can say, if you want to be synthetic and very – really a bird’s eye view, we can say that Europe is a payer, and the US is a player. We know this equation. It’s a bit of a cliché, but it is true, at the same time. And here is the second, I think, interesting paradox. The – Europe can only be a Mediterranean and Middle Eastern power if it is seconded and if it’s against the US. This is the example of Libya; this is the example of other places where it is a junior partner of the US. But at the same time, Europe knows that it can only rebuild its capacity as an actor in the Middle East and in the Mediterranean, if the US is less omnipresent in this region. And this is, you know, a huge debate today in Europe, in Brussels and mainly in Paris, and this is what Emmanuel Macron tries to frame, in several interviews and several actions, this famous concept of strategic autonomy towards the US.

It’s a huge debate between Brussels and Washington and between the capitals of Europe and Washington. There is a kind of thin line whereby Europe still needs the American umbrella for security and hard power, but at the same time, Europe knows that it cannot build a proper diplomacy and tools of military power if it doesn’t, anyway, autonomise itself from the US. And this is, I think, the equation that will weigh on US-European relations on the transatlantic bond for the next decade, if not more. I think this is the main point here and the Middle East will be a point of projection.

So, to close, I would say that Europe’s seriousness, if you – if I want to take back your own expression, if we want to take Europe seriously or not, will depend, first, on the degree, and the question is open and I think the colleagues here have touched upon this, the degree to which the US is a retrenching power in the Middle East and in the Mediterranean. And this is a question that is still open, which leads to the sub-question of the relation between Brussels and the US, and, also, it will be a function of the new global powers that are new players in the Middle East and the Mediterranean, namely Russia and China, and this is, I think, a question that has to be taken with gradualism. I think that Russia is today filling a void in the Mediterranean, in Syria, maybe in Libya, in Egypt and elsewhere. China, as our Chinese friend and colleague has said, is playing very cautiously and gradually and this is, I think, a good opportunity for Europe to prepare for the next decade, in conjunction with what will happen with – under American [inaudible – 19:03].

So, I – to summarise it, I wouldn’t say Europe is a missing link, as you’ve said. Europe is an elusive link. It’s a link that is looking for its place and role and while doing that, it has to constitute and to construct its own tools of power and diplomacy, which is something difficult for a transregional actor that has to build every single consensus between 27 or 28 very divergent members.

Hürcan Aslı Aksoy

Thank you, Joseph. So, that’s nice to challenge, sometimes, what people say about Europe, but definitely, we will go back to this discussion.

So, Nikolay, now I want to give you – the word to you, before – yeah, we have heard the name – I mean, the branding Russia is in the Middle East, it’s a militaristic power there and is, you know, like, reshaping the cards. So – but, well, I wonder, does Russia really have a very clear and very well-defined regional region in the Middle East, please?

Nikolay Kozhanov

Oh, thank you very much for your question. I would also like to thank Chatham House and Sharq Forum for bringing me into the discussion. Indeed, the question of a Russian presence in the Middle East is quite interesting, because for the last five years, the Russian presence in the region, it could be characterised, on the one hand, a certain stability and at the same time, a constant change. When speaking about stability, we need to keep in mind that, basically, the Russian goals in the region, they state the same. So, Moscow is seeing the region through the lenses of its global cold project power in the world, outside of the region, and confronting the West, but at the same time, we’re also see serious security concerns playing important role in the Russia’s decision-making on the Middle East, as well as the economic interests in the region itself playing quite an important role in Russia’s moves.

But what is changing is, on the one hand, the accents among these goals, where some of these priorities are acquiring extra importance, the others may temporarily lose it, and, also, we see the growing complexity of the decision-making on the Middle East and the Russian approaches towards the region, and these process of decision-making is getting – involve more and more actors inside of Russia. Saying this, we should also – need to understand that while Russia retains its strong interest in securing the role of a key player in the Middle East, it actually – chances to succeed are seriously limited, as the number of challenges its faces – it faces, is currently growing. And moreover, these challenges, they are mostly originate from its domestic realities, rather than from the region itself.

The limits of Russia effectiveness in the region, they are determined quite – by quite a number of multiple factors. First of all, it’s the constraints on the domestic economic capacities of Russia, growing political issues, again, domestic political issues that requires from the Russian leadership, paying more attention to what’s happening inside the country, as well as certain drawbacks in the decision-making process on the region. And on the top of it, we also have sanctions, whose pressure is affecting Moscow approaches, to a certain extent, to the Middle East, as well as the growing pressure of the confrontation with the West. That, at the same time as I mentioned, is – should be and could be considered as one of the reasons of Russian presence in the region.

The weakening of Russia’s capacities to pursues its policies in Middle East is definitely affecting its approaches. So, Moscow is getting less interested in getting involved in the riskier undertakings and now is more focused on safeguarding its achievements, rather than spreading the – its influence further in the region, but at the same time, it’s making more efforts on what has already been mentioned as a self-diplomacy, as a strategy of balancing and offering itself as a sort of, mediator. But at the same time, the adoption of such defensive strategy doesn’t mean that Russia is going to be quiet in the Middle East. It will stay active there, in order to demonstrate its importance and prevents the strategic initiative on the issues, such as, for instance, settlement on Syria, or the decision of future of Libya, falling into the hands of its opponents.

