Quentin Peel
Good evening, everybody. We’re two minutes late, I’m sorry about that. First, I want to give a warm welcome to members and friends of Chatham House, where we’ve been convening meetings on the big issues on international affairs for more than 100 years. Thanks for joining tonight to help us continue that wonderful tradition. My name’s Quentin Peel and I’m an Associate Fellow with the Europe Programme here at Chatham House. I used to be a Foreign Correspondent, a Columnist and Foreign Editor at the Financial Times. We’re meeting at a frightening moment of geopolitical turmoil, when the war in Ukraine and the renewed conflict in the Middle East threaten to revive all the worst tensions of the 20th century. There’s even alarmist talk of a third World War. The US is no longer the supreme superpower it seemed to be after the collapse of the Soviet Union, China is rising inexorably, and a recidivist Russia seems determined to revive its old empire with brute force. Yet, all face the same huge challenges of climate change, mass migration and a technological revolution that we don’t know how to control.
So, where is Europe’s voice in this disordered world? President Macron of France made a major speech in Bratislava in May, calling for a new round of European Union enlargement to take in Ukraine, Moldova and the Western Balkans. He talked of a Europe of defence, with military sovereignty and strategic autonomy. He wanted Europe to take its place in the councils of – take its true place in the councils of the world. “We need a very great moment of theoretical and geopolitical clarification,” he said. “The EU needs to be rethought extensively. It should enlarge and it should reform itself.” But what did he mean? What is France’s vision for Europe? That’s what we’re here to discuss today. We’ve a wonderful panel to do so.
First, Madame Hélène Duchêne, French Ambassador to the EE – UK, who served both as French Permanent Representative to NATO, and as a Senior Diplomat in the permanent representation to the EU. She was Director of Security and Disarmament at the Quai d’Orsay, and Director General of Administration and Modernisation, before coming to London. So, she knows it all.
Second, we have my good friend and fellow Journalist, Sylvie Kauffmann, Editorial Director at Le Monde, the first woman to be the Rédacteur en Chef. Congratulations, Sylvie. She writes a weekly column on global affairs and also appears in my own old newspaper, the Financial Times, and the New York Times. If I may, Sophie, we first met on a trip to Angola…
Sylvie Kauffmann
Yes.
Quentin Peel
…where we shared the alarming experience of being bombed by the South African Air Force, and I’m happy to tay – to say we live to tell the tale. Sophie’s new book, Blindsided: How Berlin and Paris opened the way to Russia in Ukraine, has just appeared in French as Les Aveugles. She’ll join us online from Paris.
And third, I’m very happy to welcome my new colleague, Sebastien Maillard, who’s also an Associate Fellow on the Europe Programme and Special Advisor to the Jacques Delors Institute, where he was previously Director. He used to be Correspondent for the French Daily La Croix, Jacques Delors’ favourite newspaper, in Brussels and then in the Vatican.
Ladies and gentlemen, our discussion will be on the record and livestreamed. If you want to tweet, please use the hashtag #CHEvents and @ChathamHouse. I’ll ask each of our panellists to begin with a short presentation on the subject, and then we’ll have a debate between us, and then, I’ll take questions both from the audience here and online. I must warn you that I’ve never actually juggled between online and in person before. I hope it succeeds, but anyway, as far as questions are concerned, the more the merrier. So, without further ado, Madame l’Ambassadrice, how do you see France’s vision for Europe?
Ambassador Hélène Duchêne
First, just a few words to thank you for seeing me this prestigious house. I’m very impressed and grateful to this wonderful assistant to be able to listen to me. If I – the way I see France’s vision to – for Europe, is I think the longstanding engagement of France in the European construction, you know, that we have been member – Founding Member of the EU, and that since then we keep an unwavering commitment to Europe. And I think that our ambition is incredibly stong – strong today, even in the difficult days that the world is, yes, facing, and as you may recall, President Macron was elected in 2017 on a pro-European platform. But, you know, France is also a member of NATO, and we don’t see any contradiction in that, because NATO is the cornerstone of our collective security, and we are quite confident that a stronger NATO will contribute to a stronger – a stronger EU will contribute to a stronger NATO.
And, you know, you saw that the EU transform itself and adapted at huge scale the – in the recent years. Maybe I will quote Jean Monnet. I hope that you all know Jean Monnet, one of the original architects of European integration. Because he said, “Europe will be forged in crisis and will be the sum of the solution adopted for this crisis.” And, of course – ah, Sylvie has disappeared. Since the Eurozone debt crisis, the bloc has strengthened its financial system on monetary tools, more recently in respond of the commit – COVID-19 pandemic, the EU has developed converging economic structure on a common budgetary capacity. So, we showed in the recent years, the ability to adapt, and, of course, Russian war of aggression in Ukraine is shaking up the EU. Speeding up the transformation into a fully-fledged sovereign political power, complementing its economic strength.
Beyond the speedy implementation of sanctions. the EU has been taking concrete action in four areas. First, defence. The EU is acquiring a new dimension in defence. Following on from the Versailles Summit in March 2022, EU has been reenforcing co-ordination of national effort in defence capability and created some dedicated instrument, like European Defence Fund.
