Dr Leslie Vinjamuri
Hello and welcome. It is a very real honour and privilege. I say that often ‘cause we are very fortunate at Chatham House to have many distinguished speakers. Today is especially special to all of us. Happy New Year. We have joining us, as you know, Jon Finer, who is the US Principal Deputy National Security Advisor to President Joe Biden. Jon, you were previously also served in the Obama administration. You were the Director of Policy Planning for Former Secretary of State John Kerry. You’ve spent years at the Council on Foreign Relations. You had earlier in your career, a remarkable and long career as a Journalist. You were with the Washington Post. I think it’s fair to say you bring extraordinary range of expertise on foreign policy and national security, and we also know that you have been very busy and that it is a remarkable moment for the Biden administration. So, thank you for taking time at a very busy moment of transition.
You’ve joined us today – we will be on the record, this is livestreamed – to talk with us about President Biden and the broader administration’s national security record and to reflect back, as well as thinking forward. It’s obviously a moment of multiple wars, of a lot of urgency surrounding crises for much of the world, but I want to briefly just remind ourselves – you don’t need reminding, but remind our audience that when President Biden entered the White House things looked very differently. We were in the middle of a pandemic that was neither anticipated nor probably very well prepared for, at a time when America was seen to be not really playing ball on the multilateral stage. When at home, unemployment was high and the economy was in a very difficult state. The country was far more divided, if you follow the Pew public opinion polls, than it had been when President Obama left office. So, it was a remarkable time, and I set that context because it’s almost, sort of – it seems a very different period both on the international stage and on the domestic stage.
So, let me turn to you to, sort of, ask a question. I mean, there’s a huge amount of focus, quite rightly, on Ukraine, on the Middle East, obviously on China. But before we talk about those issues, could I ask you, when you look back at the last four years, at the record of the Biden administration, how do you think, just sort of generally, about the – you know, what you were trying to accomplish, what the major successes have been? And perhaps thinking a little bit below the radar of, you know, what we’re all very fixed on in the headlines, how do you, kind of, characterise the last four years?
Jon Finer
Sure. Thanks very much, both for the question, but also more importantly, for hosting me, and thanks to Chatham House, as well. And of course I’m happy to offer my totally unbiased and dispassionate account of the Biden administration’s foreign policy successes. But in all seriousness, I think the context point that you made at the outset is a really important one. ‘Cause I think we arrived here in January of 2021, and the President arrived here in January of 2021, and identified pretty quickly out of the gate two major challenges that needed to be addressed for the country, but also for our position in the world, and to put ourselves in a place where we could execute an effective foreign policy.
One, as you rightly indicated, was righting the ship of our domestic economy and yes, pulling ourselves out of the doldrums of the pandemic economy, but also, I think, addressing some deficiencies that had been quite longstanding in our manufacturing base, in our infrastructure. The fact that we ran the risk of really falling behind in core areas of technology. And the President, frankly, primarily through domestic policy decisions and economic policy decisions, and seminal pieces of legislation that I think much of the country did not believe we were still capable of passing, laid a foundation for our own economic strength at home, and therefore our standing in the world that was critical to everything we did coming after that.
The other major deficiency that he identified, rightly, in my view, was in our relationships around the world. We inherited a set of relationships from an administration that seemed to see alliances, international agreements, multilateral fora, not as places of strategic advantage for the United States, force multipliers for everything we wanted to do, but actually quite the opposite, as essentially, burdens on the United States. And the President, President Biden, had a very different view of that and went about rehabilitating, repairing, restoring relationships in strategically consequential parts of the world.
So, when the major crises that you alluded to came, first and foremost, obviously, the Russian invasion of Ukraine, and obviously, a second primary crisis that we’ve had to address in this administration, the heinous attack by Hamas on October 7th, the United States was able to address those crises, manage those crises, and ultimately, steer them to a much better place, I think, than many predictions at the time would have allowed people to expect from a position of significant strength. And I suspect you’ll have questions about both of those areas. I’m happy to go into them in more detail.
You asked about places maybe that get a bit less attention than the Middle East and the Ukraine, and I’ll just mention a few areas that have, kind of, passed without as much notice, maybe, as we think they should get. One is, you know, we inherited a pretty horrific conflict in Ethiopia at the beginning of this administration and worked to address that conflict, resolve that conflict, and ultimately, bring a highly imperfect but still, for now, stable peace in a place where there was just far too much killing when we got here. Flies below the radar, given everything else that has happened.
Second, we inherited a refugee admissions programme in the United States that had been reduced by our predecessors to the lowest level in the history of the programme. The United States brought in about 10,000 refugees in the fiscal year when the President took office. And we restored that programme systematically over a period of four years, in response to the fact that there are these crises in the world, including a major, historic-level migration crisis, to bring in 100,000 refugees during this last fiscal year, which is an historic high for the last 30 plus years.
And third, we have pioneered a new way of doing international economic policy in strategically important regions of the world, which is an investment-driven approach that aligns some of the tools and comparative advantages that the United States has in the economic domain. We don’t have a sovereign wealth fund to be able to deploy. We don’t have state-owned enterprises that we can just direct, you know, “Do business here, don’t do business there.” What we do have is a set of incentives and policy choices that we can make that steer capital and steer US investment dollars to key regions of the world. And that is best exemplified by the President’s recent visit to Angola, where he highlighted a project the United States is leading that will link by rail, by data and by other economic and commercial activity, the Port of Lobito in Angola to the other side of the continent of Africa in Tanzania, linking four or five countries, in the process that otherwise had no infrastructural links.
So, that’s a long answer on a range of things, but I appreciate you’re particularly asking about the stuff that maybe hasn’t gotten as much attention as we’d like.
Dr Leslie Vinjamuri
I appreciate those answers. One can see that in some areas the, sort of, break going into the future might be more dramatic questions of refugees, migration more generally, and others perhaps less so. We’ll come to that, but I did want to hear from you on that, ‘cause I know our audience and the questions that, you know, that I will be asking you, get more concretely into the wars, because this is – there’s so much concern around the world, certainly here in Europe.
