Ben Bland
Welcome, everyone, to Chatham House, and thank you for joining us here in person and online, as well, all around the world. For those of you who don’t know me, my name is Ben Bland. I’m the Director of the Asia-Pacific Programme here at Chatham House, and I’m delighted to be chairing this discussion today with Enrique Manalo, Secretary of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of the Philippines.
Enrique Manalo was appointed Secretary of Foreign Affairs in July 2022. He’s a veteran Diplomat, with more than four decades of experience around the world, including posts as Under-Secretary of Policy, Permanent Representative to the UN in Geneva and New York, and posts as Ambassador in the UK and Belgium. He holds a Master of Arts and Bachelor of Arts in Economics from the University of the Philippines Diliman.
This, I think it’s fair to say, is a critical time for the Philippines, much as it is for the rest of us. Philippines, as of course you all know, is a fellow US ally that’s found itself on the sharp end of China’s assertive behaviour in the South China, or as I’m sure you’d prefer to say, West Philippines Sea, as well as being a close neighbour of Taiwan. I think just 88 miles from Taiwan at the closest point, so Taiwan is closer to the Philippines than we are to Birmingham, here in London. The US-Philippines alliance strengthened under the Biden administration, but I think it’s fair to say that, as in Britain, many Filipinos are wondering how much they rely on a potentially more unilateral and unpredictable US, now that President Trump is back in the White House.
The Philippines also faces a range of challenges closer to home, from mitigating the impacts of climate change, with a growing number and increasingly deadly typhoons, to maintaining unity in the Association of South East Asian Nations, or ASEAN, the regional body which the Philippines is chairing next year. Just a reminder before we begin, that today’s discussion is on the record and is being recorded. I’m going to allow the Secretary to make a few opening remarks, then I’m going to ask questions for about half an hour, and then we’ll open it up to questions from you in the room and online, using the Q&A function on Zoom. So, over to you, Secretary, to make some brief opening remarks, and then we’ll get into the Q&A. Thank you.
Enrique A. Manalo
Hmmm. Well, thank you very much, Ben, and first, I’d like to thank Chatham House for inviting me to speak before you today. Always a pleasure for me to return to London. Before we go to the Q&A, I’d just like to make a few points, based on the themes that we had identified earlier, in order to situate our discussions. First, the Indo-Pacific’s impressive and continued economic rise is occurring against the backdrop of a geopolitical climate marked by simmering tensions and longstanding disputes. So, strengthening our rules-based international order, especially in our global commons, is our most viable guarantee to prevent these disputes from erupting into open conflict and undermining regional peace and economic progress.
This order, anchored on international law, sovereign equality of states and effective multilateralism, should provide, and provides, the framework to deal with our global challenges and to resolve disputes peacefully. It also allows – the international law and order allows small states to pursue their various interests. In the South China Sea, for instance, disregarding international law, especially the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, has exacerbated longstanding disputes. Tensions are heightened over the past two years, due to illegal, coercive and aggressive actions against legitimate actions by Philippine authorities in maritime zones under our sovereignty and sovereign rights and jurisdiction, as provided for under UNCLOS.
The Philippine position on the West Philippine Sea, or South China Sea, disputes, has however, always been clear and consistent. Maritime claims cannot exceed the limit set by the UNCLOS, and the Philippines will defend its national interest and maritime entitlements, but at the same time, are committed to diplomacy and the peaceful settlement of disputes. Partnerships with countries such as the United Kingdom are crucial for our security and all its aspects. The Philippines also welcomes the UK’s Indo-Pacific policy as a commitment towards more deliberate engagement in the region, including the Philippines.
We’re also strengthening, we, I mean, the Philippines, our partnerships with other key actors in the region, of course with the United States, which is our treaty ally, Japan, Australia, ROK, Canada, India, Vietman, and of course, ASEAN too. Especially in the context of enhancing the ASEAN community, and on the political front, negotiations on a code of conduct in the South China Sea. So, those – I now wish to conclude my introductory remarks. Thank you.
Ben Bland
Thanks for that, and obviously you set up some of the challenges that the Philippines is facing, and I want to start with quite an open question. Because I think it’s become commonplace these days to say we live in, sort of, “unprecedentedly dangerous and challenging times,” you know, people say the most challenging since the end of the Cold War. But as I said at the start, you’ve been a Diplomat for a long time, in many different parts of the world, from your perspective, how dangerous is the world we’re living in today?
Enrique A. Manalo
Well, I have to say that it’s certainly more complex, the challenges that we face. We’re no longer living in an age of, for example, predictability dur – relative predictability during the Cold War. We now have the – in many ways, a return to history, and I think this is a – creates, of course, its own challenges, but also opportunities. While you may have, of course, now more powers, perhaps, trying to assert themselves in different regions and even globally, you have also many countries now who – such as those in ASEAN, who are also emerging, and who also have interests. And therefore, we see a world where you may have challenges, but at the same time, lots of opportunities for co-operation with likeminded countries and likeminded partners experiencing similar situations.