So, all-in-all, we see Russia playing a very interesting – seeing itself in a very interesting way. On the one hand, it sees itself as being on the defensive mode, protecting what it has already acquired in the region, but at the same time, in order to defend what it has, it should be a) active, if not aggressive, and b) inventive, because it has to use quite a limited number of means, giving a preference to those that are not threatening to incur serious threats for its presence – present risks for its presence in the region. So, that’s in a nutshell and I hope that we’ll discuss it more during the – I’ll wait unt…

Hürcan Aslı Aksoy

Thank you, Nikolay, for the excellent picture how Russia is really acting in the region. So, I will now come to Ozgür and, you know, we have heard the role of Russia, China and how Europe is being engaged in the Middle East. But we also, as I mentioned earlier, we saw also the rise of regional partners and one of them being Turkey. So, how does Turkey perceive and look at the changing nature of a moment of international powers in the Middle East? How do you assess that, Ozgür?

Ozgür Unlühisarcıklı

Oh, thank you, Aslı. I mean, before answering the question, I cannot help quoting Mr Kabbani, and we should all remind ourselves, over and over again, that when we are talking about US withdrawal or retractions from Middle East, we are actually talking about a relative withdrawal or retrenchment, because in the foreseeable future, the United States will remain highly present in the region and its capacity to project hard power into the region will be unmatched by any other power.

But coming to the question on how Turkey sees US retrenchment and Russian resurgence and Chinese entry into the Middle East, whether Turkey sees this as a threat or opportunity. I think that Turkey sees it as an opportunity, because it gives Turkey a vacuum to fill and feel its grandeur, but also, as a threat, because of the instability, this – what you could create, and – as do the other regional actors, Turkey sees this as the reality on the ground and tries to adjust to the new situation, with varying degrees of success.

So, with the US retrenchment from the Middle East and continued absence of the EU, regional actors, including Turkey, the Gulf States and Iran, and much later, actually, Russia and China, rushed to fill the vacuum, and then, emerged a new, let’s say, type of relationship among them, which can be described as competitive co-operation, in general, because they’re competing for filling the vacuum, but also conflictual co-operation on many specific issues. To give you a few examples, Turkey and Iran are generally competitors, they’re also competing for power in the region, but this did not stop them from co-operating on preventing Iraqi-Kurdistan regional governments from declaring independence. Or there is talk of Turkish-Russian reproachment and co-operation, which is a reality, as part of the Astana process in Syria, but then actually, Turkey and Russia are not only competing for influence, but they’re actually in conflict. About roughly a year ago, 35/30 soldiers in Italy were killed by a Russian airstrike. So, they are co-operating and competing and conflicting in Syria, in Nagorno-Karabakh, in Libya. Other examples could be given, but are unnecessary, given that we do not take too much time.

Now, talking of US retrenchment, US retrenchment had already begun during the Obama Presidency, so this is not actually something that Trump started. But Trump added a new dimension to this retrenchment, by overlooking power politics by regional actors and even overlooking certain transgressions that they may cause, decreasing the cost of using military power in controversial ways. Now, under the Biden Presidency, I also agree that the United States will most likely remain in the retrenchment mode, but I think that they will reverse the situation, in terms of not paying attention to how regional actors are using their power. And as regional actors, including Turkey, are trying to adjust to US retrenchment, they will also need to adjust to this reversal in US approach, and, for example, Saudi Arabia has already starting doing this through normalised – normalisation, with Qatar.

So, I would also like to say a few words about what the United States could do in the future differently and what the EU could do differently in the future. One aspect of Trump era policy towards the Middle East has revealed that the United States has relied on the Saudi-Israeli access, without any regard for a balance of power. So, I think that Biden should, and probably will, change this, because without a balance of power that is promoted by the United States, another balance of power will emerge naturally, and United States may not be pleased with this. So, rather than a balance of power emerging beyond the control of the United States, I think it would be better if the United States itself promoted a balance of power. In the region, this is what I think the Biden administration will do.

Regarding the European Union, the European Union has significant challenges when it comes to having an impact in the Middle East. First of all, this is a period when the EU has to deal with internal challenges, but also, the EU member states are not always on the same page when it comes to the Middle East. So, certain policies can actually divide the EU, rather than unite the EU, as we have seen in the episodes in Libya. However, if the EU acts very selectively and based upon its four competencies, I think that it can still play a very important role in the Middle East. And Libya happens to be, now that there is a cessation of hostilities and a political process, Libya happens to be a low hanging fruit for the European Union, not in terms of changing the situation militarily, but actually, economic sector reform, as, for example, Turkey is dealing with security sector reform, the EU could come in to support economy sector reform in Libya. So, this is, in a nutshell, what I would like to say in this first round, thank you.