Let me start with the Middle East, because I think once we begin to talk about things closer to home for Europe, we will need to stay there. Many people are going to keep us there for obvious reasons. We know that the Biden administration – President Biden came into office really, not unlike previous Presidents since the end of the Cold War, wanting to focus America’s gaze and its strategic thinking on the Indo-Pacific in general, on China, as, you know, obviously central to that. And part of that was really reducing America’s commitments in the Middle East, obviously the withdrawal from Afghanistan which here in Europe, was – certainly in the UK seemed to be very chaotic. I think a lot of America’s allies felt on the outside of that decision-making tree.
But despite this broader context, this broader, sort of, strategic ambition, you get, obviously Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, but I want to first take us to October 7th and the fact that, you know, in the – even in the weeks before, we know Jake Sullivan was of the view that things were calm in the Middle East, the entire context has changed. Can you talk a little bit about how President Biden and the administration today, in light of the last year and a half, views the opportunities and challenges? How do you think about the role of Israel going forward in the search for regional security, and Iran? If you could speak specifically to that, partly about the last year and the last several mon – the year plus, but also, where you are now and what the goal has been in trying to deliver some form of viable security for the region.
Jon Finer
Sure, thank you. So just to start by, I think, explaining how we see the President’s approach in the Middle East, which may be very slightly, although I think largely, accurately characterised in your question. What I would say is the President did not come into office believing the United States could or should simply absent itself from this region and focus elsewhere. There are people in the United States who make arguments like that, but that was never our view. What the President strongly believed is that the United States had engaged in too many costly conflicts, directly, with US military intervention in that region, and conflicts that lasted too long, in many cases.
And that was the strategic rationale behind the decision to withdraw from Afghanistan, which I’m happy to talk about at greater length. But also, the desire to avoid repeating the mistakes that he believed were made in the United States invading Iraq and then embroiling us in a conflict there that lasted almost a decade. And so we knew that we were going to have to remain deeply invested and present in the region diplomatically, that we were going to have to maintain a significant force posture in the region to reinforce that diplomacy. But all of that was in service of a desire, frankly, to have to do less direct military intervention than some of our predecessor administrations had done.
In terms of what happened on October 7th and where we are left since then, I guess I would say a few important things. One is at a strategic level, it is almost inescapable that now, you know, more than a year since those attacks, predictions that actually in the immediate aftermath of October 7th, the United States, Israel, our other partners were actually more vulnerable, have not borne out. And in reality, strategically, our adversaries, Israel’s adversaries, our Gulf partners’ adversaries, are actually the ones who are now on the backfoot.
That obviously starts, first and foremost, with Iran, and people forget that Israel was not only attacked by Hamas on October 7th, in the days after that they were also attacked from five separate countries, by Iran itself and proxies of Iran. So, this was a multipronged set of attacks that took place and the result of those attacks is that Iran’s proxies are significantly weaker than they were before October 7th, with the possible exception of the Houthis, which I will acknowledge is a more difficult, in some ways, challenge, but one that we’re working to manage. Iran itself has been put on the backfoot, in part because its proxies are diminished. It attempted twice, in an unprecedented way, to directly attack Israel from its own soil with ballistic missiles, that were another, kind of, cornerstone of its deterrence. And twice Israel, with the help of the United States and other partners in a coalition, was able to defeat those attacks, such that they did, basically, no damage to Israel in the process.
And so, you know – and this ties in a little bit to the questions you’ve been alluding to about what’s to come in Europe, but the other key partner for Iran in the region has been President Assad in Syria. When President Assad in Syria fell under pressure, you know, as he has previous times during the course of a lengthy, more than a decade-long civil war, Iran was not in a position to come to his defence. Hezbollah was not in a position to come to his defence, and Russia, because it was tied down in Ukraine, as a direct result, to an extent of US policy decisions to support Ukraine, alongside our allies, Russia could not come to his defence, either. So another, kind of, core ally of Iran and adversary of Israel’s fell by the wayside. And so, the strategic position of Israel, you know, one year plus now, almost a year and half since October 7th, is again, against the odds and against the predictions, stronger than it was. That’s one point.
Second point, though, and this has to be acknowledged, this has come at a significant cost. Obviously an enormous cost paid by Israel on October 7th in these unconscionable attacks. And a significant cost paid by ordinary Palestinians in Gaza and to some extent, in the West Bank in the days since that. That has to be acknowledged. It has been a core focus of US policy to work with and in some cases, to press Israel to do more to improve the humanitarian situation in Gaza, but this strategic, I think, success that this has been has to be measured alongside what has been a significant humanitarian cost.
Third, the Gaza piece of this conflict could end, and for months that has been the case. There is a deal on the table that we have painstakingly worked with other mediators in the region and Israel to structure, that could end this war, bring the hostages, who are still in Gaza in just unimaginable circumstances, home, and allow for a dramatic improvement in both the security situation and the humanitarian situation. There have been times when we have had to press Israel to be more open about doing this deal, but this is not one of those times. In recent weeks and months it has been Hamas that has resisted, essentially, saying yes to what is on the table, and we strongly urge and encourage them to do so and that is playing out in real time.
Dr Leslie Vinjamuri
You know, so much there. I’m sure others will come back to this, but, you know, I guess a comment and a question. One is – and I don’t suggest that you were implying this in any way – but there is sometimes a sense that the strategic success that you referred to, that the humanitarian devastation to the Palestinians was, you know, necessary for the strategic success. I think it’s important, and I’m sure you would agree, to perhaps differentiate those. One didn’t require the other one. Could you say maybe a little bit, when you’re thinking again about this question, not only of a deal, but of the broader ambition for regional security, which is profound and necessary, what does the Biden administration see as the optimal role for the question of the Palestinians in that?
Jon Finer
We’ve had it pretty clear, our position on this, from the beginning of this administration, and frankly, nothing that happened on October 7th changed it, which is that ultimately, the only durable solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, which is, you know, sometimes more of a cold conflict, sometimes, as in recent months, much more of a hot war, the only ultimate resolution that is durable to that conflict is a negotiated peace that leads to a two-state solution.
