Galip Dalay
Hello, and welcome, everyone, to Chatham House member events, on a very beautiful London evening, actually, and thank you very much for choosing the event over this very nice weather. We have both people in person and in – on the line, as well, so this is an hybrid event, so therefore, we will be also having a quite good audience online, as well.
And this is on Turkey’s upcoming election, and the title is “Turkey at the Crossroads,” and probably you have already seen many articles with the same titles, and probably you will see, also, many events with the same titles because this election is really – and does really matter. So, it’s not a cliché, Turkey at the Crossroads, because at stakes are the future of Turkish democracy, the future of Turkish foreign policy, the future of Turkey’s position in great power competition, in international affairs, so the future of Turkish economy. So, the stakes cannot be really high about this election.
And also, this election for the first time probably in two decades, we don’t know the result of it ahead of the election. I mean, that might be a bit surprising or come across a bit cynical, but actually, over the last two decades, almost we knew the result of all election in advance because, more or less, we knew what will be the result. So, this is the first election in which we cannot foretell the result in advance.
So, here to discuss all the impact and implication of this election, to discuss it, to unpack it, we have a great line of speakers here, both at Chatham House, but also on the line. So, we will be discussing the impact of this election on Turkish democracy, Turkish foreign policy, Turkish-US relationship, Turkey’s relation with Europe, Turkey’s position in – on the War in Ukraine, relation with Russia, the position in the Middle East.
So, there are quite many topics to cover. I hope that we’ll have enough time to cover them. So, for – and let me first introduce my speakers and then, also, before I actually introduce my speakers, some house rules. This is on record, so therefore, the Chatham House rules doesn’t apply. So, if you want to ask questions under the Chatham House Rules, just you know that this is not a Chatham House Rules event. And for the people online, please pose your questions in the chat box, so I can – I will ask it to the speakers, and also for the audience, if any of you have questions, please raise your hand, the mic will come to you.
So, without further ado, I would like to introduce speakers. On my left hand, we have Yaprak Gürsoy, she’s the Chair of Turkish Studies at London School of Economics. On my right hand is Güney Yildiz, a Doctoral Researcher at Cambridge University and long-time Journalist with BBC and also with the German Institute for International and Security Affairs Researcher with SWP in Berlin. Online, we have Fuat Keyman, who is the Director of Istanbul Policy Center, and also in Washington, we have Gönül Tol, who is the Director of Turkey Programme at Middle East Institute in Washington.
So, Yaprak, let me start with you, actually. Since the election, the nexus between election and democracy is the most contested one, so a very simple question, what does this election mean for Turkish democracy?
Yaprak Gürsoy
Yeah, very simple, yes. Thank you very much, first of all, Galip, for inviting us and for organising this event. It’s a privilege to be here at Chatham House and to share the stage with these distinguished speakers.
Well, to – the answer to the question and implications of the elections for Turkish democracy can be answered in and – from the perspective of institutions or institutions of democracy, or conditions that make democracy possible, and here we’re talking about the elections themselves, freedoms and the rule of law.
Here, I think a lot of research has already covered the fact that the Turkish democracy has been eroding for over a decade, and so, the elections, of course, mean perhaps the reversal of that erosion. But since this is something that has been covered relatively well in the literature and in media, what I would like to focus on instead is the spirit of democracy, or the political culture, and that makes democracy possible.
So, here we can say that there are three components that I think and that I observe to be important for Turkey and for Turkish democracy. So, these are trust, participation and co-operation. So, for a democracy to be able to sustain itself, these three elements of political culture should be present. Now, we have a mixed mixture – mixed picture right now in front of us, both in terms of the election campaign, and also for developments after the elections.
In terms of trust, this is where I see the most negative elements and the most negative components for Turkish democracy. Trust means trust to institutions, trust to political parties, and also trust of people toward one another, so neighbours trusting one another, communities trusting one another. But due to increased polarisation for again, over a decade in Turkey, and the constant fear and the constant suspicion of communities towards one another, political parties, people, unfortunately, there has been a major erosion of the trust, and we are witnessing an era of distrust, and this distrust is still growing strong. If you look at the electoral campaign, the opposition believes that the government will not hand power if the opposition wins, so we have the distrust element there. These are just examples, and the government uses scaremongering tactics, which increases fear, of course, and also increases distrust.
Now, the second element is participation, where there are mixed, let’s say, mixed results there. So, on the positive side, we can say that participation in democracy and democratic institutions is alive and well when it comes to elections, which is the greatest hope, I would say. And it’s also a great hope that both the opposition and the government actually think that they might be losing the elections. So, for that reason, participation increases, and we are expecting high voter turnout, but there is the negative side to these elements. In democracies, we would expect grassroots mobilisation, engagement with local politics and engagement with civil society organisations, participation in civil society organisations. And this is not there, I don’t observe it, particularly.
And then, the final component is the co-operative spirit and the availability of negotiation and tolerance, so this is related to trust. We need democracy as a system where winner does not take it all. It shouldn’t be like that. And the positive side about that is the opposition now consists of different political parties coming from different ideological backgrounds. So, in the future, we are going to perhaps see more co-operative spirit.
And then, the final optimistic note I would like to end with is – and this is not a popular review at all, but I believe that the composition of the Parliament, where nobody really securely holds the majority, might lead to or force groups to negotiate with each other, support co-operation and a split between the legislator and the executor. For this reason, I think might not be a bad idea.
Galip Dalay
Just a follow-up question. I mean, there is usually a wide scepticism or question arising regarding the election security, so what would you say there?
Yaprak Gürsoy
I think…
Galip Dalay
Just one minute.
Yaprak Gürsoy
…that’s the trust there. I would put that under the trust component.
