Maryam Nemazee
We’re good to go. Well, welcome, everyone, and it’s lovely to see you all here today. Just a quick reminder that this event is being held on the record. Please do state your name and your institution when it comes to the Q&A bit. You know how that works. Also want to extend a very warm welcome to those of you joining us online. We call this a hybrid event, so lots of people tuning in there. Of course, those of you joining us online will submit your questions via the Q&A function. I will be able to monitor them here. So, please do send them in at any point, and you can actually start sending them in right now, because we’re not going to speak very much on the panel before we start taking questions, so please do have them ready.
There’s been a bit of a change of plan to today’s line-up. Two of our esteemed guests have been struck down with COVID. I’m assured that there’s nothing more sinister at play, though the discussion will be no less exciting. Of course, I have with me here Keir Giles, Senior Consulting Fellow, the Eurasia and Russia Programme an a author of Russia’s War on Everybody. Jade McGlynn has been good enough to join us as well, Senior Research Fellow at the Middlebury Institute for International Studies in the US. Prior to this, she taught Russian literature at the University of Oxford, where she also completed her DPhil, which examined Russian propaganda and the uses of history with a particular focus on coverage of Ukraine since 2014. She is a forthcoming author of Russia’s War and Memory Makers, two publications to look out for. And a very warm welcome, as well, to Edward Lucas, Non-Resident Senior Fellow at Center for European Policy Analysis, who’s formerly Senior Editor at The Economist. Of course, he’s covered Central and Eastern European affairs since 1986, writing, broadcasting, speaking on politics, economics and security in the region. And, of course, as you know, there are copies of the book behind you, so do head towards that table at the end of our discussion.
I think maybe the expectation about a book coming at a time like this is that it would focus exclusively on the military threat, the War in Ukraine, but I found that it’s actually much broader than that. Events earlier on in the year seemed to move at lightning speed, caught many of us, or some of us, off guard and often particularly with news coverage, which is what I’m involved in, and the limitations of focusing on what is happening right now, what is happening today, is the absence of background, context in history, and all the individual events and incidents that can occur over a number of years, which we tend to view as being isolated when they happen, at the time, that actually reveal a pattern of behaviour. And reading that book felt like putting all the different pieces of that puzzle together, without getting into cliches about the, you know, the Russian enigma. So, I think what we have here is context that explains what is happening right now, in this new phase of confrontation between Russia and the West.
So, Keir, let me start by asking you, then, to give us a bit of background on the book. I know you don’t want to spend all your time talking about the book, but also, perhaps you could tell us what is the greatest misconception, the thing that people most often get wrong about Russia?
Keir Giles
Well, people who’ve already opened the book will probably have seen that it’s actually dedicated to Vladimir Putin for the enormous service that he’s done all of us in removing misconceptions. Now, I think there are some people in the room who were here the last time I did this, which was just under three years ago, with a different book, one called Moscow Rules, which was precisely about misconceptions that we have in the West about how Russia works, what Russia does, what Russia wants.
And before I came here this evening, I had a look back at that event. I had a look back at what I said then and as always, it’s a profoundly depressing experience, because the two key principles that I wanted people to come away with from that event, but which weren’t universally believed, were what Russia had convinced itself of. First of all, that it was entitled to empire in a very 1914 sense and second of all, that it was absolutely convinced that it was already in a state of war with the West in every possible domain except open military clashes. So, the misconception, and the biggest one that persisted, was that Russia was actually a country that you could work with as though you were peaceful, co-operative nations, when they had already decided that they were on a different track.
And the other thing that came through from that presentation just under three years ago was that if the West did not recognise this problem and respond to it appropriately, then the trajectory Russia was on meant that there would inevitably be a worse and deeper and bloodier crisis before long. And so, three years later, here we are in 2022 and precisely that has happened, because the challenge from Russia was not recognised and it was not responded to appropriately.
But as Maryam said, this book is not primarily about that. When we – it says, “Russia’s War on Everybody,” it is not the War in Ukraine. That is just the most direct and horrific example and illustration of what Russia wants to achieve. It’s about the much longer duration and broader in scope war that Russia has been waging for a great deal longer. And as Maryam said, I’m not going to go into great detail about the book, partly because it is such a huge topic that it affects everybody in different ways. It is quite literally everybody. So, everybody has their own take and interest in this topic, and that’s why we want to leave a lot of this session open for questions and answers.
But also, I won’t be talking for long because we have two expert witnesses here, too, both of them deep Russia watchers and deeply imbued in everything that you need to know about how Russia works in order to understand some of those phenomena that you detected. And I’m hoping that we’re going to use them to the full to explain this problem of Russia being at war with all of us.
Maryam Nemazee
You’re being very gracious about not monopolising this discussion, Keir. So, Jade, let me, then, come to you. Maybe you could just tell us a little bit more about the – Russia’s world view, how it sees its neighbouring countries. Does it really believe itself to be under threat?
Jade McGlynn
I think, first of all, I just want to say that – how much I enjoyed your book, Keir, and how it is really a tour de force of quite an astoundingly broad spectrum. But in answer to your question, Maryam, yes, Russia, I think –I mean, it’s always a bit – I don’t want to sound like an academic, but I always struggle a bit with Russia thinks, because clearly, there are different factions within Russia, at the end of the day. We’re talking about the Kremlin, yes, quite clearly, it does perceive the West as a threat. I mean, we can read this in the National Security Strategy that came out last July. They believe what sounds a bit like a paradox, that the West is on the verge of collapse and, therefore, is at its most dangerous.
And these two elements are quite important for understanding the thinking and the calculation that have gone into the current war against Ukraine, as well, which was that the West, well, if its principles weren’t completely for sale at knockdown prices, then they were at least very selectively priced and that, essentially, they weren’t going to do much to defend Ukraine. And in defence of the Kremlin, which sounds like a weird phrase right now, in their defence, I can see why they thought that. And at the same point, of course, the Kremlin has its own, sort of, myths and it’s very good at making sure that these myths resonate with the Russian people. It’s very good at ensuring that, and I think it’s started to believe – those in the Kremlin started to believe their own propaganda, to a certain extent, around what the West is actually up to. And that’s a longer discussion as to why and that also goes into, sort of, psychological issues that I don’t really think about and – thankfully, because I would not want to be Putin’s Psychotherapist.
Maryam Nemazee
Edward, the response to a direct armed assault is obvious, but one of the things the book touches on is that Western powers struggled to respond during an undeclared attack from Moscow. How do you explain hostile measures or actions when – during times of relative peace, when Russia is not overtly at war with anyone?