Hürcan Aslı Aksoy

Thank you, Ozgür. We will definitely come to, you know, to the discussion in our – what kind of a role the EU and US will play on the Biden administration. But it’s also very timely now I give the word to Ranj about – yeah, we have talked about US role in the region, but we didn’t really give the – talk about it, so what does the decline of the US power mean for the Middle East? Is it escalating, de-escalating, the crisis in the Middle East, what do you think?

Dr Ranj Alaadin

Thanks very much, Aslı, and thank you to Chatham House and Sharq Forum. It’s great to be back, albeit virtually. I mean, I think it’s a bit of a stretch at this point to say that the US is in a – is experiencing decline in the region. I would say rather, and one expects this is something which will become more apparent as the, let’s say, the identity and approach and policies of the Biden administration becomes clearer over the coming period, a period of readjustment, realignment, I think we’ll try to see a continuation of the approaches and policies and measures that we saw unfold under the previous two administrations. All – of course, both had very different approaches and ways and manners in which to try and achieve this, let’s say, imperative from the US perspective, of reducing the US military footprint in the region and balancing that with making sure that doesn’t enable America’s rivals, its enemies, making sure that doesn’t result in fresh security threats. And, of course, you know, no matter what visions you have, what policies you have and strategies in place, it’s always a question of implementation, but also the very real possibility that like before, like other Presidents have experienced, US-Middle East relations, US-MENA relations, is most likely, in my opinion, going to be a very crisis-driven one. And we’ve already seen indications of this with the airstrikes that President Biden ordered against the Iran aligned groups in Syria, in response to Iranian alliance, or Iranian proxy provocations and aggressions in Iraq. So, there’s always the possibility that medium to long-term policies and approaches become upended by more immediate short-term threats and challenges.

I would say, for the purposes of this discussion, especially if we’re looking at the possibility of Russia or China competing with the US in the region, or displacing US influence in the region, there’s probably three or four key features that warrant closer attention. Firstly, the Middle East is in the midst of its greatest upheaval in modern history, one could argue. There is an all-out battle for power among its key players and this has manifested in places like Libya, the East Med Crisis, for example. We’re seeing the opening of additional conflict theatres, a trend where state actors, like Turkey, for example, very notably, are embracing proxy warfare. On that particular topic, there’s now probably around 150,000 to 200,000 militia fighters that do not answer to any state authority or state institution.

Secondly – actually, before I come to the second point, I think one can also make an argument that this is all a direct result of, or indirect result of, or a symptom of US disengagement in the region. On that basis, one can make the argument that you do, in fact, need more US in the region, but perhaps a recalibrated approach to crises, to – with governance challenges and so forth.

Secondly, the Middle East and North Africa is on the cusp of change, because it really is on the brink of a socioeconomic implosion. It’s the economics, it’s the absence of economic reforms, for example, that is pushing the region to the brink and that it’s opening up new challenges and security threats. It has the highest youth unemployment rate in the world, which according to the World Bank, as it stands, close to around 30%, 27 to 30% and there’s around 2.8 million citizens that enter the labour market every year, but of course, have no job to turn to for their livelihood.

Now, that’s all very important in this discussion, because when you’re looking at the external actors that can help regional states address these challenges, particularly on the socioeconomic front, it’s only really the Americans and the Europeans that have always had this emphasis on good governance, on economic reforms, on democratic ideals and values, which, collectively, can address these crises from a socioeconomic perspective. Whereas the Russians and the Chinese simply do not emphasise those particular priorities as part of their engagement in the region. And, of course, I welcome others to challenge me on that or to disagree with me on that.

I would say, you know, if we’re looking at this combination of security threats, plus the enabling of additional security challenges, as a result of these socioeconomic conditions, one can make an argument that it’s precisely these challenges which – although you can tie to US disengagement in the region, or the absence of a coherent strategy for the region from the Americans, but also the Europeans, which also, conversely, ironically, makes them better positioned to maintain that competitive edge and that distinct advantage that the Americans and the Europeans will continue to have over the Europeans and the Russians. I’ll extend some of my remarks on those and provide more elaboration in the second round, but that’s, essentially, you know, my take.

Hürcan Aslı Aksoy

Thank you, Ranj, for this, for the American perspective onto that. So, we have seen different perspectives from the great power perspectives on – reflected onto the region. Actually, we always, of course, forget at the beginning, when we talk about great competition or superpower competition, to give the word, actually, to the regional actors, to the states, that are present in the region. In that sense, I would like to ask Nader, to you, and just zoom in what you have said, you know, at the beginning, you gave us the big picture, the greater pictures, but just zoom in onto the Syrian Crisis and what has the Syrian Crisis taught us, as regards to great power competition in the Middle East, actually? What implication does the Syrian Crisis have for – you know, in the framework of superpower competition?

Nader Kabbani

Thank you, Aslı. This is – it’s an interesting question, but I think the Syrian Crisis probably brings some of the key points that we were making together, in case of how competition within Syria evolved. I mean, briefly, you – the initial international actors that were involved in Syria, as you know, were Iran and Saudi Arabia, not Russia or the US, or obviously China. Russia involvement only came in September of 2015 and Turkey became directly involved a year later. The US, when it became involved, focused mostly on the Islamic State and now, it is maintaining a small military presence in the North East to remain relevant and to have a say in the final settlement.

