India at 75: The Indian illusion

Dr Gareth Price

Hello, and welcome to this Chatham House webinar looking at India at 75: The Indian Illusion. As India approaches its 75^th anniversary, we thought it would be an interesting time to take stock of how it’s developed economically, the challenges it faces, challenges of unemployment, of trying to replicate Chinese development, also politically. Once a vibrant democracy, is that being challenged? Is it heading towards majoritarian authoritarianism? International relations, these are interesting times globally. How does India fit with this? The recent abstentions in Ukraine show a country that’s still clinging to non-alignment. A whole host of challenges, which we thought it would be good to explore.

By way of housekeeping, this meeting is on the record and recorded. Please, if you’re listening and have questions, submit them using the Q&A function. We’re going to have some opening comments from our three panellists of around five minutes each, then we’ll have a discussion and bring in the questions form the audience for the remainder.

We have three very distinguished panellists. Starting us off is Professor Christophe Jaffrelot, Director of Research at Sciences Po in Paris, Professor of Indian Politics and Sociology at King’s College London and a non-resident Scholar at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

We have Dr Shruti Kapila, Associate Professor from the University of Cambridge, in the Faculty of History and a Fellow of Corpus Christi College. She’s the Editor of An Intellectual History of India and the co-Editor of Political Thought in Action: The Bhagavad Gita and Modern India.

And she’ll be followed by Amy Kazmin, formerly the Financial Times award-winning South Asia Bureau Chief who spent 13 years in New Delhi covering India and its neighbours and is now happily ensconced in Rome.

So, Christophe, where has India come from and where is it headed? Over.

Professor Christophe Jaffrelot

Well, I would say, in five minutes, that to define today’s India, I would use, like in my book, Modi’s India, three formulas. One is national populism, the second one is ethnic democracy and the third one is electoral authoritarianism. Now, these are the three notions, as a Political Scientist, that I find particularly helpful for making sense of today’s India. And I will try to do justice to each of them in a minute, just – or a minute-ish, to explain what these formulas mean.

Well, natural populism harks back to the repertoire that Narendra Modi invented, in Gujarat, by combining Hindutva and populism. Hindutva, of course, was – is ideology and we saw that in 2002, when the pogrom took place, polarisation had become the key strategy that a) followed in Gujarat and then imposed at the centre when, ‘til 2014, BJP was not so much inclined towards this kind of strategy and many were still in favour of partners – partnering with parties with a much moderate approach of politics.

So, that was a new way to win elections, to polarise along a religious line, with the hope of getting an absolute majority, and it worked, but it worked because it was also a strategy based on a populist technique and that’s why Modi is so different from all his predecessors. He claims that he defend the people against the elite, that he defended the Gujarati in the centre and the centre that was in the end of a dynasty. By contrast, he is a son of the soil and a self-made man and an OBC, someone from the people. So, he appears as a victim of the establishment, the same way millions of Indians feel that they are victims of the establishment.

This was based on a new way to relate to the people indirectly. He did not choose BJP so much. He did not choose the Sangh Parivar so much. It used social media, he used holograms and he continues to rely on this, Mann Ki Baat, for instance, the monthly radio programme, it is a case in point. So, this is populism as a way to promote, not the people at large, but the majority group that is the Hindu. Because in contrast to those who would consider all citizens as being on a par, the sons of the soil are, they’re real people and therefore, we speak about national populism.

You know, in 2014 there was not even one Muslim MP elected on the BJP side. This national populism prepared the ground for the making of an ethnic democracy. This notion of the ethnic democracy has been introduced by an Israeli Social Scientist, Sammy Smooha, who precisely defines, “What is Israel?” A country where you have elections, rather free and fair, where you have some form of expression, where you have so much independent judiciary, but is a country where citizens “are more equal than others,” you know, to paraphrase George Orwell, who has never been so relevant.

Israel is clearly a Jewish state. India is not an Hindi state. It’s still, if you go by its Constitution, a secular state, but it’s a de facto Hindu Rashtra where Muslims are now at the receiving end, and in the first term or Narendra Modi, we saw vigilante groups intimidating minorities, Muslims in the first place. We had campaigns, one after the other, Ghar Wapsi, homecoming, reconversion, fight against land jihad, and to avoid the presence of Muslims in mixed neighbourhoods where Hindus were in the majority. Gul protection movements resulting in the lynching of some Muslim people and, of course, this new movement against love jihad fighting the way Muslim men were supposed to seduce, marry and convert a Hindu woman.

