Report launch: A new Russia policy for post-Brexit Britain

David Lawrence

Good afternoon, everyone, welcome to this Chatham House Report Launch on A New Russia Policy for Post-Brexit Britain. I hope you can all hear me okay. My name is David Lawrence. I’m a Research Fellow at Chatham House, working on the UK’s role in the world and I will be chairing this event. And we are very privileged to be joined by the authors of the report, whom I’ll introduce shortly, as well as two additional experts in the field, to provide comment.

But first off, just a couple of housekeeping rules. So, firstly, please note that this event will be held on the record, and it is being recorded. You can submit questions using the Q&A function on Zoom and if you do, you might be asked to unmute yourself, though if you would prefer for me to read out your question, I can do that. Just indicate it in the question. And you will also see that the chat function will be open for everyone to share any observations or comments, but please put questions in the Q&A box, so that I will see them.

So, I think it’s difficult to overstate the importance and the timeliness of this report for obvious reasons, which you don’t need me to elaborate. Britain’s and indeed, the West’s, relationship with Russia is undergoing the biggest change since the Cold War. Since President Putin’s invasion of Ukraine just under a week ago, we’ve seen European partners U-turn on pacifists and neutrality policies, which they’ve held since World War Two. We face a humanitarian and refugee crisis in Ukraine, which could last years, and there’s a sense of return to Cold War politics, as well as a risk of real hot war involving NATO members and, I think, a general sense that “the West is back,” whatever that means, but it’s something people have said.

So, this is obviously in the foreground as we have this discussion, but it’s not just the security landscape that’s changed. Britain has also changed, as it has left the EU and last year, about this time, we saw a new foreign policy strategy outlined in the Integrated Review. And while this review identified Russia as the biggest threat to UK security, it also signalled a pivot towards the Indo-Pacific and this is very much the context for today’s report, which I hope you’ve had the time to read, and I’m delighted that we are joined by the report’s authors.

So, I’ll just introduce our panel. So, firstly, we have Duncan Allan, who is one of the report’s authors, an Associate Fellow on the Russia and Eurasia Programme at Chatham House. He’s the Director of Octant Research and Analysis, an independent consultancy. Duncan worked at the Foreign Office for 28 years, on the Former Soviet Union, particularly Russia and Ukraine, and served in the British Embassies of Moscow and Kyiv. And then, we are also joined by Ian Bond, who co-authored the report, with Duncan, and is the Director of Foreign Policy at the Centre for European Reform. Before that, he was in the British Diplomatic Service. He served in the British Embassy in Washington and in Vienna, was the Deputy Head of the organisation, the Security and Co-operation in Europe, working on conflict resolution in the Balkans. And before that, he was posted in Moscow and NATO headquarters. We are also joined by Joanna Szostek, an Associate Fellow of the Russia and Eurasia Programme at Chatham House, who is a Lecturer in Political Communication at Glasgow University. She focuses on the media’s – mass media’s role in relations between states, particularly in the So – in the post-Soviet region. And last, but not least, Kataryna Wolczuk, an Associate Fellow of Chatham House’s Russia and Eurasia Programme and a Professor of East European Politics at Birmingham University. Kataryna frequently contributes to publications, conferences and events related to the Eastern Partnership and Eurasian integration, as well as domestic and foreign policies of Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus.

So, I’m going to ask Duncan and Alan [means Ian] to speak first, ideally for no more than five minutes, so we have plenty of time for a discussion afterwards, and then, I’ll bring in Joanna and Kataryna. So, Duncan, would you like to kick off?

Duncan Allan

Thank you, David. Thank you, everybody, for making time for today’s event. Our paper was written last year. It was published at the end of January. Now, it’s been overtaken during the last week by the calamity that Russia is now inflicting on Ukraine, but at the same time, I suggest that the core arguments and conclusions in the paper remain highly pertinent for UK policymakers, arguably even more so in the light of recent events.

What I’d like to do, briefly, is to reiterate the four propositions that Ian and I finished our paper with. These were designed to guide the thinking of UK policymakers as they think about the Russia challenge. Our paper also set out four operational priorities for policymakers and I’d like to highlight one of those, as well. So, very briefly, just to summarise the four propositions at the end of our paper. Proposition number one is that UK-Russia relations are, essentially, adversarial and they’re going to remain that way for the foreseeable future, certainly under the current Russian leadership. And this is rooted in basic differences of interest, particularly as regards the defence of the UK and what we consider to be the foundational principles of European security, and I think that last – the second point, I think, is being vividly illustrated by what’s been happening in Ukraine during the last week.

Proposition two of our paper is that this essentially adversarial relationship isn’t, in itself, contrary to UK interests. I would suggest that too often in the past, UK and Western decision-makers have, at times, started from the premise that a good or better relationship with Russia is an end in itself. I think that’s deeply mistaken. An adversarial relationship with Russia means, rather, that UK and Russian interests are in conflict, are at odds with each other, and that the problems that this creates need to be managed.

There are two ways to do that: deterrents and dialogue. The UK is going to need to do both. So, together with its allies and partners, the UK is going to have to be much more serious and much more focused about deterring Russia in the future, including through higher defence spending. The second part dialogue will also be essential to minimise the risk of misperception, misunderstanding and miscalculation, and dialogue that is designed to achieve those goals will be particularly important during crises such as the present one. But thinking that dialogue is going to resolve basic differences of interest that divide the UK and Russia, in the foreseeable future, would, I think, be a profound mistake.