And so, it’s an example, I think, and I think Ranj made a very good point here, is, I mean, US withdrawal from the region, in terms of its influence, actually probably contributed to some amount of instability. But again, the US’s role is complicated. If you look at the years preceding the crisis, the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, subsequently the – Ozgür was referring to an intervention in Syria, possibly as “low hanging fruit”, and so there – and that had implications for how the Syrian regime, kind of, restructured its internal security considerations in 2006/2007. So, as a result, you know, one could argue that the security forces that were in place, when the events in Syria began to transpire, were those who are more the Hawks, the ones that were interested more in maintaining order, rather than the security forces that were more on the peaceful side of Dubs, that were side-lined in 2006/2007. So, the role into the US has been mixed and depending on the administration and its priorities.

Europe, generally, has played a positive role, I think, both before the crisis in Syria and since. It has been a leading supporter of humanitarian assistance. I know we don’t want to say that Europe is only about humanitarian assistance, but the Syrian conflict has cost over $30 billion in humanitarian aid. Germany has accounted for over – around $8 billion of that amount. So, it – Europe’s involvement has been extremely important in supporting the massive amounts of – the millions of people that have been displaced by the conflict, roughly six million externally and – or – and another seven million internally, and it continues to play a big role.

Even before the conflict, Europe had a very strong role to play. It was supporting civil society reform, it was supporting education and reforms in the system, so, it was really, as Ranj, again, said, really involved in issues of ‘good governance’. I think it might have been able to play a more – a faster, more important – and move the association agreement with Syria, more quickly. The Former Deputy Prime Minister for Economic Affairs in Syria, Abdullah Dardari, has used a couple of times that had the association agreement been signed earlier and allowed to take trade to occur and economic growth to be supported by that, it might have – things might’ve played out differently. It’s a reflection, but it does point to the role that Europe can play. Of course, it’s a balancing act. Europe is trying to maintain, essentially, the issues of good governance, support for democracy, the rules-based order, at the same time in – it promoting economic growth and stability in these countries, and it is a balancing act.

Hürcan Aslı Aksoy

Thank you. Thank you, Nader. Then, since it gave the opportunity, Joseph, would you like to add to that, you know, like, if Europe should really – how can Europe keep the balancing act, actually, at the moment? It’s obvious what kind of a player Europe is. Of course, we have to be careful when we say Europe and the European Union, so, can you more elaborate on that and then, you know, considering Nader’s second remark?

Dr Joseph Bahout

Yeah, this is exactly what I – this is what I tried to say. I mean, we cannot consider Europe as such, besides, or maybe except a few questions, or a few files that Nader have alluded to, like, for example, the humanitarian aid in Syria, or even the construction or the stabilisation of the Palestinian authority for a long while. I mean, I think that the – Europe is the first payer of the Palestinian authorities so far, as such as Europe, but then you have to look at the European states’ policies, each-by-each, and sometimes they intersect and sometimes they diverge, and recently, they are more diverging than converging, maybe in certain places, like in Libya or elsewhere, or towards 30, also, which is becoming increasingly the contentious point for Europe and among Europeans at the same time.

Now, again, I mean, we get back, again, to the conditions, look, we are comparing here. I don’t want to be restricted here in this panel to the role – first of all, I’m not – I’m partly European, but I mean, I’m happy to talk about Europe, I will talk about something else, also, later, about the region itself. But once again, it’s very difficult to compare state actors, like in the US, Russia, China, Turkey, Iran, etc., and the Europe Union, as such. I mean, it’s as if you were addressing, for example, Egyptian foreign policy or Saudi foreign policy and talking about the Arab League. It’s, frankly, not the same. I mean, we know that everything in Europe has to be manufactured and produced by consensus, so this is, by definition, something that prevent Europe of being an actor.

Second, there is the question of the proximity, that we often tend to forget. For Europe, the Middle East and the South of the Mediterranean is not a projection power issue, it’s a neighbourhood issue. It’s a direct neighbourhood issue, it’s a domestic issue. I mean, the humanitarian secur – the human security aspect is one that affects the stability and the equilibrium and the future of European societies. Just have a look at the debate today in France about, for example, Islam, about the populations from Maghrebi origin, the financing of mosques by Morocco, Algeria, Saudi Arabia or Turkey. This is an issue that is exactly domestic, and it is maybe determining the future of some European political powers. I mean, probably the election of Emmanuel Macron will be played on COVID first and the economic crisis, but then, second, on the issue of Islam, identity, etc., which all has to do with the neighbourhood – with the South.