Ben Bland
So, would you say there’s more opportunities than threats then, from a Philippines’ perspective?
Enrique A. Manalo
I would like to approach it that way. You have challenges, you have security challenges, but those provide opportunities to reach out to other countries who perhaps have similar perceptions as the Philippines. And that, in fact, has occurred, because in the last two or three years, for example, under the present administration of President Marcos, we have enhanced our partnerships and co-operation with countries in the region, for example, Japan, Korea, Australia, New Zealand, India, Vietnam. And in other regions, in the EU, traditional partners, such as, the UK, I referred to the Indo-Pacific policy of the UK, France, Germany, and at the moment, we’re negotiating a free trade arrangement with the EU. And just yesterday, we concluded, at least at the expert – at the sub-ministerial level, agreement was reached on a Status of Forces arrangement with New Zealand.
So, in many ways, these challenges are actually incentives for countries to reach out and seek partnerships with those willing to do so.
Ben Bland
And thinking a bit more about, sort of, the global situation, we’re going to come onto some of the specific threats shortly, but thinking about the global situation, I know that you’re an experienced Diplomat of the United Nations. You know, the Philippines is going to be running for a non-permanent seat on the Security Council, and you – when you addressed the General Assembly last year, you called for, you know, “reform of the UN and the international system.” I mean, I’ve got a two-part question on this, which is, what actually needs to be reformed, and how can you actually achieve that? Because people have been talking about this for years and years and years, and it never seems to go anywhere. And in this fracturing world that we’re living in, it would seem to me, as an outsider, to be more difficult than ever to achieve the kinds of things that people are talking about.
Enrique A. Manalo
You’re referring, for example, to reforming the UN Security Council?
Ben Bland
Yeah, and the broader global system. I mean, what are the changes that the Philippines would like to see, and how can you go about actually achieving them, given the realities of the world we’re in?
Enrique A. Manalo
Well, I think, for one, it’s obvious that there has to be greater participation incl – and inclusivity of countries, let’s say, at the multilateral level, in addressing global challenges. For example, obviously climate change, or climate – clime – and climate action, addressing, for example, global pandemics and health security issues. I think those are areas where you need to have – where countries of all levels of development, whether big or small, should have a say and should participate in decision-making. And that’s one of the areas where we would like to greatly support, especially coming from a country from the south.
And this translates also into the United Nations, because the United Nations also represents, in many ways, the workings of the international community, as governments are all represented there. And in terms of the Security Council, for example, we’re seeking, also, similarly, to create greater transparency of the work of the Council, greater inclusivity, in the sense of participation of other countries who may not be members of the Council, but at least would have a say and can speak up and be heard on issues of importance to them. And not only let the big powers decide what to do, or what to deci – or to decide on these big issues.
So, I think in the end, you need greater participation, greater inclusivity, transparency in decision-making and participation of all countries, great or small, and that’s, in our view, the way forward for trying to get a world which is – be more peaceful and also reduce tensions.
Ben Bland
And how do you go about trying to achieve that? ‘Cause this has been the mission of many countries for a long time, but obviously in the UN, it’s easy for the permanent members to block things with their veto. But even, more generally, looking at other kinds of organisations, if anything, the level of co-operation is worsening and things are breaking down. So, practically, like, what steps can a country like the Philippines take to try and get a bit of momentum behind this push?
Enrique A. Manalo
Well, those are the challenges that we face, and I mentioned earlier reaching out to likeminded countries, working together. You have arrangements, for example – well, of course, we have the traditional arrangements, like the Non-Aligned Movement, the G77, but for example, in ASEAN. We are a group of ten countries, we’re working together to see how, as a group, we can address many of the challenges we face in our region, not only the security challenges, but new and emerging challenges, such as transnational crimes and cybercrimes, etc., and trafficking.
And this – so, in other words, getting countries working together, whether that be in small groups or big groups. We have arrangements now involving three countries, or two countries, minilaterals, bilaterals, and I think this is the only way that we can work. No country can really solve these issues alone. We have to work together with other likeminded countries who have similar perceptions as us, to address these challenges, and I think that’s how we have to work in order to give countries also a greater say in these issues.
Ben Bland
I want to pivot to the South China Sea, West Philippines Sea, which you mentioned quite a few times in your opening remarks. But I guess I want to start by taking a step back from the day-to-day challenges and incursions, and I know there’s been yet another, sort of, dangerous incident, you know, pushed by the Chinese side in the last 24 hours or so. But what is at the root of the dispute? Where is the problem coming from, do you think?