Now, the third proposition in Ian and my paper is that Brexit makes it more difficult for the UK and the EU to deal with Russia. Now, I’m conscious that the UK Government probably won’t want to hear that, but it needs to be said. In particular, I would suggest that there appears to be a broadly held view in Moscow these days that Brexit is weakening the UK politically and economically and thereby, confirming it as a lesser power than Russia in the global system.

Now, one important aspect of this is the extent to which Brexit has caused friction and complicated the UK’s relations with its former EU partners and particularly France and Germany. I think the current crisis in Ukraine has, to some extent, overshadowed this in recent days and weeks, but because alliances and relationships will be central to any effective UK-Russia policy going forward, it’s really vital that the UK Government addresses this underlying problem and repairs its relations with the EU and EU member states.

The fourth proposition of our paper makes a related point, which is that it – in building a policy towards Russia, decision-makers in London really must start from a realistic assessment of the UK power and influence. As Ian and I note in our paper, the UK is an important and influential country. It has considerable hard and soft power capabilities in a variety of spheres, but nonetheless, it remains a medium-sized power that’s in relative decline, compared to its past and compared to other countries in the international system, and it’s certainly a medium-sized power, in terms of the perceptions of Russian policymakers. The UK’s core interests are concentrated, as I would argue, overwhelmingly in the Euro-Atlantic space, where, in large measure, they’re at odds with Russia’s, as again, the current crisis in Ukraine clearly demonstrates. And it’s, therefore, really in the Euro-Atlantic area that UK policymakers must concentrate their resources going forward.

And finally, on one of the operational priorities that Ian and I identify in our paper, and that’s the priority that we call “rebuilding domestic resilience in the UK.” What we mean by that is making the UK better able to deter and withstand hostile Russian activities. Now, meeting this challenge has several aspects, but I’ll highlight one, and that is combatting the threat posed by illicit finance from Russia and indeed, from elsewhere. The failure of successive UK Governments, really, to grip this question adequately is, in my opinion, nothing short of a national disgrace. The current government appears to have been embarrassed by the crisis in Ukraine into abolishing the investor visa scheme, which is welcome, and accelerating its draft Economic Crime Bill, which is also welcome. What’s not clear to me, however, is that the government is yet finally going to get serious about enforcing the UK’s existing anti-money laundering laws and regulations, effectively, and that’s going to require sustained political leadership and significant investments in supervisory law enforcement agencies.

Now, on this issue, UK Governments have been consistently over-promising and under-delivering. There’s been lots of tough talk, but words and actions have not been synchronised. Now, that’s damaging, because it feeds the view that the UK’s hypocritical, which in turn, undermines the UK’s reputation and reduces its international influence. It also causes others to take the UK less seriously. And just to conclude, I think that’s a potentially dangerous situation for the UK to be in when dealing with contemporary Russia.

David Lawrence

Thanks very much, Duncan. That was a very helpful summary of the report and very succinct, as well. Ian, can I go to you next?

Ian Bond

[Pause] You could if I could unmute myself. So, I think where I want to start is actually by saying thank you very much to Duncan, because he came to me, at the end of 2020, with the idea for this paper and he really was the author of, probably, three quarters of it. And he was absolutely right back in 2020 that the UK didn’t have a Russia strategy worthy of the name and it needed one, and I’m only sorry that the awful events of the last few days have made that so obvious.

Now, I mean, where we are today, I think in response to the attack on Ukraine, the UK is, for the most part, doing a lot of the right things, although I share Duncan’s worries about whether some of the rhetoric will be followed through, particularly when it comes to cleaning up the flow of illicit finance and so on. But the point of this paper was that actually, we need to develop a strategy for the longer-term, not just a set of instant reactions to events. I have every sympathy, having spent, like Duncan, 28 years in the Foreign Office, I have every sympathy for the people in Whitehall who are now having to deal with the ongoing crisis. And it’s very difficult during times like that to step back and start thinking about how to deal with things in the longer-term and so, I welcome the opportunity that Chatham House offered us to set out that, sort of, longer-term perspective.

Duncan’s talked about the four propositions and I’m not going to repeat everything that he said. I want to focus, really, on two things. One is on defence and security and the other is on relations with partners. So, if I start with the Integrated Review and the priorities in it, David, you quite rightly referred to that and you highlighted the point that it describes the Euro-Atlantic space as “the place where the bulk of the UK’s security focus would remain,” and it specifically says, “because Russia is the most direct acute threat to the UK.”

Now, you know, that’s unusually categorical language, it’s much stronger than previous strategic defence reviews going back, say, to 2010. The problem with that was that Ministers rather undercut it, both in the things that they said before the Integrated Review was published and in subsequent actions, particularly the AUKUS Agreement, which actually helped to damage relations with some of our European partners. I’ll come back to the question of European partnerships in a moment.