Edward Lucas
Well, I explain them in that they form part of Russia’s arsenal of what we now call “hybrid warfare measures,” and I would’ve called just active measures, in the Soviet era, ‘cause they have a long history, and they are part of Russia’s attempts to play, fundamentally, divide and rule. That’s divide and rule between the United States and Europe, divide and rule within NATO, within the European Union, and divide and rule within countries, finding ethnic, linguistic, demographic, regional, cultural, religious, any other divisions that they can find, and rip them up. And that’s one that – you know, that’s something that is a textbook example of how the Soviet Union conducted its foreign relations, and Russia still does it.
I think there’s also targeted intimidation measures and some of the assassinations we’ve seen have not been. I don’t think Sergei Skripal was a particularly important – he wasn’t the, sort of, the centrepiece of British intelligence efforts towards Russia. He was semi-retired, but they felt that killing him would send an important message to their own people, or to the Brits, or to other people, that you’re able to carry out a nerve agent attack and, basically, get away with it. Similarly, probably, with the Litvinenko.
So, I think it’s – and to me, the – and Keir’s book, which, of cour – which is brilliant, is full of the how. The previous book, Moscow Rules, is about the why, and we may want to get onto that in the discussion. But I think the fundamental point is that the – every bit of our society and our government is part of the attack surface for them. There is, I think, literally nothing that can’t be the subject of a hybrid attack from either Russia or the Chinese Communist Party and we could always find some – we could alway – if you look hard enough, you’ll find some way that they can find a way of getting into it and exploiting it.
Maryam Nemazee
Keir, you talk about unknowing targets, people who don’t know they’re targets that get caught up in it, you know, because spreading disinformation, which is one of the tools and levers that Russia resorts to, is not just a, you know, an individual operation and it’s just part of daily work. But why do you say that “No-one is too unimportant to be a target,” why do you say that?
Keir Giles
Well, the most obvious application of that is, as you said, it’s the disinformation. Where if Russia is conducting a whole of society attack, then it is all of society that is the target, and if Russia wants to influence mass consciousness, then that involves targeting masses and getting through to individuals with the disinformation campaigns that we’ve seen. And you might ask the reason why? Well, Edward talked about “divide and rule” and setting people against each other by exploiting these divisive issues, and that’s a pattern we’ve seen over and over again, prodding at the things that set people apart, whether it’s race in the US, or it’s Brexit here, or it’s migration across Europe, finding those issues to divide society.
Now, sometimes that is simply because in a zero-sum view of security, as you have from Russia, if you make your adversary weaker, then you, by comparison, are stronger. And that’s what lies behind some of the apparently completely pointless acts of vandalism that Russia’s carried out, such as, for example, sponsoring anti-vaccine movements in target countries well before there was a global pandemic, and then just stepping up the activity when COVID hits.
But also, there’s another purpose, as well. Think about the threat to societal cohesion and people standing together against a common threat and having trust in their institutions, in their authorities, which Russia targets, and then, project that idea onto Ukraine. And the way Ukrainian resilience has rested upon people standing together and having faith in their institutions and resisting, as a group, as a bloc, and being superhumanly resilient. If Russia’s campaigns of envision succeed, then that doesn’t happen and you are a softer target and so, you fall to Russia. But also, all of the things that now are affecting everybody in our societies, if everybody isn’t a target, then why is everybody now feeling the effects on their own pockets of the cost of living crisis, triggered by what Putin does with energy?
And the effect is psychological, as well. The nuclear intimidation and the fear of war with Russia has permeated so deeply in our society. When I’m doing book launches and book signings in bookshops in small market towns around the UK, I see the looks on people’s faces as they walk past, catch sight of the cover and glance hurriedly away and scurry on because they don’t want to think about it, because it is already a scary topic, and that is a success for Russia and that targets everybody.
Maryam Nemazee
Jade, let me ask you about a little bit of what Keir touched on, the effective disinformation campaigns, which is important. I know you don’t want to get into the realms of psychoanalysis, but it feels like we, sort of – that’s where we are when we try to understand how it affects people. Do they really work in changing minds, or does it just reinforce existing bias? Keir was speaking there about how it can cause a, you know, social fragmentation, division between people, this focus on trigger issues, whether it be Brexit in the UK or migration in Europe.
Jade McGlynn
So, I think often, we tend to think about research into disinformation or into narratives, in terms of production and reception, so how – what narratives are – is so and so saying and how is so and so, sort of, receiving or understanding that? And I think that sometimes we look at it in too much of a binary way. Quite often – I mean, the Kremlin and Russian, sort of, organisations, not all of which, actually, are directed by the Kremlin, a lot of which are just vying in what’s actually quite a neoliberal environment, vying for some attention from the Kremlin, some money from the Kremlin. That’s what we see with the private military contractors, as well. But I mean, that’s not to say that they’re not working in the Kremlin’s interest. They are, it’s just it’s not such a – it’s not Putin sitting there at his desk, sort of, signing off, “Yes, this narrative sounds good.”
But my point is that, often, they’re looking for what works. So, they’re looking for narratives that resonate and I think the same is also true, actually, domestically, in, sort of, Russian – in Russian news domestically, as well. But they’re looking for what resonates and that links into what Edward was saying about divide and rule, to a certain extent. So, they find problems that are there and then, they exploit them.
So, I don’t think it’s about changing anybody’s mind. I don’t think that, for example, anybody was watching RT – anybody was watching, let’s say, CNN and then, turned off CNN and went onto RT and were like, “Oh, okay, wow, I didn’t realise that, actually, you know, in Syria they gassed themselves.” That didn’t happen. What – but what would’ve happened is, people who were perhaps inclined towards that quite conspiratorial thinking, perhaps, you know, were very – you know, had a real sense of, like, moral injury because of. let’s say, around the US’s wars in the Middle East, they might then have been open to certain narratives. And I would say that Russian disinformation abroad, but also domestically, at home, is quite good at, sort of, finding, I suppose, a little nook to get into and then, burrowing and then, adding in more and more lies. It sometimes reminds about what – of what Orwell said about, you know, you say that one unspoken truth and then you can pile in loads and loads of lies on top of it. I mean, he said it much nicer than that, because he’s much more eloquent. But – so…
Maryam Nemazee
Yeah, the point is that…
Jade McGlynn
…the point…
Maryam Nemazee
…it sows discord and it creates confusion and so, that’s the effect that it has. And I suppose that, you know, they benefit from there not being a very clear divided – dividing line between formal state apparatus and, you know, business, crime groups and various other things. Edward?