Galip Dalay
For sure. Fuat, the future of Turkish foreign policy has been hotly debated in recent years, so what does this election mean for Turkish foreign policy?
Fuat Keyman
Thank you, Galip. Let me begin by thanking you and the Chatham House for inviting me, it’s an honour.
If the opposition wins the election, I think we will actually see very significant changes in Turkish foreign policy, both in terms of scope actors and the making. I think the first thing to do is to say, actually, is if the opposition wins, the government will adapt, and I am saying this on the basis of their campaign, their promises and also my, actually, interviews with the leaders of the opposition. The government will adapt a more pro-NATA, pro-EU and pro-European stance, while preserving its economic ties with Russia and the rest of the world. The government would attempt to strengthen its strategic anchor with the West, Kuwait, Turkey’s strategic vision in the West, but also, opening Turkey to the global engagements, institutional arrangements, and the – and regional relations. I think the anchor with the West will be definitely strong – strengthened.
I think, after the election, one of the first things that the Turkish Government will do, actually, is to approve Sweden’s, you know, entry into NATO membership. But on the other hand, we will actually see certain continuities. Turkey will actually maintain its dialogue between the Ukraine and Russia, but at the same time readjusting its relations with Russia. It will be much more economically – much more balanced and maintaining this actually the delicate balance. Turkey will also maintain its role in the grain, you know, corridor in terms of the food crisis.
But the second aspect, very briefly, there will be a very significant reinstitutionalisation of foreign policy, both in terms of actors and in terms of making. Foreign affairs will be strengthened, foreign ministry – Minister will be quite important in initiating and also carrying out the foreign policy. The leader-based foreign policy, the time of leader-based foreign policy, will be over, and I will – we’ll see, actually, not leader to leader, but the foreign affairs and Foreign Affair Minister and Foreign Affair Minister type of relations.
There will be much more co-operation between foreign affairs and economic affairs. They will actually look at foreign policy, not only from the security angle, but also from the economy and energy angle, and we will see that the Foreign Affair Ministry will actually have a more inclusive approach towards thinktanks, civil society organisations and experts. There will be much more deliberative foreign policymaking, actually, after the election.
If the incumbent government wins, I think the transactionalism will continue. I think the government will actually, again, approve the Sweden’s – Sweden entry. But my, actually, fear is that, you know, if the incumbent government wins, this – the existing or foregoing the problem of trust and, you know, sort of, risky relations with the West, with the transatlantic world. And also ties with Russia, it’s kind of, an ambiguous ties with Russia, will actually remain. So, in this sense, I don’t see very much…
Galip Dalay
Right.
Fuat Keyman
…bright future for Turkish foreign policy if the incumbent government wins, but there will be significant changes if the opposition wins.
Galip Dalay
I will come to this, actually. I mean, among the things that you said, all of them are important, but two issue particularly stands out that will have a more economy centric foreign policy rather than this geopolitical powerplay. And secondly, that the foreign policymaking policy and ecosystem will change in Turkey and the implication of it on the Turkish foreign policy. So, I will come to you particularly in the second round, because that also has significant impact on Turkish-European relationship, particularly the economy angle, but let me now go to Gönül.
Gönül, in recent years, Turkish-US relationship, Turkey’s relationship with transatlantic community at large has been quite crisis ridden. We went from one crisis to another. So, how this election is likely to affect Turkey’s place in the transatlantic community and particularly relation with the US?
Gönül Tol
Well, thank you, Galip and Chatham House for putting this event together. Well, it depends. If – in the scenario of an opposition win, I think Turkish-US partnership will be determined by several factors where Turkey stands on these issues, and the first one is, I think, on Russia. The opposition keeps saying that they will pursue a more balanced approach, meaning, and I agree with Fuat that it’s not going to be a dramatic change there. Turkey will – Russia is an important energy and trade partner, meaning that Turkey cannot really ali – afford to alienate Russia. So, there will be some continuity there. Turkey will have to work with Russia in places where both countries’ interests overlap, but I think the most significant difference could be on two files, and one of them is the S-400.
Now, the opposition’s foreign policy document does not mention specifically the S-400 question, but if you talk to opposition figures, they highlight that they would like to return to the F-35 programme. I’m not sure if that’s realistically – it’s – if that’s realistic or not, but that’s something that they say they will pursue, and I think in between the lines, that means that they are willing to come up with a creative solution to the S-400 questions. So, if that happens, I think that will open a new chapter, has the potential to open a new chapter in Turkey-US ties.
And the second thing is, I think, the sanctions. Yes, Turkey, under a government – under a new government will work with Russia, but I don’t think it will go out of its way to allow Russia to circumvent Russian – Western sanctions, and that is going to be a welcome change from the point of view of Washington. Washington has been quite uneasy with what Erdoğan has been doing with Russia. After the invasion of Ukraine, there are a lot of Russian companies set up in Turkey, Russian oligarchs are welcomed, so in many ways, Erdoğan has thrown a lifeline to Putin after Ukraine invasion, and that’s been a huge disappointment from – for Washington’s point of view. So, if the new government does not engage in such activity, I think that’s going to be another welcome change from Washington’s point of view.
And another file that is important from the US point of view is where Turkey stands in China. Now, I don’t think there’s going to be a dramatic change under the new government in Turkey’s China policy. Erdoğan keeps referring to Turkish-China relations as a strategic partnership. I don’t think it’s a strategic partnership. It’s mostly based on trade, and from Erdoğan’s point of view, attracting investment is a key component of that policy, but the opposition has been very critical of Erdoğan’s silence on – in the face of vigour with what China is doing to the Muslim community there.
So, you could expect a slight change in narrative. Maybe the new government could be more critical of China’s human rights record, but I don’t think that’s going to be a dramatic change given Turkish economy’s going to be – is going to be in trouble and attracting investment from China is, I’m sure, going to be one of the options that the new government wants.