So, the invasion of Ukraine, I hope, will remind the government that Russia is the hostile power on our doorstep. I mean, there are important questions about the future relationship that we ought to have with China. It won’t necessarily be precisely the kind of relationship that the United States would like its allies to have with China, I suspect, but you know, we’ll see, but Russia is right on our doorstep, and it is powerful enough to do us real damage. I don’t think we should be misled by the first days of this campaign in Ukraine into thinking that this is a paper army, because we’re starting to see, particularly in the South of Ukraine, where Russian forces have advanced furthest, that it is, actually, a very capable actor.

So, I think that, as part of a Russian strategy, we really need to think about whether we can carry forward an Indo-Pacific tilt and I’d argue it needs to be paused. We don’t have the resources to be able to distribute them both East and West of Suez, and I think the government needs to think rather hard about what capabilities we might need if Russian forces messed on NATO’s borders in the way that they did on Ukraine’s borders. And I’m not sure that we have a plan for equipping our forces that matches up to those sorts of issues. I mean, it’s good that we’ve been able to double our presence in Estonia, but frankly, the difference between having 1,000 troops there and having 2,000 troops there is more symbolic than practically significant.

So, the second point I want to make is about relations with partners, both in the context of NATO and the EU. Now, Duncan’s alluded to the impact that Brexit had. In the foreign and security policy area, the big impact was that we took a conscious decision not to co-operate with the EU institutionally, but instead, to build our foreign and security policy on two pillars. The first was bilateral and mini-lateral relations with the US and with selected European countries and the second was in a NATO context.

Now, there’s nothing wrong with either of those, and some aspects of them are quite important. I think the work that the UK is doing with the Nordic and Baltic countries, for example, in the Joint Expeditionary Force, that’s very important. NATO is clearly very important. But it’s a – it was a mistake for the UK to turn its back on co-operation with the EU institutions. This was something that actually, Theresa May understood. You know, she wanted an agreement with the EU on foreign policy co-operation. It was something which was dropped by Boris Johnson and David Frost, and I think part of that was because they thought that if it – if the UK appeared to be a demandeur, then, the EU would ask for something in return somewhere else, and part of it was that they genuinely didn’t think that the EU institutionally had a role to play in foreign and security policy. And what we’re seeing in the current crisis is how wrong that was and how the EU is finally starting to get its act together, slightly chaotically at times, but by comparison with where it was even six months ago, it’s moving forward quite a lot.

Now, one of the side effects of this crisis has been that, actually, I think the UK is having a more serious dialogue with the EU institutions, with the Commission and the External Action Service, particularly focused on sanctions, but perhaps going a bit more widely than that. But I think that looking to the middle to long-term, even after this crisis is over, the UK is going to have to recognise that European security depends on both NATO and the EU. They do different things; they bring different things to the table. The EU has a more economic role, clearly, but also a role in areas such as cybersecurity. Some – indeed, cybersecurity is one of the issues that perhaps crosses between the EU and NATO, depending on whether you’re thinking about military or civil aspects.

I can’t imagine that anything that the EU is doing in the military sphere is going to replace NATO any time soon. But I don’t think that EU military co-operation is just going to disappear when this crisis is over, and so, my closing point, really, is the UK needs to factor into its strategy for dealing with Russia the fact that there are now, or there is now, another important actor that it has to deal with and that is the EU, and I’ll leave it there.

David Lawrence

Thanks very much, Ian, and I’m sure we’ll want to pick up that thread of how this crisis affects UK-EU relations going forward. Joanna, can we come to you next?

Dr Joanna Szostek

Sure, thank you. I should, obviously, start by congratulating Duncan and Ian for this really fantastic report. Couldn’t be more timely and if anyone hasn’t read it in full yet, I would really recommend doing so. There’s a lot to be learned there. I would agree with what Duncan said that, you know, the propositions, even though they were developed, you know, before this current invasion and war, are really no less relevant now and even, perhaps, more relevant than before, and particularly the matter of domestic resilience, you know, being willing to take difficult decisions that might cost money to the UK, but are essential, really, for our security.

But I think, for sort of, my five minutes’ worth, I would just perhaps recognise that our world has changed substantially in the past week. Many things have changed since the report was put together and some things which perhaps felt, you know, relatively predictable a couple of weeks ago, now feel perhaps much less predictable. And that creates, I think, more of a need to think ahead about, you know, the different possible scenarios that might unfold in the short to medium-term and how UK strategy should, sort of, respond to that. And I think one of the biggest questions on many people’s minds at the moment is whether this war and invasion in Ukraine, and all the associated human costs and economic costs to Russia will ultimately weaken Putin’s position, because it does seem likely that there are tensions within parts of the Russian elite. Possibly might – they might develop into fractures. You know, it’s not impossible to imagine that at some point, you know, who knows whether in the short-term/medium-term, we might see changes at the top in Russia.