Edward Lucas
Yes, I think they do sometimes change people’s minds. I think Ben Nimmo has a good example of how an RT and Russian YouTube videos pretending to show ballot stuffing and irregularities during the Scottish Independence Referendum actually did succeed, bizarrely, in casting doubt on the integrity of the count. Though, in fact, the people who lost the election, the Scottish Nationalists and the pro-independence camp, who would’ve been the first people to complain if anything had really been going wrong, had absolutely no reservations at all about the way the count had been producted – conducted. But this – just a handful of videos, bizarrely, actually, showing ballot stuffing in Russia, but just put up online of, “This is how they’re moving – this is how they’re rigging the election,” and that did have an effect. So, I think there’s a – I wouldn’t underestimate it.
But I suppose the thing that really gets me about this is the, sort – is the complacency in the face of the threat, that we were warned about this right back in the 1990s. The Estonians and Latvians, Lithuanians and Poles and Ukrainians and many other people were saying, right back in the early 1990s, “Watch out, we are already experiencing this. We are experiencing information attacks, dirty money in our politics, the weaponised use of organised crime, other kinds of subversion, intimidation and so on. And it’s hitting us now because we’re quite weak and won’t – we’ve just regained our independence, but it will be affecting you soon and you need to worry about this.” And those warnings were not just dismissed.
The people who tried to deliver them were belittled and patronised and, you know, probably, I think some people in this room may have first-hand experience of the sort of way in which, for example, the German Government responded to quite sensible warnings to the Baltic States about energy security, for example. I, myself, was in the Council in 2005 warning them that they might be subject to information warfare, and they said, “Herr Lucas, are you seriously saying that the Federal Republic of Germany would suffer information attack from Russia?” And I said, “Duh, yes,” and they literally laughed. They could not conceive that the, you know, the mighty German information space could be vulnerable.
And what I’m really missing from this is any sense of contrition. We now have tens of thousands of people dead, hundreds of thousands of people maimed and traumatised, millions of people are homeless or refugees, and a trillion dollar bill, and I think that is the direct result of us ignoring this – these hybrid attacks on our societies over the last 30 years. And I hear only the Finnish Prime Minister in the whole of Western – the old West, expressing any contrition at all for having not listened to these warnings earlier.
Maryam Nemazee
So, Edward, on a related point, you’ve focused, in your research, about London being a destination for Russian money. Is it one thing to ignore, but then, also, in some cases, we have been facilitators? And Keir, you mentioning in the book, this “toxic influence on British policy and politics,” and this remarkable statistic from Economist, Timothy Ash, based on, actually, Russian Central Bank statistics, that “$1.6 trillion” have left the country since 1994. 30% of that, or 500 billion, is estimated to have gone to the UK, so that means fees for banks, asset management companies, money brings influence. If our systems have been corrupted by Russian money, Politicians and regulators have let it happen and, well, you know, can we put all the blame on Russia? Is our own politics…
Edward Lucas
No.
Maryam Nemazee
…not the…?
Edward Lucas
Our enablers – I mean, this would be so much less effective if it wasn’t for the Bankers and Lawyers and Accountants, and fixers and grifters and snoopers, who do the dirty work of the worst people on the planet. And I want to say a particular welcome to anyone who’s watching this online, or indeed in the audience, from Schillings, Mishcon de Reya and Carter-Ruck for your indefatigable attempts to make sure that we can’t talk about this in public.
I was the first witness for the Intelligence and Security Committee inquiry into Russia, and it was only then, protected by both parliamentary privilege and official secrecy, that I was actually able to tell the MPs in blunt, unvarnished terms, what really goes on in this country and what they should be investigating. And I think they did investigate and the result of that was a extremely interesting report, which Boris Johnson made great attempts to make sure would never come – never see the light of day. So…
Maryam Nemazee
So, just to – you talk about the UK’s legal system being used against it because?
Edward Lucas
Well, the SLAPPs, the Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation, mean that if you tell the truth, I, within ten words of where I am now, could land myself in a position where I would have to sell my house to pay my legal fees. That wouldn’t be the case if I was talking in the United States.
Maryam Nemazee
Maybe we could go to questions. With – yes, well, with that in mind and giving everyone here, hopefully, a voice, as well. Unless there’s anything more you wanted to add to that, Keir, I’m happy to go to questions.
Keir Giles
No, absolutely, that’s…
Maryam Nemazee
And we’ve got some questions coming in online, as well. If you could state your name and your institution. This gentleman here with the glasses.
Jeremy Mee
Thank you very much for your – to the panel. My name is Jeremy Mee, and I’m at the London School of Economics. My question is, is there anything – oh, [inaudible – 26:19] – is there anything that you think the West or the US could’ve done differently after the fall of the Soviet Union to…
Keir Giles
Absolutely.
Jeremy Mee
…better integrate Russia into the world’s community? Thank you.
Keir Giles
I can say that Edward twitched, so I’ll…
Maryam Nemazee
Who wants to take that sort of question?
Edward Lucas
I can answer you. I resent the framing of that question, actually. I think, you know, the first question in 1991, should’ve been what’s really happened? And yes, the planned economy collapsed and yes, the political monopoly of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union had collapsed. Had the Soviet Empire collapsed? Well, actually, not really, and I think the first thing we should’ve said to Russia was, “You’re absolutely welcome to integrate into the world community, but you will have to treat your former colonies decently. You will have to treat Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Ukraine and all the other ones with the same respect and sensitivity that West Germany treats France, the Netherlands, Denmark or, for that matter, Israel.”
And I remember having this conversation in 1996, I think it was, with a Kremlin official, he said, “’Why are you always getting at us? What’s – fundamentally, what’s the problem here? Why won’t you take us seriously?” And I said, “Until you treat Estonia,” just as an example, “Until you treat Estonia as a proper country, you will never have proper relations with the West.” And he said, “But Estonia’s not a proper country,” and that, fundamentally, is the problem. While Russia remains an empire and has imperial tensions over its internal, particularly external, empire, it cannot have normal – be integrated in the West, because we take countries like Estonia as serious and we’re right to do so.
Keir Giles
There’s another issue that might lead on from that question, and just as a preface, as an aside, going back to the disinformation point and whether Russian disinformation narratives do convince people or not. Another part of the book signing experience for this is going to, again, small towns, talking about what Russia does, and being told from the back that I’ve got it all wrong because – and then, a long stream of narratives that have come directly from Moscow, including about the ongoing War in Ukraine, and a lot of things that require suspension of disbelief to believe. So, yes, it is penetrating into our societies.