Galip Dalay
A very brief question, like, a one-minute question, because one issue that will be on the agenda from day one will be whether the US will sell the F-16 to Turkey, and any opposition government would also want to return back to the F-35 programme. How possible are they, very briefly?
Gönül Tol
Well, from a production – I mean, purchasing F-35 is something else, but going back into the production cycle I think is going to be very difficult. But I think the first thing to consider is whether the US is going to be willing to sell F-16s to a new government, a new – a government who promises to pursue a peaceful diplomacy-oriented approach vis-à-vis its neighbours. I think the members of Congress that I talked to recently point out that a new government, a more democratic country, is a Turkey that they’re looking forward to work with. So, I think selling F-16s could be seriously on the agenda but I’m not quite sure about Turkey’s request to go back in the production line of F-35s.
And another thing that will also be critical in, I think – for the US ties under the new government is what Turkey does in Syria. In the past, as you know, Syria has been a big inflection point and caused a lot of frustration, so what Turkey does there is important. And Erdoğan, as you know, has made a U-turn there, and I think one of the first foreign policy moves from the new government is going to be shaking hands with Syria. If that comes down to withdrawal of Turkish troops, that could significantly impact US’s Syria…
Galip Dalay
Thank you.
Gönül Tol
…policy and things on the ground.
Galip Dalay
Thank you. Güney, if you read any articles in recent years, or if you just go through the articles that has been produced on Turkish foreign policy recently, you will see a lot of talks on Turkish-Russia relationship. I mean, that is creating a lot of curiosity. So, how this election is likely to affect Turkish-Russian relationship, but particularly Turkey’s position on the invasion of Ukraine?
Güney Yildiz
Yeah, thank you, Galip. I mean, it’s a – first, a privilege to be here. First, the Turkish-Russian relationship, the dynamic of Turkish-Russian relationship is different from, you know, Turkey’s relations with their – with its allies, and it’s because of how Turkey – it’s mainly due to how Turkey divides its foreign policy. Like, Turkey sees, you know, the – it divides – categorise foreign policy into two, foreign policy with difficult and high maintenance friends, like the West, like we – which makes a lot of noise on human rights and the democracy, but – yeah, and – but high maintenance. And there are dangerous enemies, and Russia belongs to this camp, dangerous rivals. Iran belongs to this camp and others.
So, Turkey knows full well that the West wouldn’t try to destabilise Turkey, security-wise, for example, or – a nation will come to Turkey’s help. But Russia can very easily and have – it has demonstrated that it can destabilise Turkey. So, Turkey is ver – more responsive to countries like Russia, and the next government will still continue to be the same, I think, and Turkish-Russian relations are multi-layered, and all these multi – all these layers includes lots of risks. For example, Turkey and – I mean, what I called in a previous article “adversarial collaboration,” the relationship between the two. So, one, you know, there’s energy co-operation, there’s, you know, tourism links, there’s co-operation, co-ordination, deconfliction in Syria, in Libya and South Caucasus. These issues are not going anywhere. I mean, there are possibilities of symptom resolution.
So, each of these contain risks, each of these relations, but when you have too many layers, all contain risk, it actually balances itself because you don’t want to risk everything else for just one policy file. So, I want to say, like, what will remain the same and what will change in the next government. So, I mean, we can’t look for an answer how the government will – you know, how a new government, if the opposition wins, will behave, because Erdoğan himself, the same person, behaved quite differently in the 20 years. So, it doesn’t – you know, we need to understand whether the Turkish foreign policy is, you know, determined by geopolitical necessities or ideological convictions. It’s clearly not ideological convictions, because Erdoğan went from shooting down a fighter jet, Russian fighter jet, to being the best friend, you know, with Putin.
The – what will remain the same are geopolitical reasons, what – which is, you know, the US gradual withdrawal from the Middle East, which means that Turkey can no longer outsource its foreign policy in the Middle East to the West, even at CHP government or whoever is in power. There are also strategic reasons. Yeah, I mean, the world is increasingly multipolar, and Turkey, even, you know, in the past, as well, will never, you know, side actor, which has implications to Ukraine, as well.
There is, you know, an overwhelming anti-Americanism across the political spectrum in domestic policy, so any government would find it difficult to, you know, be openly friendly with the US, and this creates an opportunity for the public to be open to narratives coming from countries like Russia, not because they’re pro-Russian, but they’re anti-American.
And there are also actors that some of the actors will remain the same, so, you know, who is influential in Turkish foreign policy today and in the last decade are the presidency and the security establishments, you know, both intelligence and, you know, the military. Both of these actors will still be there, so that’s also another point of continuation, but as for other German – Gönül mentioned, you know, there will be some changes, like the institutionalisation, which has already been mentioned, so I’ll skip that. But there are also tactics. For example when Sweden applies – applied to become member of NATO, President Erdoğan saw it as an opportunity to use his leverage against others, but the CHP’s, you know, main foreign policy people were saying that was a re – irresponsible move. We should have not risk our multilayered relationship with NATO.
Galip Dalay
You know, briefly also the Middle East, because I think the contemporary Turkey’s vision of international affairs has been largely shaped by what’s happened in the Middle East, and so, it saw the world through the Middle East. So, very briefly, what would change in Turkey’s position in the Middle East?
Güney Yildiz
Well, Turkish position in the Middle East has already changed extremely dramatically in the last – you know, in the last year, Erdoğan went from, you know, being antagonistic, having antagonistic relationship with the Egypt – the President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi of Egypt, UAE, Saudi Arabia, even Syria, to – like, trying to normalise all these relations. I think this trend will be contin – continue. Why this trend is there? There are multiple reasons, but also geopolitical reasons, which is the Middle East, the landscape in the Middle East, is changing, rapidly as well. Like if you’ve seen Chinese brokered a normalisation relationship between Saudi Arabia and Iran, and Russians steered normalisation relationship between Turkey and Syria, and Saudi Arabia and Syria. So, Turkey cannot continue its forei – previous policy.