So, I think it is essential that there is thinking about those different scenarios that might unfold and, you know, how would the UK respond if there were to be change at the top in Russia? And I would say that here, it’s important to recognise that the threats which Russia poses to the UK, they’re not the kinds of problems and threats that would dissipate if Putin were no longer the man at the top, because you know, I think, at the moment, I’m seeing a lot of framing of the war in Ukraine as “Putin’s war.” You know, this is not – it’s Russia’s war, it’s Putin’s war. But I would challenge that point of view, because this war is not the product of one man. It’s a product of a political system, which Putin created, and it’s – you know, that the problem is that that political system is built on repression and it’s built on lies and it’s built on a media system that generates an alternative reality, which the current leader is now so immersed in, he – you know, it’s hard to really see his actions as rational and logical. But he’s not the only person caught up in that alternative reality. So, that’s, I think, something we should just recognise when thinking through, you know, how policy might shift and adjust, how sanctions might shift and adjust if we see changes at the top in Russia, which I’m obviously – you know, I’m not saying those changes are going to happen. I wouldn’t want to say how likely they are. I think that’s, sort of, impossible to estimate at the moment, but that’s – it’s all important to think about. So, I’ll leave it there.

David Lawrence

Thanks, Joanna. Yeah, that’s really helpful to bring things up to speed, especially all that’s happened in the last week. Kataryna?

Kataryna Wolczuk

Thank you very much. Once again, congratulations on the report and I have to say it’s a rare example that we have this depth and breadth of analysis, which provides us with an excellent starting point for discussing what needs to be done. But I will come back to this, to the issue of expertise and the challenges that we face when it comes to Russia. And – but I’ll start with the big point of our policy and engagement with our, sort of, friends and allies. The paper talks about ‘co-operation’ and I think it’s co-ordination as well and specialisation.

We cannot be good at everything at the moment, and I have to say what the UK has done has been exactly focusing on the right areas, like military, not necessarily humanitarian, because macroeconomic assistance can be left to other people. And, also, using, sort of, various channels, big multilateral channels, using UK’s phenomenal, sort of, diplomatic experience to lead. And that leadership is very important, and as someone who’s spent the week before Russia invaded before the war in Poland, I have to say that we should not underestimate Britain’s soft power and the megaphone effect. It really – I mean, the praises I’ve heard – I heard in Poland for the role of the UK. But it doesn’t mean that we don’t have to co-operate, because Germany and France are on a different page from when the report was written. This is good, this is for wrong reasons, but there is more, sort of, update needed in the way that we actually forge alliances and how we co-operate.

So, this is, sort of, the first point in terms of specialisation, co-operation and co-ordination. My second point, perhaps it’s more difficult and it’s confronting what I call Russia’s trans-imperialism, using economic ties to develop political leverage, and we’ve seen in the UK being on the receiving end. And what was – what is spectacular now, that we don’t know what’s happening in the Kremlin, but the Kremlin knows very well what’s happening across Europe and including the UK. And in terms of actually trans-imperialist, it’s, sort of, developing economic ties and converting them into a political currency, and we are now, sort of, dealing with this issue of our gaps and failings and addressing them. And it’s the issues of – I’m thinking about state-owned companies, you know, like Gazprom.

Putin personally turned the tap on gas to Ukraine, I think, in 2009. By 2014, Manchester United had sponsorship from Gazprom. So, leaving everything to the market has not been the best strategy and we are now, hence, scrambling, sort of, the scrambled eggs. And in terms of the market, as well, what’s been noted several times is projecting our known – our own sense of rationality onto Russia, and drama is very important to say that, you know, in terms of the alternative reality created, how do we engage? And whatever we do here, Putin is at war with the West. It’s not Ukraine, it is the official media, say, about NAT – fighting NATO in Ukraine. Whatever we [audio cuts out – 28:21] – it’s going to be used upside down.

So, understanding the mindset is what we need to do, but this takes me to my penultimate point on expertise, and I’m delighted that Duncan and Ian have come together and I’m very to – sorry to say that we don’t have this expertise in British academia, in British universities. We’ve lost our expertise. It has been decimated and there’ve been no incentives to develop the kind of expertise that matters, and for me, as an academic, was much more fruitful to come to Chatham House to discuss and focus on problem solving, rather than, sort of, abstract theorising that goes on in many British universities when it comes to Russia.

Where are our experts on the Russian economy? Some of them have retired. How do we know what’s happening? This is present in the business sector, but not in British academia. No incentives have been provided, and this takes me to the second point of the white swan event, sorry, black swan event, which we are going through it, and yet, including British business, actually, not listening to Putin, despite the ample, sort of, warnings that it’s important to do so. And perhaps I don’t have answers, but I will throw into the debate two final, sort of, points on soft power, the issue of – as Duncan and Ian said, about the need to engage, especially the younger generation. And going back to Joanna’s point, engagement is going to be how do we engage now that everything is weaponised, everything is securitised?

So, this is a real challenge that we face and the related issue, what is covered in the report, is the issue of the rule of law. How it has been instrumentalised and the British Government being afraid of Russian oligarchs using the rule of law, British law and courts, to actually undermine governmental policy. This is a real challenge. I don’t have easy answers, but the fact is that this is something that will probably need political solutions, in order to address things sooner, rather than later. And I will stop on this point, thank you.

David Lawrence

Thank you very much, Kataryna. That’s such a valuable perspective to have, especially in terms of how the UK’s response is viewed from Eastern Europe. I can see there are a few questions that have come in. Please do continue to submit questions using the Q&A function. We’d love to have a open discussion here, but I am going to use my Chair’s prerogative, if it’s alright, to ask the first question, and I suppose this is somewhat in response to the report, although I think you all talked about the importance of the UK working with the EU. And if I were to be a little provocative, I suppose I might ask has the last week actually shown that we need to work particularly closely with the EU? Because one might look at the events of the last week and see that Britain has been agile where it has needed to be, in terms of responding swiftly, sending military equipment and aid to Ukraine and to the – in many ways quicker than Germany and France and elsewhere, to the extent that the Union flag was raised in the Ukrainian Parliament.

