Adam Ward
Good. Well, good afternoon everybody. My name’s Adam Ward. I’m Deputy Director of the Institute. I’d like to welcome you all to this event, which is being held on the record. It’s being livestreamed via the Chatham House website and do please tweet about it, using the #CHEvents.
It’s a real pleasure to welcome Julie Bishop to Chatham House. Julie Bishop was appointed Foreign Minister of Australia in 2013, having, I think, shadowed the role for about four years in opposition. She is Australia’s first female Foreign Minister. She’s also, as you know, Deputy Leader of the Liberal Party and as a Parliamentarian, she’s represented her constituency for some 20 years now. The Foreign Minister’s theme today is the bilateral relationship between the UK and Australia. Obviously, that’s a relationship marked by incredible breadth and depth across political, military, economic and social fields. But arguably, in present circumstances, the bilateral agenda has to be a much more global one than ever before. To many onlookers, I think, it’s clear that the conventions and some of the certainties of the international order, of recent decades, are being eroded, not just by a range of direct challenges, but also by, arguably, the Trump administration’s apparent departure from the more classical precepts of US leadership. And those who would seek to convert the Trump administration to a more traditional US foreign policy and who want to support and strengthen the rules-based international order, as the US itself adopts a more transactional and qualified attitude towards it, they clearly have their work cut out for them, and I noticed your next visit is actually in Washington, following that on the United Kingdom.
So, the importance of that rules-based international order for both the UK and Australia is sharpened into focus by the variety of local challenges that each country is seeking to grapple with. In the case of UK, there is the need to chart a credible foreign policy course after Brexit. For Australia, there’s the need to position itself for the opportunities and the risks that are inherent in living in a highly dynamic Indo-Pacific region, in which the seminal changes are those being driven by China’s growing stature and confidence. So, the twin test for both Australia and the United Kingdom is how, where, the rules-based international order can be repaired, made more resilient and also, perhaps, where it might, in future, be extended. So, we’re very much looking forward to hearing your analysis of those subjects and your ideas for the future. Thank you very much. Please join me in welcoming the Foreign Minister again to Chatham House [applause].
Julie Bishop
Thank you for that kind introduction, Adam, and I am delighted to be here at Chatham House, and may I pay tribute to the role that this famous institution has played in support of the principle of free speech, which we must continue to uphold and defend. I am in London for the inaugural Australia-UK Leadership Forum and also, the annual Australia-UK ministerial dialogue. This will be my first opportunity to meet with new Foreign Secretary, Jeremy Hunt, and there are many issues for us to discuss. I am then on my way to San Francisco for the annual Australia-US Ministerial Forum. So, the juxtaposition of these ministerial forums will be very interesting and useful in informing our foreign policy.
The Australia-UK relationship is strong and enduring. Yet, last month, our nations opened a significant new chapter in our long history of military co-operation, with the awarding of a $35 billion shipbuilding contract between BAE Systems and the Australian Government, for nine Hunter-class frigates for the Australian Navy. Now, this contract establishes a relationship that will last many years, perhaps decades, as we build a stronger Navy, a regionally capable Navy, for our vast island continent. Military co-operation between our countries is, of course, not new, as that relationship goes back to British settlement of Australia, part naval base, part penal colony. But the strength of our shared military tradition is our commitment to democratic civilian rule and here in Chatham House, we are very conscious of that political tradition our two countries share. One of the three Prime Ministers, who lived here in Chatham House, William Pitt the Elder, famously described the importance of English liberties in a speech to the House of Commons in 1763, when he was opposing the imposition of a land tax and he said, “The poorest man in his cottage may bid defiance to all the forces of the Crown. It may be frail, its roof may shake, the wind may blow through it, the storm may enter, the rain may enter, but the King of England cannot enter.” So, individual rights under the state, including property rights, are key pillars of stable societies, one of Britain’s great gifts to the world.
The nations of the world have come a long way in developing rules and norms for international affairs, not least to protect and advance ideals of individual freedom. It’s the nations, which have borrowed from the tradition of English common law, the United States and Australia and others, who’ve played an important role in developing the contemporary world order. This international rules-based order, instigated by the United States and its allies, developed after the horrors of two World Wars, where there was a collective will to create a world out of chaos, to ensure that we never again experience the ordeals and horrific loss of life and that there would never be a third global conflict. The United Nations came into being to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war and also, to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights.
