The Future of the Korean Peninsula

Dr Robin Niblett CMG

Ladies and gentlemen, welcome to Chatham House, and I know that it’s nice and sunny outside, which is one of the reasons we have such a good turnout here at 8 o’clock in the morning for a members’ meeting, which is not what we normally do to our members. On the other hand, we don’t often have the opportunity to have such a distinguished speaker come by Chatham House, although we were discussing we had Julie Bishop with us yesterday, but two, I think, of the most – to have two of the most dynamic Foreign Ministers operating on truly critical issues, in complicated parts of the world, in two days running, is a huge privilege for us and, Minister Kang, thank you very much, indeed, for coming to Chatham house to share your thoughts with us today. So, I’m delighted to welcome the Foreign Minister of the Republic of Korea, Kang Kyung-Wha, here to Chatham House and to come and talk to us, as she will today, about the future of the Korean Peninsula.

We were discussing, a few minutes ago, I was saying that one of the contrasts between think tanks and Washington and in London is the extent of focus on the Korean Peninsula, the challenges that it faces, which is that bit more distant, even for a global Britain that keeps a wide eye on all of the economic relationship with South Korea, is particularly deep and strong, and many British Diplomats have worked actively on this topic, at least in terms of capturing the popular and even the Press attention, this has been less of a topic. But, obviously, the last year has really been a truly dramatic one, with the Singapore Summit between the US President and the President of DPRK, obviously, the preceding summit between the President, you know, and having President Moon and Kim Jong-un, has been quite a moment of drama. And so, what we’re truly looking forward to at the moment is to hear from Foreign Minister Kang and her remarks about where the negotiations are, where they’re going and what the prospects are for the coming months and years.

Foreign Minister Kang was the first – is the first woman to take the position of Foreign Minister, but she’s somebody who has mixed her career between one in the Foreign Ministry and one in the United Nations, and she’s held a number of important positions there in the UN, in fact, appointed positions by three successive UN Secretary Generals, if I’ve got it right, Foreign Minister Kang. But having served as Deputy Relief Co-ordinator, Assistant Secretary General position there as a Senior Advisor to Secretary Gutierrez as well and also, within the Foreign Ministry of Korea, in a number of senior positions, including as Director General for international organisations, and she really is somebody who, therefore, is extremely well placed to be able to address this topic. We look forward to your remarks. We look forward to a bit of conversation and we look forward to some questions here with our members. But this could not be a more interesting time with us all enthralled to see what the denuclearisation programme is likely to look like, how it’ll change the region. We really are, at the moment, a test and we look forward to your remarks and your thoughts of this very delicate stage-in, probably, one of the most important international negotiations taking place internationally right now. So, Foreign Minister Kang, over to you and welcome to Chatham House [applause].

Kang Kyung-Wha

Well, thank you very much, Director Niblett, for that very generous introduction. I’m here for the first time, but it is truly an honour to be here in this august space of great tradition, a place where great minds have gathered, on behalf of peace and prosperity in – around the world, so it’s really an honour to be here. I’m a little bit under the weather. I think the job of Foreign Minister requires you to travel to various places, regardless of your preference for weather or climate, and I was in India and Singapore with my President last week and that meant hot, cold, hot, cold, hot, cold, for a couple of days and, as a result, I have this cold, which is a bit disruptive of my voice, with a runny nose, so I will speak a bit lower than my usual tone, but I’m hoping that it still gets through to you.

So, Director Niblett, distinguished guests, ladies and gentlemen, let me begin by thanking Director Niblett and Chatham House for giving me this opportunity to discuss the current state of affairs on the Korean Peninsula, with a distinguished audience this morning. I am, indeed, delighted to have this exchange of views with you on the diplomatic efforts of my Government, to bring about complete denuclearisation and lasting peace on the Korean Peninsula. Admittedly, a very tall order, given the difficult history of the North Korean nuclear issue and decades of military tension that have defined relations on the Korean Peninsula. But we have a historic opportunity to achieve this and we are endeavouring to strengthen the momentum for dialogue toward our goal, based on airtight co-ordination with our ally, the United States, and close consultations with Japan, as well as China and Russia. And we have enjoyed the fullest support of the United Kingdom and other key players in the international community in this endeavour, as we affirmed, in my meeting with the new Foreign Secretary, Mr Jeremy Hunt, yesterday.

Let me give you a brief background and update on the developments on the Peninsula during the past year and then I’ll be very happy to take your questions and comments. I think we can say that the current Peninsula has been at the centre of global attention, but never so intensely as in the recent months. In the past, the news was usually about North Korea’s nuclear or missile’s provocations in defiance of the will of the international community. But, this year, the news has been about the start of dialogue to resolve the issue and about inter-Korean reconciliation.