But then, also, it has worked with European countries, including the EU, where it’s mattered. So, for example, on sanctions, there has been co-ordination and the – as well as bilateral co-ordination of the kind that Ian mentioned earlier. So, is this not – is arguably quite a good model of agility where it’s helpful and an ability to move quickly, quicker than the EU 27, but also, there are still relationships there, bilateral, mini-lateral, that allow us to work with partners where necessary. Or so put the question another way, how would things have looked different over the last week if the UK had remained a member of the EU or just had more cordial relations with the EU? Would things have really been much different? So, that’s my question. Yeah, Ian, why don’t you start?

Ian Bond

So, I mean, it’s a good question and I think the British Government’s assumption is you don’t need to have any structures, you don’t need to have any formal institutionalised co-operation. You can just do this all ad hoc. I mean, as I understand it, it took a certain amount of nudging from the US to get the UK, the EU, the US, sitting around a table to talk about sanctions co-ordination. I think there’s also a value in doing this sort of thing not always in a crisis. I mean, yes, you can do it in a crisis, but it’s easier if, actually, you’ve thought about it before and you know who to call, and you have gained some of the scenarios that you might face.

So, I’d still say, you know, none of that limits our agility. In fact, even if we were still members of the EU, it wouldn’t limit our agility. I’m always amused when I hear people saying, “Well, you know, we couldn’t have done the things that we did in terms of sanctions.” You know, some of the Baltic states had Magnitsky Acts before we did and they’re members of the EU. So, one shouldn’t exaggerate this sort of thing.

So, I mean, I think I can pick up – there was one of the questions in the chat, as well, about the – whether this would change as a result of the crisis and I think the answer to that is I hope it does, because I think we need to get away from the idea that we only really talk to the EU institutions when there’s a war breaking out in Europe.

David Lawrence

Thanks, Ian. Would anyone else on the panel like to come in, either on my question specifically, or more generally on how this crisis will affect UK-EU relations? Duncan.

Duncan Allan

Yeah, not really much – terribly much to add to what Ian’s already said. I’d perhaps pick up on two points. Ian’s absolutely right, one would hope that this kind of close, in some ways, unprecedented co-operation in recent days and weeks, isn’t simply going to be confined to a crisis. Now, you know, we are in a lengthy crisis and the pressures to co-ordinate will clearly continue to be intense. But one would like to think that, all the same, the UK would see long-term value in maintaining essentially co-operative, positive relations with the countries that are, at the end of the day, its nearest geographical – its geographical neighbours and countries with which, fundamentally, the UK shares basic interests and basic values. And it seems to me that in con – when dealing of – thinking about dealing with the Russia challenge long-term, it’s absolutely imperative to have as many allies and partners of that type with you all the time.

The other thing I’d add, as well, is that one of the interesting aspects, of course, about the Western reaction to events in Ukraine has been, on the one hand, really remarkable unity as regards imposing unprecedented packages of economic sanctions on Russia. Actually, the EU has actually moved more quickly and more aggressively and more comprehensively than the UK has, which rather to my mind, raises a question, well, how – we were being told – we’ve been told for a long time that leaving the EU – the U – leaving the EU will enable the UK to be an autonomous sanctions actor. It doesn’t seem to be living up to that promise so far and I fear that, in this area, again, we may be looking at another example of overpromising and underdelivering at the moment, I fear. I hope I’m wrong.

David Lawrence

Thanks very much, Duncan. I want to stay with this theme about EU co-operation on – and I will bring in Joanna and Kataryna as well. But Richard Wright has a question in the Q&A function, which seems relevant, so I will invite Richard to unmute and ask his question.

Richard Wright

Yeah, can you hear me?

David Lawrence

Yes.

Richard Wright

Thank you very much. Well, thanks both to Duncan and Ian and other panellists. Yeah, my question is, sort of, in the same sort of sphere. Ian, can you identify areas where the European Union response would have been stronger if the UK had been onboard? Now, my experience as a former EU Diplomat, was, for example, on sanctions, you just talked about this, I mean, the – whenever I was dealing with sanctions, the EU – the UK was right in the forefront, was the country that was almost leading the whole process, and it hasn’t been the case here. But are there other areas that you could point to where you believe that the EU global response, okay, to this disaster, would’ve been stronger if Britain had been institutionally onboard?

David Lawrence

And if you don’t mind, Ian, I’ll just read out one question which has also come in, which also seems relevant, which is from Fernando Herrero. “Please clarify if France and Germany, as the two main players in the EU, also see themselves as having an adversarial relationship to Russia. Perhaps the Ukraine crisis answers it in the affirmative.” So, Ian, quickly to you, as – since Richard’s question was directed at you, and then I’ll come to you Joanna and Kataryna.