But I mention that because one of the myths that Russia has propagated that has permeated all of the discussion about this is the idea that the West did not help Russia after 1991. That it actually did its best to make things worse for Russia, to ‘exploit’ it, to ‘humiliate’ it, all of the usual words that you hear from Russia, which is the opposite of what actually happened. Because every possible effort was made, not only to prop Russia up by pouring in billions in aid and massive amounts of food because the country was unable to feed itself, but also to try to tie it into the international community by any means possible. From the entirely spurious granting of a UN Security Council seat to Russia and look at the pernicious consequences of that now, right all the way down, through business, through non-governmental organisations, through all of the different ways in which Russia was trying – was welcomed in.
All of that now has been as cleanly forgotten within Russia as Lend-Lease in the Second World War, as during the Second – during the Soviet Union, because it’s not convenient and instead, they have to tell themselves the story that the West was evil and tried its best to take advantage of Moscow.
Jade McGlynn
I think just to come back on that, just before we go to questions, but I think it’s an important point, because that myth of the not – well, it’s not a myth. I mean, the 1990s was clearly very horrible and not just for Russians, and it’s been – that’s, sort of, my point, though, around disinformation, was that you have this resonance where, obviously, s lot of Russians have very bad – well, over 79% of Russians have terrible memories of this time. And then, Putin has been – and the Kremlin has been very adept at making the West to blame for those memories, rather than the people who were actually to blame, which is probably a slightly different conversation.
But I mean, I – in terms of – in answer to your question, I have to admit, I’m not a fan of the framing, either, I’m afraid, but I do think that there needed to be a lot more honesty about what was happening in Russia. I mean, even now, you hear this framing that, “Okay, Putin” – you know, “Russia was a democracy and then, Putin took it off,” and I think, well, it’s a strange democracy that shells its own – that shoots its own government, the White House, the Russian White House in 1993. And I mean, it – that was not a fair and honest and election in 1996, and whilst I can understand why people didn’t want somebody like Zyuganov, who’s just – certainly, I wouldn’t care to vote for him to be President, I mean, has it helped us in the long run that that happened? Just as a question, I don’t know the answer.
Maryam Nemazee
Is…?
Jade McGlynn
And the laws.
Maryam Nemazee
There’s a lady here, could we – in blue.
Kaya
Hi, I’m Kaya. I’m a PhD student at King’s College. My question is – first of all, thank you, all of you, about your expertise. But despite we have seen how Russia is working, despite what we heard – say, did not recognised their neighbour Ossetia countries, despite in 2008 they invade Georgia and did not respond the West properly, and next, we have saying in 2014, War in Ukraine, next, in 2015, in Syria and now, what’s going on, we all see, do you think the West is ready to answer properly what Russia is doing right now? One is we are interesting what’s going in Russia. Maybe it’s a time to more interesting what the West response should be in this situation, instead of pushing Ukraine to go and negotiate work to defeat Russia in Ukraine completely, politically…
Maryam Nemazee
But what…?
Kaya
…and militarily?
Maryam Nemazee
Yeah, so, you’re saying what more can the West do?
Kaya
Yeah, yeah, definitely.
Maryam Nemazee
Yes, alright, we….
Kaya
Thank you.
Keir Giles
There are two elements to that, and the answer in both cases is no. There is the general recognition of the Russia problem and the full understanding of what that means, not only for the frontline states, but for the rest of us. We still hear from Macron, just very recently, the idea that you can return to a state before February 24th this year and that would be peace, which is a nonsense. But also dealing with Russia’s methods, and my apologies to the people who are in the room who heard this discussion just a few days ago, but the fact that we respond to Russia’s campaign of destruction in Ukraine, a campaign that goes against all of the values that all of us hold, a means of winning the war by inflicting the massable – maximum possible misery and suffering on the innocent civilian population. How does the West respond to Russia destroying all of this critical civilian infrastructure in order to trigger humanitarian catastrophes? It sends more infrastructure for Russia to destroy.
It is like witnessing a school shooting and sending in more children, instead of addressing the problem at source, and the problem is the way Russia thinks it is normal and natural and right to wage war. And unless and until we see somebody saying that, “No, Russia, this is not acceptable,” then we are playing Russia’s game by Russia’s rules, and that is another symptom of a complete failure to recognise what the problem is that’s facing us.
Edward Lucas
Can I just add that if we had sent ten months ago one tenth of what we’ve sent to Ukraine since, there wouldn’t be a war. It reminds me very much of the Bosnian War in the 90s, where 100s and then 1,000s of Bosnians had to die in order that the West then got the courage to take its red line and move it a little bit. So, our red lines have gone from send only defensive weapons, to send only these weapons, send only that weapons, to do this, to do that, and at each stage, we do something that we’ve previously said we couldn’t do.
And the reason why we have decided to do it is we just feel a bit more guilty ‘cause there’s been a bit more death and destruction and that’s really disgusting. You know, our geopolitical education is being paid for in the blood and tears of people who are innocent and whose soldiers are fighting and dying for our freedom as well as theirs, and we sit here in this, kind of, self-indulgent, introverted, ponderous foreign policy discussion. I’m thinking particularly of the Germans here, wondering about, you know, what the new freedoms are and what it’s going to be like in Europe, and I just think, have you any idea what’s happening a day’s drive from your well-upholstered Diplomatic Salon?
I think Euan’s had his hand up for a long time. Maybe I’ll want to stop.
Maryam Nemazee
But…
Keir Giles
There are quite a lot of people…
Edward Lucas
Yes, please.
Maryam Nemazee
Yes, yeah, there’s a lot of people.
Keir Giles
…being so patient.
Maryam Nemazee
Let – well, quickly – if you keep your questions short, we’ll get to as many as possible, so…
Member
Thank you for the panel, a lovely speech by all of you. Now, the question I want to ask on the title of the conference, it says, “Russian War on Everybody.” Or is it really the war on – everybody’s war on Russia? This A – Part A of the question. Part B, we’re talking about today Russia being an empire, an aggressive empire. Which is bigger, is it the US Empire bigger or Russian Empire is big now? Thank you.
Edward Lucas
Well, nobody – sorry.
Keir Giles
We did have a ground rule that we’re not wasting time on the usual routines of what about it? So we can move onto the next question.
Maryam Nemazee
Okay. Now, the gentleman at the back. He’s right at the back.
Benjamin Tallis
Thank you very much indeed. Benjamin Tallis, German Council on Foreign Relations, so nice to hear Germany getting a good press up the front, as ever.