One thing I expect will be – could be different is, you know, Turkey is having these resets and de-escalations with these powers, but still, it also escalates in certain areas, which is – like the – mostly centred on the Kurdish issue. So, Turkey is trying to get – become too friendly relationship with everyone else, but not, for example, one of the two main political parties in the Kurdistan region of Iraq, like the PUK. And also, Turkey, you know, expressed its desire to conduct a large-scale operation inside Syria. So, friendly relations with everyone except the Kurds, so this has domestic policy consequences.
Galip Dalay
Will this change or not change politically?
Güney Yildiz
I think it will change because the opposition – there’s potential for it to change, because the opposition is receiving support from the Kurdish voters in Turkey, which will affect its domestic policy, and if domestically, Turkey has less problems with the Kurds, but regionally, it will be there – it’ll be replicated.
Galip Dalay
Gönül, I mean, I think many people in this house will be asking about what’s going to happen to Sweden’s NATO membership. So, I mean, Fuat already said that probably that will be approved irrespective of who wins, but what’s your take? So are we – when we go to win the summit, NATO win the summit, will we see this issue having already resolved by then?
Gönül Tol
Well, no, I certainly think that no matter who wins in the upcoming vote, Sweden’s accession is going to be approved. But I don’t know if they will make it because it’s going to – when is the summit, in June, right? So, it might be – depending on what the new Parliament looks like, maybe it won’t happen by then, but I think it will certainly happen soon.
And one just thing that I forgot to mention in the first round, I didn’t talk about the scenario in which Erdoğan wins, what will happen to Turkey’s relations with the West. I think the common thinking is that Erdoğan will pursue a closer relationship with Western countries, including the United States and European Union, mainly because he will want to attract investment, given the dire state of Turkish economy. Obviously, that’s a possibility, but this is how I see things. I think if Erdoğan wins another term, we’re going to see a more unstable country, and when autocrats face domestic uncertainty and unstability, they usually turn to more aggressive foreign policy, and that is a possibility.
And the second thing is that Western investment might not be pouring into a Turkey where Erdoğan wins another term, right? So, that means Erdoğan could turn further to other autocratic countries who have already thrown their support behind him, so that will drive a further wedge, might drive a further wedge, between Erdoğan and Western countries.
Galip Dalay
Thank you. Fuat, there has always been very close connection between Turkey’s European journey and the quality of its democracy, so how do you see the nexus between Turkey-EU relationship and also the impact of its domestic democracy in Turkey being affected by this election?
Fuat Keyman
Thank you. I think, again, you know, there is a difference – or, you know, who wins will make a difference. If the incumbent government wins, I think the problem of trust will continue, the problem of the existing transactional relations in terms of the refugee issue, you know, and energy will actually continue. But, you know, that will be the end of Turkey’s membership to EU, the end of any possibility of opening accession negotiations with the EU. So, in this sense, although I agree with Güney that Erdoğan or the incumbent government might actually have to re-establish its relation with Europe, EU, NATO, and the United States, but the most likely scenario that the existing problem of trust will continue between these parties.
But if the opposition wins, I think there will be significant changes. To start with, maybe Yaprak’s first point about trust, I think, you know, there will be actually a process of rebuilding trust between Turkey and the EU, and I think this confidence-building and trust-building process will include, you know, civil society organisations and thinktanks. At Istanbul Policy Center, we will be actually working on these issues in terms of Turkey-EU relations.
And secondly, multilateralism will be the main, actually, or how is – or multi – rules-based multilateralism will be actually the framing process in terms of Turkey-EU relations. There will be the elimination of hurdles in Turkey-EU relations, the – by which I mean, for instance, Osman Kavala will be released. The [audio cuts out – 31:25] will be released. There will be actually restoration of rule of law Turkey, at least in terms of releasing the, you know, prisoners, and reassess the process of more impartial and independent judiciary.
So, in this sense, today, for instance, the main hurdle erosion, the institutional erosion, and autocracy in Turkey, I think these things will be eliminated, you know, from the government. The government will try to actually establish trust as much as possible, as I’ve said, through civil society organisations and thinktanks. I think trust, though, and confidence-building will be the first agenda, and that will be actually, also, you know, internal developments in Turkey.
I think Turkey is a country very tired of severe polarisation and autocracy and authoritarianism, and as a matter of fact, you know, if the opposition wins, there will be actually a winning here on the basis of the what we call table of about six different ideological groups, political parties, and ideological references are working together. There will be some kind of, actually, move to remedy or overcome severe polarisation in Turkey. There will be some opening for democratic reform, or opening the possibilities of living together, establishing trust in Turkey between citizens and institutions and the government, especially, you know, insti – individuals and the justice and the other kind of systems. That will reflect on Turkey-EU relations.
What I expect at the last point, maybe Turkey – and that’s we are actually also debating in Turkey in terms of how to actually start the process of, you know, trust-building, you know, confidence-building, so that actually, we actually reenergise, revitalise, Turkey-EU relations, especially – all – at the same time, Turkey-NATO relations. A) you know, there will be that much emphasis on full membership or the excision period. I think there will be actually, you know, sort of, efforts to bring together Turkey and the other European countries to work together in terms of Syria, in terms of tackling with the – with – on Kurdistan, with global challenges, climate change, food security and other things. And as a matter of fact, there will – and also Turkey and the EU will work together with the NATO to have a balance in terms of Russia and the Ukraine. You know, sort of, a – Turkey’s a very pivotal country from Baltics to the Black Sea.