The international rules-based order remains a work in progress, of course, like all bodies of law, and there’ve been times when it’s faced great strain, including through the decades of the Cold War. However, it is arguably facing its greatest test, as it’s challenged and strained on multiple fronts, and I believe that there are three primary challenges currently to the order. First, some states are openly defying the international rules and norms. Russia, Iran, North Korea, for example, have adopted hybrid tactics, undertaking disruptive activities in cyberspace, arming proxies and threating conduct that is often below the threshold of warfare, but still greatly destabilising.
Take Russia and its annexation of Crimea. The first time since World War II a nation has used force to redraw national boundaries in Continental Europe. It’s support of so-called separatists, in some of its bordering states, including Eastern Ukraine, has challenged state sovereignty and has resulted in significant loss of life. Just on four years ago, on the 17th of July 2014, the deployment of a powerful book missile system from Russia’s 53rd Brigade, into Eastern Ukraine, resulted in the shooting down of Malaysian Airlines MH17 with 298 civilians onboard, all killed, including 38 Australian citizens and residents and ten British citizens.
Australia and the Netherlands are holding Russia to account for its role in the downing of MH17. Russia has played a spoiling role through its membership of the UN Security Council to shield the Assad regime from accountability for chemical weapons used against the Syrian people. The nerve agent attack in Salisbury brings into questions Russia’s involvement in the use of military grade Novichok, and this is just another example of conduct that constitutes a growing threat to international security and the rights of other sovereign nations. And the chilling incident in Wiltshire raises more questions for Russia to answer, regarding its management of its stockpile of military grade nerve agents.
Now, Iran, while it may have paused its nuclear programme under the JCPOA, it continues to deploy armed groups across the Middle East, with proxies in Iraq and Syria and Lebanon and Yemen. The scale of humanitarian suffering in Yemen is being prolonged by Iranian support for armed groups, with more advanced missiles being fired at targets in Saudi Arabia in recent months.
North Korea has long threatened its neighbours and has launched attacks against targets in South Korea, across the Sea of Japan, while continuing to develop a nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles programme in direct defiance of numerous binding UN Security Council resolutions.
There’s a familiar pattern adopted by states seeking to defy the international rules-based order. Unable to meet the economic and political expectations of their citizens, these states seek to harness nationalism, to create a narrative reflecting a siege mentality, where they are beset by external enemies and must stand against them. A second challenge to the international rules-based order is the increasing tendency for nations to take a one sided, unilateral approach to some of their international interests, including economic interests.
The United States is now favouring a more disruptive, often unilateral, foreign and trade policy that has heightened anxieties about its commitment to the rules-based order that it established, protected and guaranteed. The US has withdrawn from the JCPOA. It was a treaty level agreement that it had struck with the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Russia, China and Iran. It was endorsed by the UN Security Council. The United States has withdrawn from the Paris Climate Agreement and from the Human Rights Council. The administration’s admonishment of NATO members to share more of the defence burden was a point worth making, as long as it leads to a stronger and more robust alliance. The administration’s decision to unilaterally raise tariffs and quotas against some of its trading partners has raised concerns about the United States’ commitment to champion the international trading system, a role which it has played for the last three quarters of a century.
Now, while the US trade grievances are justly held, in many instances, the answer must lie in peaceful negotiations and resort, if necessary, to the World Trade Organisation. For the United Kingdom and Australia, the current picture is complex. Our closest ally and the world’s most powerful nation is being seen as less predictable and less committed to the international order that it pioneered.
The third challenge facing the international order is that it must accommodate a changing balance of power in the Indo-Pacific. The 1979 normalisation of relations between the United States and the People’s Republic of China marked a new phase in the mission of the people of China, one fifth of humanity, to reclaim their place in world affairs and this process accelerated as China opened up its economy, as did China’s succession to the World Trade Organisation in 2001. So, in turn, China’s economic integration boosted economies across Asia and has been a steady driver of global economic growth. China is Australia’s largest trading partner and that of probably over 120 other nations around the world.
Sustained growth has to be managed, but it has also underwritten its military modernisation and through that its increased strategic weight in the Indo-Pacific. So, China is contesting the United States’ role in the region, through tactics that fall short of direct confrontation. Across the Indo-Pacific, nations are adjusting to new trajectories of power and influence, and this regional contest has global implications. The United States-China trade dispute is one manifestation of a larger struggle between the world’s existing super power and a growing economic and strategic power. The global economy and global stability will feel the impact of this for some time to come.