Edward Lucas
I dare you to say party.
Benjamin Tallis
We certainly know…
Edward Lucas
I assume you’re talking…
Benjamin Tallis
…something about the reasons turning into excuses pretty quickly in Berlin over these last months. I think, for many of us, I’d just like to second very quickly what Edward just said about this disgusting behaviour of only giving Ukraine the new weapons when another massacre happens, and I’m sure, for most of us, Ukraine is our absolute priority and Ukraine’s victory is our absolute priority now. But what I think Keir does is a really good service of putting that into a wider context, and I’d just like to pick up a couple of things that were mentioned in the talk on that regard.
The term “attack surface” was used and it was mentioned, also, that there was a whole of society challenge, if you like, that Russia poses. I would put it to the room that, actually, rather than an attack surface, it’s that Russia works in the cracks that we make for ourselves, and it exploits cracks that are already there. Taking this on as a whole of society challenge means, actually, having a whole of society theory of victory, or a whole of society theory of continuous winning. And I’d like to hear, without it going into self-indulgent navel gazing, actually, what it is that actually the West does need to do to take more of our people with us, on the road to not only defending democracy, but actually renewing it in a serious way that will prepare us for the challenge of authoritarian regimes to come? Thank you.
Edward Lucas
Sorry.
Keir Giles
Go for it. You go first.
Edward Lucas
The – I think, you know, our policy starts from ignorance and ignorance begets arrogance and arrogance begets complacency, and above all of them is greed. And we thought, in 1991, that it was the end of history and all you really need to do is to get on and make money, and I think money’s been the Achilles’ heel of the West. It’s been the greed, particularly of our enablers, but in a way, of all of us, that we have decided that the most important thing is to get stuff cheap, make a profit and not worry about the geopolitics and the national security. And that’s, fundamentally, what’s got to change.
We have to look at trade and investment through a national security lens and not just through a narrow economic one. And that’s true whether we’re dealing with China and thinking about rare earths, which aren’t actually rare, they’re just expensive to – difficult to refine, but we buy them all from China, whether it’s about the gas dependency, which we’ve allowed to build up on Russia, and many other things, as well. So, I think that that – that the sea change that we need as a result of this, and as a result of all this appalling suffering in Ukraine, is to realise that freedom doesn’t come free, sometimes you have to pay for it.
Keir Giles
And in terms of practical steps, Edward mentioned the key problem is ignorance and dispelling that ignorance, it’s been proven time and again, is the first thing that needs to be done in order that people can protect themselves against the problem. We’ve seen, over and over again, that as soon as a country, or a society, or a group, admits that it is under attack by Russia, that triggers a lot of other things happen. It means that they are empowered to defend themselves, and that could be as simple as a President, or a Prime Minister, or a Defence Minister, just simply stating the state of affairs and what Russia is doing, and that means that business and media and government can start to actually take appropriate defensive measures.
Which is precisely the opposite of the situation we have in this country, where not only was the report that Edward referred to, the Intelligence and Security Committee reports from July 2020, simply called “Russia,” suppressed for as long as the government could manage it, but also since it was published, how many of the vulnerabilities that, Benjamin, you’re talking about, that were identified in that report, much to the astonishment of the MPs, have actually been plugged? I believe the answer is zero.
Edward Lucas
Well, was – no, I think the security at the House of Commons has slightly improved.
Jade McGlynn
Could I just come quickly onto Ben’s point, because I think it’s a really important one, and I’ve been thinking about this recently, in terms of a lot of the time when I – speaking to you, probably ask, “Okay, how can we, sort of, defeat Russia, how do we do this?” and bluntly, we can’t necessarily defeat Russia. We can defeat Russia in Ukraine, but I think the important thing is to make sure that Ukraine wins and that may sound like sophistry, yeah, but it’s not. They’re different and I think making sure that we have a strategy, that we’re not just reacting to massacres, you know, or to further atrocities, but that we actually have a long-term strategy of how to protect Ukraine as much as possible and to defend it, to make sure that we can actually invest, that other businesses want to reinvest in the reconstruction, to make sure as much – we can keep certain parts of it safe, we need to have this longer-term vision.
And, also, I think, for our own society and, again, it’s the, sort of like, the catchphrase of “Be brave like Ukraine,” because if you think back to 2013/2014, Ukrainians decided not to take the money. They decided not to take the cheap energy deal, and I’m afraid that you can’t say that for a lot of Western European countries.
Edward Lucas
And if I – just one other thing. I think what’s really stood out for me since February is that the failure to get the Global South onboard is the harvest we are reaping from 30 years of ignoring, patronising, mistreating, the countries outside the West. You – we won’t get the East-West stuff right, whether it’s with Russia or with China, when we have countries in Africa, Latin America and Asia saying, “We don’t trust you. We don’t trust you ‘cause of the way you run the world economy. We don’t trust you ‘cause of the way you handled COVID. We don’t trust you ‘cause of Iraq and Afghanistan. We don’t trust you” for whatever. And the idea that an imperialist war conducted by Russia doesn’t receive the support of countries such as South A – you know, it receives the support and not the hostility, of countries like South Africa, which define themselves as anti-imperialist, is really shocking. And we should really be asking ourselves very hard questions about how that’s come about.
Maryam Nemazee
So, they are winning the battle of the narrative across much of the…
Edward Lucas
I wouldn’t say…
Maryam Nemazee
…Global South.
Edward Lucas
…they’re winning. They’re doing far better than they should be, and the fact The Varda Group does so well in Africa, like, you know, what we’ve seen in Mali, is an extraordinary failure of French and Western policy. And, you know, the – if anyone had said 15 years ago, “The Russians are going to be back in Africa,” we would’ve said, “What are you smoking? They’re never going to get back,” and yet, there they are.
Maryam Nemazee
But they’ve been invited back by…
Edward Lucas
They’ve been invited back ‘cause we’ve screwed up.
Maryam Nemazee
Question, this lady here?
Gabriella Shabuz-Gaita
Thank you. Gabriella Shabuz-Gaita, University College London. So, there’s been a lot of talk in the media that the Baltic States now should feel vindicated because their warnings about Russia finally being heeded. However, I recently came back from Lithuania and there’s this general sense of them not really feeling safe by their NATO membership in the face of Russian imperialism. And I wanted to ask, do you agree with that type scepticism? Do – have the Baltic States finally made it to the status of real country, and what’s their role in the future of international politics and this conflict, in particular? Thank you.