The year began with North Korea responding to our repeated call to revive dialogue and to come to the PyeongChang Winter Olympics and Paralympics. Its participation in these games, in February and March, was turned into an opportunity for high-level strategic dialogue between South and North Korea and this, then, led to the first inter-Korean Summit in 11 years, on April 27^th, at the Peace House of Panmunjom. Another follow – another summit followed barely a month later, easing the way towards the first ever US-North Korea Summit, which took place on June 12^th in Singapore. Since then, there has been a series of inter-Korean talks to follow-up on the Panmunjom Declaration, as well as the start of negotiations between the United States and North Korea, to implement the broad agreement reached in Singapore. These developments would have been unimaginable as late as November last year, as the world watched, with growing alarm, over North Korea’s repeated nuclear and missile’s provocations. The change in less than ten months seems dramatic, but it is, in fact, the fruits of strategic thinking and much hard work that has characterised the Government of President Moon Jae-in since day one in office.

Upon assuming office in May last year, President Moon Jae-in has put achieving peace on the – achieving lasting peace, on the Korean Peninsula at the top of his foreign policy agenda. He made it clear that we seek peace with the North and not its collapse or certain unification. And shortly, thereafter, in July, while in Berlin for the G20 Summit, he elaborated this vision in his Berlin initiative, whereby South and North Korea would live together in peace and co-prosperity, free from the threat of nuclear weapons and war and, since then, we have been steady and unwavering in our endeavours to realise this vision with the support of the neighbouring countries and the international community.

The three parts to this vision are as follows. First, the Korean Peninsula must be free from the threat of nuclear weapons. The threat posed by North Korea’s nuclear and missile development must be eliminated once and for all, and this must be achieved through peaceful diplomatic means, backed up by the solid, combined defence posture of the are ROK-US Alliance. Our goal and, indeed, that of the entire international community is the complete denuclearisation of North Korea. And, on this point, our message to the North, in close co-ordination with the United States, has been a combination of pressure on the one hand, with the offer of talks on the other. Its repeated provocations, as it’s sought to advance its nuclear missiles programme last year, were met with further pressure and sanctions, as embodied in the series of UN Security Council sanctions resolutions. The international community has acted in unity in implementing these sanctions and making clear to North Korea that its nuclear ambition is just not acceptable. But we have also offered dialogue to resolve the situation and to start charting a course towards a better, more prosperous future for North Korea.

Second, we must establish lasting peace. Permanent peace has yet to be established on the Korean Peninsula. The Armistice, signed in July, 1953, after three years of devastation, has left the two Koreas technically, still at war. The 65 years since then have seen a few periods of dialogue and reconciliation between the two sides, but have been, mostly been characterised by military tension and mutual hostility. North Korea’s nuclear and missile’s development, the pace of which have quickened, in recent years, greatly added to the tension and posed a grave security challenge for the whole world. Thus, for lasting peace, we must work, not only to denuclearise North Korea, but also, to replace the Armistice with a peace treaty that will define the legal parameters of peaceful co-existence between South and North Korea.

Third, with complete denuclearisation and South-North peaceful co-existence, the doors will open to development and economic co-operation with North Korea. North Korea would be brought into the fold of co-prospering countries in East Asia and the Korean Peninsula will become the bridge that links the Eurasian Continent to the North and Southeast Asia to the South. The positive dynamics this would create for peace and prosperity in the region and the world would be enormous.

In pursuit of this vision, we have engaged in proactive diplomatic endeavours, led by President Moon himself, to secure the political will and agreement of the top leaders of the key countries, most notably the United States and North Korea, but also of Japan, China and Russia, and to win the support of key players in the international community. The two inter-Korean Summits in April and May and the first ever US-North Korea Summit in June were the culmination of these efforts.

In the outcome of these summits, the Panmunjom Declaration and the Sentosa statement, President Moon and Chairman Kim Jong-un and President Trump and the Chairman Kim, respectively, committed to work for the establishment of lasting peace on the Korean Peninsula and to achieve complete denuclearisation. Furthermore, in the Panmunjom Declaration, South and North Korea agreed to sustained dialogue and promote inter-Korean co-operation in various fields, including military tension reduction, rail and road connections, forestry, sports and family reunions. The two sides also agreed to declare the end of the Korean War and to seek three-way or four-way talks for the start of negotiations toward a permanent peace regime.

In the Sentosa statement, the United States and North Korea reaffirmed the Panmunjom Declaration, committed to overcome the decades of hostilities between the two sides and to work towards a new relationship and to start the recovery and return of American POW/MIA remains from North Korea. And, most importantly, North Korea reiterated its commitment to complete denuclearisation and the US pledge to provide North Korea with security guarantees.