So, that’s a very important dimension of today’s India that harks back to the ideology and the modus operandi of the Sangh Parivar. That is so much interested in converting society, in transforming society. The state is there, but the state apparatus is not the main actor in this de facto Hindu Rashtra in the making. It does not mean that the state – the official dimension of this ethnic democracy is not on the right. In fact, for 2019, we saw a kind of, transition from a de facto Hindu Rashtra to a, kind of, Deori ethnic democracy, with the Citizenship Amendment Act making only non-Muslims among the refugees of Bangladesh, Pakistan, Afghanistan, eligible to citizenship. That was the law that went against the Constitution. We also saw new laws making almost impossible religious – inter-religious marriages in Uttar Pradesh, in other BJP ruled states, like Madhya Pradesh. We also saw new rules making equally impossible the selling of a flat or a house to someone from a different community in some states, including Gujarat.

So, we see a kind of, officialization of what was a de facto situation before and that takes me to the last point, briefly, that is the rise of what I call electoral authoritarianism. Populism, most of the time, transitions to authoritarianism, simply because the populist leader gets the legitimacy. He has the mandate of the people and, therefore, he prevails and he prevails over institutions. It’s his party in the first place, the party doesn’t matter so much, but also, other checks and balances, including the judiciary, including the bureaucracy. And what we’ve seen in India, and I don’t want to be too long with my return to this in the conversation, but what we saw recently in India is the decline of these institutions, including the Election Commission, including the Central Bureau of Investigation, including Parliament that has lost most of its power.

So, there are elections. In fact, populist leaders need elections, because it’s at the time of election that they get the legitimacy, but these elections and between elections we have a new form of governance, which results in a form of authoritarianism that finds expression in the decline of institutions, which are supposed to work as checks and balances. I don’t want to elaborate and give details, ‘cause my five minutes are over, but I’m prepared to return to these issues which are, of course, so important.

Dr Gareth Price

Thanks, Christophe. Yeah, no, I think these are core issues to come back to. Shruti, over to you, how would you point to…?

Dr Shruti Kapila

Well, thank you. So, I’ll do the same, in the sense I’ll gloss the main arguments of my recent book, which is called Violent Fraternity: Indian Political Thought in the Global Age, which actually maps the major political ideas that founded both India as a free country, but also as a Republican democracy. And the two main findings are that India actually departed, through an ideological innovation, from given Western norms of how politics might be conducted.

One is that the state did not emerge as either the pre-eminent actor or the natural destination of politics and indeed, that related to questions of the monopoly of violence and where it was held. And therefore, anti-statism, both in its violent and non-violent forms, Gandhi being non-violent, has been a very operable important political legacy ‘til date, which has also resulted into, sort of, kind of, tangentially relate to Christophe’s point, a, kind of, contestation between the realm of the state and the realm of democracy. The state and democracy are not the same thing.

In India, one could easily argue that under Modi, that actually, Indian democracy, I’m wary of using the word ‘populism’, but Indian democracy has certainly overwhelmed its constitutional and democratic structure. So, there’s been a capture of the state by a kind of – by what was actually given birth to in the anti-colonial struggle itself.

Secondly, unlike the West, the foreigner, the refugee, the external, has never mattered for the questions of political enmity, but rather, the intimate, i.e., the brother, the kin, the neighbour, and therefore, the Muslim, has become the object, has been the object of both intimacy and violence. Because our listeners should not forget that 75 years ago, when India became free, it was – it also still housed the largest Muslim population in the world. So, perhaps that did not, as it were, resolve this issue of minority to nationality, as had been in the case with its twin, i.e., Israel in 1948.

So, I think this has had a very long legacy and multiculturalism is – has not been – I think part of the problem has been the freight of a certain kind of liberal reading of Indian politics, which has actually looked for management of interest groups and patronages and looking for proceduralism, but actually, India had actually already innovated, one could say either a radical form of democracy or something more dangerous, in which the people and non-state actors were empowered all the way through. Today, I could ease – one could easily agree and say that, you know, from – you know, rather than labelling it, one could say that substantive democracy seems to be on the wane and it’s merely procedural, merely performative, but at the same time, it is incredibly driven by high emotions of attachment and attachment and expulsion. So, this is a highly emotive political field, it’s not simply a world of submission, control and command. This is not China, I don’t even want to compare it with any other society, but Modi in a way, draws a kind of, emotional political charge, which I think is unprecedented in India, even in comparison to Indira Gandhi, whom he has been compared to.

Secondly, I would say that – and that I mean, I would make this point that some of these themes were already in play in the anticolonial struggle, but the, as it were, the Gandhian legacy had won out, plus the Nehruvian legacy won out at the moment of 47, which I think you could say that the long history of the RSS, which is a secret society, secret organisation, has, in a way, won out as it gains publicity, a public life and as it were an electoral and politically mandated presence in India. Which means that it is undoing the basic compact laid down in 47, in which the default subject or citizen was not Hindu. Even electorally, that was what men like Ambedkar had worked tirelessly to ensure that that would not – that would – that India would not be a replica, a Hindu replica of Pakistan.