Second subject, but it’s an very important issue, industrial sovereignty, because we are – we own what we produce, and it’s very important. This sovereignty is focused on digital technology, energy, industrial sectors. The reduction of our energy dependence towards Russia is a star – is important and – is very important, but we have also adopted a strategy on energy transition. And, for example, the recent agreement we got with Germany and the reform on EU electricity market is very important in this step and shows that we are able to adapt and progress.
The first – the third progress is also the third place where we were very determined that it’s Europe of democracy. I think Europe is going to contribute – continue to anchor its identity as a democratic power, strongly anchored in the Eurozone. We show no intelligence outside or inside on the lack of respect of – in the rule of law.
And now, the question of Europe as a geopolitical power. I think that Europe must become an anchor of stability for the European continent, as well, as President Macron said, in the well-known GLOBSEC statement. It is France view that Europe must see itself as a bold geopolitical continent. And it is why the sovereignty agenda of Versailles is not about – only about defence capability, but the strategic autonomic agenda means being in greater control of our destiny through what we produce and what we buy, by reducing your dependency and diversifying and supporting European industry to produce more and faster. It’s a condition to be able to share – to choose our partners.
So, you spoke about the international context, and of course, it’s today creating a world of power crisis, where the situation is very volatile, as we are currently seeing with the developments in Israel and Gaza, and where there are increasing tensions over international rules-based system. On – in that world the – Europe has changed, too. Enlargement is very high on this agenda. Today it’s not an option, it’s a strategic necessity, both for the European Union and for the countries applying to join it. As you know, the Commission is assessing progress in each of these country, but looking to the larger picture, France believe that it’s an opportunity for EU to discuss its border, stabilise its institutional framework, and adapt its rule and governance.
For us the question is not whether or when we should enlarge, but rather how we should do it. And I think it’s a important moment of clarification for the European Union, and we believe that enlargement and reforms are on the same time of the same coin, because it’s clear that we have to ask the question how an European Union with 30 or more member could still work. What are the decision we will have to take on more qualifying majority on the number of Commissioners? So, it’s an important debate and it’s clear that in this debate I think that people will have a say, because we will have to involve, of course, the people. But, you know, European Union is not only Europe, and I think – and we remember – and we hear it’s also the UK has left the European Union and not – EU, and we are very aware of that, and we know that UK is a strong partner.
You probably know the European political community, it was a proposal by France to extend – to open the debate to all the countries on the European continent, and not only on Europe. And I think it’s – we are very interested to see how the UK, who is going to host the next EPC Summit in next spring, I think, will deal with that. EPC, since the Prague Summit EPC has achieved many, many – I mean, progressing on many subjects, since, like cybersecurity, transport, and young people, and I think it’s impor – it’s also an important issue.
I think I would say a few words about relations with Germany, because that – you know that the European project was built on Franco-German reconciliation, and it’s something that we must remember. Europe was a Europe of peace, and we are at a certain – we are in a changing world, and Olaf Scholz said that we are the – in a Zeitenwende, and I think it’s really exact. But I think at this time, on – the agreement we got on the European markets shows that France and Germany will behave very responsively at a time where EU embarks for maybe one of the most – biggest tran – political transformation it has in – ever faced.
And outside the EU, the relation is – with the UK, is getting better, so I can speak a lot of hours on that but I think I took all my time. As you know, we had a Franco-British Summit last March and it was a time where UK and France, we had strong disagreements linked to Brexit, linked to AUKUS and many, many other subject, probably, but these main. Where show that the Ukraine situation, we did a real co-ordination, and the fact that we were both nuclear power, Permanent Member of the Security Council, member of NATO, gave us some responsibilities. And at the time we have been working, co-ordinating on that, and also on many, many topics.
The summit of March agreed a very long declaration with, like, a [inaudible – 16:54] for the bilateral relation, 60 pages. If you want, you can read it. So, we have a lot of convergence and we know that European issues are not limited to European Union and that we are keen and eager to work with our British friends. It’s my only life and you can make out that it means a lot. So, I will stop there, and thank you for your patience.
Quentin Peel
No, thank you very much, Ambassador, and thank you for the overview that you’ve given us of the whole situation. There are a couple of points I will come back to later about – not least about the relationship with – between France and Britain, but let me turn to Sebastien. And Sebastien, ask you to put this initiative by Macron, this acceleration if you like, of the process of enlargement and so on, put that in the broader context of Macron the man who, as the Ambassador said, won his election on the basis of a European platform. Which was something that took quite a lot of people by surprise, and pleasure, I may say.
Sebastien Maillard
Exactly, yeah.
Ambassador Hélène Duchêne
And that’s very true, and this is definitely…
Sebastien Maillard
Thank you, Quentin, and I’m very honoured to speak tonight at Chatham House. The Ambassador Duchêne rightly recalled that Emmanuel Macron was elected in 2017 with a strong European – on a strong European platform. But when he went to push a stronger European integration agenda, he – actually he faced, and he still faces in some way, two challenges, a domestic challenge and an external challenge. The domestic challenge is that perhaps Macron is the most European of all the French, meaning that we – or he follows a European agenda in a country that is not the most Europhile of all. Not – we’re not as Europhile as the Germans, not as Europhile as the Poles or the Irish, or as the Portuguese. I mean if – and in a way, we’re perhaps closer to the British in that sense. We are the country that said no in 2005 to the Constitutional Treaty. We saw Le Pen campaigning against EU. So, he has to deal with a form of French Euroscepticism that is not – it’s not a given that France will just follow EU and EU agenda.