The US-North Korea track to implement the Sentosa statement began with Secretary Pompeo’s third visit to Pyongyang earlier this month and this has been followed with further talks for the POW/MIA remains, and working level negotiations on denuclearisation and security guarantees are expected to take place soon. The South-North Korea dialogue to implement the Panmunjom Declaration has been active on several fronts, with some concrete results already. The military communication line along the western sea coast has been reconnected and further talks are expected on steps to reduce military attention. Red Cross talks have led to preparations for a family reunion event in late August, and work is underway to open a South-North joint liaison office. Sports talks and exchanges are also taking place. In these processes, the ROK-US co-ordination remains vital to ensure that the two tracks move in complementary. We are well aware that the pace of improvements in inter-Korean relations is contingent upon progress on the denuclearisation track. And we remain firm that the Security Council sanctions, placed upon North Korea for its nuclear and missiles provocations, will remain in place and be faithfully implemented until we are assured of its complete denuclearisation. This will take time. Focus and unity of purpose among all who share the goal of North Korea’s complete denuclearisation.

In the meanwhile, my government is fully abiding by the sanctions regime in engaging with the North, seeking waivers, where necessary, and ensuring that the cooperation projects do not translate into economic benefits for the North. And, as we move forward, we count on the abiding support of our close friends, the United Kingdom, in particular, as a permanent member of the Security Council, share a special responsibility in ensuring the effectiveness of the sanctions and promoting dialogue to achieve complete denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula, as confirmed in the Panmunjom Declaration and the Sentosa statement.

As a special friend of South Korea, who had sent its troops to fight with us during the Korean War nearly seven decades ago, the United Kingdom shares our aspiration to achieve lasting peace on the Korean Peninsula, which must surely be the best reward for the sacrifice of so many lives it paid then. The Korean-UK ties have grown deeper and wider since then, with the support and encouragement of the United Kingdom, and other likeminded countries, Korea has become a vibrant democracy and a thriving market economy that shares the same values with the United Kingdom.

Our two countries have become vital trading partners and likeminded voices in global fora. The United Kingdom is our second largest trading partner in the European Union, so we are obviously closely following the Brexit developments and working together with our UK counterparts to ensure that the bilateral trade and investment ties will continue to thrive in the post-Brexit era. My meeting, with Secretary Hunt yesterday, was very timely and useful in this regard and I very much look forward to forging a very good working relationship with him. So let me end there. Thank you for your attention and I look forward to the conversation. Thank you [applause].

Dr Robin Niblett CMG

Thank you very much, Foreign Minister, for laying out, as you said, what has been just a remarkable last seven months. In fact, we were talking, just a few minutes ago, before you started your conversation, that we both had the opportunity to participate in a private meeting in Davos there on Korea and, sufficed to say, that it was a pretty gridlocked discussion amongst those Western allies, to be frank, of the Republic of Korea, South Korea, who really were trying to think of a way forward. But, at that point, as you said, you really could not have foreseen what has happened since then, and you’ve gone through the series of steps that have taken place. And also, just one other image just stayed in my mind very firmly, since late last year, where I participated in a conference in Beijing where it was all about infrastructure connectivity. And there were people from South Korea, from Japan, from China, from the United States, people from Europe, and they had this wonderful map up on the wall where they showed all of the connections that would happen. And South – I looked at the map, so this weird, this strange island South of China, I couldn’t work out what it was, and the map had South Korea and then a blank and then the rest of the Asian, Eurasian Continent. It was like it was cut off and your remarks just then about the reconnecting of the Eurasian Continent, this idea that there can be a North-South connection, the Korean Peninsula could play this role. That image you evoked there in your speech was quite powerful ‘cause it’s the complete antidote to what I saw last year. So, I think the stakes, at so many levels, couldn’t be higher.

I’m just going to ask a couple of questions to get going, then I do want people, hopefully, here to think through what questions and issues they’d like to raise. But just contextually, if I can, I wanted to ask just about your thinking on China, because, obviously, this is a negotiation, which each of the players, but especially the United States and China, are just extremely important and defining in the way this will move forward, and I just wonder if you could just help us think through what you think Chinese thinking is.

There’s been a lot of overestimation of China’s power over North Korea, in general, whichever leader, even Kim Jong-un, who I think has been blatant and blunt in his keeping China to one side until this last, last phase here. And it did seem that China’s move, not only towards the UN sanctions, but to step up what appeared to be unilateral sanctions on the transfer of oil early this year, around January, may have really been a moment that tightened the screw on the North Korean Government and its thinking. How do you think China sees the progress here? What concerns does it have? How does South Korea play the relationship with China? Just anything you could share on their role in this negotiation, such an important relationship bilaterally for you, as well.

Kang Kyung-Wha

Of course. Of course. China is our largest trading partner. We have various conversations at official levels and, obviously, on the issue of peace and security on the Korean Peninsula, it’s a player with a big interest. It is also the largest economic partner with North Korea and given that the sanctions are about cutting off economic ties, obviously, China has had a major role to play, in terms of the effectiveness of these sanctions, and it has. It’s a repeated statement. It commits it to faithfully implementing the Security Council sanctions and it remains committed to the shared goal of complete denuclearisation. It’s North Korea’s economic partner, but it is also, you know, a member of the United Nations Security Council, a permanent member, who writes these Security Council resolutions, together with other members and, therefore, it has a particular responsibility and ownership in ensuring that the global pressure regime to get North Korea, now that it’s committed to the track, that it goes along that track with some concrete action.