Ian Bond

Yeah, great, thank you very much and thank you very much, Richard. Well, I mean, sanctions, yes, in the sense that the targeting of sanctions was something that the UK was traditionally very good at. Now, you know, we’ll have to see, and it may be that the, sort of, informal co-ordination that’s going on will enable that gap to be filled. But in the past, the UK provided a lot of input to the EU’s, sort of, sanctions cell and that’s something which has been lost and will certainly have to be recreated, if it is – hasn’t been already, on an ad hoc basis.

The other thing that I would say is even with the arrival on the scene of the External Action Service, the UK has a very large and generally pretty effective diplomatic network and when it comes, for example, to getting action in UN bodies, it really helps to have UK lobbying alongside, and again, that’s something that, to some extent, you can recreate on an ad hoc basis. But it’s easier if you have a mechanism and you have a habit of doing that.

The other question was on French and German relations with Russia. I mean, what’s extraordinary for me is how carelessly Vladimir Putin actually cast aside one of the assets that he had, which was that Macron and Scholz, for their own reasons, both had a strong desire to get a diplomatic success, and I think were, at earlier stages, quite willing to put a certain amount of pressure on Zelensky to make concessions on the implementation of the Minsk Agreement in order to be able to say, “We are the people who delivered peace.” And Putin lied to them and went ahead and invaded and he’s cast that aside and, to some extent, you know, both of them were faced with a choice between being humiliated or taking a very tough line, and they’ve both chosen to take a very tough line. So, I think this is a big miscalculation on the part of Putin in terms of, you know, his future relations with two of the major powers of Europe.

David Lawrence

Thanks very much, Ian. Kataryna or Joanna, may I bring one of you in? Joanna.

Dr Joanna Szostek

Yeah, I think just on the point of France and Germany, I mean, I would absolutely echo everything that Ian just said, because I mean, we always got the impression that Putin cared a lot more about those relationships than he did about the relationship with the UK. I mean, if you look at how France, Germany and the UK are presented and discussed in Russia, you know, the UK is generally presented as a lapdog of the US, you know, almost not so relevant. Whereas Germany is – was more presented as an important partner, same with France. So, yeah, I mean, it’s almost things are moving so fast, it’s hard to understand quite where – how France and Germany will, sort of, figure in the Russian worldview, I guess, going forward.

I mean, one thing to mention, perhaps it’s worth mentioning, is that, you know, the message coming out through Russian media is that these sanctions, they’re not going to last, right? This unity against Russia is not going to last. It’ll be another year, and I think this is partly a consequence of how things played out after the war in Georgia and how things played out after previous, you know, violations of international law by Russia. So, you know, obviously, you don’t know to what extent the – what the media are saying is really what’s being thought about at the top, but I think it is crucial to really keep that unity and, yeah, just make it last this time and just – so that this doesn’t – you know that – so that this stops, this – these kinds of, like, gross violations of international law, that we really, kind of, stand up to them in a unified way.

David Lawrence

Thanks, Joanna. Kataryna, would you like to come in at this point?

Kataryna Wolczuk

Thank you very much. I will just tackle some of the issues and perhaps saying that – what Duncan and Ian are – their argument is, that we are not aiming for adversarial relationship for the sake of it. That’s not the aim. It’s rather to actually react. We are having a big reality check, so actually, we cannot now afford not to have adversarial, because otherwise, we would be, you know, become like China vis-à-vis – or Kyrgyzstan vis-à-vis Russia. Those are the realities. So, it’s not adversarial by desire, it’s by necessity and we are not alone. So, from that point of view, I don’t think we are designated and we face any bigger risk than the countries in France, such as France or Germany.

And in terms of actually our position of the UK and co-operation, why should it – why should the EU co-operate? We have credibility on our side, that the UK has been saying for a long time, “I didn’t fall into the, sort of, diplomacy trap as France and Germany have.” So, from that point of view, the UK actually could see much more, sort of, with – much more clearly what was going on.

In terms of, actually, our expertise, what is now, as someone who’s worked on the region for over 2½ decades? For me, it has been amazing how successful Russia has been, in terms of disseminating all kinds of narratives, starting from ethnic, religious, historical or NATO. And those arguments, being, sort of, strong men, which were used by various people in the target countries, including the UK, to actually persuade us that Russia is correct. So, the exclusion argument and NATO, this is – I don’t want to go into this detail, but I think we have to – it’s perhaps time to abandon this, because you – nothing changed insofar as NATO/Ukraine was concerned, before the invasion, in order for this war to be started by Russia.

And perhaps the final point is, in terms of, actually, adversarial and preparation and securitisation of relations, we actually haven’t done enough to securitise and now, we are catching up very quickly. It’s Russia which securitised, but we haven’t actually understood the nature of the challenge it presents, not least for knowing what is the state of mind of Vladimir Putin? So, you know, Psychiatrists from the US, watching his body and his mind. So, securitisation, we haven’t had enough of it and now it is actually a catch-up moment. Thank you.

David Lawrence

Thanks very much, Kataryna, and we’re going to come to a couple more questions from the audience, firstly, Doran Doeh. Apologies if I said that wrong. Would you like to unmute and ask your question?

Doran Doeh

Right.

David Lawrence

We can hear you.