That’s been President Biden’s position for decades now, it’s been the position of this administration throughout. And it has been, frankly, what we believe is ultimately where the diplomacy that will start with, we hope, in the days to come, either in this administration or early in the next, lead to a ceasefire in Gaza and the return of the hostages, where that ultimately should lead. Because what that can do is that can unlock, in addition obviously to the improvements in the conditions in Gaza, the further integration of Israel in its own region, including, as you know, we’ve worked quite hard to bring Israel and Saudi Arabia to the cusp of at some point being able to normalise relations, reducing the security threats to Israel. And that the culmination of all of this will have to be a negotiated peace with the Palestinians, or else this very fragile, I think, way forward that we have been trying to navigate cannot ultimately, come to fruition.
Dr Leslie Vinjamuri
And just quickly, I know it’s hard for you to assess this, but in your engagement in the transition to the second Trump administration, do you have confidence that that commitment to the two-state – a two-state solution, will remain at the top of US political policy concerns for the region?
Jon Finer
I’m going to try very hard today and I suspect you won’t totally let me off the hook and neither will other questioners, not to speak too much for the administration that is coming in. They will, you know, explain and defend their policies themselves. They’re already starting to articulate some of those, and I will leave it to them to do so. I will say, though, that they made an attempt at a version, their version of a two-state solution the last time. So, I don’t think you can totally take off the table that that could be part of their agenda, but it really isn’t for me to lay out what I think they’re likely to do.
Dr Leslie Vinjamuri
Okay, I appreciate that, thank you. Let’s come to Ukraine, because it is – we are here in Europe and it is top – you know, Ukraine and terror are, sort of, top of concern, top of mind for decision-makers, policy leaders, and frankly, the economic community more broadly defined in the UK and beyond, and Ukraine. And if you could speak to – you know, President Biden has both been applauded and criticised, you’re very well aware of this, for the broader policy, the US policy in support of Ukraine. Some, as you know, say it’s been too little, too incremental, too dominated by concerns of mitigating the prospect of escalation and hamstrung the Ukrainians. Others have been very supportive and really pointed to the – especially the early successes in bringing together and uniting America’s NATO allies.
What is your, you know, sort of, response to that and again, if you could, sort of, assess where we are now? We’re heading into just a phenomenally high level of conversation about a deal. Where is the Biden administration in thinking about, reflecting on, you know, what’s gone well, what perhaps – what decisions perhaps you would have rethought, and where you hope things go now?
Jon Finer
I appreciate the question, and I think, again, as with some of the other questions you’ve asked, context matters here too. And, you know, while it’s hard to do, I think it is important to put ourselves back in the mindset that we were in at the end of 2021 and at the very beginning of 2022, when the United States was going around the world saying to countries, including to the Ukrainians, “This is going to happen. The Russians are going to invade Ukraine, and not just seeking incremental gains in the Eastern part of the country. They are going to try to subjugate and dominate and essentially, occupy all of Ukraine. That is their strategic goal.”
And there – we were met with varying degrees of alarm and scepticism and maybe a little bit of complacency, but ultimately, that prediction proved correct, and when that happened, many people thought – I will acknowledge, many people inside our own administration thought – I think you would probably acknowledge many people on the outside who were analysing the situation – that Russia was likely to be, militarily at least, in the initial phase, quite successful in terms of being able to roll over the Ukrainian Army and take broad swathes of Ukrainian territory. If not all of it, massive, massive chunks of Ukraine in the process.
And because of a few things, and I will say first and foremost, because everybody underestimated the will and fortitude and capability of the Ukrainian Army. But second, because I think people also underestimated – and by the way, the main under-estimator in both cases is President Putin – that the West would remain united and in solidarity and really step up and provide enormous amounts of support to Ukraine. That started, by the way, before Russia went in in February of 2022, and dramatically scaled up during the course of the conflict.
Now you mentioned that we are sometimes criticised for, I think you said, you know, moving too slowly, or something along those lines. By the way, we’re also criticised – and I was at an event, speaking at an event in Texas of all places a few weeks ago – for pushing the country to the brink, the United States, of direct conflict with Russia, in a way that is dangerous and contrary to American interests. I had somebody stand up and yell that and walk out of the room. So, there are critics on both sides of this question of how far we have gone and, you know, that’s normal and natural about a major consequential set of policies.
What I think we feel strongly about is that we have been able to provide, at every moment of the conflict, what the Ukrainians needed in order to succeed on the battlefield. There is often a lot of noise about this particular system or that particular system. The weapons that we have been focussed on providing the Ukrainians, first and foremost, you know, two million now, I think, artillery shells that the United States has provided, tens of thousands of rockets, armoured vehicles. The, sort of, basic nuts and bolts of the type of conflict that they are engaged in that we identified early on were going to be the key to their success, we have gotten them. They have deployed them successfully.
Air defences is another key tool in this arsenal, to essentially, negate, to a very large extent, what could have been a Russian push for total air superiority over Ukraine, which they do not have because of these air defences. And we actually reprioritised air defence systems that the United States sells around the world. We put Ukraine at the front of that line, ahead of other core partners and allies, not because anybody on the outside was saying, “You should do that.” It was a technique that we identified ourselves and decided to implement and it’s been very successful and kept them in the fight. There are other systems, frankly, that have been called for from the outside that have made far less of a difference, even though we have ultimately provided them to Ukraine on the battlefield.
So, where does this leave us now, you know, at the end of 2024 and into 2025? Where we think this leaves Ukraine is in a position on the battlefield where they are grinding Russia down. Yes, Russia is making some incremental gains in the far eastern part of the country. That is far less strategically consequential than where people expected Russia to be, you know, at a far earlier stage of the war. Russia is suffering enormous casualties in the process. On the order of a thousand plus a day killed and wounded during the course of this conflict. Losing, by the way, in some cases in two weeks, as many Soldiers as the United States lost in the entire Iraq war, killed and wounded, which is just a staggering number.
And so, the Ukrainians are making them suffer for every single inch of territory that they gain, and they’re not gaining all that many inches, heading into the New Year. And we have surged over the last month, heading into the new administration, additional material to Ukraine to continue that success. We’ve also, by the way, imposed a significant set of new economic pressure – steps on Russia, going after the financial sector, and I will say there are more significant economic steps coming against Russia in the days to come. And we have provided Ukraine with $20 billion, access to $20 billion in the proceeds of Russian assets, such that their economy is in a place of basic solvency heading into the new administration.