So, that, of course, is now, in a way, not just up for grabs. It is very clearly looking like that the default Indian citizen or subject is Hindu. But I think this is not going to be without difficulty. Precisely – not so much in terms of just domestically, but internationally, also India is facing a major identity crisis. You mentioned non-alignment and India’s, kind of, way of, you know, abstention. I don’t think much of India’s right wing has actually pirated left wing and Socialist or other liberal language, to usher in precisely the opposite agenda. So, this is not a non-alignment stance. This is a strategic pause for India to actually try and ensure a stronger hand with China and America.

How it is coming undone is actually precisely through the relationship India has with its Muslim trading partners, particularly in the Gulf, which is now – as you know if you’re reading the papers, India has come under severe censure for the first time, precisely for the kind of political rhetoric, which is highly – it’s beyond dog whistling. It’s proper hate speech, which is now part and parcel of everyday political discourse in India, which is not only jeopardised India’s in Muslims, but also India’s relationship with Islamic nations, and particularly in the Gulf.

And I think India will find it hard to navigate a New World Order in which it is not clear who is the supreme power. While the word, the buzzword, in India, is ‘multipolarity’, that well, you know, they cannot be China and America and that, you know, that India gains best from a multipolar world, you press people at what this actually means, it’s very hard to come up – to actually, kind of, find out what underlies it. So, at the moment, India’s foreign policy feels rather ad hoc, rather transactional, but behind it is actually India’s domestic ideological remaking and warfare, which will come – which will be – which will pose a significant obstacle to its international image and ability to transact.

So, I’ve, sort of, said things, you know, very quickly, but the main point I would like to say is that I would – that I think this is not without contest in India. I think, you know, if I – as a Historian, if I look at it and I look at, you know, literally 100 years ago, you know, when the British Empire was completely in total command of violence, of protest, of media, and you know, it produced the world’s largest protest movement with Gandhi, with a, kind of, anti-colonial movement, which ushered in the era of decolonisation. And I don’t think Indians – I mean, you know, it’s not simply my optimism, the diversity of India’s political needs are such that it will not be able – this is – this politics of command and obedience is likely to face a backlash, either electorally, but certainly in terms of social movements and protest movements, because Indians, you know, as my book argues, you know, have – might not agree with a lot – large number of Political Theorists, that in India, there’s a, kind of, despotism of the political realm and simply controlling it will not yield the results, how much ever the fantasy might be coming closer to a Hindu Rashtra that Christophe eloquently described. So, my jury’s – my – I would say that it’s at a turning point. It is not a done deal, both in terms of India’s internal map, as well as India’s new identity internationally. Both will face significant challenges in the coming years. So, I’ll leave it there.

Dr Gareth Price

Thank you, Shruti. Before we turn to Amy, can I just repeat, participants, if you have questions or comments, please put them in the Q&A function. Amy, 13 years a Journalist in India, please, your response.

Amy Kazmin

Okay, well, thank you very much. It’s rather daunting to go after two such Scholars as Christophe and Shruti. I mean, you know, Christophe is someone we’ve all admired for decades and learned from, so, I won’t even try. I will attempt to talk a little bit more experientially about, I mean, my lived experience working as a Journalist and what I’ve noticed and the way – like, the way that it feels. I lived in India for 18 years of my adult life. I got there for the first time in 1994 and I was – and then, I was there for five years and then, I returned after eight years in South East Asia, in 2008, and I was there until December, so another 13 years.

The India that I came to and that I arrived in, was an India that was beginning to open up. Three and a half years earlier, the financial crisis had forced the beginning of the dismantlement of the Licence Raj. Of course, the trauma of the Babri Masjid was also just two years earlier, after – two years prior to my arrival, but overall, the mood that I came to was a nation that was, kind of, optimistic, looking forward, getting ready to join the world and especially talking about the urban middle classes, the urban educated middle classes, which for decades, had not really had jobs and opportunity. There was high brain drain among educated people, who were going abroad and, you know, looking for jobs that weren’t there at home under the, kind of, stultifying presence of the Licence Raj.

And I arrived in an India where new things were happening, where call centres were being set up for the first time, where companies were looking around and seeing a potential market and a potential manufacturing destination and young people felt really positive about the future. Indians were returning. People who had lived in the Silicon Valley were returning and people were optimistic. People felt India’s time had come. They wanted to be part of new things that were happening. But it was also, like, a very freewheeling and free time.

I remember there was, I think it must’ve been a World Economic Forum event, held in conjunction with CII and it was in the basement of the Taj in Delhi, in this huge ballroom. And I still can remember that, like, Anand Mahindra, the, you know, prominent businessman and Peter [Dunbram – 23:47], who was, I think, then, part of this, kind of, a fragile ruling coalition, were actually on the same panel, which you can’t even imagine something like happened now. And they were, kind of, butting heads, talking about the reform process, how it was going. Anand Mahindra was giving credit for – to the government for, you know, what had happened so far, but talking about how reforms needed “to be accelerated and stepped up,” and [inaudible – 24:13] was defending the government, and it was a lively debate.