A third question, also, that has popped up, and here I’m joining what Nader has just said, also, I mean, we can’t but examine everything we are discussing here today and Europe, in particular, without taking into account the legacy, good or bad, and the huge turmoil that the region here, I mean, the South of the Med and the Middle East, has lived for the ten last years. This is the result of ten years of Arab upheaval, Arab revolution. For me, at least, this is an open-ended process that has not yet come to an end or to a conclusion. So, the waves are still, I mean, moving here, and at least from the migrant issue, or the refugees’ issue, or the human security issue, Europe is still living in the midst of the Arab Revolution consequences. The US can decide – I mean, Biden can do like Trump a little bit and proclaim that he’s not concerned, but what’s happening in the US, make a Muslim ban or something like that. He can retrench from the region, but Europe cannot retrench from the region, because it is by – it is in the region, by definition.

I started my first round of observation by reminding us all of the history, but history is also geography. I mean, Europe is a Mediterranean actor and power. It is sometimes a Middle Eastern power. I mean, you know that – I mean, the history of colonisation, the history of economic and cultural and political ties between Europe, at least the southern flank of Europe and the Middle East, is an organic tie, so, it’s not a choice. I mean, having a Middle Eastern policy for Europe is not a choice. It is a choice for China, it is a choice for Russia, maybe, it is a choice for the US, but for Europe it’s not a choice. It’s a predicament, it’s a fate.

You have to have a Middle Eastern policy, with the limitations that I have described. I mean, the consensus, second, the inefficiency of the tools you have so far. Europe has, of course, a very huge soft power in the region, but this soft power needs also money and needs power projection tools and these are lacking. Europe is still in quest of a proper, not only diplomacy, in terms of substance, but in quest of a diplomacy in terms of tool. I mean, we still – I mean, I could challenge some people here, even, who are specialists, to name me the European top Diplomat. I mean, sometimes I tend to forget it, or a European military action that is also submitted to several parameters and constraints and – etc.

So, all this to say that Europe is in this very strange and difficult situation where it has no choice but to be a Mediterranean and Middle Eastern power, but of all other powers, it has probably the means that are the most insufficient to do that and it has, now, the challenge to construct it. Once again, it will not be able to construct it if the US does not clearly, and this is why I always advocate a strategic European-American dialogue on the Mediterranean and on the Middle East, just to divide, probably, the work and the tasks and the burden, and then to have a strategic dialogue with the rising powers, not only globally, like China and Russia, but also with the rising – the new rising powers in the region and in the Mediterranean, like Turkey and Iran. If this is not done, I think that Europe will go on turning in a, kind of, vicious circle, or in a circle that is ultimately and unavoidably sterile.

Hürcan Aslı Aksoy

Thank you, Joseph. So, considering the time we have left, it’s just 25 minutes, so now I will start – you know, I will open up the floor for audience questions, and I have here approximately nine questions, but some of them have been actually answered, but the first one I see here, from Hillary Briffa. Would you like to ask your own question, or shall I read out, Hillary?

Hillary Briffa

Sure, I can ask it. Thank you, everybody. My name’s Hillary. I’m a Lecturer in Defence Studies at King’s College, London. And I’ve been interested in your remarks, which focus a lot about hard power projection, but I wonder if there is also a role for Europe, especially Mediterranean neutral countries, to play more of a soft brokering role? And here I’m thinking of Malta mediating in the Libya crisis and serving as the UN rapporteur on Israel and Palestine. So, can you Europe do more of this mediating and sort of brokering role in the region? Thank you.

Hürcan Aslı Aksoy

Joseph, maybe very shortly, since we have…

Dr Joseph Bahout

Yes, it will be…

Hürcan Aslı Aksoy

…a very short…

Dr Joseph Bahout

It will be very short, because I think I’ve probably answered most of this question during the, I mean, dur – in what I said. Yes, of course, but I mean, the question of neutrality is something to be, I mean, questioned, or the issue of neutrality or the concept of neutrality. I don’t know exactly what you have in mind, I mean, the person who has put the question has in mind. What are the countries that could play that role? Probably the Scandinavian countries. They have tried to play it in the countries like Syria, or elsewhere, with very few results, with very few successes, and as Nader said, it’s mainly a humanitarian role, but not a brokerage role for a political solution. But again, this has to do with European diplomacy, as such, as a whole. If not, we are talking about nation states’ diplomacies, which is not, at all, the same thing.

Hürcan Aslı Aksoy

Thank you, Joseph. So, my next question will be to, you know, just take the tension from Europe, back to China, and there is one audience, Umar Abdullah, would you like to raise your own question, Umar?

Umar Abdullah

No, that’s fine, you can read the question out, thank you.

Hürcan Aslı Aksoy

Alright, it’s directed to Jie. So, “I believe China’s economic influence in the Middle East and, by extension, the West, can and will affect the balance of power and diplomacy. Is this an underlying sentiment held by all members of the panel?” Okay, it goes to all of the – but I’m particularly interested in hearing from Mr Ranj Alaadin, but I will first give you the word, Jie, then I will turn to Ranj. Thank you.