And the last point, I think what needs to be done to re-energise Turkey-EU relations is to put Turkey back on the European agenda in terms of European debates about, you know, security, architecture, dealing with the war, dealing with actually climate crisis and the other crisis. There will be significant changes, as I see it, if the opp0sitions wins. That’s what we’ve been talking about and working, actually, in Turkey.
Galip Dalay
But - and you adapt that?
Fuat Keyman
Trying to open, actually, you know, windows of opportunity to re-energ – to revitalise this relations. But nevertheless, you know, I think it is faithful that pivotal elections, and as you said in the very beginning, I think what will be decided with Turkey in terms of the selection will be implications, not only domestically but also regionally and globally, and Europe and…
Galip Dalay
And globally.
Fuat Keyman
…EU-Turkey relations are quite important in that sense.
Galip Dalay
Hmmm, thank you. Yaprak, I mean, I think there has been extensive discussion on the implication of this election on Turkish democracy, but what else are at stake in terms of Turkish for domestic politics?
Yaprak Gürsoy
Well, if I may, I mean, this is – we are gathered here to talk about the elections and you described this as crossroads. But I would like to talk a little bit about the aftermath of the elections in more general sense of the term, and to say that yes, we are at a crossroads but the road ahead is bumpy one way or another, even if the opposition wins or – and the government stays in power. We are facing at the moment – I’m going to just name three main challenges that Turkey is facing. The first one is the economy, the second one is the social psychology of the Turkish people after the earthquake, and the final one is the status of refugees. We can come back to these in the Q&A, but whoever wins the elections will face the calamity of the economy, and this is going to be very difficult to reverse.
Although the opposition believes that with the re-establishment of the rule of law and a return to orthodox liberal policies, it’s going to signal to the markets that Turkey is a safe place to invest in, and then, that will result in more foreign direct investments, and of course, more orthodox policies would also mean that there will be a better control of inflation. And of course, giving Central Bank independence and, you know, communicating with the people and foreign investors in a more orthodox manner, again, would result in the rebuilding of trust, which is also very important for the economy.
Now, the second element is the aftermath of the earthquake. I’m going to be relatively brief here. I think we have all experienced collective trauma. I’ve talked about this in other places, and I’ve written on it, as well, and there’s no better description of what has happened, other than collective trauma. So, it was a combination of grief, shock, anger, again distrust and also fear that nobody’s homes are actually safe, that they cannot really trust the state institutions to save them or to rescue them.
So, this is going to be very difficult. For generations, we are going to have the impact of the earthquake. The status of refugees is also highly difficult to handle and then, we’re seeing, because of a combination of all of these things, a protest votes of the third candidate, which reached, at one point in time, 10%, probably even higher, and it’s mostly youth voters, so young people. So, we are facing, in the next few years, young people with completely different agendas, with completely different issues, and how is Turkey, any government, going to handle all of these problems combined with the dissatisfaction of young people?
Galip Dalay
Thank you. Well, we have already many question in the house and also online, so let’s start here, the gentleman at the front. Please state briefly who you are and please keep your questions briefly to only one questions.
Pyotr Kurzin
That’s very challenging considering the breadth that we’ve covered, but yes, my name is Pyotr, and I’m from the World Bank, previously Crisis Group, and I run the geopol – the Global Gambit podcast. But yeah, I really appreciate the comments here today. I want to focus on fringe issues, specifically a couple of ones. Number one, Turkish-Cypriot relations are ongoing in terms of trying to find a, you know, long-lasting peace deal. What do you, the panel, consider that to be? And then, the second one is more the focus, which is no mention of the Lachin corridor, Nagorno and Karabakh. Turkey and Russia have a co-operatively competitive relationship, and I want to know what we think this new government could do for that, as well. Thank you.
Galip Dalay
Thank you. The third, yes. Yeah.
Annette Bohr
Annette Bohr, Russia-Eurasia Programme in Chatham House. My question is in relation to the Central Asian states. Erdoğan has been very much trying to step up his influence in the region, particularly through the organisation of Turkey states. These states are feeling a bit of a security vacuum at the moment and have been looking to Turkey. Some have received drones from Turkey while Tajikistan has received drones from Iran. So, my question is how far do you think Turkey would be willing to step up in terms of being a security provider for this region and would it be worried about Russian concerns in this respect?
Galip Dalay
Yes. Yeah, the third row…
Abdi Fattah
Sorry.
Galip Dalay
…here, yeah.
Abdi Fattah
Yeah, thank you very much.
Galip Dalay
And…
Abdi Fattah
My name is Abdi Fattah. I’m from Somalia originally, so I’ve got my accent. I want to ask, what was the economic decision of the Turkey before the Erdoğan? And in terms of the global ties, Turkey had less ties with Africans, but right now they have more than 40 or something, is that a good things or bad thing?
Galip Dalay
And then – yeah.
Lorenzo
Hi, I’m Lorenzo. I’m a student at SOAS, imported from Middle East. My question is coming back to the trust point that you touched before, so how likely is it to, like – Erdoğan to consider actions the day after if he lost the elections, especially after the declaration – the comments of the Minister of the Interior about the possible coup? Yeah.
Galip Dalay
Well, thank you. There are still many questions, hands raised, so let’s go to the panel. So, please try to keep it to one and a half minutes, if possible. Güney, let me start with you because there has been a few question on the Middle Eas – about the Middle East, and also Turkey-Russia, one on Nagorno-Karabakh. So…
Güney Yildiz
Yeah, I’d like to…
Galip Dalay
You can select and answer any questions, actually.
Güney Yildiz
Yeah, the first question I can respond, but the…
Galip Dalay
Yes.