So, what must we do? Individually, these challenges would be difficult enough. However, in combination, they require urgent and co-ordinated engagement by countries committed to an international order that provides opportunities for all nations to rise. Australia and the United Kingdom must work together and with other partners to defend, promote and strengthen the rules-based order, as we have a key stake in the role it plays in regulating conduct between nations. We will continue to hold Russia to account for its role in the downing of MH17 over Ukraine and the Salisbury nerve agent attack. We’ve called out cybercrime by Russia and by North Korea. Equally, we must engage more deeply with those who do seek to circumvent or destabilise the order in pursuit of short-term gain. We must demonstrate that international co-operation can be effective and that there are penalties and consequences for attempting to subvert international law and norms of behaviour. We must work to preserve and develop transparent, predictable rules for trade and investment, in our region and at the WTO, with the EU and with the UK.
In some cases, we must take forward international co-operation in non-traditional ways. Australia and Japan, for example, overcame the sceptics to rally others who saw the logic and the benefits of the Transpacific Partnership Agreement of 11 countries after the United States had decided to withdraw. The Paris Climate Accord remains a major international achievement. It creates a workable and important platform for further commitments to sustain our environment.
On the third challenge, the power shifts in the Indo-Pacific, no long-term foreign policy objective is more important to Australia than ensuring the Indo-Pacific region evolves peacefully, as it undergoes a period of profound strategic change. So, we all need to work harder for the security of the Indo-Pacific. That’s why we welcome global Britain as a partner in our region. Australia and the United Kingdom can strengthen our influence by co-ordinating closely and aligning our advocacy of the United States on key alliance issues. Acting together, we can better support the United States to lead in ways that advanced all of our mutual interests, in ways which support the rules-based order.
We are taking greater responsibility for our own security and prosperity through the framework that’s been detailed in our foreign policy white paper, released last year, and the defence white paper, in 2016. For Australia, our regional neighbours have become strong economic partners, with bilateral and regional trade agreements, delivering substantial mutual benefits over many years. The relations between Governments and peoples have matured in tandem. In partnership with the Pacific Island countries, we’ll continue to build resilience across the region and amplify island states’ voices on the international stage. And we look forward to a stronger UK voice in the Pacific and welcome the commitment to a greater diplomatic presence, as well as increased levels of development assistance, as we work together to support the stability and economic progress of the Indo-Pacific region more broadly. Australia will continue to deepen engagement with South East Asian countries, including by building countries’ capacity to protect their maritime domains. We’ll work more closely with democracies in our region: New Zealand, India, Indonesia, Japan and South Korea, as well as the United States, to promote our ideals and values.
My message isn’t new, although I think it’s always important to be reminded that we are stronger when we build coalitions of likeminded nations to support the structures that have delivered so much benefit to the world. The rules-based order, developed after the Second World War, and it has seen the greatest expansion of prosperity in human history and that framework was designed as a level playing field, so that all nations had the opportunity to rise economically. However, some nations that have gained significant benefit from the order are now challenging it and we need to remind them and our populations at home of its importance. We also need to continue to advocate for the principles of liberal democracy, freedom of speech, individual liberty and human dignity. Struggles which many predicted were over with the collapse of the Iron Curtain have returned, as populist leaders promote ideas that have, in fact, failed so many past societies.
History has a painful lesson on the consequences of nations seeking narrow gains at the expense of others, of seeking to dominate others through military or economic power, of an environment where might is right. The rules-based order is not perfect, by any means. It requires constant attention and development to ensure that we take the path to a more enlightened future for our people in the world. Australia looks forward to joining forces with global Britain in upholding and defending the ideals and values that have underpinned our respective security and prosperity. Long may our joint endeavour, in that regard, endure. Thank you [applause].
Adam Ward
Brilliant. Thank you very much for that. I’d like to pose just a few questions to get us started, before we hand it over to the audience here. You talked about the challenges to the rules-based international order brought by countries that are defying the system of the rules of the road. I mean, I wonder what your thoughts are about how some of those countries that seem to have abandoned any sense of self-restraint, the Russias, the Irans and so on, how do you think they can be put back into the box? Are there things that we could be doing that we’re not doing? What are the instruments we need to avail ourselves? Is that more traditional conceptions of military deterrents, is it additional sanctions instruments? I mean, apart from vigilance on the issue and calling things out when they happen, what do you think we need to do to change their risk calculus?