Dr Ju Jie

Thank you, Aslı. To answer quite quickly, I mean, yes, we seems to assume that China seems to have that enormous finance resources, want to spend all of the world and buy influence. But actually, what we have forgotten is, largely, that China’s diplomacy and China’s foreign policy actually derive itself from domestic economic driver. So, anything whatever China does, or China has done so far, it is based on its domestic economic population. I mean, I said very clear in earlier, this cou – China’s global ambition is very soft centred. It calculate very carefully where to go in order to secure its material interest, where to go, be able to secure its sea line and where to go in order to secure its exon – economic prosperity. So, all this taking into account and that’s why China is a, very much a latecomer in the Middle East region. I mean, Beijing, the only issue is, first, a white paper on Middle Eastern policy from 2016. I mean, how late is that? It’s only in the matter of last five years.

So, just perhaps we should really lower the expectation that how much China can do within the region. And also, no, and just coming back, challenge the bit on – regarding the good governance issue, the governance issue on China, why China does not necessarily introducing the good governance standards when it come to develop an assistance, when they come to infrastructure building. I mean, that has always been the stumble block, that has always been the standard line. China does not want to interfere domestic affairs of another country. Why is that? Because China has his own chip on the shoulder. I mean, just given the fact that what’s happening in Xinjiang and all these various questions and remain unanswered, and of course, China doesn’t wish its economic partners to question on its own domestic governance issue, as well. So, that’s part of the reason why China put forward this – shall not interferes of domestic affairs of another country, and then, in particularly when they come to engage with the MENA region. That the Chinese state companies and also government doesn’t have sufficient resources to engage with local civil societies, or the local businessmans, unlike the Americans and the Europeans have done in the past, which they have been working in those areas for years, or if not years, but decades. So, yeah, just…

Hürcan Aslı Aksoy

Thank you, Jie. Ranj, would you like to take from here, because it was also directed to you?

Dr Ranj Alaadin

Oh, yes. Well, let’s – I mean, it’s always important, I think, to make a distinction between – when we say the region and its relationship with China, I think it’s important to dissect that a bit. You’ve got a relationship that exists between China and, let’s say, a very narrow group of individuals, political actors, cliques, let’s say, that hold the reigns of power in some of these countries, a relationship between China and the broader political class, and the relationship between China and the wider general population, overall. So, I think whilst there is a lot going on when it comes to the relationship between China and the cliques that dominate states, governments, institutions, I think in the medium and long-term, it’s the relationship that China builds with the broader political class in these countries, plus the wider population, that will determine whether it can actually compete with the likes of the US and Europe.

For every, you know, headline that there is in relation to China’s bilateral economic relations with the regional countries, there’s also, probably, four or five different headlines that we don’t see, in terms of how that relationship isn’t really developing in the way that one would assume. So, I would say always be wary of the sensationalism that sometimes undergirds the reporting and the commentary that China has with the region.

I would say, to sum it up, it really is America’s and Europe’s to lose. I do agree China has that policy of non-interference, which in a way, domestically, at least, as we’ve just heard from our colleague from China, that constrains its ability domestically to shape the contours of governance in these countries. But at the same time as any student of international relations affairs will tell you, non-interference, no matter how much a country or a government talks about it, can also be a myth. So, eventually, that economic relationship and leverage that Beijing has in these countries will allow it to bend governments, political classes, towards its will. So, I think that’s very important to bear in mind.

And look, I don’t think you can discount the fact that, you know, Europe expends, what, close to $9 billion per year on foreign aid. The yearning would then be broader society, the wider population in the region, or enhanced ties with Europe, with the Americans, to build up governance, to, you know, rehabilitate institutions. If we believe that the revival of the state and state institutions in the Arab world is critical to forestalling this crisis, which is around the corner and which is in the making, then that also tells us, at the same time, that it’s really the Americans and the Europeans that will have that edge, that competitive edge, for quite some time, I would argue.

Hürcan Aslı Aksoy

Thank you, Ranj. Another, I mean, kind of related question on here, ah, Ozgür, would you like to add something to that?

Ozgür Unlühisarcıklı

Oh, sure, very briefly. I think that the silence of the Islamic world on the human rights violations toward the Uighurs speaks volumes, and at the United Nations, 39 nations condemned China for those human rights violations and not a single Muslim nation joined. I’m speaking of my own country. Not only does my government not utter a word about that issue, actually, a private citizen who talks about this issue is treated as a traitor in Turkey. The media is silent, the government is silent, both the parties are silent. I think this shows the extent of influence that China has gained over countries in the region.

Hürcan Aslı Aksoy

Thank you. Thank you, Ozgür. I would like to give the floor, if he’s ready to ask by himself, Khalid Al Tenahi. Would you like to ask your question, or shall I read this question out, because it is – do you hear us? Ah, so, he’s actually asking how the – “How do the different powers see democratisation of the region?” I remember. while I was teaching how to – on democratisation in the region, it was beginning of the 2000s, but now, we live in a completely different time and we mostly talk about, you know, stability actually. But I would like to give the opportunity to Nikolay, for example, because, you know, like, he has given us the perspective of Russia and Russia’s regional strategy, and for China, we heard that the China is really not interfering, but how does Russia see the domestic dynamics of the regional actors or states? And is democratisation on the agenda in the Russian strategy?