So, the tools are in place for them to be successful in 2025, which we always identified as a very important year in this war, and it will be up to the next administration whether they continue to press the advantage on the battlefield, pressure Russia economically, and if ultimately, they want to head into a negotiation, which they have said, they could do that from a position of strength, if they continue down the path that we’re currently on.
Dr Leslie Vinjamuri
Can you speak to this question? Because while the Biden administration and yourselves won’t be the administration that engages in that question of a deal, surely in the course of the past 12 months, you’ve been talking about 2025 as a year when bringing both parties to the table and having negotiation for a deal has been part of the conversation. What is the deal that you’ve seen as the, sort of, realistic sweet spot that could produce a degree of stability in a way that complements and recognises the ideals, obviously of the Ukrainians, of Europe, and of the Biden administration, for Ukraine?
Jon Finer
So, I guess I’d start by saying bringing the two parties to talks is not the way that we think about how negotiations will ultimately come about. These are sovereign countries. Ukraine in particular, is a sovereign country that has suffered a totally outrageous and illegal assault on its territory, and it will not be for the United States, our European partners, or really anybody else, to tell Ukraine, “Now is the time to negotiate the end of this war.” They’ll make that decision themselves, as they will tell you if asked that question, and that’s very much our position, you know, for a range of reasons.
There is increasing, I think, discussion in Russia, in Ukraine, about the possibility of some sort of negotiation in the period ahead. I can’t predict whether that will come to pass, exactly when that will come to pass. So, our approach has been to prepare the Ukrainians to play the strongest hand possible, if and when they ultimately make the decision to go into those negotiations. That is the theory behind both everything we’ve been doing that I described on the battlefield over the last couple of years, but also, in particular, this surge of material that we have provided in recent weeks, as we head into a new administration. Part of the theory behind the ramped up economic pressure, as well, Ukrainians themselves are sending signals that at some point they’re going to want to talk. They have said that ultimately, the only way this war will end is at the negotiating table.
Now what a deal ultimately looks like, you know, not for me to lay out, certainly in public, obviously something we could or would discuss with the Ukrainians, but that would be done in private. But a key aspect of that is going to have to meet the Ukrainians, kind of, basic conditions. And by the way, terms that are broadly accepted not just by Ukraine supporters, but by many other countries in the world, including countries that adopt a, basically, neutral posture toward the war, which is Ukraine’s sovereignty has to be respected, its territorial integrity has to be respected, and Ukraine will need, I think, a set of basic guarantees for its security, given what has happened.
And so, you know, how that actually looks when things are put on paper and discussions take place, I think it is premature, because that’s a decision that the Ukrainians will have to make, both the timing and the substance.
Dr Leslie Vinjamuri
May I ask you one final question before I open it up? We’ve got several people who would like to ask questions, and I guess it’s a question about Europe. President Biden, I think, many of us who live in Europe appreciated this, his deep commitment to Europe, to the transatlantic partnership, to NATO, but it hasn’t been entirely smooth. There’s been a lot of negative reaction to the Inflation Reduction Act, to what’s perceived as a much more – to be a much more protectionist America. There have been a diversity of views across Europe on the question of aligning with the economic security agenda of the US with respect to China. And now, of course, there is a palpable, if not urgent, if – and, you know, legitimately deep concern about America’s commitment to working with Europe, collectively and individually, on the question of Ukraine, on the question of China, on the question of the economy.
What – how would you speak to your experience and the Biden administration’s experience of its relationship with Europe across these different dimensions? You know, for example, do you feel like Europe and – you know, whether you want to answer that collectively or bilaterally, has been aligned on the broader question of the Biden administration’s policy towards China, cert – especially on the technology and economic security side? Do you feel like there’s been very good alignment on the question of Ukraine and on – and of NATO more generally? You know, if you could just say a little bit about where you think the, you know, the really sweet spots have been for co-operation and where you see more dissensus, what you’ve hoped for from Europe, what you haven’t seen from Europe. And if you want to speak specifically to the UK, we always welcome that.
Jon Finer
So I guess I’d say a few things about this. One is…
Dr Leslie Vinjamuri
I know you have spent time in the UK as well. So…
Jon Finer
I have, a long time ago. I guess I’d say a few things about this. One is that, you know, it almost goes without saying that there has been a significant shift in the United States, but also in many other countries in the world, in terms of, sort of, the basic, conventional wisdom about how to structure your international economic policy. And that was driven, I think, by a couple of very important insights, that I don’t think, by the way, are contested among, you know, likeminded countries around the world, and certainly, I don’t think the Europeans see these questions differently.
One is that I think in a previous era of international economic relations was, sort of, predicated on an idea, or on an expectation, of, kind of, basic good faith relations among key economic actors. And then – and what has been revealed, I think in an era of much more intense competition, in particular competition among major powers, and obviously, I’m talking about China here to a large extent, is that that expectation cannot be counted on and certainly, should not be counted on from the perspective of national security at moments of vulnerability or sensitivity, or moments where a country finds itself at odds, for example with a country that controls key elements of its sensitive supply chains. And so, the pandemic really brought that home for the United States. A basic vulnerability that we had and other countries had, and we needed, we believed, to take action to address that vulnerability. And that’s a big part of some of these pieces of legislation that you referenced, and I’ll say a bit more about how I think the reaction to those pieces of legislation has been. That’s one.
Second is, I think, you know, in a democratic country, if your international economic policies are not broadly supported because the benefits of those policies are not perceived to be flowing as broadly as they should to, you know, the majority, the broad swathe of the population, you’ve got a problem. And you know, I think that has become clear and it’s not actually even a partisan issue in the United States. It’s a strain that is present to a significant extent in both parties, has become clear in the United States in recent years, and I think clear in other parts of the world, as well, and so a different approach that tried to ensure that the benefits of what we were doing around the world in terms of our trading relationships flowed more broadly across the United States, was quite important. And those were the, sort of, animating theories behind what President Biden has tried to do.