Julie Bishop
We need collective action, with all voices strongly united in support of that action. So, whether it be sanctions against Russia for its behaviour over Crimea and Ukraine, and breaches of sovereignty, whether it’s sanctions against North Korea’s illegal nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles programmes, they must be enforced and enforced universally. For a sanctions regime is only as effective as the universal implementation of it. We must also speak out with strength and purpose when behaviour is unacceptable. I look forward to a time when the United Kingdom feels free to make statements beyond those issued by the European Union, about issues that I know are dear to the heart of Britons. So…
Adam Ward
Would you like to set out which those areas are, where you think the UK has been underpowered, in terms of its emphatic denunciation of certain things?
Julie Bishop
There have been instances when I had hoped for a more robust response from the United Kingdom, but you rightly felt constrained by the conflicting interests of the European Union membership and so, from our point of view, we always see a silver lining from Brexit. I don’t mean to identify the United Kingdom, because you are one of our most trusted and principled and pragmatic partners. Indeed, one of the most trusted nations, according to the view of the Australian people. There was a recent poll, which showed 90% of Australians thought that Britain was the most trustworthy country on the planet, so that’s our view of the UK. But I think that we need leadership in pursuing what is right, not is – not just what is expedient, and Britain, Australia and other likeminded nations, I believe, have a responsibility to be that voice and show that leadership.
Let me give you an example of behaviour, as well, that can be powerful. When it comes to maritime disputes, for example, they can be negotiated over decades, centuries, even, and never be resolved. But Australia’s view is that maritime boundary disputes should be negotiated and negotiated peacefully, otherwise resort to UNCLOS, the arbitrator, and that’s exactly what Australia did with Timor Leste. We had a maritime boundary dispute that could’ve gone on for generations, but we submitted to a conciliation programme, under the United Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea, and we now have a treaty agreement between Australia and Timor Leste and the opportunity to start a new chapter in our bilateral relations. So, conduct by example can also be powerful.
Adam Ward
I know you don’t want me to necessarily drag you back to the UK, but there’s just a couple – a set of questions around that, since it was brought into the conversation. I think some of the critics around the slogan, if you like, or the concept of a global Britain, feel that one of its weaknesses is that it suggests a capacity for, kind of, strategic or geopolitical ubiquity, and it glosses over the sense that foreign policy is also about the hierarchy of priorities, the commitment of resources to pursue those priorities and so on. Now, obviously, from your perspective, the UK’s engagement in the Asia-Pacific or the Indo-Pacific region should be fairly high or top of that. Do you feel that it’s currently consistent with the level that you would expect of a UN Security Council permanent member? Are there would forms of engagement that you would welcome that currently don’t exist?
And then also. on this question about values, which was very – that’s a very strong feeling in your speech, are you concerned in any way that – of what some people might see as a more cramped situation for the UK after Brexit, might lead it to de-emphasise some of the values-based foreign policies that it’s been consistently pursuing, over a number of decades, in pursuit of more transactional arrangements, as it seeks to arrange trade deals and form new alliances?
Julie Bishop
I have great confidence that the United Kingdom will continue to play a role commensurate with its status as a permanent member of the UN Security Council. Of course, it has global responsibilities in that regard, as do the other members of the Security Council, which I’m very fond of reminding them of from time-to-time. The five permanent members hold a unique position to uphold global peace and stability and security. So, the United Kingdom undoubtedly, has global demands. But our part of the world, the Indo-Pacific, is one of the most dynamic, and economically and strategically, in the world today. Many nations of the Commonwealth are in the Indo-Pacific and when we were here at the Commonwealth Heads of Government meeting in April, many were heartened by the leadership role that the United Kingdom appeared to be playing in a revitalised Commonwealth of Nations, a group that is brought together by the very values about which I’ve spoken today.