Enrique A. Manalo
Well, I think you could look at it from two perspectives. First, of course, there’s the resource and economic perspective. The – of course, South China Sea is known to possess reser – vast reserves of resources, also marine life, and these are things that we have to preserve and protect. The second is the strategic nature of the South China Sea, or West Philippine Sea. So much of world trade and commerce passes through the South China Sea. That means that any increase or tensions, or even worse, a conflict in the South China Sea, would affect not only the literal states or the states in the region, but the entire – the international community, because it would effect – have profound effects on global trade and commerce.
And then in the – from our perspective, in the Philippines, another key issue is the – is international law, and abiding by international law, as agreed, and in this particular case, the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. It’s important, given the fact that so many countries surround the Sou – the West Philippine Sea and the South China Sea, it’s important that international law, that is UNCLOS, provide the basis to ensure greater co-operation within the region, within the – along the South China Sea and in the South China Sea. And by disregarding the convention and not – and in fact, sometimes making domestic laws prevail over international law, this provides a real basis for increasing tensions and perhaps even, at some point, conflict, which of course, we hope doesn’t happen. So, it’s really abiding by international law and the UNCLOS, and the rule of law, which is also at stake here in the South China Sea.
Ben Bland
And yeah, again, looking at the slightly longer-term picture, what do you think that Beijing is trying to achieve in the South China Sea? Do you have a sense? You know, as you try to deter them and manage these incidents that happen, you know, daily or weekly, do you know what they’re actually trying to – what point they’re trying to get to in the next five, ten, 15 years?
Enrique A. Manalo
Well, what I really would like to say is that we are looking at this issue from the perspective of Philippine interests. We have, of course, in the UNCLOS, we have what many nations possess, too, is an exclusive economic zone. And what we would really like – yeah, what we are really aiming for is to allow the Philippines to exercise its rights in its exclusive economic zone, which are all in accordance with international law or UNCLOS. And that is the reason why we feel we’re having problems there, is that we are being deprived of that right, actually, to exercise jurisdiction and sovereignty – or sovereign rights, over areas within our exclusive economic zone, as defined by UNCLOS. And by being deprived of those rights, naturally, they’re – that would lead to greater tensions. So, that’s how we’re viewing the situation in the South China Sea.
Ben Bland
And I know that over the years you would have had many formal and informal encounters with your Chinese – and discussion with the Chinese counterparts.
Enrique A. Manalo
Hmmm hmm.
Ben Bland
I mean, again, do they ever give you a sense of what they want? ‘Cause I think in the end, if you’re going to have a stable, sort of, peaceful future, you, I imagine, need to understand their position clearly enough so that you can find some, sort of, compromises and middle ground. And particularly on things like the nine-dash line or the ten-dash line, which we know, sort of, cuts through almost the whole South China Sea. I know it’s ruled in the arbitral ruling that it had no legal basis in law…
Enrique A. Manalo
Hmmm.
Ben Bland
…but do you understand what that line is meant to imply and what China wants?
Enrique A. Manalo
Well, we don’t recognise the nine-dash line or the ten-dash line, the so-called ten-dash line. In fact, the arbitral ruling clearly indicated that the nine-dash line is certainly completely inconsistent with the – with UNCLOS. Really, the issue here is what law are you going to apply in this area, in the West Philippine Sea or South China Sea? We adopted the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, that was adopted by almost the entire international community, and to provide the basis on how nations should co-operate and the rules of engagement in that area. The real issue here is the fact that a certain country is applying its own domestic laws, or its own interpretation of UNCLOS, and that is where the root of the tensions really will begin. Because if a country doesn’t abide by what it agreed to and doesn’t allow other countries to exercise those rights, then you really have a recipe for tensions in the region.
Ben Bland
And yeah, as a Researcher, and before as a Journalist, I’ve been writing about rising tensions in the South China Sea for 15 years, and it sounds very abstract, right? But in concrete terms, I mean, for the Philippines, like, do they – day-to-day, what does this actually mean? What sort of incidents are happening, and what sort of pressures are you feeling? Can you paint a bit of a picture for our audience of the sorts of pressures you’re feeling day-to-day from China?
Enrique A. Manalo
Well, a lot of it has to do, in very practical terms, economic terms, our Fishermen, who have been fishing, for example, in the – in these areas lying within our EEZ for literally hundreds of years have been harassed, because one country claims that those areas are now within their domestic jurisdiction. And they have harassed our Fishermen and prevented them from earning their livelihood, which creates also domestic problems, because the Fishermen need to earn a living and are being deprived of that ability. The ability of our own companies, for example, to develop natural resources, for example, oil exploration, are also being hindered by the need by one country to be involved in those activities.