In terms of how countries have reacted to the IRA, which you mentioned, into this mindset and this approach writ large, I mean yes, we have obviously gotten some countries that initially, I think, had some concerns, came to us and asked for an explanation. I think the position that we took, and I do believe it has been borne out, maybe not 100% across the board, but certainly to a large extent, is that there is advantage to you, to likeminded countries that work closely with us, in what we are trying to do to restore our own manufacturing base and strengthen our own core industries, like chip production. Advantage for other countries that want to work with us by meeting certain standards, and I think countries have found that to be the case when they actually dug into the details of what is in this legislation. And second, what we have encouraged countries to do is emulate this approach, and increasingly, I think countries are starting to do exactly that.
So, it is going to be a bit turbulent, as there – as it always is when I think there is a shift in, sort of, mindset like this. But I think we’re in a very strong place in terms of the transatlantic relationship, yes, in terms of security, for all the reasons we just described, but I think increasingly, on economic grounds as well. And we are working through what is a basic paradox shift here and there, in, I think, the most constructive way that we can.
Dr Leslie Vinjamuri
Thank you, I appreciate that a huge amount. I would add the caveat, and you know it well, there’s not an eq – a relationship of equals. You know, the desire to have access to the US market is profound and based on a lot of inequality, even across a very important partnership. But, you know, a lot of the fear is projected into anticipation of what’s coming down the line, but people obviously don’t actually know what’s coming. It is an extraordinary time here, and I know you are very well aware of that.
I’m going to come to Mark Landler first. If you could say who you are, your affiliation, and state your question and please recall you’re on the record. Mark Landler. If you unmute, Mark.
Mark Landler
Hi, Jon can you hear me?
Jon Finer
I can.
Mark Landler
Great, it’s good to see you after a long time. I want to pick up a little bit on Leslie’s last question and ask you more broadly about all the work you did repairing alliances. Because, you know, it’s clear if you listen to the early statements from the incoming administration, they’re going to undo a lot of that work. And I guess the question I have is, at what point does the damage to alliance relationships become irreparable? You know, I’m, sort of, put in the mind of that old saying, “Fool me once, shame on you. Fool me twice, shame on me.” So why after four years of Trump, should we expect that any future administration will be able to do what you guys did in your first year?
And then maybe to add one more thought to this, is there things you did – are there things you did in the course of that repair work that had the effect of Trump-proofing some of these alliances, in other words, making them resilient so that even if you had an administration that came in with a lot of hostile rhetoric and even some hostile policies, that the relationships would survive and endure? Thank you.
Jon Finer
Thanks, Mark. I guess I’d say a few things about this. One is, you know, again, I will not pretend to either speak for the new administration’s approach or predict exactly what they will do. I don’t necessarily question the premise of your question. I will say I think it would be a mistake to undo, I think, some of the progress that has been made. We have found it profoundly in the interests of the United States to have these stronger relationships with different architecture in transatlantic relations, in Indo-Pacific relations. And we think this has fundamentally positioned the United States in a much stronger way to deal with the competition with China, for example, and that leaving those relationships on the sideline, or treating those countries in an adversarial way, I don’t think is in the United States’ interest. Hasn’t been the approach taken by the administration. The new administration will decide what to do.
In terms of, you know, going forward, you know, whether or not we have been able to Trump-proof, I don’t think we really think about things in those terms. Foreign policy is a realm in which the President has broad authority. I think that goes without saying in the American system, constitutionally and by precedent, and they will do what they decide to do. But I think one piece of what we’ve done that will make these relationships more resilient, and I do think it has been an innovation of this administration, has been to link to a much greater extent our allies in Europe with our allies in the Indo-Pacific. In other words, these are no longer just the US as the hub with two spokes leading off them to two – those two regions of the world, but we’re increasingly integrating our alliances.
And so you are seeing, for example, the Japanese and the Republic of Korea and the Australians stepping up to help Ukraine. You are seeing, you know, the Germans, the French and other countries pursuing freedom of navigation operations in the South China Sea and across the Taiwan Strait. And, you know, you didn’t see this five or ten years ago, and I don’t think there’s any reason to believe that all of that is just going to go away depending on US behaviour. These are now policies that these countries pursue not because the United States tells them to, but because they choose to for their own reasons, in their own interests, and I think that will continue.
And the last thing I’d say, Mark, is I just am very wary of the word ‘irreparable’ when it comes to international relations and, you know, I just look at the last four years, and in particular, two trips that President Biden made during his presidency. One to Vietnam, where we upgraded the US relationship with Vietnam to a comprehensive strategic partnership, the highest level of relationship that you can have in their system. We have increasingly, a very close defence relationship, we are pursuing greater economic co-operation. This is an area of real strategic opportunity for the United States in a country where the history is, you know, beyond complicated, but certainly, has not proved irreparable. And the other is the President’s recent trip that I referenced to Angola, where the United States essentially fought on the opposite side of a civil war during the Cold War, or at least US proxies did. And here, too, we are pursuing a strategically advantageous relationship in an important part of Africa with a country that is increasingly distancing itself from Russia, its longtime Cold War backer and sponsor.
So, there is no inevitability to any of this. I don’t think there’s any such thing as irreparable. I think these relationships and partnerships are important on their own terms, and countries will continue to pursue them in their own interests, and whatever happens over the next four years, I think you will see these relationships continue into the future.
Dr Leslie Vinjamuri
Thank you, Jon, and thank you, Mark. Let’s come next to James Landale. James, if you can unmute.
James Landale
Hi, Jon, this is James Landale from the BBC. Can I ask a terribly narrowminded UK-focused question? What is the UK Government’s position on the talks between the British Government and the Mauritians over the future of the Chagos Islands? The British Government says that the United States supports this deal because it ensures the legal stability and position of the military base at Diego Garcia, but there are others who say no, that this is a strategic concession that opens the door for greater Chinese influence in the region. And we get conflicting reports as to precisely what the United States thinks about it. So, if you could shed any light on that, that’d be great.
Dr Leslie Vinjamuri
Thank you, James.
Jon Finer
Okay, I think the way you initially phrased that question is for me to comment on the UK Government’s position, which I won’t do, but you know how to reach them. I guess what I would say is this was a bilateral process that the UK engaged in with Mauritius. Obviously, the US has significant interests in it. We consulted very closely with our allies, with the UK, at every step of the way, but we were not a party to the negotiations. We obviously, also consulted with the Mauritians from time to time. The agreement that we – that ultimately, emerged from that process was one that we believed met our core strategic interests and so, we believed it was above threshold and had no discomfort with it being consummated.