Doran Doeh

Oh, you can hear me. Okay, well, the question is, Duncan didn’t actually explain what the irreconcilable differences of interest are, and this has come up repeatedly with people asking whether we have the same irreconcilable differences as the French and the Germans. So, perhaps you might like to elucidate that and then we can all be the wiser.

David Lawrence

And I’ll just take another from the audience. John Mason, if you would like to also unmute and ask your question.

John Mason

[Pause] Thank you. So, I think it may have been partly addressed, but the question, I’ll put it, is had relations between the West and Russia already been securitised before the crisis to the point where it was inevitable that the current crisis became a materiality?

David Lawrence

Thanks very much, John, and if you’re able to hold multiple questions in your mind, I’m just going to read out another that was from Kieran O’Meara. “Some academics, such as Richard Sakwa or John Mearsheimer, have advanced the perspective that the current conflict with Ukraine was inevitable because a post-Cold War pan-European collective security institution was snubbed in favour of NATO, locking Russia out of the global security structure. To what extent is this view correct and such an institution possible or desirable in the future, if at all now, of course – if at all?” Duncan, would you like to start and I presume address Doran’s question particularly?

Duncan Allan

Yes, thank you very much, indeed. So, I – in my analysis of where the UK-Russia relationship is and where it’s likely to go, I see, really, two areas in particular in which there are some very basic differences of interest between the UK and Russia. Now, the first group of issues really relate to what I would call the defence of the UK, the defence of UK citizens and institutions, in particular. What I have in mind there are things like assassinations, because we are talking here about a state whose state organs and operatives have murdered, and attempted to murder, UK nationals on UK territory.

Secondly, we’re talking about a country that poses, I would argue, a very significant cyber enabled threat to UK national security, a country that continues to pose a major espionage threat, but also quite possibly more subtle forms of negative influence, covert influence peddling. And again, this takes us back, in part, to the question of illicit finance, which is not simply a problem confined to Russia, far from it, but since this is a Russia focused discussion, it’s important, I think, to recognise the potential threat of – that Russian illicit finance poses to the integrity of UK institutions and, indeed, prominent individuals, possibly. So, in all those areas, it seems to me that when it comes to defending the integrity of the UK’s law-based democratic institutions, Russia, in a number of ways, is a very real threat and I don’t see that threat receding in the foreseeable future, so that’s one bunch of issues.

The other bunch of issues really comes down to what I would characterise as the foundational principles for European security, and this is the, if you like, the irreconcilable difference with Russia that the current awful events in Ukraine really do bring home, graphically.

In our paper, Ian and I argue that it is in the UK’s long-term interests to continue to support three sets of principles, really, as really being the building blocks for stability and sec – long-term security in Europe, and those principles would be: sovereign choice, democracy and also human rights and fundamental freedoms. Now, on all of those issues, it seems to me that we, again, we have fundamental differences with Russia. And most clearly in the case of the Ukraine, Russia does not respect the sovereignty of its neighbours and as regards democracy, human rights and fundamental freedoms, again, one’s – one only has to look at the situation in Russia to see how far apart the UK and Russia are. On those – on all of those issues, essentially, our paper argues that there are irreconcilable differences, certainly under this Russian leadership and quite possibly in the leadership that comes after it, as well.

David Lawrence

Thanks very much, Duncan. I realise we’re actually coming up to the hour, but I want to give everyone a chance to say something. Apologies if we didn’t get to your question. One issue, which we haven’t explored in lots of depth, is the illicit finance component. Duncan, I know you just touched on it briefly, but if anyone would like to speak to that, that would also be good, but there’s plenty to talk about. Kataryna, I see on Zoom that you indicated you’d like to address Kieran and another question, as well, that came up. Would you like to go next?

Kataryna Wolczuk

Yes, and, in a way, I’ve partially addressed them already. So, in terms of actually – we have – in the 1990s, the UK actually had a specific initiative for boosting our capacity, especially on the post-Soviet states outside Russia. But that capacity has been paradoxically diminished and it’s now – in terms of, actually, information coming about the region, so many people still get it via Russia to find out what’s happening in Georgia, Ukraine and Moldova. So, we really have to be conscious about that we need this capacity building to understand what’s happening in the region and what Russia is doing.

But I would like to come back to the issue of resilience, which I think it’s very, very important, the UK resilience. And the sheer range and plethora of issues that we are dealing with at the moment is mindboggling and there – a lack of securitisation of so many aspects of our interactions, starting from internet satellites, which are due to be launched on Friday. Russia, basically, put up conditions, they’re not going to be used against Russia; that’s vulnerability.

The second issue, our intelligence. We know very well that this has been used very well by the UK, but on many occasions, it hasn’t been used. I remember reading about the apartment bombing on Putin’s – on the eve of Putin coming to power. The US and the UK had intelligence about apartment bombings and that was not used at the time. By the time I started looking at it, 2013, people like Berezovsky and Litvinenko, who were actually uncovering – providing that information, were both dead in the UK.

So, intelligence, satellite, and just to give us another example, what we need to look at, our market – basically, marketisation of energy supplies and storage. It means that we have no gas – sufficient gas storage security – storage facilities in the UK to prepare us for the gas crisis. Even though we don’t actually get our gas from Russia, in terms of, actually, vulnerability, our customers have certainly been seeing it. And the very final point from me, preparing the UK audience that it’s – basically, citizens, that – in say, long haul and there will be costs. We already feel them when it comes to oil and gas prices and we need much better communication that there will be some costs for us, but the cost for Russia and Ukraine are much higher. Thank you.