Güney Yildiz
…second one, I need a little bit of a reminder, very sorry about that. On Nagorno-Karabakh and Cyprus, I mean, Nagorno-Karabakh is becoming increasingly complicated issue with multiple different actors are being increasingly involved. So, it’s not just like Armenia versus Azerbaijan with Turkey and Russia involved, but also Iran is being pit more and more against Azerbaijan, also because of Israel’s good relations with Azerbaijan.
We also have Chinese for potential interest in this area with the connection of the – you know, that corridor. We also see Georgia and also some strange, you know, indications from Armenia about, you know, pursuing anti-Russian policies. So, it is extremely complicated and it’s a state issue. It’s not necessarily – I mean, it’s been – this policy’s been run mostly by the security establishment. I don’t expect there to be, you know, much change on this issue, but if you ask me how Turkey will behave, will – there will be continuation, but how they are going to behave, it will depend on whether the – depend on other regional components.
On Cyprus, I think the main difference will be, you know, Turkey – we need to, I think, underline that Turkey, yeah, President Erdoğan has these dramatic, you know, messages, but he actually, at the end of the day, he’s very careful not to cross the real red lines. He’s – there are real red lines that are put forward by the West and there are phony or fake red lines. The phony and fake red lines are mostly about European Court of Human Rights’ decisions need to be approved or freedom of expression and others. They will never lead to any sanctions on Turkey. But as 400 and – Turkish, you know, oil drillings in oil and gas exploration in the Middle – in Mediterranean are those two. So, we will not hear the – if elected President Kiliçdaroğlu to say we will – one night, we will come to invade Greece, which President Erdoğan said more than once. But still the arguments against Greece and then Cyprus about, you know, the rest will still be there, and I’ve already heard them from the main foreign policy people from the CHP.
Galip Dalay
Gönül, would you like to address any questions?
Gönül Tol
Yeah, sure. Maybe the – Turkey’s relations with Turkish states question. That’s nothing new; Turkey has been trying to cultivate closer trade and linguistic ties with – in the post-Soviet space since the 1990s. And Turkey has been seeking Asia inroads with Russia distracted, especially after the Russia’s invasion of Ukraine spooked neighbours, Moscow’s neighbours in Central Asia, and that, kind of, paved the way for Turkey’s boosted efforts.
But I think, as in the past, those efforts have been hampered by lingering Russian influence, so the question becomes how much – how long will Russia be tied up in this war, and whether its influence there is going to wane to the point that will open – that will provide some opening to Turkey. And I can easily see a new government, again this wasn’t Erdoğan’s doing, this was done previously, a new government can seek closer ties with these states, but it’s not – it might not entirely be up to Turkey.
And on the question about conceding the elections, I think – I keep saying this, in the last two weeks, because there’s a lot of concern about, and they’re not unfounded concerns, by the way, whether the election is going to be entirely free, whether Erdoğan is going to accept the results. Now, looking at his track record, we know that there are a lot of question marks and anxiety around election security. He’s done this before in 2017, very controversial referendum. In 2019, he didn’t accept the results, and he could do that again, but we should keep in mind that Turkey’s not Russia, yet, at least. That means elections still matter, and even autocrats, they need elections, too, for – he have the veneer of legitimacy. So, that means they cannot engage in the crudest forms of election rigging.
So, if, let’s say, there is a wide enough margin, Erdoğan is just going to have to walk away and concede, but if it’s not wide enough, and in the post-earthquake context, where there are eight million voters there and we don’t know how many of them registered, so that’s a lot of grey area, and Erdoğan can engage in election rigging. But again, there’s – there are limits to what he can do in terms of stealing the elections or not accepting the results.
And one key thing, and I’ll end it there, is in such a scenario where Turkish bureaucracy stands, and I don’t think it’s a foregone conclusion that Turkish bureaucracy will back Erdoğan, an Erdoğan who has lost elections, and we’ve seen signs of that. I think Turkish bureaucracy is hedging its bets and might not be willing to support an Erdoğan who just doesn’t want to accept the election results.
Galip Dalay
Thank you. Fuat?
Fuat Keyman
Yes, I will actually answer some of the questions, for instance in terms of the question about the Turkey-Africa relations, because my thinktank works on these issues, both from the aspect for the economy and imperialism. I think there will be continuity in that regard, that if the opposition wins, there will be no, you know, sort of, stopping of those, you know, recent relations with Africa. As a matter of fact, when I look at the Turkey-Africa relations the last ten/15 years, the – you know, you can actually, you know, sort of, grow it steadily, and that will continue. The post – with the Turkey’s relations with the post-Soviet, you know, Turkey states, and on that there will be continuity there, too, actually.
And – but I think in terms of Turkish foreign policy, the discourse style and Turkey – the foreign policymaking will be different. I think it will be much more, you know, multilateral, and much more reference to the institutional arrangements, for instance, you know, that, sort of – that we are talking about Turkey’s relations with Cyprus, it was actually brought back to me a UN framework, the European framework.
And I think more institutional framework based or rules-based multilateral references will be used in Turkish foreign policymaking, but most of the areas from Africa to [inaudible – 48:54]. I think, you know, in terms of Turkey-Cyprus relation, the – you know, there will be actually a change in terms of Turkey’s Foreign Affair Ministry and actually Cyprus and they’re actually – the way that they behave. We will be actually, sort of, institutional multilateral framework.
I agree with Gönül that from Turkey’s perspective, someone in Turkey following the Turkish elections, I still believe that, you know, this actually – there will be a political, you know, sort of, a shift, a governmental shift, actually, in the election. So, I think it was important elections, you know, sort of, pivotal elections, in terms of foreign policy and, you know, domestic policies, too. But the Turkish waters, it is Turkey’s choice, Turkish waters, the Turkish people’s, you know, choice in this election, what kind of Turkey they will live in it, what kind of Turkey they will see in the world. And their words, their, you know, attendance to the election, which is always high, will determine the result and I will actually see what kind of government we will have on the basis of Turkish people’s vote in that, actually, election.