Edward Lucas
That may…
Keir Giles
Unfortunately, if you ask countries around Europe whether the Baltic States have made it to the status of real countries, it’s probably not only Russia that says, “Not yet.” But at the same time, they are the safest that they have been in centuries, simply because they finally got NATO to do what it had supposed to and put in place enhanced forward presence so that Baltic States couldn’t be picked off one-by-one if Russia had chosen that one of them was to be the next target instead of Ukraine. Simply by having in place contingence from other NATO nations removes that whole conversation immediately about how NATO would respond if there were some kind of overt assault against the Baltic States, as opposed to the covert ones.
However, it’s an unfortunate accident of geography that affects not just them, but all of that Russia’s Western periphery, that it doesn’t matter how much protection you have from NATO, you are never going to be completely safe if you get into a situn like – situation like Ukraine did where the West is giving a green light to Putin to go ahead, both through what it says and through what it does in the lead-up to the invasion.
So, there is reason to be happy with what has happened about the actual direct protection of the Baltic States, but there’s never going to be a situation where they can feel completely safe until we have a very, very different Russia and that is going to be not in my lifetime.
Edward Lucas
And I also think we need a very different NATO, because what we have at the moment is a, kind of, NATO lite in the Baltic States, that there is – it’s all based, really, on deterrence rather than defence, and NATO needs to change its doctrine pretty profoundly, in terms of defence first, rather than deterrence first. We need to radically rethink our command structure for Northern Europe. I would hope we get a new Northern Command based in Britain. I think that would be a very good thing. But the – if you look at what NATO does in the Baltic States, it’s what the Brits call Heath Robinson and what the Americans would call Rube Goldberg. It’s a series of improvisations and, sort of, workarounds.
We don’t have a proper standing defence plan. The stockpiles are far, far too low. I mean, the Western troops based in the Baltics have measured their ammunition in days, when they should be – we don’t – and everything depends on the United States and that is an enormous bet now. It depends particularly on the United States’ stockpile in Norway, which is a Marine base, and the Marines are now turning into a coastal raiding force in the Pacific, rather than being the – part of a conventional war in Europe.
So, the ground is shifting very quickly under our feet, and even if the United States wants to help, they may just be busy. So, Europe – I think the fundamental point is Europe is strategically naked. We’ve realised it ‘cause of the Ukraine War, and because we’re strategically naked, the most exposed countries are right to be worried and we have an awful lot of work to do.
Maryam Nemazee
Okay.
Keir Giles
So many questions.
Maryam Nemazee
Yeah, so let’s just take three in one go. So, the guy at the back with the longish hair. If you just ask your question and then – yeah, go ahead.
Max
Hi, I’m Max. I work for the Charity Commission, and thank you to the panel. Is Russia’s war on the 1.5 billion people in China, as well, or does their partnership really know no limits?
Keir Giles
Russia-China.
Edward Lucas
We need three, or we…?
Keir Giles
Yeah, we need three.
Maryam Nemazee
Yeah, so, Russia-China, and then, just pass the mic to that gentleman there with the glasses, yeah.
Arman
Hi, my name is Arman. I’m at the University of Edinburgh. I just wanted to ask, you spoke about the Global South briefly, I wanted to know if hybrid warfare from Russia looks different outside the West? For example, you talk about paying dirty money, weaponizing organised crime. Is the – are those the kind of measures they use, for example, in Asia, in the Middle East, in Central Asia? If you could talk a bit about that, please, thank you.
Maryam Nemazee
And just – yes, this – right, this guy here, yes.
Keir Giles
This guy, Ian Bond, there.
Ian Bond
Hi, Ian Bond from the Centre for European Reform. So, the book’s called Russia’s War on Everybody, and I tend to agree with that, but some people will say, “Well, isn’t it Putin’s war on everybody?” So, I mean, it’s partly a question for Jade, but to what extent is the narrative that Putin’s been pushing for the last 20 odd years so far under the skins of the Russian population that even if Putin disappeared tomorrow, the same mindset, the same war thinking, would continue?
Keir Giles
Sounds like it’s Russia-China, methods in the Global South and is it Putin or is it Russia?
Edward Lucas
I think it…
Keir Giles
And…
Maryam Nemazee
Sounds good.
Edward Lucas
Yes, I mean, I think our problems with Russia predate Putin and will outlast him, and anyone who doesn’t think that, wasn’t paying attention in the 90s. The – China is not pleased about this war, because we don’t know whether Russia really warned Xi Jinping what he was going to do. But certainly, they would’ve told him that it was going to be over in days, and it’s not, it’s led to high prices for fool – food, fuel and fertiliser, which China doesn’t like. It’s blurred the edges of nuclear doctrine, which China also doesn’t like, or the Chinese Communist Party doesn’t like, and I think that there’s clearly pressure from the Chinese Communist Party leadership on Russia, on the nuclear side. They absolutely hate this nuclear [inaudible – 49:00].
I mean, I would recommend very strongly another excellent book called Overreach by Owen Matthews, which has an interesting scoop in it about the back channel between the United States and China relating to the War in Ukraine, and it certainly fits many of the known facts. And I think that the Chinese are – it’s very striking the fact that China has not supplied any of the things that Russia really wants, no munitions, no drones, no serious help with sanction busting, no trucks. Russia desperately needs trucks, ‘cause their logistics are so rubbish, and China’s not doing that. So, something’s making China hold very far back from this. I would be not surprised if, in the endgame, China plays more of a role, as well.
Keir Giles
I’ll try to be super brief. Do we see the methods that are directed against the West being employed elsewhere? Yes, we do. Of course, it depends entirely on the target, because the influence and the effects are tailored to the target, and you can tell that by the way that they are most successful when they are employed not against the leadership of a given country, but actually in co-operation with the leadership of a given country. ‘Cause if you take examples of the spectacular Russian successes, like Mali, as Edward referred to, and like Burkina Faso, like Central African Republic, it is where the local leadership has found the Russian offer attractive. Because let’s not forget that not everybody agrees with our system of government and some leaderships around the world want, actually, to be protected against their population, in precisely the same way that the Russian leadership sees its own subjects as a threat. So, the nature of the measures that Russia’s taken are actually fully in tune with some of the nastiest regimes around the world and that, in effect, is why they quite often work.
Jade McGlynn
To come to Ian’s point. I very much think that this is “Russia’s War,” which is why I went to the effort of writing a book with that title.
Keir Giles
Called Russia’s War.