And his external challenge is that when you want to be influential in the EU, when you want to be heard, when you want to be – to have some leverage, and when you want to be taken seriously by the – by Germany, we were referring to Germany, you have to prove that you are also reforming your own economy. I mean, if you want to talk about reforming the EU – Stability Pact you have also to show that you’re controlling your own public debt. So, he has to fix his own house to get to – that’s – and I think all the structural reforms he’s been doing internally, with the pension reform this year, on unemployment, on skills, it’s also to be – to get a better leverage, also, when speaking out on the EU, to be heard.
Having said this, now that he – I think he tried to address those two challenges, domestic and external, by showing that EU affairs and Euro – and French affairs are not separate things. It’s like, you know, the two faces of one coin. If you look – if you take a Euro coin, you know, there’s the national face and a European face, and I think it’s the same coin. And his view – and that’s why, for instance, he would take von der Leyen on his plane to China with the German Minister, or he would easily always want to show that EU interests and French interests are completely intertwined. And that’s a way to get the French people onboard. And the way, also, when he speaks about European sovereignty, the word ‘sovereignty’ is the way to show to the far-right, you know, sovereignty is not your affair, it’s actually ours. And it’s that sovereignty now is an EU question, not just a national one.
So, I think he’s tried to make the French proud of E – of the EU, not to shy away from it, or not to be ashamed of it, but really, to show a form of European pride. And his vision of Europe, to put it in a nutshell, is really to make Europe, and not just the EU, Europe as a whole, a world power in its own right. And not just a trade power as it already is, or not just a normative power, soft power, but really a full-fledged power, industrial power. And I think he started by relying very much on Germany on this, and I remember during his campaign in 2017, he said, “I want to govern with Germany.” I don’t think he would say that today, again. I think he’s been trying to still, of course, rely on the Franco-German engine, but also, try to enlarge partnerships.
He’s made – he’s just paid a recent state visit to the Netherlands, and to have the Netherlands onboard, also advocating for industrial policy, the Netherlands also supporting a carbon tax, I think he has been trying to get, you know, other allies than just Germany. Because Germany is difficult to – is a difficult partner in this, and so, he’s done a par – a strong partnership with Italy, through the Quirinal Treaty, a strong partnership with Spain. You’ll recall, also, his – he – how he’s trying to get closer with the UK.
So, I think he’s trying to not move out of a Franco-German engine, but try to diverse it, and also, put enlargement in the division of a European power. Meaning that enlargement will not dilute the EU, but actually if we want a stronger EU, we have to have the Western Balkans with us and not with Russia or with China, but with us. So, it’s really trying to put enlargement, which is very not – a not-popular issue in France, and we can come back to this. We have been traditionally quite, I think, reluctant on any enlargement, except Greece, I think, historically. But otherwise the fact that enlargement is put into perspective as in the agenda of building a more powerful EU, is the way to bring it back. And also the European Political Community is, in a way, to make Europe think for itself and think for its own geopolitical agenda, without Russia, of course, and without – even in some way, without the US.
Quentin Peel
Okay, thanks very much. Sylvie, let me come to you now, because we’ve already heard quite a bit about the Franco-German relationship, still very much in theory, at the heart of the EU. But do you see that this initiative of Emmanuel Macron to very much deepen the security side of the European Union, is that something that Germany’s entirely onboard with? Do you think you see the two being very much in-step in this direction and therefore, it is a joint initiative, or is it still very much a French initiative?
Sylvie Kauffmann
Good evening. Thank you very much, Quentin, for the question, and I’m sorry not to be able to be with you. I’m in Paris, in the news – stuck in the newsroom this evening. So, regarding Germany and France, it’s a very important and very difficult question at the moment. I think, as Sebastien mentioned, the Franco-German engine, and I’m afraid that it’s not very much of an engine at the moment, it is, of course, still a very, very strong relationship and partnership because of its historical background, and also because there is a structural building to it, you know, which has been building up over the decades. And so, you have all these people in France and Germany having to work together because it’s even engrained in a treaty.
So – but at the summit level, which is Macron and Scholz, the relationship is not giving much impetus to new initiatives, I think. That’s to put it mildly, probably. There are a lot of differences. They are permanently trying to work them over and solve them, but it is a difficult relationship at the moment, for many reasons. We can come back to it.
So, in terms of security, obviously, the two countries are – see their security differently. I think the Germans are still very much relying on the United States. We could see this – and I don’t know whether you want to go into this argument, whether the European pillar of NATO – and I think the Ambassador is very competent on this for a – thanks to her experience in NATO. But I think this – the War in Ukraine has shown that France was really committed to its relationship with NATO. But we saw, for instance, in the NATO Summit in Vilnius in July, if I’m not mistaken, how, in fact, France was in favour of opening the door of NATO to Ukraine, and it was Germany which sided with the United States not to go along with this. So, there you have a sign of the differences.