Not a geographic or ideological grouping a such, but brought together by a collective commitment to democracy, the rule of law, democratic institutions and freedom. Whether each member lives up to those ideals is an ongoing challenge, but the fact is that the United Kingdom was the driver of the revitalised focus on the Commonwealth. And my point being that so many Commonwealth nations are, in our part of the world, South East Asia and the Pacific. But in any event, I think Britain’s global interests will be served by a greater focus in our region. We all have conflicting and competing priorities, but I think it makes logical sense for the United Kingdom to have a greater presence in the Indian Ocean, Asia-Pacific region, and we look forward to partnering with you. And there will many instances where you wouldn’t do it alone, you wouldn’t unilaterally engage, but you would certainly do it in partnership with others, who are looking for more British leadership, not less.
Adam Ward
Another theme of your talk was the challenge posed by unilateralism and you singled out the United States actions in respect of climate, action in respect of the non-proliferation trade regime and trade. I’m just interested in your own reading of how far this current tendency in US policy is likely to carry. Do you see this as an aberration that will eventually settle back more in the middle of things, or do you think this is a new permanent dispensation that we’re going to have to get to grips with?
Julie Bishop
I actually believe it’s part of a trajectory for some time. It didn’t start with the Trump administration. It has been a changing situation over successive administrations. The Trump administration is perhaps more unorthodox in its articulation of this trajectory, but nevertheless, I feel that the idea that others must share more of the burden, for example, has been with US administrations for some time. So, a number of the approaches of the Trump administration are just a more obvious manifestation of what’s been there for some time. So, I think it is something that we should expect from the US administration, which is – and subsequent US administrations, which is why I believe that countries like the United Kingdom and Australia need to double our efforts to support the US to continue to lead, but also, to share the burden that the US has willingly taken since the Second World War.
Adam Ward
I suppose the counterpoint to American introversion on some policy issues, if one can put it that way, has been Chinese extraversion and a lot of people say that there’s obviously a direct linkage between those two. How do you assess China’s analysis of the international situation? There’s often talk of the idea that they sense a moment of strategic opportunity, which is there for them to exploit, to begin to reorder things in a more that’s more deferential to Chinese interests, are more tied into those interests. Or do you think that in a sense, it’s all come a bit too soon and it’s a bit unnerving this American orphaning of its own, sort of, international structures, and that this might actually, in a, sort of, counterintuitive way, make China cleave more tightly to those bits of the international order that remain and provide a continuing basis for stability?
Julie Bishop
It’s probably a combination. I think China sees an opportunity to assert its growing confidence on the world stage. When the Trump administration announced it was withdrawing from the TPP, that it would embrace the America First policy, that it would seek to lift tariffs, President Xi Jinping responded by appearing at Davos and championing the liberalised free trade agenda around the world, which was an interesting juxtaposition for followers of foreign and trade policy, let alone everybody else, and I think China will continue to take advantages – take advantage of those opportunities. But likewise, I don’t believe that China is looking to, or is ready, or perhaps will ever want to be the global leader that the United States has been, in terms of the burden that the United States has carried from the Marshall Plan on. Nevertheless, China is extending its influence, its engagement, across Africa, Latin America, most certainly into the Pacific and while it has opportunities to do so, it will continue.
Adam Ward
Thank you. Okay, well, I’ll now open it up to questions and comments from the floor. Stick your hand up, if you’d like to make an intervention, and when the microphone reaches you, please give your name and affiliation. Thank you very much. The first person to catch my eye was actually, Patricia Lewis at the back.
Dr Patricia Lewis
Thank you very much indeed, Julie Bishop, for an excellent presentation. One of the things that we’ve been working a lot on is the international digital economy and the threat to it by attacks through the internet on issues such as cyber security, such as free speech, fake news, etc. This is an international problem and it would be really interesting to get Australia’s take on where Australia might play a role. It’s really you have, you know, fantastic technical based Scientists, who can really contribute to the world stage in this regard. And the Secretary General has just announced an international panel to look at the whole broad range of these issues in the UN and I’m just wondering what Australia’s role will be in that?
Julie Bishop
Australia most certainly sees this as the new frontier and the new battleground. Cyberspace is immensely complex and challenging, but we support an open, free, secure internet. We believe that it drives economic growth, international stability, national security, but it can also be a vector for malign actors in transnational crime, in the spread of poisonous terrorist ideology. Cyber attacks can be devastating in their consequences. We are loud advocates for the application of international laws and norms across cyber and we believe that the UN Charter applies, in all its entirety, to cyberspace, that there is a place for international law and norms and conventions, such as state responsibility and international humanitarian law and the use of force. And we believe that, just as air warfare in the 20th Century was conducted according to international laws and norms, so must activities in cyber and space in the 21st Century.