Jade McGlynn
Yeah. But – and I don’t think it’s possible even to talk about, sort of, Putin pushing – it’s not because Putin’s been pushing these narratives for 20 years. It’s that these narratives existed and that’s actually why the Kremlin media, pro-Kremlin media, state affiliated media, uses them, is because they resonate. Of course, then it manipulates them and tries to make sure that it feeds their interests more, but – or to co-opt them in – but it’s not that it just, sort of, created these out of thin air and imposed them on the population.
And we can see this, as well. I mean, there’s lots of studies, for example, that are looking into Russian patriotism. So, you have, sort of, two different forms of patriotism. Generally, you have the, sort of, the benign form of, “Okay, I like my country, it’s where I’m from, it’s where I belong,” and then, where – and Russians are entirely not at all peculiar on that, there’s, sort of, normal rankings. And what you also have is this, sort of, “My country, right or wrong,” the less benign forms of patriotism, which are that “My country’s interests should be pursued even if they hurt others.” And there, even in the 1990s and throughout, in the early Putin years, we see Russians scoring incredibly highly, if we look at the World Value Survey, if we look at these surveys that have gone on since 1993. And so, that’s before Putin, sort of, took it – that’s before the Munich speech, that’s before anything else. So, Putin’s responding, he’s articulating something that’s in Russian society. Now, why that’s in Russian society is a very, very long conversation that’s not for here, but…
Keir Giles
Okay, but not that there’s any…
Jade McGlynn
Yeah, not in 11 minutes, but yeah, I think it’s important to understand that differentiation.
Maryam Nemazee
So, maybe three more, if we could do a quick round of…
Edward Lucas
Maryam…
Maryam Nemazee
Oh.
Edward Lucas
…Euan has had his hand up…
Maryam Nemazee
Where?
Edward Lucas
…at the back since before the…
Maryam Nemazee
Where?
Edward Lucas
…questions started.
Maryam Nemazee
Where? I think – before the questions started? Okay.
Euan Grant
Yeah.
Maryam Nemazee
Well, is there a microphone? Yeah.
Euan Grant
Thank you very much, Edward. Euan Grant, I’ve worked in EU programmes in Ukraine. I’m not the only person in this room who has done that. There’s at least one other person and believe you me, we can tell you all that Edward’s article in The Times yesterday was spot on, absolutely spot on.
My question for you all is, when you meet a Russian and discuss the war, or even by implication, what do you see in their eyes? And the second question is the same question, but for Germans. Thank you.
Maryam Nemazee
Thank you.
Euan Grant
I saw Wagnerism 24 years ago and Edward is 100%.
Keir Giles
That’s another point, yeah.
Euan Grant
Our failure to call that out is coming back to us now.
Keir Giles
After Jade.
Maryam Nemazee
Question?
Sean Kurdi
Thank you, and Sean Kurdi, member of Chatham House. So, thank you for all the stimulating analysis. I’d like to ask you about what is, perhaps after Ukraine, the biggest threat to NATO? Is it Kaliningrad, the enclave, that if you visit Lithuania or Poland, people are very worried about that issue because of the use of Belarus as the, sort of, platform for Russia’s invasion of the Ukraine? And one brief point about Edward’s comment about Sanna Marin, the Finnish Prime Minister. Isn’t it rather easy for her to acknowledge past mistakes, since she’s only 37-years-of-age? Thank you.
Keir Giles
Yeah.
Maryam Nemazee
One more, yeah.
James Nixey
Thank you very much indeed. James Nixey, Chatham House. You’ve spoken very eloquently about the pernicious influence of enablers and the corporate sector, then the need for compulsion to make money from Russia. How would you evaluate – how crucial to the situation that we’re in has been the naivety of diplomacy and diplomats?
Keir Giles
Right.
Jade McGlynn
I’m very…
Keir Giles
Diplomats…
Jade McGlynn
Oh.
Keir Giles
…eyes and…
Jade McGlynn
Oh, I have just a very quick comment on I think that James’s point there is right on naivety, and I think it comes back, as well, to the point around ignorance and having people who are, sort of, generalists, maybe doing – being too involved in foreign policy.
Edward Lucas
It’s – the fact that Keir isn’t working in government anymore tells you everything you need to know about…
Jade McGlynn
Yeah, actually.
Edward Lucas
…the way our government treats its Russia experts. On this – on the one – the looking into the eyes, and obviously, there’s no such thing as a – you know, standard Russians. But I meet a lot of Russians in London, I meet a lot of Germans and I speak Russian and German, and the thing that jars most with – is self-pity. There’s an extraordinary ability to make this all about Russia. You know, “We are having – we had to leave our country. Your sanctions are making my life miserable. This is a catastrophe. Putin’s just as bad for Russia as it was for us. We suffered most under communism,” and so on. And there’s an inability to centre the narrative, the discourse on Ukraine, which I find quite jarring.
With Germans, I think it’s orientalism, this idea that there’s only – there are – big countries are what matter, “Russia’s a big country, we have this deep spiritual bond, going back to Catherine the Great. We unders – we get Russia in a way that you don’t, but you’re both continental superpowers,” and all these countries in between are, kind of – you, Tazbekistan, I mean, they’re not real countries. And it’s –and, in an odd way, that, kind of, echoes Russia’s, which wasn’t orientalism, but, sort of, you know, a patronising attitude.
I mean, I don’t understand why it matters that she’s – I mean, any Politician who apologies for their country’s mistakes in the past is better than a Politician who doesn’t. Obviously, I’d far rather that President Steinmeier apologised for the sanctimonious, greedy and fund – colossally irresponsible policy that he pursued as F0reign Minister, but we wait on that one. But for the meantime, I will happily take Sanna Marin.
Keir Giles
There are two very distinct groups of categories, say, of Russian citizen, or former Russian citizen, with whom I have conversations about the war. There’s one group that I talk to, not face-to-face, but for professional reasons, that are fully in favour of the war and think it should just be done better, harder, faster, and they can’t understand why Ukraine isn’t yet crushed. And there’s the other group, which tends to have been outside Russia for sufficiently long that they have a slightly different view, and they are the ones who are appalled and horrified and throw themselves wholeheartedly into supporting the cause of Ukraine, including simple things, like, for example, joining me in volunteering at local support groups for displaced Ukrainians needing help for navigating British bureaucracy, etc. And there is no commonality between the two groups whatsoever.
So, up to a point you’re absolutely right. You can’t generalise about Russia, which is why there’s a lengthy disclaimer in the front of the book saying, “When we say Russia, we mean” etc., etc., etc., because otherwise, we have to put it in every single time we mention Russia through the book and that gets a bit tedious. But I would agree absolutely with Jade, this is not a Putin problem. We’ve established a long time ago that it’s far deeper than that.