It was interesting to see business and Politicians, kind of, arguing publicly about the needs of the country and its future in a way that was respectful and constructive, where there was actually, kind of, concrete content and arguments being made, and I just thought my God, I love this place. And it was vibrant and – but overall, there was a feeling of optimism and when you would talk to people from the business community, as we do, given our – the nature of the Financial Times, people were unafraid to tell you exactly what they thought about pretty much everything. You know, how the government was doing, where it was good, where it was bad, what they should be doing better, the problems. And there was a feeling of, like, true freedom, that people were unafraid to voice and express their ideas and, you know, policy issues were being debated by people who agreed and disagreed with the government and it was all pretty open.

The India that I left in December could not be more different and, you know, and it was with a heavy heart that I flew away in December. And the kind of climate of fear that has permeated every sector of society under this government, for fear of the cost of expressing yourself about anything, from economic policy to COVID management, nobody wants to talk about anything. Everybody is scared. Maybe that fear is unjustified, but whatever – there has been a climate created that is unrecognisable from the freewheeling India that I came to, where again, at that time, it was, like, about AIDS control and people were, like, debating openly, “The government is doing this wrong, that wrong. They need to be doing this.” I mean, it couldn’t be more different.

Today, the coun – the way that the government has – this government has established its control over information, the influence that it has used to, kind of, tamp down on debate in newspapers. The way that it has signalled to different kinds of people in positions of society, whether it’s public health or business, that – the potential costs of criticism. I know for a fact that, like, high-level business people who, 15 years ago, would’ve had no hesitation to, kind of, bash – you know, criticise Manmohan Singh’s Government for what it was doing wrong or could be doing better, will not say a word now. They get calls from Cabinet Ministers, “Watch out, watch what you say. Don’t talk to Journalists, be careful,” and I know this because they tell me. People are absolutely terrified to say what they think and what the costs of that might be.

And that was also very clearly shown in the COVID pandemic management, where public health professionals just wouldn’t talk, were afraid to talk and, I mean, there is going to be a cost to this long-term. Autocrats get trapped in a feedback loop of their own creation, where they don’t really get enough, you know, information and I mean, eventually, the fact that nobody in India wants to say anything about anything, because of the fear of the consequences, you know, is going to have a cost. And perhaps we all paid a cost of that, you know, those of you who were there, as I was there, riding through the Delta wave in New Delhi.

So, I’d like to make one second quick point. I know my five minutes has gone, but sorry, and that is about communal hatred. I don’t think it’s anyone’s case that communal hatred is new to India. Obviously, we all know that there have been communal hatred and mistrust within – you know, people are carrying animosity in their heart. The memories of the, you know, older generation that have personal memories of the trauma of partition, you know, that – there has been, you know, there has been communal hatred and can nobody say that, like, “Oh, it’s” like, “everyone loved each other,” you know, “before the BJP came.” There have – there’s always been the memories of partition and the damage that that left.

But what I feel is there was, like, the embers of the memories of partition and the drama of that and the trauma and what people went through, but as a general rule, I felt that the political leadership, with some exceptions, you know, the establishment, the state was, kind of, at that time, committed to trying to tamp it out. I can’t forget that when I arrived in India in the 90s, when, you know, there was the PTI official wire service, and in order to avoid inflaming communal tensions, when there were riots, the wires, or communal conflagrations of any size, big or small, the wire tape would come and say, “Members of one community have attacked members of another community.” They really tried hard, like, to, kind of, obfuscate what was happening so that it wouldn’t, you know, inflame passions and go on to feed cycles of violence. And as an American, I found it so bizarre on arrival, you know, why is this being reported this way?

You can’t really understand who’s done what to who, but it was very deliberate and part of a whole state programme of trying to tamp down embers of mistrust and hatred, whatever was left. Now, basically, you have a political establishment that is, basically, blowing as hard as it can and trying hard to stoke up these passions, communal hatreds, mistrust, mis – hatred, mistrust, suspicion, resentment, senses of victimhood and, you know, with a Prime Minister who’s basically, you know, giving speeches about an Emperor who died 400 years ago.

So, I think, you know, we are starting to see the consequences of that. I fear the consequences will continue to get worse and it’s, to me, like, really, sad to see and that optimism about where India was going, I think, you know, has, like, dissipated a lot. And in fact, there’s actually a fairly large exodus, I think, you know, among people who have options. So, that is what I want to say.

You’re on mute, Gareth.