Australia and the United Kingdom signed a joint agreement. Prime Ministers May and Turnbull signed a joint agreement for us to undertake greater co-operation in cyber activities. Last year, I released an international engagement, cyber engagement, strategy, which not only looks at the opportunities, but also the challenges of implementing and enforcing international law in cyberspace and looks at the, kind of, consequences and penalties that will have to apply and how they would be enforced.
So, we have played a significant role in various UN committees. I anticipate we will continue to do so. We have a dedicated Ambassador for Cyber Affairs and it is a matter of considerable priority for our defence and foreign affairs and other portfolios. So, I see Australia, United Kingdom, US and others, continuing to engage closely on the issue of cyber and how we manage to ensure that its benefits outweigh its negatives.
Adam Ward
Thank you. Yes, gentleman here at the front?
Dominic Dudley
Thank you. Dominic Dudley, a Freelance Journalist. Two questions for you: one, you had some criticism for Iran and obviously, US sanctions are due to come into force on Iran again. Does Australia support those sanctions, and if not, if it’s not going to fall in line with them, what efforts are you going to make to enable Australian companies to continue trading with Iran? And, on the other hand, you also pledged your criticism for Russia. Given the curiously strong relationships between this White House administration and Russia, does Australia have any concerns about sharing security and defence information with this US administration?
Julie Bishop
First question in relation to Iran, Australia supports the JCPOA. It’s not perfect. It doesn’t cover all of Iran’s behaviour, but it was never designed to. It focuses on Iran’s nuclear programme and we believe that any effort that could halt Iran’s progress in developing a nuclear weapons programme, should be supported. We were disappointed that the United States pulled out of the JCPOA, not only because it gave Iran a reason to complain about the United States not abiding by UN Security Council resolutions, but it also had the potential to undermine whatever other agreements the United States would enter into with other states, for example, North Korea.
I was present in the UN General Assembly meeting, when the United States made it clear that they’d be pulling out of the JCPOA and immediately, Iran had its narrative that, “You can’t trust the United States on anything, not even a UN Security Council backed treaty like the JCPOA.” So, we saw that it had more downside to the US to pull out than upside. In relation to – and we have our own sanctions in place, as well as the sanctions imposed by the US in relation to Iran. We believe that Iran’s other behaviour in the region, its proxy wars and other behaviour, even its ballistic missile programme, which is not covered by the JCPOA, ought to be the subject of separate negotiations with Iran. And we’ve certainly urged our friends in the White House and State Department to pursue those negotiations in relation to Iran’s other behaviour.
On the question of US sanctions, we will obviously consider any request for us to do likewise. But at this stage, we have acted as other supporters of the JCPOA have and have continued limited commercial opportunities with Iran. I visited Tehran in 2015. We’ve had a continuous diplomatic presence in Tehran. It has certainly proven to be a very useful presence and we certainly hope that that will continue.
In relation to your question about the United States: we had absolute confidence in the United States as a FVEY partner, just as we do with the United Kingdom. We have deep, probably unprecedented levels, of intelligence and information exchange and it has worked, undoubtedly, to our benefit, over decades, and will continue to do so. I will continue to urge the United States not to reward Russia for its bad behaviour. I’ve said that publicly and I’ve said it directly to the administration, that where our interests are affected, for example, the downing of MH17, we are holding Russia accountable through state responsibility. And we’re part of an effort to prosecute those responsible for the bringing down of that civilian aeroplane in the Netherlands courts, and we don’t believe that Russia should be rewarded for the pattern of conduct that’s undertaken over recent years.
Adam Ward
Thank you. This lady here in the second row. Just keep your hand up a moment and the microphone will reach you.
Robyn Fitzsimons
Thanks. Robyn Fitzsimons, an Australian Member of Chatham House. Very interesting comments about Britain – British involvement in the Pacific region. There was a statement released by Her Majesty’s Government after the Chequers conf – recent conference, which said, in the context of prospects of British trade with other countries, that Britain might actually seek to exceed to the TPP. I was wondering whether you’ve got any comments on that, or for that matter, said to the insipient quad arrangement? And do you have any comments on Richard Armitage, the Former Deputy Secretary, who’s reported recently as saying that Australia might need to take over the role that America had played, and not exactly in those words, but in terms of lead – instigating leadership in the area?