But I think, you know, the War in Ukraine has changed so much in Europe, and maybe I will just say a few words about this and then, we can discuss it. But it has changed, of course, Germany very, very deeply. It has shaken Germany probably deeper than France, because there was much more at stake in the relationship with Russia in Germany than in France. Obviously, there was the energy policy, the dependency on Russian gas. There was also its security policy and its economic model, also, was very much affected.
So, for Germany, at a time when it was on top of it, moving into a coalition of three parties, which is pretty difficult to manage, you know, this Zeitenwende that the Ambassador mentioned has been rather difficult to enforce, I think. And so, this also of course affects the relationship with France, because when you are so busy on your domestic front and you are unsettled in a way, you have probably less – you don’t have so much luxury to pay attention to your neighbour or to your old relationships.
And then there’s the new – another factor affecting the Franco-German relationship, in my opinion, is the new power dynamics inside the EU because of Ukraine, and I think France – Macron has been late, but good at taking it into account. You mentioned this Bratislava speech, so that was really the shift, I think, that, you know – where he accepted the fact that you have to take into account more central – our cent – partners of Central Europe and Eastern Europe, the Baltic states, for instance. And that the relationship with Russia will – I cannot say will never be what it was, but for a long time, it’s going to be very different from what it was. And that all the projects, you know, all the schemes of building a new architecture of security for Europe with Russia, this is not going to be possible for a foreseeable time.
So, maybe I’ll leave it there, because I’ve raised several points that maybe we can discuss further, later on.
Quentin Peel
Okay, thanks very much, Sylvie, and I’ll come back to you now, Ambassador, if I may. Let’s start with the Franco-German relationship, because it is critical to any move forward in Europe. And I always remember that when enlargement was the subject of discussion in the 1990s and still, those blessed days, the UK was still a member of the European Union, it – the position of France, Britain and Germany was always described as, well, “Britain wants widening, France wants deepening and Germany wants both.” Has France shifted to wanting both, like Germany, but Germany is perhaps now the hesitant one?
Ambassador Hélène Duchêne
I think that we have now – we are really clear on the fact that we are ready and willing to enlarge, of course, on – as – you saw of course the Bratislava GLOBSEC statement. And we saw, you probably saw also, what Minister Èlisabeth Borne, said, “Now the question for us is now really how” – but we also say that we want, also, to depend on that we will – we want – that the EU is able to function, because it’s also important that on – in the – as its effect it’s not very different than to position we are. [Inaudible – 31:35] precedent enlargement, the two or more.
So, is Germany more reluctant? I don’t think so. Maybe you should ask the German Ambassador more than me, but I don’t see any enormous reluctance, at least on the idea of enlargement. I think it’s a necessity, but I think – I don’t see it so much different. And, you know, the thing I see, because I spent, a lot of time in my long life already, in Franco-German affairs, is that with Germany we come from opposite views from time, with different tradition, with different relations to the past, to nuclear issues, to defence. We have – of course, we are very different, but at the end, we are able to find a solution.
And I think the core of the Franco-German relation is that the thing that we are – we have the feeling that European integration was really the thing we did after the Second World War to avoid that this will happen again. And it’s the reason why we made the Coal and Steel association, the reason we made the choices on everything, on the – and we always progress, we made a lot. We are really integrated. You know, it’s not only – it’s also the level of civil servant, of [inaudible – 33:09] of the youth, so we – I think we are not obliged, but we have the feeling that we will look for and find a situ – a solution.
So, I’m not so concerned, because you see, even on – in the energy market, at a certain time, it seemed very difficult, but we – I think we achieve it. And it’s not for the interests of France, of Germany, it’s for the interest of Europe that we want to do that, and I think the European solidarity is something very strong to both countries.
Quentin Peel
But…
Ambassador Hélène Duchêne
Maybe I’m dream, but it’s my – the way I see the things.
Quentin Peel
Having followed the Franco-German relationship over the years, it’s always had its ups and downs.
Ambassador Hélène Duchêne
Yes, of course.
Quentin Peel
And the – one of the interesting things being that on the whole, it seems to work best when the two leaders come from opposite sides of the political spectrum. Remember Helmut Kohl and François Mitterrand, went very well. Helmut Kohl and Jacques Chirac, it never went very well. So, it – we’ve always had that sort of thing. But what I’m wondering in this particular case, now, we’re talking about a situation where the War in Ukraine has really changed things, as Sylvie was saying, as well. But is it possible for a Europe that says to Ukraine, “Okay, we will open the door to the European Union for membership, but we’re not opening the door to NATO membership at the same speed,” that is surely not a security guarantee that Ukraine can rely on?
Ambassador Hélène Duchêne
First, thank you for this question. I think NATO and EU are different organisation, different groups, and also, different use, also. I think it’s – for the time being, it’s – the EU is rather open to enlargement. For NATO, some countries are more reluctant, but it’s not a question – we say it, and we said even in 2008, Ukraine and Georgia will be member of NATO. The question is when should it take place, and it’s also, the reason why at the Vilnius Summit, we will take this engagement, but we said, also, it’s important also to provide some security guarantees. And it’s a thing that will be done by bilaterally.