Dr Gareth Price

Thank you, Amy. We’ve got some questions starting to come in. I have a lot of questions. I think a question, which I’ll throw at all of you, because I think it’s something you’ve all touched on, the changes in India in recent years, and in different ways, on the fact that India is a incredibly diverse country. And for many years, that diversity was managed through politics, but now it’s shifting towards a more uniform idea. I guess maybe we’ll skip Amy for this, because I think she stepped on it, but Christophe, where do you think India’s headed?

Professor Christophe Jaffrelot

Well, it’s really difficult to consider that a point of no return has been reached. As Shruti said, it’s not as if the trajectory was a linear one. There is “a sense of direction,” certainly. BJP is expanding, Hindutva forces are penetrating society in a way that remains largely under-estimated. It’s a huge organisation that has infiltrated almost each and every sector of society. But there is an interesting disconnect between state elections and what we see at the Lok Sabha level, I mean at the parliamentary level. And never forget that not only BJP won only 37% of the votes in the last Lok Sabha elections, but could not make any significant dent in Kerala, Tamil Nadu. West Bengal and Orissa are certainly under pressure, but resist. Even in the Hindi Belt it’s not as if it was a clean sweep. Rajasthan is still governed by Congress and the Madhya Pradesh was won by Congress four years ago. The list is very long. Maharashtra, who are interestingly, the great ally of BJP, that was Shiv Sena is changing. Who would have imagined that Shiv Sena would have been the kind of party it has become?

So, we should not consider that there is no alternative. There are alternatives. There are social movements. The farmers’ movement is the last one in the list, but there are movements all the time, you know, Dalit Movements, Adivasis. Of course, the CAA, the – sorry, the anti-CAA protest were…

Dr Shruti Kapila

Yes.

Professor Christophe Jaffrelot

…there. So, I would like to emphasis – to emphasise this dimension, forcing that yes, there is a trend and this trend takes us to the transformation of India into a big Israel of a different kind.

Dr Shruti Kapila

Yes, hmmm.

Professor Christophe Jaffrelot

But it’s not inevitable, and civil society is still there. Well, of course, this moment is much longer than the emergency, but the emergency was a time when he had a, kind of, authoritarian rule for 18 month and then, magically, almost, everything returned to normalcy. It’s a different story, I don’t compare, but it’s an interesting parallel that has to be made there.

Dr Shruti Kapila

Yeah.

Dr Gareth Price

Thank you, and so…

Dr Shruti Kapila

I mean, could I…?

Dr Gareth Price

Shruti, Shruti.

Dr Shruti Kapila

Yeah.

Dr Gareth Price

Can I just add into the question of where you think India’s headed, a question from Advait Gumaji? “Do you think liberal – substantive liberal democracy can be re-established and what would the journey look like?”

Dr Shruti Kapila

Well, thank you. I just wanted to, actually, really jump off from Christophe’s point that, actually, after the emergency saw, the first time, multi-party democracy in India, you know, at – and a real sense that you got all the past parties up and up until that, it was really primarily the Congress and some local Communist governments. So, I do think that – and I don’t want to, kind of, again, compare it too much, precisely because I think that the story of the Indian state and the story of Indian politics is not collapsible, is not equal, these are separate phenomena, the BJP does want to close the gap and makes – make everything one thing. Like the Chinese state, which is there is no difference between government party and state and [inaudible – 35:44]. That’s really what, in a way, the BJP wants to do through the RSS and that. But I think it will find it very hard to do so, partly because of the diversity of the country, partly because the RSS is actually – seemed to been not simply – and people are not simply indifferent to it, but are hostile to it in large parts of India’s – Indian society. And I think the question really is, to me, whether India can produce a bipartisan polity at the national level.

So, we’ve always had, like, big one national party, with a large number of regional parties, federalism in action and the like and coalitions, and the question is whether something like the Indian National Congress can actually step up and offer a real social coalition against the BJP. Because one thing it has done, for sure, is that it has shown ideological clarity against majoritarian politics.

So, all is not loss. In that way, on liberal – on the liberal substantive thing, again, if we go back, as a Historian, if we just look back to the emergency, the first thing that happens is the clawing back of judicial authority and autonomy after the emergency. And so, possibly – but for that, I think Modi – the, kind of, the man – Modi mandate, first, needs a bit of a shock and I think a lot of that would also depend on the international scenario, whether deglobalisation, which is really enabling strong men tactics and strong men leaders, whether there’s actually going to be a change, also, in the international mood.

So, yeah, this is an – you know, Mao’s curse. We are living under Mao’s curse. These are very interesting times, so, yeah.

Dr Gareth Price

No, thank you both. We’ve got some other questions coming in. One quite specific one, which I’d like to throw at Amy, because she mentioned it, looking back to 20 and 21. This is from Sian Brady, “COVID ripped through India and caused chaos in the health system.” You were there at the time, I’d just be interested in your views on, yeah, the legacy of that, Amy.