Julie Bishop
First, in relation to post-Brexit Britain, we will obviously wait to see the form and the conditions and the way that Britain exits the European Union. Until that is negotiated and determined, we’re not in a position to invite Britain to join the TPP. But at an appropriate time, we propose negotiating with the United Kingdom a free trade agreement and we would see that as an obvious segue into the TPP and indeed, this is what occurred with Japan. Australia negotiated a free trade agreement with Japan. We dealt with some of the very challenging issues, not least being agricultural access and market access more generally. We negotiated a free trade agreement with Japan and once those debates were had and won within the Japanese diet, it was easier for Japan to then enter into a negotiation with what was then 11 other countries, for the TPP. So, that may well be a model that Britain could consider, depending upon the circumstances of Brexit, that it would enter into free trade agreements with countries like Australia and then that could lead to the TPP. I mean, negotiating with one country I believe’s easier than negotiating with 11. In – well, that’s been our experience, anyway.
In relation to Rich Armitage’s statements, it’s interesting, coming from somebody of the experience of Rich Armitage. It might well reflect his view of the current administration. But Australia is already taking a fair share of the responsibility for securing our region. We have committed to the largest military build-up in our defence programme, $200 billion, since the Second World War, and this manifests in submarines, in frigates, and planes and the like, so that we are a regionally capable power. And so, Australia is already, I think, doing more to assure the security and stability of the region, particularly the Pacific.
Adam Ward
Gentleman here in the blue shirt in the third row?
Jack
Hi, I’m Jack. I’m an Analyst at SRM Risk Consulting. I was just wondering, with America, as Adam put it, introverting on the world stage and Britain somewhat hamstrung in its ability to project globally with Brexit, is Australia really looking for, sort of, other long-term strong partners that it can look to uphold the international order with, with those two countries seemingly going backwards, in terms of their ability?
Julie Bishop
I cannot foresee a time when Australia will not be the closest defence and strategic ally with the United States. We depend upon the United States for our defence and strategic security and the relationship is as strong and as deep as it’s ever been. The more unorthodox policies of the Trump administration are matters that we take into account, but the overall umbrella of the US-Australia relationship remains the same. We are stepping up our engagement with India, for example, with Indonesia, with countries in Southeast Asia, the ASEAN nations, the ten ASEAN nations. Some are much more developed and advanced than others, but nevertheless, the ten ASEAN nations are an increasingly dynamic and economically important, strategically important group. This year, we held the first ASEAN-Australia leaders dialogue in Sydney to deepen our engagement with those nations. So, yeah, Australia is always seeking to make friends with those whose interests align with ours and whose values and instincts align with Australia’s. The United Kingdom is an obvious partner, and we just see so many opportunities post-Brexit for the UK to, as I said, take a greater global leadership role, in addition to what it already does.
Adam Ward
Thank you. Yes, you sir, in the front?
Robert Gardner
Thank you, Minister. Robert Gardner, Chatham House, with lots of Aussie friends. North Korea and their words and actions since this performance in Singapore, I wonder what your comments might be and do you believe them? And if I could ask another question, Helsinki, can you make some comments, please? Thank you.
Julie Bishop
In relation to North Korea, it has a long history of promising many things and never delivering and so, we have had a healthy scepticism from the outset that North Korea would negotiate, would agree, would even sign documentation. But whether it actually came through is another question and we have been down this road before. We certainly appreciated the President’s unorthodox approach. No-one, six months ago, was expecting the President of the United States to be sitting down in Singapore, let alone anywhere else, with the leader of North Korea. But the promise that President Trump extracted from Kim Jong Un of denuclearisation is yet to be understood. What the US might mean by denuclearisation may not be what Kim Jong Un believes. I suspect that Kim Jong Un is talking about bilateral denuclearisation, in other words, they give up the nucs if the US pulls out of South Korea and other issues. So, we have a long way to go, in terms of seeing the removal of the threat of North Korea from the Korean Peninsula.
Adam Ward
Knowing now…
Julie Bishop
What was your second question on…
Adam Ward
Sorry.
Julie Bishop
…Helsinki?
Adam Ward
Yeah, Helsinki, yeah.
Julie Bishop
The President has sought to clarify his comments and I’m yet to absorb the impact of the clarification.