Dr Leslie Vinjamuri
Thank you. I’m going to come to Elena Lazarou and then to the Ambassador.
Elena Lazarou
Yes, good afternoon, thank you for all these comments. I am Elena, I am an Associate Fellow here at Chatham House and I work for the European Parliament’s Research Service. Thank you for starting with Africa, especially in the context of the recognition of genocide in Sudan by the US administration this week. I think it’s important. But I want to ask you about two things you mentioned, a negotiated peace between Israel and the Palestinians and then the potential ceasefire between Russia and Ukraine. I think largely, we are expecting to see both these things in 2025. But the question behind all these things is the security guarantees they’re after, and I wondered if you could talk a bit about that and particularly, discussions you’ve had with allies, regional allies, and also NATO in the Ukraine context. What do you see as the security guarantors the day after in both those regions? Thank you.
Jon Finer
Thank you, and yes, obviously, security is at the core of both of these potential conversations, or in one case, actual conversations, in the Gaza context. But, you know, I think beyond that, they should probably be discussed separately ‘cause the circumstances are just dramatically different.
Look, Israel is going to need assurance that what happened on October 7th cannot happen again, you know, at a fundamental level. That was their primary objective in pursuing the war, and if they’re going to stop prosecuting the war, they’re going to need to be able to have confidence and represent to their population that they have reached an agreement that prevents that from being able to happen again, even absent to continued military action. And, frankly, they’re going need it clear, and they’re going to make it clear that they will take action in self-defence when it is required and when it is warranted. That is, sort of, their basic conditions.
We believe, by the way, that there is a deal on the table that meets those requirements and meets the basic requirements of the other side, because there are two sides to a negotiation. And that deal is on the table, that deal is under discussion in real time. I probably won’t say too much more about the contours of it, other than repeating what I said before, that it would get the hostages out, it would dramatically improve the humanitarian situation, it would look after Israel’s basic security requirements. And it would create a whole range of other possibilities, you know, over the medium term, for deeper integration in the region and ultimately, a process that could lead to a two-state solution. That’s the goal. A very, very challenging path to say the least, I will acknowledge that.
On the Russia-Ukraine side, you know, it’s Ukraine whose basic security needs are going to have to be met. Ukraine has now, over more than a decade, suffered from Russian direct intervention inside its sovereign territory. This is a, you know, member of the United Nations that has full rights of sovereignty, whose rights have been violated in just egregious ways now for quite some time. And so, Ukraine in order to make peace with Russia, if that’s ultimately where this is heading, and you know, I’m not necessarily saying that’s the case, is going to need guarantees of its own security. Obviously, Ukraine wants to be in NATO. The US position, as has been the position of the Alliance writ large, is Ukraine ultimately will become a member of NATO. Beyond that, I’m not going to get into the puts or takes of exactly, you know, what path, what timeline, you know, what Ukrainian membership in NATO would look like. And, you know, that is ultimately, going to be an issue that they will need to pursue in the talks, with the backing of their allies.
Dr Leslie Vinjamuri
I think, given that last response, I’m going to go ahead and let James come in, ‘cause it’s on a – on the same general topic. James Nixey, please.
James Nixey
Yeah, can you hear me?
Dr Leslie Vinjamuri
Yes.
Jon Finer
Yes.
James Nixey
Thank you, and thank you Jon, in particular, and thank you for your years of service. And you no doubt, you absolutely do have a record to speak of, and I fully respect that. But I wonder if it’s not – I know you’ve had criticism from both sides, as Leslie pointed out, your Texan objections, as you were talking about, but I wonder if on the basis that Ukraine is on a losing trajectory, I am sorry to have to say that, that this balance has been too finely judged or overjudged, and in fact we have not got the calibration necessarily right to get Ukraine onto a winning trajectory. I’m afraid – I took your points about the number of losses that Russia is taking, but Russia can take those losses. That’s what autocracies can do, and I’m afraid that it’s got another couple of years of war left in it, according to most experts. So, without having a strategic objective to win, rather than just to keep Ukraine in the fight, I wonder if we haven’t actually just extended the problem.
Jon Finer
So, look, one of the things I think we collectively, you, me, our Military Analysts outside and inside the government, should have a degree of humility about is predicting developments on the battlefield. I think the track record here is not great, really by anybody. You know, there was a moment when it looked like Russia was going to take all of Ukraine. There was a moment when people were saying this was when Ukraine was ultimately going to achieve its great strategic success on the battlefield, the counteroffensive that Ukraine launched last year. You know, there is undeniably, as I think you’re alluding to, the fact that Russia is grinding out small but inexorable gains in the eastern part of the country.
Ukraine, by the way, is currently occupying a significant portion of Russian territory, which is a relatively new facet of this conflict just in the last six months or so, that people did not predict. And actually, to the extent people have made predictions about Kursk, which Ukraine continues to defend, it was that they would not be able to hold it very long, and now here they are still holding it. They are still holding Pokrovsk, which is a town probably almost nobody on this call had heard of until recent months and now is seen as, like, this sort of, strategic bellwether for how the war is going. And it is important at the end of the day.
But you’ve got to take a step back here and look at not just battlefield gains one day or maybe a minor setback the next day. This has not been a war in which either side has been able to sustain successful offensive operations. That is just the basic reality of what’s happened on the battlefield. Ukraine’s counteroffensive was not wildly successful. We resourced that in a substantial way, we tried to train them up to do it. They made a significant effort. It ultimately, led to modest gains, at best. Russia has launched a number of offensives, including some that have gained territory, but none of them have achieved the sort of strategic, game-changing battlefield success that they are seeking.
This is a hard, hard war in which to fight offensively, and frankly, two armies that are not all that adept at offensive operations. We have tried to overcome that by providing the Ukrainians with a whole range of capabilities they did not have before, you know. Including, by the way, some of the technological innovations that they have made to basically, close the gap between what you’re alluding to, which is you’ve got one country that is very large, with a large population, and another country that is large geographically but not as large in terms of population, and they basically, fight the same way. So over years and years and years, if Ukraine fights exactly like Russia, because Russia is bigger, it will ultimately, gain more territory.