Galip Dalay
Thank you. Yaprak?
Yaprak Gürsoy
Yes, I mean, everybody has pretty much covered all of the questions.
Galip Dalay
The concession.
Yaprak Gürsoy
The con…
Galip Dalay
Conceding.
Yaprak Gürsoy
The conceding, yes. So, that question, I think Gönül has answered that question very well, but I – maybe I can draw on, you know, some of the political science literature on that. If – Turkey is a hybrid regime, if we label it as a competitive authoritarian regime. Competitive authoritarian regimes are actually highly unstable regimes, they can go either way. They can turn more authoritarian, or they can have a democratic, let’s say, breakthrough.
Well, Turkey, because it’s a very plural society, it’s a heterogenous society with a history of democracy, with a social media that is very active, it would be very difficult to establish a consolidated authoritarian regime. So, my expectation would be for Turkey to go towards a more democratic path sooner or later. With Erdoğan conceding this particular election, it depends, exactly like Gönül said, on the margin of the win, and it depends on what the oppositional voters will do if he decides not to concede. Because of all the, you know, tensions, it might not be the situation where because people are hopeful now, if the margin is very small, if Erdoğan doesn’t leave, I mean, it’s hard to tell what’s going to happen in terms of people protesting and the results.
If I were Erdoğan, I would actually take exit guarantees. There’s also an established literature on that. So, it is possible to negotiate your way out of power and then, be in the opposition very gracefully and enjoy being in the opposition, because the current – I mean, the government in the opposition will have difficulties, right? The economy is not going to – it is not going to be a magic wand that will solve all of Turkey’s problems overnight. They are going to have major difficulties. So, in the opposition, Erdoğan will be more popular than he is now.
Galip Dalay
Thank you. Well, we have also many, many question online, so I apologise to people because we already have 14 questions, so I will have to only choose three of them, and then I will come back to the audience, as well, so to pick the last three questions. So, some of the questions has already been addressed. One of them, Yaprak, what does this election mean for the Syrian refugees?
Yaprak Gürsoy
Yeah, it is – unfortunately, it’s bad news for them, I would say. So, the opposition is very clear. Kiliçdaroğlu has made a video very recently and said that they’re definitely going to, in two years’ time, make the refugees return to their home countries. What was interesting in that video from my perspective is that he explained that we won’t be able to welcome them anymore because of environmental concerns, because of environmental issues, and he doesn’t mention the civil war at all in the video. But he also started the video by saying, “We’re not racists,” so there you go. But that’s the policy of the opposition.
And then, the third and the fourth candidates – and the fourth candidate, according to polls right now is adamant in terms of – and that’s a single issue, you know, political party, they’re just – they’re against refugees. So, the government, one way or another, would have to handle this even if Erdoğan wins the elections, and it’s just going to be very difficult to make them return. I mean, I really – you know, I can’t say more about this in terms of, like, what kinds of deals should be struck with the Middle East and the European Union in order to make this possible.
Galip Dalay
Sure. A question actually, I mean, one of the online participants is asking, we have this discussion largely about – you know, from one perspective, how does this affect Turkey’s policy towards the West? But what does this election mean for the West? How will it change the Western behaviour towards the Turkey? Will we see – for instance, will we see restart of the EU membership tolls?
So maybe, Fuat and Gönül can very briefly say will this election also change the Western behaviour towards Turkey in any significant way, particularly when it comes to fundamental issues like, you know, the fundamental issue of the framework in Turkish-European relationship, which is the membership. Is the membership not working because of the authoritarianisation – authoritarianism in Turkey, or it was not going to work anyway so authoritarianism was only a good cover for the European to say no to Europe – to Turkey? So, one – if we can just, like, briefly address it, one minute Fuat, one minute Gönül. Fuat?
Fuat Keyman
I mean, you know, where you look at, you know, the way that Brussel [means Brussels] talks about Turkey, Berlin, London, talking about Turkey, even Washington, what I see actually is that for a long time, they have big difficulty of imagining, envisioning Turkey without Erdoğan. They are actually more, you know, sort of, leaning towards the transactional relations in terms of the refugee issue and energy issues, and also Turkey actually is quite functional to these capitals, because they were containing refugees, and they were fighting against that. And the government, the Erdoğan government, they don’t have any actually aspiration towards the EU membership or, you know, revitalising accession process.
But I have seen actually really recently change, actually, in these capitals, that they will look at actually, you know, elections from a different angle, with different eyes. That maybe Turkey without Erdoğan is a possibility, or maybe they will actually see, after the election, Turkey without Erdoğan, and how are they going to actually approach Turkey without Erdoğan.
In that respect, you know, I think they are preparing themselves, too. I think these relations are, you know, not one-way traffic, actually. It’s – so, as much as – if the opposition wins or if there’s a change in Turkey towards revitalising Turkey’s relation with Europe, NATO, EU and the United State and transatlantic alliance, of course, you know, the Western parties actually look at Turkey in a different angle, by actually appreciating what is going on in Turkey, complexities in Turkey. And they are – and they also, you know, need to go beyond transactionalism. They also need to actually, you know, work with Turkish partners.
That’s what we like to do, actually, in Turkey, that this will be met by – you know, like, I think one of the first things that we should do after the elections is, if it is possible, if the new government’s position is towards that, is actually confidence measures and trust-building processes. Not full membership right away, not actually, like, the excision processes, but, you know, establishing grounds on which we could actually work together on Syria, we could talk, you know, on actually refugee issue, we could talk – work together, actually, on the Ukraine work.