So, I don’t see – you know, all the member of EU are not member of NATO. The – it’s not necessarily the same trend. It’s not the same guarantees, and it’s not also the same process, because, you know, when you begin negotiation for enlargement, it takes time. You have to take their key. It’s also – you enter into a process when you enter NATO. It’s very – in fact, I was Ambassador to NATO, it’s rather a small-time – or this – the process is rather small.
Quentin Peel
Let me come to Sebastien, because it strikes me that there is another problem with this vision that Macron has of a European of defence. It’s a vision primarily of a, sort of, expeditionary European defence co-operation. We’ve just had, last week in Spain, a European exercise of togetherness. Spain, France, Portugal, and I think – who else was involved? Austria, and actually the Irish. Landing on a beach, and the plan was we will protect a government that’s in danger of being overthrown, and this will be a European intervention. But this is not the security threat that Ukraine faces. Is it that we’ve got to fundamentally rethink what European of defence means, from what initially was the idea?
Sebastien Maillard
Well, if you read his speech in Bratislava, there is a – I think Macron’s idea is not to build the European defence on his own, but have a strong European pillar inside NATO. Having said this, we can perhaps argue what he really means, but he – it’s true that he believe that the – as far as I understand and I think – I’m sure the Ambassador is – would know this matter much better, but the – we – the idea that we need a strong European pillar within NATO. Because we – I think the fear in France, and not only in France, is that the US, if it turns to another President next year, perhaps more – less supportive of Ukraine, or if the other – the American democracy is not in – ready to support our backyard as we’re supposed to, we must take care of ourself.
So, there is a push to engage more public spending on defence, but I – but we also, hmmm, understand that security is – must mean – it has a much broader meaning. And Ambassador Duchêne was referring to Macron’s vision that if the EU is to be a power, it’s not just – being a power just does mean have major power. It must be – we must also reduce our dependencies on technology, on China, on energy. So, it’s – this is part of EU security in a broad – in the broader sense, and I think the whole Macron agenda that was decided in Versailles during the French presidency of the European Council, was to really address all the aspects of security, so – and not just leave it to – although it’s important to military defence.
I’d like just to say one word on the Franco-German divide on enlargement. I’m not sure the two countries do not agree on the necessity to enlarge. I mean, the – and Chancellor Scholz also did a speech on that and he’s very clear on – but I think perhaps both countries may not agree on how to reform the EU in order to enlarge. When it comes to giving up a unanimity vote in cert – in foreign affairs or on the fiscal, there may be a need for a trade-off. There’s been a recent report by 12 experts of both countries, but I’m not sure it has convinced the Élysée on that would be the right way to go.
On the speed to enlargement, I’m not sure both countries also see it at the same speed. And I’m looking forward I think to a forthcoming speech of Macron earlier in – next year, on perhaps the way to engage a new kind of accession, the idea of a staged accession, that, you know, you don’t have to wait for years and years before benefiting from EU subsidies and for having even your place in – around the table at a European Council.
So, we could move in towards a step-by-step accession, because Hung – Ukraine is a huge member state. I mean, it’s – we’re talking about a very poor country, and it’s true that if you had asked the question before the war, France was – never imagined Ukraine part of the EU. I mean, to – let’s be serious, we – I think the accession treaty that the associantry – association treaty that had been done with Ukraine was perhaps as far as we could go. But, of course, war changed the whole picture. There is no more – Putin doesn’t let us any room for grey zones in the continent.
So, yes, we – I think we change our mind on enlargement, but we think we need to tackle enlargement in a different way, and perhaps even yet, in the way Ukraine can enter the single market. I think we will be surprised by perhaps new ways of entering the EU, and not just, you know, waiting for years before you negotiate your 35 chapters and having a unanimity vote everywhere before entering this, ‘cause this will take us for decades.
Quentin Peel
Yeah. Okay, thanks. I just want to bring Sylvie back in now and then, I must turn to getting questions from the house and online. But Sylvie, looking at the security of Ukraine and bringing Ukraine in, I mean, your criticism, I believe, in your book, and put me right, ‘cause I tried to get it in London yesterday and it’s not arrived here yet, but the…
Sylvie Kauffmann
I’ll send you a copy, yeah.
Quentin Peel
Thanks very much. Your criticism was that initially, the Franco-German vision of a Europe – new European security architecture might actually have involved Russia. But that, at least, has been – that illusion has now been cured and it’s very different, but what is on offer now, do you feel that’s adequate for the security of Ukraine?
Sylvie Kauffmann
Well, I mean, we’re – you – we’re in the middle of a war, and this war is not showing any signs of being over soon, huh? Actually, while we are looking, of course, for very legitimate reasons, looking at the explosion of violence in the Middle East, the Russian forces have been launching a new offensive in the east of Ukraine and the situation there is quite difficult. So, I don’t think we have any idea at the moment of how this is going to end up and what will be the security situation, but what we know is that there’s – there are no signs of evolution at the moment within Russia, in the political system of Russia. Putin is probably – I mean, he’s going to run for another presidential election next year spring and, you know, he’s – he changed the constitution to stay in power until 2036. So, we’d better be prepared for, you know, for a confrontational Russia for a long time.