Which means that coming back to the question about, where does the threat to NATO come from? It’s a slightly strange phrasing from the question, because of course, Ukraine was not a threat to NATO, or rather Russia’s threats to Ukraine were not, strictly speaking, a NATO issue. But what makes it one is recognition of the underlying problem and that is the threat. Rather than any specific geographical area, it is just the attitude of Russia. The attitude that the countries around it should not be sovereign, independent nations, which would have a right to determine their own future, but instead, they should be under Russia’s domination. Now, some of those countries are members of NATO and members of the EU. Therefore, that clash, that conflict, is not going to go away until Russia does, and Russia’s not going away.
Jade McGlynn
Just to that point, actually, I mean, still, Put – what’s called “Putin’s ultimatum,” so the idea that NATO should be put – should go back – should agree to go back to its 1997 borders and essentially, not have any of the countries that used to be part of the Warsaw Pact. You know, that’s still being discussed in diplomatic circles by people who are what would’ve been known previously as the, sort of, Westerniser realists, in the sense that, you know, they don’t love the war, they don’t really understand why it’s being fought. Not because they, in any way, are good people who feel sorry for Ukraine, but just because it’s damaging Russia’s prestige and they understand that. And they’re still saying, “Oh, perhaps there could be some sort of agreement where it goes back to Putin’s ultimatum.” You’re like, “No, because nobody takes that seriously in the West. That’s” – in saying – then, they say, “Well, why don’t you take it seriously? Is it because you don’t take Russia seriously?” Like, “No, because it’s just not in any way a serious suggestion,” and I think that difference between mindsets, between, sort of, what is actually happening and what is possible in the world, is enormous, it’s vast.
And then, finally, I also wanted to come onto your point, Keir, there, about the polarisation. I mean, the amount of people – I speak to a lot of pro-war people and I also, of course, having lived in Russia for a very long time, I have a lot of Russian friends, who it won’t be a surprise, are not pro-war. And when I speak to my Russian friends who are not pro-war, they say, “Oh, I don’t know anybody who supports this war,” and then, when I speak to the people who are pro-war, they say, “Oh, I don’t know anybody who’s against the war. Everybody’s for this war,” and I find that always interesting. Yeah, it speaks a lot…
Edward Lucas
Can I just – on the diplomats, I do think it’s ab – it is really scandalous the way that we have misplayed this from a diplomatic point of view. We were really good during the Cold War at Sovietology and at dealing with the Soviet Union. We – our intelligence services had fantastic insights, chiefly thanks to Gordievsky, but also for other reasons, and our – we had some – a really – you know, a world class ability to do this, and we just destroyed it. We destroyed it partly because we didn’t think that geopolitics was still going on.
I mean, I have – there’s a Former British Ambassador to Moscow, who I won’t mention by name, because who knows, he may have no Libel Lawyer, who actually said his job in Moscow was to “promote British trade and investment.” He said, “I’m representing Britain Plc, that’s why I’m there,” and that was so fundamentally wrong, it’s really, really shocking. And we also got rid of – yeah, we got rid of all the expertise and we gave them the wrong jobs – the wrong tasking, and there used to be a phrase in the Foreign Office called “Crazy Edward Lucas talk,” and I remember that very clearly from, sort of, 2002. There was a phrase, “Crazy Edward Lucas talk,” yeah.
Jade McGlynn
Put that one next – on the back of your next book.
Maryam Nemazee
Maybe just one more question.
Edward Lucas
Anyone here from…
Jade McGlynn
Oh.
Edward Lucas
…Ukraine? I think we should have…
Jade McGlynn
Yeah.
Edward Lucas
…a Ukrainian, sort…
Maryam Nemazee
Is – yes, is this lady here Ukrainian? Both of you, both Ukrainian?
Edward Lucas
Orysia, say something.
Orysia Lutsevych
Thank you. I don’t actually have a question prepared, but I, first of all, wanted to say huge thank you for actually bringing this subject and talking about the, you know, threat of Russia beyond Ukraine. Because I can’t believe how many people, how many of my friends here, still ask me, “Well, can’t Ukraine just agree to some deal and it will all be done with, and we will all be happily – happy ever after?” And it’s – you know, I’ve been living in the UK for 22 years and it pained me, for the last at least ten years, to see the lack of understanding in the West of what was really happening, and ignoring the messages from, you know, from Ukraine particularly, Ukrainian Politicians and all that. And, basically, you know, people, as you say, trying to play a nice game with Russia while they were doing really, you know, unheard things, and all the propaganda.
You know, I think Putin – you know, we’re saying Russia and Putin are, kind of, maybe the same, but I think Putin has created and, you know, fascism in Russia, in terms of he pushed the idea, what was – you know, some idea of what they had, you know, in terms of attitude to other countries, to an extreme. And he created a propaga – you know, that for years we’ve ignored what was happening with Russia, TV and everything, and we, in fact, we, kind of, played – we, I refer to myself now as a British person.
But – so, I just wanted to say big thank you to the panel and for – you know, I’m looking forward to reading the book. I think this is invaluable conversation. I hope you will take it, kind of, further, because we need to learn. My brother is on the frontline. My parents, you know, for days without electricity and power and they all stand, hope – you know, because they believe they have something to fight for. And I think we owe it, not just to Ukraine, but to ourselves and to the world, to make this right, and so, all those tens of 1,000s of people have not died in vain [pause].
Maryam Nemazee
And that feels like a really good note on which to conclude this, so thank you very much. And I’m really pleased that we got to hear from someone who is from Ukraine in this discussion, and I think it, sort of, brought together a couple of those points really well, sort of, naivety of diplomats. And Keir mentions in the book Russia being able to use this, sort of, fear of escalation that we have in the West and, you know, mentioning possible use of nuclear weapons, something that creates a lot of chaos and discussion in the media, particularly. But also, more important questions about, you know, how to repair that ignorance at a time when trust is eroding in our own public institutions and perhaps, what more we can do here to protect civil liberties and democratic processes.
So, yeah, I think the book is at the back of the room. Please do grab a copy.
Edward Lucas
Makes a nice little Christmas present, as well, now, though.
Maryam Nemazee
It does. Is there anything you wanted to add? Oh, yes, now, there’s members’ drinks upstairs and I’m told that there is also space for non-members. So, officially members’ drinks, but open to everyone in the room, all are welcome, and you can watch this session on-demand, as well. It’s going to be available online.