David Lawrence

Thanks very much, Kataryna, and we’re probably moving towards final remarks. Joanna, and then I’ll go to Ian. I think you two haven’t spoken in a while.

Dr Joanna Szostek

Yeah, I mean, I don’t have much to add, really, to the great comments that have been made already. I think, you know, in terms of resilience, in terms of flows of illicit cash, I mean, we’re learning now that you can’t separate security and the economy, right? I mean, if you, sort of, tried to compartmentalise those things, you’d get yourself into the kind of trouble that we’re in now. So I think it is, yeah, as Kataryna said, just recognise that, yes, there will be economic costs of, you know, sanctioning Russia, trying to isolate Russia, but the security payoff is worth it and that does need to be communicated.

David Lawrence

Great, thanks. Yes, I think this crisis has very much reiterated that. Well, perhaps I’ll come back to Ian and Duncan, then, for closing remarks, as the authors of this report and there were some other questions, as you’ve probably seen, about the various aspects of the – right, I see that you – to respond to some of them, as well. But yeah, Ian, why don’t you go first?

Ian Bond

Yeah, and so, I think the only one that I want to respond to is the one from John Holmes, “Does Russia have legitimate security interests, which we can usefully address?” And the answer to that is, clearly, it does, and the question is, how does it pursue them? So, I think it is entirely legitimate for Russia to say that it’s not particularly keen on having large forces of other nations close to its borders. But then, they have an equal interest in not having large Russian forces on their borders, and we had a structure for dealing with that in the past. We had the CFE Treaty, which, basically, created a series of zones in Europe. So, it, sort of, reduced the density of forces close to the line of contact, but Russia tore up that treaty, partly because Putin said it was “unacceptable to have constraints on where Russia could put its forces on its sovereign territory,” and that’s a problem because of the geographical disparity.

You know, if Russia can put all of its – all of the forces its entitled to have on its Western frontier, that’s quite destabilising. If Russia is allowed to have a certain share of its forces on its Western frontier and a certain share of its forces behind the Urals, that works much better for everybody and, then, on the Western side, you can say, “Well, you can only have so many forces in the Baltic states and Poland and Romania and Bulgaria and you can only have so many forces in France, Germany and the UK,” and so on. That’s the old structure and we could, in a sense, easily go back to that, probably rather more diffi – with rather more difficulty now, after this war.

And there are things that we can do on transparency measures and those were the sorts of things that were on offer in NATO’s counterproposal to the two Russian draft treaties, but I’m not sure how serious Putin was about those draft treaties, because, you know, he didn’t allow any time for discussion to continue, where I think he might well have ended up getting some concessions. He just went ahead and ploughed into Ukraine.

So, you know, I think – I agree with the basic point that Joanna was making, that we do face a systemic problem and it’s not just a Putin problem. But equally, I don’t think it’s a kind of, inevitable Russia problem. There are other Russias and other leaders of Russia with whom I could foresee having a much more sensible negotiation about these sorts of security issues and how you meet the legitimate security concerns of countries, not just of Russia, but of countries on the Western side.

David Lawrence

Thanks, Ian. I’m going to give the final word to Duncan, if you can squeeze it into 40 seconds or so, and then we’ll finish up.

Duncan Allan

Well, I’ll just – I realise I didn’t answer the question about the pan-European security structure. Look, it’s a nice idea. The problem is that it founders on this irreconcilable difference that we have with Russia over the question of sovereignty. So, Russia views itself as a great power with special privileges, that – including the privilege to veto any security initiative in Europe it does not like, the right to a sphere of influence around its borders and, also, the right to conduct its internal affairs free from internal criticism.

Now, on each of those points, the UK and other Western governments have consistently disagreed. So, quite how a new European security architecture, a new European Security Treaty, could be formed when there are these fundamental differences about the question of sovereignty, in particular, is not clear to me. And one thing that I’ve noticed, from some of the arguments that have been put forward over the years in favour of such a system, is that nobody ever explains how this fundamental difference can be resolved. It’s assumed that somehow, magically, the new system will make these differences go away. Frankly, that’s tilting at windmills. The reality is that there are some very basic differences between ourselves and Russia. There’s nothing inherently tragic about that. We just need to recognise it for what it is, be clear about our interests, understand where we can and can’t agree with Russia and, also, work very, very hard to manage the differences with Russia that are going to be confronting us for the foreseeable future.

David Lawrence

Thanks very much, Duncan, and thank you to all our panellists, Duncan, Ian, Joanna, Kataryna, and thank you to all of you for joining. Sorry that we didn’t have more time to discuss today. It feels like that there’s so many strands that we could unpick and go on for hours, but we have to leave it there today. I believe this will be posted online, on the Chatham House website, so you’ll be able to watch it back if you want to, or share it with others, and Chatham House will obviously continue to monitor the situation in Ukraine and, hopefully, also, at times, take a step back and provide a longer view, as well. But for now, we’ll say goodbye and thank you to everyone, again.