So, we have tried to close those gaps by providing material, by training the Ukrainians to fight slightly differently, to help them improve their technological capability. Systems like drones that they’re using in an unprecedented way in, you know, in a modern war that sometimes looks like World War One, but is also being fought with incredible technological enhancements. And we’ll see how it goes, but I’m not going to sit here and tell you I know the exact trajectory of the battlefield. You sounded quite confident that Ukraine was on a path to lose. That’s not how we see things. All we can do is put them in the best position we can, and that’s what we’re trying to do.
Dr Leslie Vinjamuri
Jon, I know you have a hard stop, so I’m going to take three succinct questions and then, let you answer how you’d like.
Jon Finer
Okay.
Dr Leslie Vinjamuri
And they’re tremendous people, who you will know well. Sir David Manning, Steve Erlanger, you won’t know Ambassador Agboti, but he has a great question for you, and then if Phil Reeker has a quick question, we’ll have that, as well. So, Sir David, very succinct please, if you each can.
Sir David Manning
Jon, thank you very much for doing this talk and indeed, thank you as you leave office, for the work that’s gone on to sustain the transatlantic relationship. My question for you is about nuclear weapons and the risk that we may be coming to a period when the NPT expires and we find that we have a new era of proliferation. With China expanding its nuclear weapons capability and with worries among allies that the US nuclear guarantee may not hold, do you fear that yours is the last administration that will work within the confines of the NPT context and are we entering a new and dangerous nuclear world?
Dr Leslie Vinjamuri
I am sorry to give you so many at once, but we will invite you back in person after January 20th. Steve Erlanger, New York Times, and a friend of Chatham House.
Steve Erlanger
Thank you to both of you. I will be succinct. Do you believe that the re-election of Donald Trump marks a significant change in the United States and its view of the world, or do you think somehow it’s temporary?
Dr Leslie Vinjamuri
Ambassador Agboti?
Ambassador Agboti
Okay, thank you so much, Jon. Thank you, Chatham House, for this call and I fully appreciate it. My question is centred around global partnerships, Commissioners [inaudible – 53:53], primarily from the African perspective. So, my question is what strategy can be implemented creating global partnerships in [inaudible – 54:03] particularly in terms of the US, Nigeria and Africa at large, to ensure collective security and stability in the continent, especially now that they are facing those challenges in Africa? The challenges are to do with integration at the risk of the insecurity going on in Africa. Thank you so much, please.
Dr Leslie Vinjamuri
Thank you, and finally, Phil Reeker.
Phil Reeker
Oh, thanks, that’s only…
Jon Finer
Could you – if – no, sorry, one second. Could you just – the audio was coming in and out of that last question. I just want to make sure I heard the core of it, but I’m not sure I did.
Dr Leslie Vinjamuri
Yeah, Ambassador Agboti, I can read that out for you, but if you’d like to just repeat [pause]? Let me read this out for you. Ooh, we seem to have lost it. Let me come right – Ambassador Agboti, would you like to just very quickly repeat?
Jon Finer
I’m sorry.
Ambassador Agboti
Yes, please, I would like to repeat.
Dr Leslie Vinjamuri
About the global partnerships.
Ambassador Agboti
Can you hear me, please?
Dr Leslie Vinjamuri
Yes.
Ambassador Agboti
Okay, good, fantastic. I – my question was centred around global partnership, you know, from the African perspective. So, I was asking a question that has to do with, you know, the issue of the disintegration in Nigeria. In Africa as a whole, you know, we are having issues that has to do with insecurity. So, what I was asking is what strategies can be implemented affecting global partnership, you know, in national security, particularly between the US, Nigeria and the African nations, to ensure collective security and stability in the continent. Thank you.
Dr Leslie Vinjamuri
Thank you.
Jon Finer
Thanks.
Dr Leslie Vinjamuri
So global partnerships for national security, US-Africa, great question. Then Phil Reeker, very, very quickly. We’re so out of time.
Phil Reeker
Thanks Leslie, and Chatham House, and Jon, we’ll catch up when you have more time after the 20th. Just on Europe, put in a point about one unresolved area where we worked closely with our European partners under different administrations for nearly 30 years, that’s the Balkans. Coming up on 30 years of the Dayton Accord, and I wonder if you could just offer some thoughts on where things stand. Unresolved conflicts, of issues, Russian meddling, Chinese efforts to get involved, NATO allies now, Montenegro and North Macedonia in difficult situations, Serbia, Kosovo…
Dr Leslie Vinjamuri
Thank you
Phil Reeker
…still challenged. So thanks.
Dr Leslie Vinjamuri
So anything you’d like to answer. I know you have a hard stop. It’s been tremendous to have you. I wanted to – you to hear how much enthusiasm and interest is there as we know you will travel to London in the months ahead.
Jon Finer
Great, thank you. I’ll be brief, but I’ll try to at least address parts of all those questions. On the first one, I will confess, I did not expect – I think one of the big surprises for me about how the last four years has proceeded, I did not expect to spend as much time as I have in this job focused on nuclear issues. And, you know, for various reasons, they have been thrust into the fore, and I will say a bit more about why I think that is. You know, and one of things I think that I would like to say upfront, is there was, sort of, the implication in the question, as in previous questions, that maybe the United States sometimes has been overly focused on, or overly concerned about Russian sabre rattling when it comes to nuclear – the possibility of nuclear weapons use.
And what I’d say about that is really two things. One, it’s a critique I understand, and it’s a critique that I think is frankly, much easier to make from outside of a government than it is from sitting in a chair that I’m sitting in. It’s been publicly reported now that there have been different assessments by the US intelligence community that in some circumstances or scenarios, there was as much as a 50% chance that Russia would use at least a battlefield nuclear weapon in Ukraine. Now you can agree with that assessment or disagree with that assessment, but one thing you can’t do if you’re the, you know, US President or National Security Advisor or Deputy National Security Advisor, is completely dismiss that possibility out of hand because you maybe you think it’s less likely than 50%. That’s not really an available option if you want to responsibly address US national security and the security of the wider world.