Amy Kazmin

So, I think one of the things that’s very interesting about the Modi Government is the way – and the BJP, is the way that they’re able to, kind of, delink electoral performance from government performance and also, the way they’re able to manipulate the narrative on, you know, on issues relating to their performance. And you can see both of those things in the handling of the COVID pandemic and the aftermath of the COVID pandemic.

So, the do – like, obviously, the first year of the COVID pandemic was, you know, characterised by this, kind of, draconian lockdown, with very little preparation, which was among the most draconian in the world and imposed on, perhaps, one of the most vulnerable populations in the world. You know, the – most of the countries that had draconian lockdowns, still, you know, people were allowed out for food. I mean, in India, too, people were allowed out for food, but nobody really thought about the fact that in cities, there was huge numbers of people that if they couldn’t work for three days, would not have money to buy food and that just wasn’t really factored into the planning, because there wasn’t really that much planning. It was just like, oh, look around, you see that other countries are having lockdowns. So, you know, “We’re going to do it, too,” and boom, you have large numbers, you know, millions and millions of people, essentially trapped in cities, with no access to food, especially for – you know, as their earnings dried up almost immediately.

And then, after a while, you know, as they made their presence felt, mostly by leaving cities, you know, in a mass exodus on foot, then some kind of relief efforts came and there were soup kitchens. And, I mean, it actually looked like the 1930s Great Depression in Delhi. When I was going out and about, you know, there were humongous queues for food and, kind of, public soup kitchens start – type set-ups, that got going after a while, when people realised that there was actually a massive hunger issue. But it took time. It wasn’t really properly planned for.

And then, of course, there was the Delta wave and the interesting thing about the Delta wave, which was really very, very devastating, is that, you know, the government was able to swing the narrative very effectively by, kind of, pointing out the chaos that other countries had experienced when the pandemic first hit a year earlier. The fact is, India’s, kind of, peak, in terms of illness, death, collapse of the healthcare system, happened in the second year of the pandemic, you know, when you should’ve known better and been a little bit more able to foresee the consequences of, for example, having mass political rallies. And again, because public health professionals were intimidated and not able to speak out, you know, and didn’t feel empowered to speak out or question the official narrative, things went on and then, boom, you had, you know, this huge Delta wave.

But the narrative was very effectively managed. You know, the media was accused of being ‘vultures’ for preying on people’s grief. It was compared to, like, what happened in Italy and New York City in the first month or two of the global pandemic, before the world really knew what was happening, what it was dealing with, understood, before a vaccine was available, and – but, you know, but people, sort of, bought it. Like, well, look, even those industrialised countries, you know, they struggled, but India’s, kind of, big health disaster actually came, you know, more than a year into the pandemic. It was April of 2021 when everyone I knew had it in the same time. So, by then, you should’ve known how to handle it and avoid such a wave that would put such collapse on the health system.

But then we come to the aftermath, so UP was absolutely devastatingly hit. You know, we sent Reporters, we talked to people about – you know, everybody knows that it was a total disaster and huge numbers of people died. Of course, the government keeps bluffing by, you know, putting out fake numbers that any public health professional knows that the way the data is collected is all – you know, insurers of the numbers are artificially low. No serious public health professional believes these numbers, but they just cling to it like anything, “We only have this many deaths.”

But the interesting thing is that, you know, in the UP election, though UP was so hard hit, Yogi Adityanath comes roaring back and that really, I think, goes to something that’s at the heart of the Modi Government and maybe it’s been true of other governments before, but they’ve been able to, kind of, delink actual, you know, perf – an evaluation of their actual performance on concrete issues. And even when they botch up completely, they still are able to come roaring back on some, kind of, emotive issues and they’re able to control the emotional narrative.

And we also saw that in 2019, where prior to the whole, kind of, kerfuffle with Pakistan, the mood against them – I have gone out to the countryside before the attack on Kashmir, the mood was – I mean, there was a lot of people who had voted for Modi and the BJP, non-traditional BJP voters, who then said, “But actually, he didn’t deliver the jobs and opportunity that we thought that was going to happen and we’re a little disappointed in that and maybe we made a mistake.” Because he raised expectations of his delivery on the economy very high and he did not deliver on those promises, but then, you know, there’s the strike on, you know, in Pakistan, with a missile after – and this, kind of, brief military, kind of, heated up. And after that, everybody forgets the economy and it’s all about, you know, Pakistan and emotional issues and national security and boom, he comes back with a bigger, like, landslide than before.

So, I think that, basically, you know, people do remember what happened in COVID, but they, kind of, also blame it on faith, they blame it on God, they, you know, blame it on bad luck and they, sort of, are willing – they don’t – because there’s not enough debate, it’s very easy for the government to say, “We did the best that we could possibly do. Nobody could do better. Even these industrial advanced countries had a really bad time of it in the pandemic.” And so, it’s – they’re very – I mean, it’s very interesting to watch them. They’re quite masterful the way they manipulate the narrative and the information and the fact that nobody is willing to stand up and say, “Actually, maybe having those huge political rallies where nobody was masked, might’ve contributed a bit to this and maybe there are policies you could’ve taken that would’ve, you know, prevented this from getting so out of hand.” Nobody says that publicly, so they’re able to control the information space.