So, that means, you know, security – very, very strong security guarantees for Ukraine, of course, and supporting Ukraine in its war effort, as everybo – every Western leader promises, as long as it takes, but as long – how long is it? We have no idea, and the question of NATO will remain open. And there’s another summit in Washington next year, which will be an anniversary summit, I believe. So, again, the question will arise, what do we do with Ukraine and NATO? And I think the longer we wait to take this decision, the longer Putin is happy, yeah. That’s my personal view.
Quentin Peel
And do you think he’s looking at the Middle East and actually saying, “Thank goodness, this is going to actually put too much of a burden now on the US and the Europeans and distract them from Ukraine”?
Sylvie Kauffmann
Yes. I mean, I’m not – the best news for him is not so much the burden at the moment. We don’t know, again, how much of a burden it’s going to be, but the rising anger in [audio cuts out – 44:57] – from the global narrative, and this is weakening the Western narrative, and this is a very good thing for Putin, yeah.
Quentin Peel
I think – sorry, we just had a glitch in the sound from you there, Sylvie. But…
Sylvie Kauffmann
Yeah.
Quentin Peel
…look, I think now I bet – I must open it up to the floor. And give me an idea of where there are going to be questions coming from the floor, and I’ve also got questions coming online, and I’d better put my spectacles on. Good, fine. Let me take one online, and then, I’m going to come back to you here. Online I have a question from Jeffrey Allen. “President Macron famously said at the inception of the Biden administration, “America is back, but for how long?” How concerned, in your view, is the Élysée,” I think perhaps, Ambassador, it comes to you, “about the most recent read – leadership crisis in the US House of Representatives? What does this crisis portend as far as Franco-US relations are concerned, and especially Europe’s influence in international affairs?”
Ambassador Hélène Duchêne
Hmmm, yeah.
Quentin Peel
Difficult. It’s hanging there, this…
Ambassador Hélène Duchêne
Yes, it’s hanging there. I think maybe any difficulty – I was the French Ambassador to NATO at the time where Trump was the President, so I have strong memories, but I think…
Quentin Peel
Yes, you hide the scars well.
Ambassador Hélène Duchêne
Yeah. Well, anyway, but I think it’s – the thing where – I don’t know what Élysée thinks. Just ask them, you know, I’m don’t claim anything for that, but I think the important thing is that it shows that we have to be able to take our responsibilities, and it’s also the message of the GLOBSEC statement, you know.
And if I may come back on the GLOBSEC statement, I think the main goal of this statement was just that – one of the goal was probably to put in perspective the Russian aggress – what Russian aggression meant for European strategic stability, and what it means for you and it – what it meant. It meant that Article 5 deters Russia, because – it deters Russia because, of course – and also that EU has to organise itself. We have been able to deliver within hours very – a lot of weapons, and we have to beef up our capabilities. We have to develop our industry, and of course, we have to take care our strategic environment, because you know that now the European security architecture has disappeared. We don’t have any CFE, we don’t have any INF, we don’t have Open Skies. So, that means that everything has to be recreated, and maybe the message is also that whatever happens, we have to do that, also, on your – on own and be able to understand that.
So, I think it bring us to the responsibility of Europe, so it’s a reason why it’s also in term of Europe.
Quentin Peel
If we actually had a worst case scenario, I’m showing my colours but – and Trump came back next year, would that not galvanise Europe to actually step up to the mark much more, because Trump would be turning away?
Ambassador Hélène Duchêne
I think it will – in fact, it will probably galvanise Europe in doing what it already does and that we are doing. That mean investing more in defence and be ready, in fact, to defence it, and to be a really invested part of the world in defence. I think it’s a – it will – I don’t – I hope it won’t bring back – us back to the situation we were, but I think we know how it happens, and I think that if they want to go on their own, we have to be ready.
Quentin Peel
I’m going to come to the floor now. A question here in the second row. Could I ask you to wait for the microphone to come to you and then, just to identify yourself. You don’t have to stand up. There it comes.
Aya
Bonsoir, Madame l’Ambassadrice. Good evening, everyone. It’s a pleasure to be here. My name is Aya, I work in the House of Commons and I’m also a student at UCL studying Eastern European politics. So, my question is, given the historical diplomatic role and relationship of France with Russia and Western nations, do you think France now could see itself strategically positioned, in the light of the current geopolitical conflict, to take on a role, to some extent, as a mediator between Russia and the West? Thank you.
Quentin Peel
Who would like to pick that one up? Sylvie, perhaps. Did you – could France take the role of a mediator with Russia?
Sylvie Kauffmann
It depends on the circumstances, but I doubt that it could. I think Macron did try, before the Russian invasion, to convince Putin to, you know, to go back and not to do it, not to go ahead with this invasion, and he failed. You remember that trip, I think it was February 8, 2022, so that was, like, two weeks before the inv – the actual invasion. You know, as long as things are in Russia as they are at the moment, I don’t see much possibility for this, yeah.
Quentin Peel
Okay. Do either of you want to pick that up, or shall I just carry on, try and get some more questions? Question over there in the front row.
Paul Cannon
[Pause] Hi, Paul Cannon. The question I have is to do with this EU/NATO thing. At what point does the deepening of EU unity make individual nation state membership of NATO moot and effectively, EU becomes the member of NATO?