Adam Ward
Yes, okay. But just on North Korea, knowing now what you know about the Singapore summit, do you think that in retrospect it was ill-advised? Would you have liked to have seen more consultation with allies on the granularity of the details?
Julie Bishop
Of course one would always like to be consulted more in advance. That’s what powers like Australia would always wish. But the United States had its own course of action underway. It brought Kim Jong Un to a negotiating table. Six months ago we were talking about military action and we were talking about more sanctions on North Korea. North Korea was ramping up its capability, the fear that it had in intercontinental ballistic missile that was capable of attaching a miniaturised nuclear device and hitting Continental USA was, of course, in everyone’s mind. Since the summit, there has been no overt action on the part of North Korea. They didn’t even celebrate, as they normally do, the start of the Korean War. They normally have a big military display, but there was nothing overt. So, we can only hope that Mike Pompeo and those who are charged with responsibility for implementing the Singapore declaration, are making progress. But I think it will be a very slow road.
Adam Ward
One of the controversial aspects was the notion that what were termed war games could be suspended. Did that, sort of, send any shockwaves as far as your concerns about the alliance with the US was concerned, that this was seen as something less institutionalised than perhaps has been understood?
Julie Bishop
I think it needed clarification, particularly for Japan and in South Korea, but they have obviously discussed with the US administration as to what that means. Again, I think President Trump’s approach is to give a little and then see what North Korea will give and he gave an indication that they could suspend the joint military exercises. Well, the ball’s in North Korea’s court, to coin a phrase. That must now prove that it’s genuine in its attempts to normalise relations with the world.
Adam Ward
Okay, we’ve got time for two more questions, I think. There’s a gentleman, very persistent, at – right in the far – to my far right at the back.
Pablo Uma
And Pablo…
Adam Ward
If you’d just like to grab the microphone.
Pablo Uma
Oh, you’re talking about me?
Adam Ward
Yeah.
Pablo
Oh sorry, sorry. Pablo Uma Muslim Aid. I’d just like to ask you about foreign aid. Will Australia ever reach that 0.7% target?
Julie Bishop
It’s not a target to which we subscribe, because the importance for us is how the aid is targeted. Just a benchmark for the sake of a benchmark doesn’t achieve the kind of development that we want to see with an aid budget. So, like many Governments around the world, we’ve been constrained in what we can attribute to the foreign aid budget, but it’s what we’ve done with it that I think counts. We’ve focused on our strengths; we’ve focused on the Pacific. In fact, we’ve had the largest funding increase to the Pacific. $1.3 billion in aid to the Pacific is the highest ever and it’s how we focus on more productivity enhancing infrastructure and greater economic sustainability, as well as the reduction of poverty, that counts. So, the target isn’t the issue, it’s how the money is invested.
Adam Ward
And a final quick question from this gentleman here, yeah.
Simon Plombier
Simon Plombier, K2 Intelligence. A couple of weeks ago Ben Rhodes, Former, or Deputy Security Advisor for Obama, was here, and he said that he felt that the timeframe on the horizon for US power withdrawal from the region has, sort of, shifted from a 20/30 year horizon to a five-year horizon. Does that leave Australia with enough time to build the meaningful relationships that would see it share that security burden for the region?
Julie Bishop
I don’t accept that the United States is withdrawing from the region. In fact, when we released our foreign policy white paper, which for the first time in a foreign policy document, articulated what we meant by the Indo-Pacific, the Indian Ocean Asia Pacific, not just a geographic term, but a priority region for us, that the United States put out a national security statement, which also encapsulated the notion of the Indo-Pacific as a priority for the US. They’ve renamed Pacific Command the Indo-Pacific Command. The US is holding the annual AUSMIN meeting on the West Coast of the United States and I know that is to symbolise their commitment to the Indo-Pacific and so, I don’t accept the premise that the United States is disengaging from the region, so I don’t need to put a timeframe on it.
Adam Ward
We don’t have time, unfortunately, to go into, I’m sure, another set of questions about the areas where you feel new rules might be needed or where existing rules need to be updated and modernised for the world that we’re living in. But I hope very much you’ll agree to come back, on another occasion, and give us an update on how things are going there.
Could I please ask you to remain seated in order to allow the Minister and her delegation to leave, but also, join me in thanking her very much for this presentation [applause]. Thanks. Thank you very much.