Dr Robin Niblett CMG

But do you think that China’s pressure to be meaningful and for North Korea to really feel the economic pressure requires more than China’s observation of just the UN Security Council sanctions? Does it require China to go above and beyond at a bilateral level? Do you think that was and is instrumental in the pressure?

Kang Kyung-Wha

Well, I think we already saw a clear indication of North Korea changing course, with the Chairman’s New Year statement, right? So, this is before what you mentioned about China’s steps, when he said – responding, basically, to our call for revived dialogue and responding our invitation to come to the PyeongChang Olympics. So, you can analyse what led to that discussion and how the developments of last year fed into that. But I think, already, there was a swift change in the calculations of the North Korean leadership at the very highest levels. I think there’s dialogue going, you know, various ways, two-ways, four-ways, among the – three-ways, among the four countries surrounding the region and we think it’s useful. Obviously, the diplomatic discussions made in private is – the official versions of that is what we see and that’s just the nature of diplomacy, and we go by what we hear and what we are told. But we are confident that the Chinese are – continue to be serious about getting North Korea on the road to denuclearisation and faithfully implementing the sanctions. They were very welcoming of both the inter-Korean Summit and the US-North Korea Summit as well.

Dr Robin Niblett CMG

And I raise this, as you’ll appreciate, slightly because the worsening of US-China economic relations, which is now a feature of the period after the Singapore Summit, and the considerable scaling up, at least rhetorically, on the next 200 billion, if the US does follow through on this, you know, will change, somewhat, the diplomatic environment in which the US and China operates and wouldn’t put it past the Chinese Government to want to, sort of, potentially, play on two sides of this. I mean, are you worried about the flow of the economic relationship bilaterally between the US and China, potentially, getting in the way of the incredible progress that’s taking place on the Korean Peninsula? Or are you just nothing we can do about it, we just have to focus on the game?

Kang Kyung-Wha

Well, you know, as I said, China’s our largest trading partner. The US is our second largest trading partner, so if there’s tension between the two sides, obviously, we are deeply concerned at many levels. First of all, at the trade and economic level, but also what it might mean for the very keen security issue. But I think the gravity of this and the implications of failure is there for all to see, and I think that is a shared, you know, analysis of the situation.

Dr Robin Niblett CMG

And, you know, I think that President Trump has invested a lot of his own personal capital, obviously, in his working so, at some point, he’ll have to balance those two dynamics out: his trade agenda and his diplomatic agenda. One more question from me and then, let me hand it over to our members and guests here. One of the views of those observing the remarkable progress that’s taken place this year is to be a little cynical and say, “Well, actually, Kim Jong-un has achieved what his father and grandfather have not been able to achieve.” He’s, in essence, got North Korea to the stage of being nuclear, almost a de facto nuclear power, with an implicit ICBM capacity to be able to take some type of crude nuclear device, potentially, to the United States. He’s clever enough to just hold off doing a missile test that would – it’s a little bit in the grey zone, as people would describe it, you could say that he hasn’t, you know, completely revealed that capacity. But this is a moment for him to, sort of, declare victory and try to then, sort of, negotiate back to something that still leaves that level of ambiguity, but with him with the security that his dynasty, his family, seem to have wanted, of following the China model, get safe first with nuclear capacity, then focus on economic development.

Now, that cynical view would say, therefore, he’s not going to give it up that much. What’s your reading? How would you – would you, sort of, counter that viewpoint? Would you have some sympathy with it? What do you think?

Kang Kyung-Wha

Well, I think, yes, cynical, sceptical, I think a healthy amount of scepticism is always good, especially given the history of negotiations on this issue with North Korea. But I think when the leader, himself, has come out and committed, before the international community, complete denuclearisation repeatedly, and he clearly understands what we mean and what we want when we seek complete denuclearisation. It means the whole bit. It means the weapons that they already have, the materials, the programmes, the plans and the expertise involved, that this all has to, somehow, be eliminated. How to get there is the challenge, and it’s going to be a tough challenge because they are very tough, smart negotiators. But I think, having come out this far, for him to go back I think will be hugely risky. Furthermore, he has not only come out to discuss denuclearisation, he has committed, vis-à-vis his domestic public, a different path to the future, in terms of economic development. And we saw an indication of that in his New Year speech, we saw a much more robust version of that in his statement to the plenary of the party. And so – and we know, though – he knows that he cannot deliver that different path to a better economy under the sanctions regime, and which is why it is important that the sanctions remain in place until we are assured of complete denuclearisation.

Dr Robin Niblett CMG

Clear answers. So, let’s open up and I’ll take hands as I see them go. So, the gentleman here, lady there and I’ll come here, yeah. So, gentleman there in the corner, keep your hand up, please, sir. There we go, thank you. Introduce yourself, if you don’t mind, not just Member of Chatham House, that’s fine, but a little more would be useful.