Nikolay Kozhanov

Well, I’m afraid that Russia represents, here, a slightly different case, to put it mild. So, on the one hand, if we have a look at the set of those people whom our Russian leadership considers as its close friends, we suddenly find Russia surrounded by, mostly and predominantly, let’s say, if not military authoritarian tools, or at least militaristic figures. I’m not saying that – the question’s related to the domestic situation, they are mostly exploited Russia in a slightly different way. So, Russia definite tries to keep distance, on the one hand, from discussing the domestic discourse, where it goes against its interests. But on the other hand, Russia is playing, actually, on the concerns of existing political system in the Middle East regarding the potential democratisation, trying to emphasise, the one hand – on the one hand, Moscow is supporting so-called historical or authentic developments, implying that there should be no model imposed from the outside, and this is partly reflecting, basically, the concerns of the Russian leadership itself about the potential democratisation processes in Russia. But on the other hand, Moscow is also sending the signals that it is ready to talk to any force in the Middle East, relatively to its ideological background and by doing this, Moscow, initially, was trying to oppose itself to, on one hand, the American authorities, if we are talking about the pre-Trump era, and on the other hand, to – the attempts of the European Union to erase the questions about the situation with the human rights, with the democracy, in this region, which is occasionally causing quite a lot of concerns among certain political circles here.

So, does Moscow exploiting the issue of democratisation? Yes. Is it doing it in a way like the West is doing? Of course, no, which is determined, on the one hand, by the opportunistic nature of the Russian leadership, in terms of its foreign policy towards the region, and on the other hand, determined by the inner and domestic concerns inside of Russia.

Hürcan Aslı Aksoy

Thank you, Nikolay. I have another question from Trisha de Borchgrave. I hope to pronounce it correctly. Trisha, would you like to raise your question.

Trisha de Borchgrave

Yes, hi, can you hear me?

Hürcan Aslı Aksoy

Yes.

Trisha de Borchgrave

Great. I think everybody has, sort of, touched on it and I just – I would like to point out that Joseph made such a compelling argument. If anyone was to reach out to the EU and to give them reasons why they should step in, in a very significant, meaningful way, through this sense of, you know, neighbourhood solidarity and geographical commonality, it is you, and I don’t see that. And I think, partly, that’s – my question to you guys, is that I feel that the EU is permanently on the backfoot as a player in the MENA region, just because it continues to be so divided on how to handle the migrant crises, because they seem – they are so besieged by them that they’re also – you know, they’ve had to make deals that we all thought were pretty Faustian at the time, but it was in the middle of 2015, and now they seem to be held to ransom by all these individual players in the region, particularly Turkey, when it comes to refugees.

I mentioned the fact that, you know, an EU member state actually shot live ammunition on migrants last year and that was absolutely shocking, I think, to many, many Europeans. You know, where have we got to at this stage? And I’m wondering whether Europe just cannot – or the EU cannot properly engage with the MENA region because it is so divided on what they do, with the repercussions of, perhaps, their actions themselves when they get engaged in the region. They cannot afford to take on more crisis of the type that they’ve had, and yet, there doesn’t seem to be a consensus there of how to handle it, and I’m just wondering whether is that what is really keeping them on the backfoot? Thank you very much.

Hürcan Aslı Aksoy

Joseph, would you like to answer?

Dr Joseph Bahout

Yes, but I will do, but with, really, the risk of, I mean, repeating myself, because it’s – we’re getting back to the same issue, the division, the impact of the Middle East as a direct, let’s say, cause or source of causes on Europe, as Trisha has said, the migrants and we talked about it. But just not to repeat myself, I’ll add something maybe new. I mean, we were talking about, of course, the transatlantic bond and its importance and what will shape, probably, Europe and what has shaped Europe so far. I mean, you – very schematically, Europe has lived under the security umbrella of the US and NATO for the case during the Cold War. After that, it had a lull, where the American had Germany or unipolar power, let’s say, with a – I mean, really endorsing the world’s security. And then, it has lived, the last 15 years, a very hectic period, whereby it is soul searching and looking for the conditions of its own autonomy, let’s say, growing and reaching the adulthood, in a way, in a world where it has probably got used to live under the umbrella of a big brother, that is the US.

But in the meantime, and this is where I’m probably adding something new and I would like to challenge a little bit Nikolay on this, also, Europe, or at least part of Europe, the Eastern part of Europe, and other political forces within Western Europe, like the extreme right and, etc., are also increasingly looking at Russia as a new, not protector umbrella, but as a new cosying neighbourhood, let’s say, in the potent world, not in the southern world. And, I mean, be it the extreme right in France, in Germany or elsewhere, or be it governments, like Hungary, Poland, the Czech Government and, etc., you can see it in countries like Syria, in countries like Libya and etc., they are more, let’s say, tempted to confide to Russia and to walk with Russia more than probably with the US, and this is a tremendous shift in the European construction and this is probably the first time where you have a Europe that is split, not only on issues of interests, but also of ideology and political culture.