Quentin Peel
Is that what a European pillar in NATO might mean? Ambassador?
Ambassador Hélène Duchêne
Indeed. As far as I know I think NATO is open to nations and not to organisations.
Quentin Peel
The thought of one bureaucracy on top of another.
Ambassador Hélène Duchêne
Exact – no, but, you know, but it’s a time where – no, because I think, you know, the question of defence and the – you know, because NATO is about Article 5, engaging, plotting thing, going to war, it’s the decision that has be – to be taken by nations, you know. Article 5 tell you that NATO members consult and decide to use, okay.
Quentin Peel
To tell you…
Ambassador Hélène Duchêne
So, no, it’s an – no, it’s a nation issue, I think, the drawing of…
Quentin Peel
It wouldn’t work.
Ambassador Hélène Duchêne
It wouldn’t work. I think it wouldn’t work.
Quentin Peel
Sebastien, what…?
Paul Cannon
So, there’d never be a federal Europe?
Quentin Peel
Hmmm hmm, yeah, yeah. What – Sebastien, what does the European pillar in NATO mean to you?
Sebastien Maillard
Well, that’s a very good question and I think no-one can really answer it clearly, at the moment, which is actually…
Ambassador Hélène Duchêne
Yeah.
Sebastien Maillard
And, you know, sometimes ambiguity can be very useful, and think we – now, we have to clarify this, and perhaps should Trump come back to power, it will accelerate the necessity to define what it means. We are now having Finland in NATO, and perhaps soon to be Sweden, if – I see Turkey is now moving on that, lifting its veto. So, more and more member states of the EU are actually NATO members. So, it may – without the EU being a member of NATO, it’s true that the majority of the membership of the EU are de facto mem – NATO states. We have to cope with neutral states, because Ireland, Austria, Malta, cling to their neutrality, but that’s another aspect. We have also an article in the European Treaty, 42.7, that says we also need to defend another member state that is – could be threatened by an external invader. So, there is also, even in the EU treaty itself, the need to guarantee security.
But that really means catching up with our spending, catching up with our own forces, and the whole difficulty is our capacity to do that quickly, to catch up quickly, and also, to have the same strategic minding on what is really threatening us. And that is the most difficulty, is having the same culture of what is a threat, for when you’ve – when it’s close to us as Ukraine, we all saw that we all united overnight and everybody was surprised that, you know, the EU can actually speak with one voice. When it comes to something a bit further, like the Middle East, it’s a complete cacophony. Yeah, and so that is – tells you how far we are in having a common assessment of what is really threatening us and threatening our societies.
Quentin Peel
Let me take a question from the online attendees, which brings us to the UK-France and UK-Europe relationship. Elizabeth Balsom asks, “Obviously, the UK was not the best team player when we were still an EU member, but do all the remaining members sing from the same hymn sheet? I’m thinking about Viktor Orbán, and what about Slovakia?” Sorry, it isn’t about UK relat – it’s about Viktor Orbán. What are the implications of these rather contrary-minded members? I mean, is having the opinions of a Viktor Orbán – the Polish elections may have changed that support, but now Slovakia, actually hosts in Bratislava, have a different view. Is that going to make it much more difficult for Macron to get his agenda?
Ambassador Hélène Duchêne
Who responding?
Sebastien Maillard
On Orbán, he – I think the war also has shifted the way we treat with so-called illiberal democracies. Orbán at the moment is quite isolated, and I’m sure he’s going to have a hard time tonight at the dinner table with his colleagues explaining what he did with Putin in China, while he was supposed to attend their own European Council. So, we saw it with the divide between Poland and Hungary, which only will get stronger.
On Slovakia, Robert Fico, I’m not that worried in the sense that he’s in a coalition. With all due respect I have to Slovakia, it remains the size of Slovakia, and so, we’ll see what happens in the next European elections. But if you look at someone like Giorgia Meloni in Italy, the way she has gone completely mainstream on EU affairs, broadly, and especially when it comes to the economy, so the – there is – and even other voices, far-right voices in Europe, I’m thinking of Le Pen in France, have, sort of, downplayed their stance against the EU.
So, it’s – and Orbán, actually, is desperately in need of EU money. I mean, he’s – he – the only reason he’s playing this game in vetoing everything he can is to get in a negotiating position where we defreeze the 13 billion he’s begging for, for his own – to – for his own country. So, it’s not in – I think in – it’s not completely damaging the way we want to push forward the EU. If we had had another – I think the victory in Poland, it can be a game-changer in that sense, because…
Quentin Peel
Well, that’s – I wanted to come to Sylvie on that, because I happen to know Sylvie’s just written something for the Financial Times on how the Polish elections may change the chemistry and the dynamics within the European Union. How – what do you think, Sylvie, is that going to make a big difference to European policy, the victory of Tusk and the opposition in Poland?
Sylvie Kauffmann
I think so, and I do hope so, but for instance, for Orbán, Orbán is more isolated. I mean, this Polish election is very bad news for Orbán. If the peace – you know, the Law and Justice Party had been – had won a third term, that means that this Visegrád Group of – and with the victory of Robert Fico in Slovakia, that meant that you would have had the Visegrád Group, which is Poland, Hungary, Slovakia, Czech Republic, again as a nuisance, if you want, or, you know, a contradiction, or trying to go against the most – the main European line. This is not possible anymore with Poland – with a pro-European government in Poland, which will, you know, take office probably in December, and Donald Tusk, of course, being the next Prime Minister.