Member

Well, thank you, Minister Kang, for your opening words. Perhaps building up on the last question of Dr Niblett. My name is [inaudible – 31:06] from Colombia and serve in the military. I wanted to ask you, what do you think is the genuine cause of Mr Kim Jong-un for looking peace now and not before and how solid do you see his views and his narrative, in order to achieve a deliverable peace and, perhaps, what are the caveats here? Thank you.

Dr Robin Niblett CMG

So, maybe why don’t we take this question first and I’ll group them later, if we run short of time. But what caveats do you think exactly are in place, as well, on the North Korean side?

Kang Kyung-Wha

Caveats for North Korea or for ourselves?

Dr Robin Niblett CMG

Yeah, well, I heard maybe both sides, why don’t you do both. I heard on North Korea, but yeah.

Kang Kyung-Wha

Well, I think the whole rationale behind North Korea’s missiles, nuclear weapons, other WMD programme, is that the world outside is hostile, the South Korea and, in particular, the USR military is a hostile force that is constantly trying to collapse it or undermine it. But what the Sentosa statement has done is remove that rationale and I think the importance of that very simple agreement, and not just at the working level or at senior level, but at the top highest level between the President of the United States and the top leader of North Korea, to overcome the decades of hostilities and work towards a new relationship, has changed the political context in which we are having now this discussion on denuclearisation.

So, what North Korea seeks is security guarantees, because the rationale behind this nuclear programme was that this provides them security against the hostile world. And when the President of the United States has pledged, you will get your security guarantees if you denuclearise. I think that that’s a sign of courage on both sides, to commit to that and then to have follow-up discussions for actions. So, the negotiations, going forward, will be about North Korea’s concrete action on denuclearisation and American security guarantees for North Korea. And every step of the way, obviously, are, you know, South Korea and the United States are close allies when it comes to security issues, so these discussions will be taking place constantly. I go to New York tomorrow to meet with Mr Pompeo again and we are briefing the Security Council on the latest developments together, not informal meetings, but over breakfast.

Dr Robin Niblett CMG

And if it takes a long time, you just laid out the list there of potential steps that we need to be taking in terms of security guarantees, isn’t there a risk of a disconnect between the speed at which Kim Jong-un needs those economic rewards to start taking shape ‘cause, obviously, his country’s in quite a bit of trouble, and, economically, and the speed at which the negotiations can take place on something, as you said, that needs to be as verifiable and complete as one expects. Are you worried about a, sort of, time mismatch here?

Kang Kyung-Wha

Well, I think, you know, you always get the question as to how long? When? But I think what is clear is that there is the political will that was not there in any previous negotiations at the top – from the top level, to move in that direction. Obviously, you can’t get the Presidents and the leader engaging directly in these negotiations, but the negotiators work, based upon that political will. So, I don’t want to prejudge how long, but I think the commitment of the two leaders will ensure that the negotiations proceed, you know, more expeditiously than in any previous roles.

Dr Robin Niblett CMG

Great, lady there, please, in the white shirt first..

Member

My name is [inaudible – 35:29]. I work in emerging risk at Santander. Let’s say that North Korea has been really genuine with the denuclearisation commitment. It doesn’t erase the fact that a generation of people have been brought up with self-defence as a region, and extreme anti-American propaganda. Do you see any risk of actually, Kim Jong-un losing legitimacy between his people, or maybe including his own military apparatus?

Kang Kyung-Wha

Good question, but I think it’s rather risky for me to comment on the future wellbeing of a very important partner that we are negotiating with, so I will not directly comment on that. But, as I said in my speech, we are about co-prosperity and co-existence and we are willing to work with North Korea towards a more normal engagement with the outside world and, most importantly, in the economic sector, and I think we are off to a very good start, both South-North and US-North Korea. We’ll see. We’ll see how things develop. But, I think, given the pace of developments, this past month, there’s an expectation that this has created – that things are going to move very fast. I think we need to pace our self a bit because it will take time.

Dr Robin Niblett CMG

Right, here, please, first. No, just in front of you. Actually, no, not you, sir. Not you. Later, first, Jon, yeah. Sorry, just to take them in the order in which I saw them.

Jonathon Paris

Jonathon Paris, Member of the Institute. Minister, I’d like to talk to you about the commitment of the United States to retain its troops in South Korea. Is that something that might, at some point, be up for negotiation? And, if so, how do you prevent, you know, down the line, an inevitable reunification on their terms, which turns the Peninsula almost into like a dagger pointing right at Japan?

Dr Robin Niblett CMG

A key question.