I would put it, maybe, in a way that could be provocative, but I don’t mean to provoke here, part of Europe today is Putinised, I mean, in political culture, in – even political forces, the influence, monetary, financial influence. We know the ties that exist between the Kremlin and certain political forces in Europe, and this is, to add to Trisha’s existential question, this is adding, also, to maybe the paralysis of Europe and this is a huge challenge for Europe, but I think that it’s also a challenge for the US. I mean, this cannot be explained but by the passivity of the US in the last 15 years, that have let, probably, part of Europe drift towards Moscow, at least intellectually and conceptually, if not in these terms. But this is something that we also, when we talk about Europe, have to take into consideration, even though, probably, in real terms, Russia doesn’t have the means, the exact means to go on constructing this kind of network, but so far, this is the result and it’s a paralysing result for Europe.

I’m sure that Nikolay has many, many things to add to this.

Hürcan Aslı Aksoy

So, Nikolay, would you like to respond to Joseph? But shortly, we have five minutes left, so, I will give you all again, you know, to wrap up and give, maybe, an advice to European countries, from your point of view. First, Nikolay.

Nikolay Kozhanov

Well, Joseph, thank you very much for your comment. It’s always a pleasure to be challenged by your questions. But basically, we are speaking about one and the same thing. We, indeed, see the process of Putinisation and not only, let’s say, Europe, but also, we see Putin becoming quite appealing as a model over here in the Middle East. So – and this is, of course, a result of several factors. First of all, it’s definitely the sudden passivity of the West and precisely the US in the recent years, again, due to the clear factors, due to objective factors, in building up the support for the democratisation processes.

But there is also a sudden fatigue that you could see in the Middle East, in the Gulf, with the Europeans, with the US representatives coming and raising this question of human rights, which are pushing certain part of the local leads towards people like Putin, who, on one hand, provides the support for the violators of the human right. I need to remind about this famous high five given by Putin to Mohammed bin Salman, in a very critical moment of the aftermath of the Khashoggi killing. And on the other hand, he, himself, represents a very appealing behaviour model. So, he shows that certain rules that were established in the post-war Europe, in the post-war world, could be violated, and there is almost no punishment, which is, of course, creating a certain appealing image for quite a number of people who would also like to behave without being in danger of punishment for their deeds. And of course, given the turmoil, political turmoil, that’s happening in the Middle East, the number of his supporters is only growing, I mean, not personal supporters, but supporters of these type of behaviour, building up a certain base for the dialogue between Russia and quite a number of forces in the Middle East and beyond.

Hürcan Aslı Aksoy

Okay, thank you, Nikolay. So, we have last three minutes, and I would like to give the opp0rtunity to our speakers who have spoken a little less than the others. So, Nader, would you like to have a last comment on, you know, how the great power competition reflect, and the very last comment, just one minute, please?

Nader Kabbani

I think the issue I’m left with, and this builds on comments by Ranj and Joseph, is that the Middle East is going to be in continuous turmoil for the foreseeable future, and like we said, that this is a neighbourhood for Europe.

One thing that wasn’t mentioned too much is that as you see turmoil continue, you’re going to see refugees continue. When young people can’t find jobs, when there’s no democracy, when there’s no dignity or freedom, you know, it’s just, basically, across the Mediterranean, and so, Europe will probably try to limit this and influence it, but that’s going to continue happening and that’s going to place political pressure on Europe. So, it’s in Europe’s interest to try to find mech – new mechanisms to try to build democracy and good governance and economic development in the region. And I emphasise maybe more processes, they need to devise ways where countries can follow a road that, kind of, pulls them into this process and helps them develop over time, rather than setting standards, which they’re not able to meet right now. The region is just too far behind, in terms of freedom, democracy and weak economies, but the process would potentially be the right way. Thank you.

Hürcan Aslı Aksoy

Ozgür, very briefly, your take from Ankara.

Ozgür Unlühisarcıklı

Yes, I mean, I don’t know who I am quoting, but I’m sure I’m quoting someone when I say if you don’t visit the Middle East, the Middle East will visit you. So, unless the European Union invest in preventing state failure in the Middle East, it will have to invest in post-state failure rebuilding in the Middle East and will face a growing number of refugees, and European Union cannot forever outsource its refugee problem. So, I think the EU should do two things. First of all, invest in state failure in the Middle East, and second, develop mechanisms to take care of the refugee, I won’t even quote the Crisis, but the refugee situation, without needing to outsource it.

Hürcan Aslı Aksoy

Oh, thank you, Ozgür. So, we unfortunately reach our limit, time limit, so I want to really thank to all of our excellent speakers for their remarks, comments and your engaged answers. It was really wonderful to listen to – from different perspective, also challenging arguments on the issue. It was really great and thanks to Chatham House and Al Sharq Forum, and I hope to see you all, not through online events, but also in person. It was really nice. Thank you everyone, thank you to all our audiences for participating and I wish you all a healthy and well life and well week. Bye, bye.

Nader Kabbani

Thank you, bye, bye.