Dr Gareth Price

Thank you, Amy. A question here for – I’m going to put it to Christophe. It’s not dissimilar from the previous question. It’s from Gayatri Ghosh and he asks, “To what extent is Indian’s authoritarian shift constricted by its diversity? The Hindu shift seems to be very North Indian centric. The question of pushback from South India, some BJP people have changed,” you know, “the relationship between Hindi and national languages, the role of Tamil.” And I would add my own questions, or comment to that, which is if we were sitting here in 1957, the discussion would’ve been how can this diverse country hold together? And then, that question, kind of, went away. And, yeah, so, I’m adding in my own little comment, Christophe.

Professor Christophe Jaffrelot

Yeah, well, as I said, there is an element of diversity that continues to prevail, huh? I have listed Kerala, Tamil Nadu, Orissa, West Bengal. We can add, of course, Punjab and other states, showing that there is, of course, a resilience of diversity that makes the hegemonic project of BJP difficult to complete.

Now, there is a big caveat to that, and one is federalism is not what it used to be anymore. The centralisation of power in India has reached a new level. When you can impose demonetisation, without consulting the Chief Ministers, when you can do the same thing with lockdown, when you can repeat these, kind of, policies and get away with it, because the Supreme Court, for instance, has not objected anything, you have a new, kind of, federalism that makes the centralisation process really dangerous.

And secondly, and that is a way to respond to your question, Gareth, what we’ve seen, in the last few decades, is a gradual nationalisation of the Indian identity and that is something that used many different routes. The linguistic route, Hindi is much more popular, I mean, practice, at least, used in states where it was not that common, including Gujarat, including Maharashtra, including Karnataka, one.

Two, you’ve seen a nationalisation of Hinduism. Hinduism was, you know, a religion of hundreds of Ramayanas. Well, there is only one Ramayana today. Regional traditions have eroded. There’s been a standardisation of this religion. TV played a big role. I remember in the 80s, when I was doing [inaudible – 48:09], on Sunday you Ramayanas, episodes of the Ramayan and then, of the Mahabharat. It went on for, like, for years, in fact. Well, it’s one of the reasons why we have this new standardised brand of Hinduism, and they use it a lot, you know.

It’s very important, and it builds on what Amy has just said, very important to realise that this lack of accountability, why can they get away with it? What can – why can they get away with the COVID crisis, demonetarisation, the farmers’ laws, everything, you know? Well, I think for two reasons. One is Narendra Modi is above accountability. Like so many populist heroes, you know, they cannot be guilty of anything. They cannot be held responsible for anything. Indira Gandhi was not held responsible for the Emergency. She was re-elected in January 1980, only two years after the Emergency. So, this is a way to reconfirm what Max Weber told us 100 years ago, “Charisma works.” The charismatic leader, he may be doing good things, he may be doing wrong things. He is, like, above the human spacing, and there is an element of sectoralisation or at least exceptionalism in Modi as a leader.

But there is another explanation and that is not good news – these are not good news. Religion plays such a big rule in politics today, that even Yogi Adityanath, who is not as charismatic as Narendra Modi, can also win because he appears as defending the origin of the [inaudible – 50:07]. And if the second alternative works, if it’s not a question of the charismatic leader who will go one day and, therefore, something else can be re-invented, but if it is Hinduism has become the only game in town and you can be wrong, in terms of policy, you will survive politically, then it’s a different story.

I’m – I don’t know for them. It’s too early to say. I think there are many other reasons why people vote, but the UP elections, given the context in which they took place, are rather disturbing. This is really something few people could anticipate. The Government of Lucknow has not been punished and it’s very exceptional, because UP usually don’t give a second term to Chief Ministers. So, we’ll have to watch this possible explanation of why accountability is not the order of the day anymore.

Dr Shruti Kapila

Can I just say something slightly different? To argue that, actually, neonationalism and exclusive, aggressive nationalisms are the order of the day because of deglobalisation. France’s election has shown that. I would not like to, kind of, orientalise and exceptionalise India in a story, which is across the world on charisma, strong men, neonationalism. That’s just a general point, because after all – and this was a corrective, certainly in America, with a non-charismatic leader.