So, I think this is really a very different dynamic now, thanks to this new majority in – here in Poland, and it will also, I think, give new impetus to the European – to Brussels. I mean, this is going to be a big change in Brussels, I think, and a positive change.
Quentin Peel
Okay, I’m going to come back to the room now. In the front row here. I have two side-by-side, so perhaps we can ask one after the other.
Member
Okay.
Bénédicte Paviot
Hi, question really for Madame l’Ambassadrice, bonsoir, and you, Sylvie, in Paris. I’d like to come back to the title of this debate.
Quentin Peel
Can I…?
Bénédicte Paviot
Bénédicte Paviot, France 24, in French and English, ex-BBC. What can France’s foreign policy shift? The word achieve, I’d like to hear what that’s going to achieve. I’m not sure I’ve heard it.
Quentin Peel
Yeah, go to your neighbour next-door and we’ll have two.
Member
Similar, ‘cause I’m a member of Chatham House. My question will be direct to the panel. In relation to the enlargement of NATO eastwards, and also enlargement of European community or the European Union, the question I have specifically to Turkey. Turkey is the second-biggest NATO country in the organisation, but France, specifically France, objecting to all applications by Turkey to join the European Union. Why?
Quentin Peel
Who’d like to take up which? Ambassador…
Sebastien Maillard
Do you want me to…
Ambassador Hélène Duchêne
Hmmm?
Sebastien Maillard
…for the Turkish point?
Ambassador Hélène Duchêne
Okay, yes.
Quentin Peel
…would you like to pick up on the Turkey question and how that go…
Ambassador Hélène Duchêne
My neighbour is very fussy, he can…
Quentin Peel
Sebastien will do Turkey. We…
Ambassador Hélène Duchêne
Yeah?
Sebastien Maillard
But yeah, I will do Turkey, but perhaps you can answer the first question on the…
Ambassador Hélène Duchêne
Well…
Quentin Peel
Is – but Ambassador, I think you were essentially saying it wasn’t that much of a shift, really?
Ambassador Hélène Duchêne
No, I think it was not that much of the shift. I think the Bratislava statement was really interested – interesting, and it was a shift, at a certain extent, where it was rather the time where the President conceptualised the evolution of Europe, linked to Ukraine aggression. What does it mean, what does it mean for our strategic stability, and what do we have to do? You know, I think it’s more – you know, we saw many things going. We remember the statement by Putin at the Verkunde in 2007. We see – we saw the treaty – the Russian aggression in Georgia in 2008. We saw Crimea in 2014 and we saw the aggression in 2022.
So, I think – and we – meanwhile, we saw the destruction of all the instrument of strategic stability, being INF. So – and it’s maybe the – putting in perspective with that, where we know – and what it means for Europe, and I think the thing we can achieve – we achieved a lot. We achieved a lot in supporting Ukraine, on having sanctions. I think we already achieved then and we are, of course, ready to achieve more, to grow, and I think the determination of Europe is – has been enormous, and it was, of course, good news that we were so united.
Quentin Peel
Sebastien, on Turkey, and I fear this is going to be the last response, ‘cause we’ve run out of time.
Sebastien Maillard
Well, we saw that – we mentioned several times that France was now very pushy on enlargement, which is true for the Western Balkans, true for Moldova and Ukraine, but not for Turkey. It’s true that this has – it has not been change – the view in France has not been change, because France believes that Turkey, as a member of the EU, will be just a too-big member state. I mean, it would have a weight at the European Council, in the European Parliament. It will become the biggest, by far the biggest member state. So, it’s a really – a whole gamechanger in the way our own leverage in the room would be – would not benefit from that.
And also, firstly, because the way President Erdoğan is behaving regarding to what we believe are European values, the fundamental rights, the rule of law, he’s completely shifting away from that. So, for now, the – when we talk about enlargement, Turkey is clearly today not in the picture, and it’s been frozen. It will never be explicitly, I think, said, you know, that it’s stopped, but it’s de facto stalled.
Quentin Peel
Alright, thank you very much. I apologise very much to everybody who would’ve liked to ask a question and I’ve got a string of questions online here that I should’ve put to you, but I’m afraid we’ve run out of time. I will have serious words with my colleagues at Chatham House about giving us a little more time on a future occasion, but nonetheless, the rules are the rules. I’m so sorry, I was just going to say to Sebastien, I remember going to Turkey in the mid-1980s at the invitation of a Turkish Journalist, in order to say to Turkey, “Don’t raise your hopes for membership of the European Union, ‘cause it ain’t going to happen fast,” and we’re still there.
It’s been a very interesting first toe in the water to find out where France’s vision of Europe is going, but I think there’s a long way still to travel, and we will watch with fascination. Ambassador, thank you very much, Sebastien, and Sylvie in Paris, we hope very much next time we can welcome you here in person at Chatham House, maybe to sell the book. Thank you very much. Thank you [applause].