I will actually see those things, you know, as possibility and I think, you know, I think Western governments need to think about the relation with Turkey differently than right now, if the, actually, election result will create a change in Turkey in terms of Turkish foreign policy and Turkey’s democratic…
Galip Dalay
Thank you.
Fuat Keyman
…navigation internally.
Galip Dalay
Thank you. So, Gönül, one-minute question. So, are we seeing – I mean, is the crisis in Turkish-Western relationship fully due to the what’s happening in Turkey or is it also due to the what’s happening in the West?
Gönül Tol
Great question, Galip, and I posed that question to the two Senators last week. I moderated a panel with two Senators who are on the Human Rights Caucuses, and I want to be hopeful about that, but unfortunately, having lived in Washington for many years, I’ve become cynical about that. We have a Biden administration who promised to put democracy and human rights – make democracy and human rights the backbone of its foreign policy, and yet he shook hands with Mohammed bin Salman. So unfortunately, I think the consensus, especially here, has been what Erdoğan does to its own people is not our concern, as long as he behaves on the foreign policy front. So, that’s a very Cold War lens, but it’s still there, and it’s still strong.
So, that’s why I think Turkey’s authoritarian term has never been considered an existential problem, it – even a real problem for Western countries. So, if there’s a democratic Turkey, I think things will change, but it’s a great question in the sense that because we always talk about whether a new government is going to change Turkey’s foreign policy posture, but it also – it’s not just up to the new government, right, because it doesn’t – it won’t be operating in a vacuum. It will depend on how this new government is perceived by the West.
And I’m not sure there’s going to be a dramatic change, because the United States – it’s not just about Turkey, but it’s about where the US sees itself in the world. And I think it’s quite prone to – it’s worried about its waning leverage, and it’s quite prone to cultivating transactional relationships, meaning author – autocracy or democracy won’t make a dramatic difference from Western point of view.
Galip Dalay
So, authoritarian Turkey and minus Russia – co-operation with Russia doesn’t seems to be a bad things for US, from what I understood. You had two fingers, and also, I will ask – pose you, like, one-minute questions. So, is an authoritarian or a democratic Turkey more of a challenge for EU? So…
Gönül Tol
I was just going to say, since we’re in a Western institution, and since the question asks from the Western perspective, that the West should not give up on Turkey because now they’re actually seeing what kind of a society Turkey has, with all this energy, with all this willingness to make things happen, and the youth, as well, are so dynamic, so don’t give up on Turkey.
Galip Dalay
Yeah. Güney?
Güney Yildiz
I think in terms of the strength of institutionalisation of foreign policy, it is less of a challenge than an authoritarian government. But in terms of if you look at specific issues, like for example, the refugee issue, an autocratic government can go against, you know, the general public view on that and can make deals with Europe, but a more democratic government can lead actually here to the solution that Europe might not like. And as, you know, I argued, these issues are more like a realistic or real red lines compared to the others.
When it comes to specific countries, we see, for example, you know, on Libya, Europe is divided, on Iraq, you know, there is – Europe is also not on the same page with itself, and in Syria, we see a dishonest between where European, you know, narrative and European actions, for example. On even Ukraine or China, I mean, we see differences. So, for a democratic Turkey to be on the same page with Europe is actually a anomaly because the Western world behaves differently and, you know, a democratic Turkey can be less predictable than an autocratic one, because an autocratic one – the autocratic government wants to remain in power, and…
Galip Dalay
Yes.
Güney Yildiz
…you can actually predict better their behaviour.
Galip Dalay
Behaviour. Well, I know we have only – but one last question, one final question, please.
Dr Nadaud
Yes, Dr Nadaud, member of Chatham House from the United States. The West has been characterised as having a high maintenance relationship with Turkey. From the Turkish perspective, what are two things the United States could do to make that relationship just a little bit easier?
Güney Yildiz
I think you have the fragmented policy on many issues and ad hoc responses to the relations with Turkey. So, like, you know, “Oh, you have a problem in Northern Syria, let’s resolve it, you know, by ad hoc solutions,” or, “You have” – like, or, “You do this in Ukraine or – then it will be fine.” I think, you know, leading, you know, with a non-fragmented kind of policy, like, you know, state departments acting in one way and NATO you see different acts, and Pentagon or Central – CENTCOM is acting in a different way, and they usually don’t go to the – deep inside the real problems.
I mean, the Kurdish issue, as I mentioned, is one issue in – that we can focus on because US is actually uniquely positioned to put pressure on every possible actor that is – that has problems, like you know, on the Kurds, different – Kurds in different countries, and on the Turkish government, you know, economically and otherwise, and US hardly was present in this issue. For example, much less than they were in, like, the peace process in Colombia, for example, which, I mean, I think it’s a, kind of, a blind spot that US doesn’t see that this one small issue, resolution of that issue can resolve multiple strategic issues, you know, Turkey has with the US vis-à-vis Syria, vis-à-vis Russia, vis-à-vis the rest of the Middle East. So, I think that’s one thing…
Galip Dalay
Thank you.
Güney Yildiz
…that the US should focus on.
Galip Dalay
Well, thank you very, very much, and I deeply apologise, because we have already still another 14 question in the chat box, and many questions in the audience. So, I’m terribly sorry, but I think we will have another event once we have the election and we will know the result, so the question will not be theoretical, probably a little more concrete, and I hope the answer will be equally concrete. But thank you very much for joining us for this lovely evening in London, so for spending time for us, rather than for nice weather, which is not, you know, the normalcy in the city. So, thank you very much again and thank you very much to, also, the people online, Fuat, Gönül, and also many people joining us online, and also thank you, Yaprak, thank you, Güney, and thank you to you. Thank you very much [applause].