Secondly, I think I take great heart from the repealing of the farm laws, which saw actually the, kind of, original democratic language of India, which was cast in civil disobedience by Gandhi and it actually brought to heels one of the most arrogant political leaders in the world. So, I actually take heart from those two things. Why – of course, what is happening in Uttar Pradesh, and Uttar Pradesh has been a story long in the making on Hindu nationalism, precisely because it also has – I think one – we haven’t said much about Muslim politics. Someone has asked a question about it. It’s partly because whether it’s the press, whether it’s Social Scientists, we have overegged the Muslim question from UP. Whereas, actually, if you look at Assam, Gujarat, even Andhra Pradesh, there are all kinds of new kinds of Muslim leadership emerging in South Asia, in India, particularly, and Kerala.

So, I think if we were to change the focus a little bit, I’m not saying that the story is not bad, but the story will show that this is not – that this is a kind – a society in motion, in contest, in aggressive contest, in rich – the – one side is incredibly strong, precisely because it has captured the state, but it has not exhausted the political possibilities of Indians. So, my – this is not about being optimistic, but to actually say that the coming two/three years, both internationally and nationally, are tipping points.

We haven’t quite reached there yet to say that India is a Hindu state. It will take a lot more for it to actually officially anoint itself as that. That it has been aggressively majoritarian, I mean, no-one can dispute that, but at the same time, I, as I said, take great heart from the large number of regional election results, but also the fact that a social movement could bring down someone – could actually humble, and if not, humiliate, Modi just last winter.

Dr Gareth Price

Thank you, Shruti. A strange tack, there’s a few questions about India’s international role and a few people flagging up India’s current issues with Muslim countries. Shruti, in earlier comments said that “India will struggle to navigate the New World Order.” I’d like to ask Amy, because we were discussing this beforehand, and Amy had a slightly different take.

Amy Kazmin

[Pause] I think that India will experience, you know, times and periods of discomfort, such as what’s happened in the last week or so with Muslim countries, you know, kind of, taking note of some of extreme statements, extreme offensive statements, made by a senior person, or spokesman of the ruling party. I think that when these temperatures rise, you know, India will act to – you know, for damage control and try to smooth over relations and will, you know, brand people as, you know, fringe elements and not representive.

I mean, there – I think the ruling party is, kind of, clever. Modi – I mean, it’s very noticeable, as somebody who’s watched him, I mean, he rarely says anything inflammatory. If he does, it’s very – he – it’s – I mean, okay, he’s talking about Aurangzeb, so that’s historical, but in general, they – there’s the people who are, kind of, deployed to say the more outrageous things and then, people in senior positions are more careful. And so, there’s always the possible deniability of – but I also think that, generally, these countries want to do business with India, they see India, still, as a market, a big buyer, a big consumer and I think that India will be able to do damage control.

And then, I think the West is so preoccupied with China and the strategic threat posed by China. India isn’t seen as a strategic threat to anyone, really, in – and India will always talk about, you know, its domestic – you know, India’s focus is inward. It’s not an expansionist, aggressive power. In fact, it’s, kind of, struggling even to continue exert influence, even in its own immediate neighbourhood, in the face of an expansionist China. And the US and Washington clearly is looking to India as an ally, as a partner, I – to, kind of, help it with the China threat and I think that as long as China is, kind of – China and Russia are the big threats and India is a country that the US wants to do business with, security business, defence business, economic business. And I think that conti – countries will generally put their strategic interests, you know, first and tend to look away from, you know, the way that the democratic fabric may be getting eroded in India. That’s my personal feeling.

And you can see, even now, that, you know, European leaders have made a beeline to Delhi, Modi’s come to Europe. So, you know, even in the middle of all this Ukraine stuff, where India hasn’t taken a side, or refuses to take a side, still, the major Western powers are – you know, I don’t think there’s been very high consequences to India of that. I think India’s size and weight and the potential military heft that it can bring to bear gives it space to, sort of, do what it wants domestically, up unto a certain point.

Although I do think that in Washington, I mean, there is some disappointment that, you know, there is concern that this whole idea that they have of India as a great strategic partner, will India actually be able to fulfil that role if its economy doesn’t grow fast enough? If it can’t – if it doesn’t have the domestic resources to invest sufficiently in security spending, to further build up and modernise its military.

So, there are concerns about India’s ability to play the part that the West wants it to play, as a counterweight to China, but I don’t – but there’s still not really a – I don’t think anyone has actually, sort of, said that, actually, you’re not fit for this part. They’re just are trying to nudge India along to play that part. So, I think that that’s my personal feeling.

Dr Gareth Price

Thank you, Amy. We seem to be out of time already. Apologies for those of you whose questions I didn’t get to, but I hope the participants have enjoyed the discussion. It leaves me to thank our panellists, Amy Kazmin, Christophe Jaffrelot and Shruti Kapila. Thank you very much.

Dr Shruti Kapila

Thank you. Great to be in conversation. Thank you, bye.

Professor Christophe Jaffrelot

Thank you, bye, bye.

Amy Kazmin

Thank you very much.

Dr Shruti Kapila

Thank you, bye.