Kang Kyung-Wha

Well, a key question. The US-ROK Alliance, in fact, the strength of the Alliance and the defence posture has been, I think, an important part of North Korea’s changed calculations, and it will remain so. The troop presence on the Korean Peninsula is not something on the table for discussion with North Korea. It is an Alliance issue and it will be dealt with at the Alliance level, first and foremost. What we seek is not unification, as I said, it’s peaceful co-existence and after a period of peaceful co-existence, you create the dynamics and the desire towards unification. I think it’s ludicrous to think that, given the capacity of South Korea currently and North Korea, that unification would, somehow, end up on their terms. So, let me just end my comment there.

Dr Robin Niblett CMG

We’re all discovering sovereignty has lots of different meanings and feelings to it, these days. So, first, there’s the gentleman here and then there and then there, yeah. Yeah, microphone at the front here. Sorry, yeah, and gentleman in the blue shirt.

Phil Phillips

Minister Kang, thank you for your comments today. Phil Phillips, Member of the Institute and sometime resident of Korea. May I address your comments about your relationship with the UK post-Brexit? There are two views here in the UK, that if we follow the Chequers White Paper and have a close alignment on our trade arrangements with the EU, that other countries won’t be able to sign a trade deal with us. What are your views on that? Will we be able to find a trade deal with Korea and do you have a preference for which way we go in our negotiations with the EU?

Kang Kyung-Wha

And you expect me to answer that?

Dr Robin Niblett CMG

Yeah, you’ve had the easy questions on Korea, North Korea, now you can get the difficult ones on Brexit.

Kang Kyung-Wha

No. Well, I think…

Dr Robin Niblett CMG

Welcome to our world.

Kang Kyung-Wha

As I said, the Korea-EU trade and economic ties has benefited greatly from the Korea-EU FDA and, obviously, the UK was part of that whole. Now it’s becoming separate from that whole and my discussion with Jeremy Hunt yesterday was, you know, making – ensuring that the ties that we’ve had with UK, under that broader agreement, is not undermined or damaged, as we make the transition to a Korea-UK FDA, and I think the discussions are robust and enough, so that we prepare for all contingencies.

Dr Robin Niblett CMG

And you got to ask the question. That’s as much of an answer as you’re going to get, I think, right now. Gentleman at the back first. Yeah, no, and sitting down, I’m afraid, sitting down. Well, I’m afraid, I’ll get to you later, yeah.

Dominic Bokor-Ingram

Dominic Bokor-Ingram from Fiera Capital. We’re an emerging market asset management company. A quick question on nuclear deals. The last time the US did a nuclear deal it took about two years before they unilaterally reneged on it, and I’m talking about Iran, obviously. Whatever you think of the pros and cons of the deal or what, kind of, a deal it was, how much does that complicate or hinder what might happen, regarding North Korea?

Kang Kyung-Wha

Well, I think the influence of that on North Korea’s calculations is not all that clear at this point. It certainly has not come up in the discussions with them so far. At one level you can argue that it is a clear demonstration of the American will to have a complete deal and not a halfway deal, as the American says, it’s the reason that they withdrew from the JPCOA. Our immediate concern is the effect this might have on our businesses, as I think everybody is with Iran post deal, and we have close consultations. I think we learn from others. Obviously, we very much hope that some, kind of, a deal can be made between all parties with the US to move things forward with Iran. But, in the meanwhile, we want to take care of our ties, business ties in particular. We are – we import a great deal of crude oil from Iran, so it is a huge challenge for us.

Dr Robin Niblett CMG

And I suppose one of the advantages, you talk about a complete deal and that the JCPOA did not necessarily represent that, ‘cause it was very much tied on nuclear. I suppose one of the advantages you have is that North Korea is not involved regionally the way that Iran has been, is. But the proliferation side has been a big worry, has it not? About North Korea that, as a nuclear capable state, its risks have been one of proliferation. Is that a – I presume that’s a central part of the negotiation as well, yes? Thinking about in the context of the North Korea nuclear negotiation and denuclearisation, you’re going to require some very important safeguards, aren’t you, in this?

Kang Kyung-Wha

Yes, yes, yes, absolutely, absolutely. By denuclearisation, we go back to the joint statement on denuclearisation of 1992, and that is not producing, not using, not proliferating the whole range.

Dr Robin Niblett CMG

So, verifying that is going to be fun. Right, in the order. Gentleman there, then here, yeah and then there, yeah.

Euan Grant

Thank you very much, Minister. Euan Grant, Institute of Statecraft. My question follows on from your warning that let’s not – Rome wasn’t built in a day. We don’t necessarily going to see a rapid change very quickly. Are there any specific indicators of accepting we are in very early days, of particular grounds for optimism or, indeed, for concern? And very, very quickly, because diplomacy’s sometimes private and public, Russia, was Russia’s public stance in the enquiry to the sinking, the torpedoing of your corvette, was that actually the private opinion of the Russians? ‘Cause, of course, the Russians, as per usual, came out and said, “It’s not proven who was responsible,” but I wonder if their private body language was different. Thank you.