So, we didn’t dismiss that completely out of hand. But we also did not allow ourselves to be deterred by it. At no point did the United States dial back what has been a massive amount of support for Ukraine because we were concerned about the possibility of Russian use of nuclear weapons. And I would make the argument that if any country was deterred in this conflict, it was Russia that was deterred from crossing what we set out as two things that we, almost at great cost, wanted to avoid, which were a direct Russian attack on NATO territory and the use of weapons of mass destruction, like nuclear weapons inside Ukraine. They did not, up ‘til now, take those steps. It remains a strategic objective of the United States to avoid those steps, and we have continued to provide Ukraine with great armaments and tools that they are using to inflict enormous damage and harm to the Russian military, in spite of the noise and the sabre rattling, which we could not dismiss, but we did not let it derail us. That’s one.
Second though, and it goes to the core of this question, I share very much the concern about the future of the non-proliferation regime, and the reason it is eroding, frankly, is not at all due to action by the United States. It is due, I think, first and foremost, to the fact that these two key actors that we’ve been talking about quite a lot today, Russia and Iran – which does not have nuclear weapons to date, but there is increasing conversation coming out of Iran about whether they need to resume that sort of activity. And the reason is in both countries, their conventional capabilities and deterrents have been revealed to be far less effective than maybe they believed and then the rest of the world believed. So the reason you see Russia musing about nuclear weapons is because when you look at the state of Russia’s conventional army and conventional capabilities, it does not seem like a very effective deterrent vis-à-vis NATO and other potential Russian adversaries.
The reason you see the Iranians talking about the possibility of returning to a nuclear weapons path, which they have abandoned. really for the better part of the last 15 years, is because their conventional capabilities, their missile programme and their proxies, have been revealed to be less effective. And that is due to, I think, a judicious and effective exercise of US power and the power of our partners and our alliances in both cases. So, you know, it’s not to sugarcoat what I think is a very concerning situation that we’ll have to continue to monitor, but it is happening, frankly, because of these countries’ revealed weakness, not the opposite of that.
China’s a different case. China wants to compete with the United States, very obviously, in just about every significant realm, and that includes, unfortunately, their desire, apparently, to pursue a parity or near parity in terms of their nuclear weapons programme. And I don’t think anything is going to derail them from the path that they’re on, and that is another challenge broadly to the non-proliferation regime. We have tried and we will continue to try to engage all of these countries in discussions about their various plans and capabilities. Diplomacy is going to be an important part of this strategy. But if those countries aren’t willing to engage on these topics, we will fall back on deterrence, defence and our own capabilities, which we feel very comfortable with and confident in, including our nuclear umbrella, which nobody should question.
Is Trump’s election a turning point in terms of how Americans see the world? I guess what I would say, and maybe it’s a bit self-serving, is – and not to put on my Political Analyst hat, I don’t think that this election was, at its core, about the question that you asked. I think election, at its core, was about other things, and so, you know, I don’t believe necessarily that it reflects some major inflection point in, kind of, Americans’ views of what the United States should do and be in the world. Again, that may be a self-serving answer, that’s my view. You know, you may have a different one, Steve.
On US partnerships in Africa and security partnerships, this is a very important and challenging area, first and foremost, for two reasons. One, there has been a tremendous amount of democratic backsliding in parts of Africa. You know, a half dozen or more coups that have taken place during the course of the last four or five years. I think probably more than half a dozen, including in some countries in which the United States has invested substantially in their democratic progress. Niger is one that comes to mind. And this is an opportunity for countries with which the United States competes. It’s an opportunity for countries that could care less, frankly, than we do about the democratic trajectory of parts of Africa. That’s China and that’s, maybe even to a greater extent, Russia.
And so, the United States is working to redouble and reinforce our partnerships with countries that remain on a democratic path. Nigeria is one, and you gave that example yourself. But this is going to be an increasingly contested space. It is going to require treating these countries with a degree of respect as equals, not with a mindset of us telling these countries what is best for them or what they need to do. And I think it’s going to require some pioneering and innovative approaches outside of the security realm, like the investment-based foreign policy approach that we have applied in Angola, where we are using economic and security relations, kind of, hand-in-hand to bring the overall relationship with that country forwards. It’s an approach I think we should take and the new administration could take in other parts of the world.
And the last question, from Phil…
Dr Leslie Vinjamuri
Western Balkans.
Jon Finer
Western Balkans, yes. So, look, this is an area of great concern for the United States. I’m just speaking on behalf of President Biden, who himself has been deeply invested in security issues in the Western Balkans since he was the Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, now decades ago. There are obviously two key fault lines that we worry about more than others. One is the situation in Kosovo, you know, obviously a core ally of the United States that has been on a knife’s edge. And the other is our concern about the potential fragmentation, refragmentation in Bosnia, where you have one leader at least, a Mr Dodik, who is at least rhetorically pursuing an agenda that calls for the disintegration of the state, which we strongly oppose.
And so, you know, the United States is going to continue to maintain relations with all the key partners there. We believe fundamentally that there is no better approach than Dayton to maintain the peace in Bosnia and that Kosovo both needs to be sovereign and needs to be respectful of the minority communities that exist inside what is a sovereign Kosovo. And so, these are problems that we have worked to manage, often below the radar, through careful diplomacy throughout this administration, but areas that we’re going to have to continue to watch, and it’s certainly all concerning.
Dr Leslie Vinjamuri
Jon Finer, you have given extraordinarily of your experience, expertise, knowledge, your years in public service, and your time today, and I think we’ve covered pretty much all of the globe, not its entirety. We could have gone on to the Arctic, Greenland, you know, many interesting questions emerging, but…
Jon Finer
Next time.
Dr Leslie Vinjamuri
…very ser – next time. Very seriously, this has been a tremendous sharing and gift to us at the Institute. Thank you so much for your time, and we do hope that you will return in person, revisit your former experiences of the UK, and bring all the depth of experience that you’ve had since you were a Rhodes Scholar. Again, thank you so much.
Jon Finer
Thank you, and I hope to see you soon.
Dr Leslie Vinjamuri
Thanks, thanks to everybody for joining.