Kang Kyung-Wha

Well, I wasn’t there in this position when this had happened. But our – the position of Government, after a very thorough joint Government expert investigation, is very clear, that this was due to a North Korean torpedo explosion that led to the sinking of the boat, I think that’s what you’re referring to. I recall that the Russians had a different view on this, but our – you know, we – our position is very clear and we have the evidence for that. Specific concern, as we move forward.

Dr Robin Niblett CMG

Yeah, and what steps? What have you seen North Korea? What steps have you seen, so far, that are indicators by the North Korean Government, in particular, that they are moving? I mean, is it simply we’re going to have talks about talks or have you seen any actual steps? Obviously, we’ve seen the dismantling of the test flight and so on, I mean, anything you’d say that points specifically towards that?

Kang Kyung-Wha

Well, I think we, of course, watch very carefully their internal developments and when the nuclear missiles programme was a stated aim of the country for many, many years, and from that to suddenly switch to denuclearisation is going to require domestic management of the messages. And we see, clearly, the shift about denuclearisation and about the United States, the state media is very now clear of any hostile rhetoric, vis-à-vis the United States, and I think that’s an indication of preparation for the negotiations to proceed.

Dr Robin Niblett CMG

And there was some reports, just in the Press here, publicly, that there have been indications from satellite imagery and so on, that the North Korean Government is expanding the construction of one of its missile sites. There had been that step of, what some people consider, is a collapsing nuclear test site, which has been, as I understand it, been dismantled. Some people think, ah, well, they would do that ‘cause then they can’t – no-one can get in and find out how far they’ve advanced their programme beforehand, which will then make verification more difficult later. But you see mixed signals, I suppose, is where I would go on this. On the one hand the, sort of, positive steps, oh, we’re getting rid of our nuclear test site, on the other hand, you still have construction going on in missile production sites. Do we worry or not worry?

Kang Kyung-Wha

What they have committed is to stop the testing and to show a concrete step in that direction they have closed down the nuclear test site. We very much wanted international experts to be there to observe and to confirm that hasn’t happened. We will press them, at some point, to verify that this is, indeed, a genuine closure. They had committed to stopping the testing and not stopping the programmes themselves. Obviously, this is a big concern. We watch, very carefully and we share the information and the intelligence and do the analysis, with whomever has the information on this, the United States and others, and this will all be part of our talks for denuclearisation. The known facilities, as well as those facilities that will emerge, potentially, and be confirmed.

Dr Robin Niblett CMG

Thank you. Right, I’ve got at least three more questions here. We’re good on time. We need to finish bang on 9 o’clock, so we have about seven more minutes. Gentleman here first.

Chan Nassif

Chan Nassif, Member of the Institute and Freelance Journalist. I’d just like to ask you the effect of all this [inaudible – 49:15] situation on the relation of North Korea, with some countries that are central to the Middle East peace process, like Syria and Iran and others. And whether there will be any commitment from North Korea of a change or whether things will be left to them and to their allies in that respect, you know, that’s my question.

Dr Robin Niblett CMG

And let me just take one other question. I’ve got, sort of, four questions left, so I’ll group two and two, if that’s alright, Foreign Minister, yeah?

Dominic Dudley

Hi, Dominic Dudley, Freelance Journalist. I just want to press you little bit more on your plans, in terms of US sanctions on Iran. I sounds like you’re not planning to fall into line with the new waves of US sanctions. So, is South Korea still planning to buy Iranian oil and what steps will you take to protect and, even, encourage South Korean and Iranian trade and investment in the future?

Dr Robin Niblett CMG

So, the Middle Easty questions, yeah

Kang Kyung-Wha

Yes, well, I think the US sanctions on Iran have ways for waivers and exemptions and we had gotten that in the previous round of sanctions before the agreement, and we are seeking similar ways to minimise the impact on our industries. I’m not sure I clearly understand the first question about North Korea’s ties with Syria, Iran then going forward.

Dr Robin Niblett CMG

Yeah, and it was, are we likely to see pledges in the agreement that will, in a way, prevent proliferation. I think some of the suspicions, the Syrian plant, and I presume the one we’re talking, the Israelis blew up may have had a little bit of North Korean helped in its construction.

Kang Kyung-Wha

Well, I can’t be – that would be having a crystal ball in front of my – to specifically see the concrete terms of the agreement, going forward. But, as I said, this would also cover any proliferation concerns.

Dr Robin Niblett CMG

Great, gentleman here in the corner. Yeah, so you had your hand up before, you still want a question? No, there was a gentleman there definitely had his hand up, somebody there, no? You’re covered, okay, sorry, did you want to ask a question or not? Yeah and then I’ve got the lady here? Yeah?

Karen

Karen [inaudible – 51:35] from Reuters. I was just wondering, you touched on the UN GA Assembly in September, are you making any detailed plans of any leaders or other representatives between North Korea, South Korea, United States, either meeting on a bilateral or trilateral basis? Thank you.

Kang Kyung-Wha

I wouldn’t rule that out, but there’s no concrete plans at this point.

Dr Robin Niblett CMG

There you go. Right, please, yeah, here.

Susan Schoenfeld Harrington

Susan Schoenfeld Harrington, I’m a Businesswoman here and involved in American politics from here. A question for you, first of all, were the South Koreans expecting President Trump to give up joint exercises between the Korean and the US, South Korean and US military? Was that a surprise? And given what’s happened, over the last couple of days, how do you feel about prepping, working together with the US and the President moving forward? How are South Koreans looking at the negotiating process, based on what we’ve seen over the last week or two?

Kang Kyung-Wha

The decision is a joint decision to suspend the exercises in August to further strengthen the momentum for dialogue as a goodwill gesture and this, expecting very much North Korea to move on the denuclearisation track. These exercises are – you know, it’s not frozen in stone. They are discussed, planned for, the focus has changed, the scope changes, depending upon where the two militaries, the ROK and the US, would like to focus. And the decision, as I say, is a suspension of the August exercises, no decisions on further exercises going forward. I have to say the level of consultations between the United States and ROK has been extremely tight at all levels. The two Presidents have met frequently, are often on the phone. I have enjoyed close relations with the previous Secretary of State and also, with the new one. So, I think, you know, in fact, the challenge, ironically, has meant that the Alliance and the level of consultations has grown even tighter and closer, in the recent years, and I think it will remain so.

Dr Robin Niblett CMG

We’ve got time. Sorry, and I’ve got lots of hands going up, which I can’t – we’ve got literally two minutes, so let me just take two last questions here at the front and I will forgo what I was going to say, yeah.

Donald Griffiths

Donald Griffiths, and it’s about the South China Sea, what is your opinion? How is South Korea going to handle the challenge that China’s throwing down to the world that the South China Sea is their sea and it’s the main trading route in the world?

Dr Robin Niblett CMG

Okay, South China Sea and Roger, question next to you.

Roger

Roger, I’m from – my family’s from East Germany, so it’s another country which was divided and, of course, I’m looking very – great interest to the developments in South Korea. There is one news, which came out recently, that the Russians met the North Korean counterparts and negotiated the building of a bridge over the Tumen. What role do the Russians play in the background?

Dr Robin Niblett CMG

There you go, always the last questions are the easy ones.

Kang Kyung-Wha

Okay. Well, on the South China Sea, we are, you know, a trading nation and the freedom of navigation and flight and this very vital sea link is extremely important to us and we very much hope that the commitments to keep it open, free and we – you know, so we have a very principled position on this and this is the position we make at every opportunity.

I’m not quite sure what specific project that you are referring to, but the Council resolution makes a specific exemption for a particular project between Russia and North Korea. It’s called the Najin-Hassan railroad connection, and I’m not sure if this is connected to that. But there is an exemption for this in the Council resolutions, but the reality is not much has happened to use this connection because it’s just not profitable. We have – you know, South Korea has unilateral sanctions that prevents any ship that had docked in North Korea to dock in our port for a certain period of time, so add it altogether, there’s not been much activity. Obviously, we would like to see a day when our economic ties with Russia connects with North Korea and the trilateral economic co-operation proceeds in full force. But, again, this requires the conditions being right and those conditions mean the sanctions are lifted.

Dr Robin Niblett CMG

And just to close, one word on Japan, the vital – I mean, the two treaty allies for the United States in the region, we haven’t really mentioned Japan, and they felt, I think, one would believe, a little bit sidelined in this process. What can the South Korean Government do to make sure that America’s two key allies are not any way split by this process? And how important is this for your role at the moment?

Kang Kyung-Wha

Well, I think, you know, I think we have – I am in frequent discussions with Taro Kono, my Japanese counterpart, there is frequent trilateral meetings between the three Foreign Ministers. My President has also met with the Prime Minister and on the phone. So, the level of communication, I think, assures us that we move in the same direction and the messaging may be different on a daily basis, but I think the commitment to the ultimate goal is something that we all, very clearly, share.

Dr Robin Niblett CMG

At a time of extremely sensitive negotiations taking place at a moment of historical opportunity, clearly, it is also clear that South Korea’s very fortunate to have you as their Foreign Minister because, Minister Kang, you’ve handled these questions extremely adroitly. I think we can see the scale, I mean, the ramifications from this bilateral – well, it’s not a bilateral negotiation, but a Peninsula challenge has really international tentacles connecting itself to the trade, to geostrategic relationships, to military balances of power, to examples of Iran, to America’s leadership role, or not, at the moment, you know, you really are in the eye of a particularly fascinating storm. I think you can see, from the turnout this morning, and the level of questions you got from Chatham House members, the great interest in the future and the great hope for you to be successful, as well, in all that you’re doing. So, we think you very much for taking the time to share so many thoughts with us.

Kang Kyung-Wha

Thank you.

Dr Robin Niblett CMG

And hope to welcome you back for an update again in the future. Thank you very much. A strong hand, please [applause].