So, these incidents hit home directly, and as you probably recall, or have followed in the recent incidents in two year – the past two years, in one area, we call in the Philippines a ‘UN Shoal’, it’s known as ‘Second Thomas Shoal’, we have – we were simply trying to resupply a ship which is on the Shoal, and where we have military assets, supplying them with food and provisions. But because one country claims that that lies within their area, or is questioning our right to be there, they harassed, and in fact, a number of incidents occurred over the past two years consisting of water cannoning and use of lasers, even ramming. So, this is also of great concern, obviously, because if these incidents were to escalate further, then obviously tensions would really rise dramatically.
Ben Bland
And how worried are you that some of these incidents could spiral into accidental conflict? Do you feel that there are enough channels between the Philippines and China to at least manage the risk of an accidental spiral into conflict?
Enrique A. Manalo
Well, the Philippines is absolutely committed to seeing how we can manage these incidents, these pute – these disputes peacefully, and in fact, we have mechanisms with China. We have a – what we call the “Bilateral Consultation Mechanism on the South China Sea,” which meets regularly, roughly twice a year. It was created eight years ago precisely, to provide a means for discussing incidents, such as those which occurred over the past two years, and as well as exploring ways where the Philippines and China can co-operate on maritime issues and co-operation. So, that’s one means. We have also other dialogues with China, Foreign Ministry dialogues, etc.
So, it’s – we have vehicles, of course, it takes – it’s not that easy, but we have vehicles or mechanisms for discussing these incidents. Of course, we don’t expect that these mechanisms will lead to the grand solutions immediately, but they provide means for talking and discussing and for perhaps in some ways, even letting off tensions. But of course, we are open to even fur – exploring other mechanisms, to see how this can work, but at the same time, we’re also building up our partnerships with other countries in the region.
Ben Bland
And how worried are you about other kinds of pressures from China, you know, economic pressure or, you know, meddling in your internal affairs, to try and, sort of, drive wedges? We know that in the past, in – like in many countries, China’s been quite a divisive issue in your domestic politics, so aside from the South China Sea incidents, how worried are you about these other, sort of, mechanisms or methods of pressure or coercion from Beijing?
Enrique A. Manalo
Well, I can speak not exactly – we haven’t experienced yet the economic pressures that you’re saying. China still remains our number one trading partner. But, you know, I think all countries nowadays are trying to develop policies of economic resilience and adaptation, in order, precisely, to address possibilities of, let’s say, experiencing pressure from a certain partner, or big partner. And this is the reason why we, for example, in the case of the Philippines, we have been building – trying to build up our economic partnerships with other countries in the region. Precisely so that the reliance on one country is not so great. And so we have increased our economic partnerships with countries in the region, and even with the United States, we’re exploring, and even as I mentioned earlier, with the European Union, a free trade arrangement. So, that, in a way, would be enhancing the economic resilience of a country, in the event that there are situations where they face economic pressures.
Ben Bland
And on my travels around South East Asia, I’ve definitely, sort of, picked up a sense in some other ASEAN capitals that Philippines Government has been needlessly provocative towards China. That’s not necessarily what I think, but there’s definitely a sense from quite a few other countries in the region, you know, with some of the comments about Taiwan and other issues, the, you know, partnership with the US. I mean, what’s – you know, I mean, I’m sure you’ve heard similar comments before, what’s your response to that? Do you think the Philippines has pushed too hard against China in some respects and is now paying the price?
Enrique A. Manalo
Well, is trying to resupply a ship provocative? The Phil – I mean, the Philippines has not made any threats to China. We’re simply trying to fish; we’re simply trying to resupply a ship by bringing food and water. And I made this comment the other day that in the Second Thomas Shoal, we have one ship of 23 milit – 24, 25 military assets, we’re delivering food. Yet China has over 50, double digit number of coastguard vessels along Second Thomas Shoal. Second Thomas Shoal is only 70 to 80 miles from the Philippine territorial waters. It’s hundreds of miles from Hainan. So, I asked the question, “Why are there so many vessels there, and how can one ship be a threat to China?” So, I don’t see how that’s being provocative. Perhaps if the attempts to prevent the resupply were not made, there would be no provocation at all.
On Taiwan, we’ve always had the position, we have the One China policy, we have always had the position that the resolution of disputes on Chi – on Taiwan should be through peaceful means, and we’ve urged all the parties concerned to maintain open lines of communication. So, again, I don’t see why that’s provocative, because we’re urging peace. So, I think sometimes the story gets distorted, and the Philippines has always had a positive approach to co-operation, and in no way have we ever said that we are trying to provoke an incident. It’s unfortunate, though, that things have happened, but we have to assert our rights.
Ben Bland
And on a pivot to the US relationship, obviously, you know, probably the most important bilateral relationship for the Philippines. I think under the Biden administration you described the relationship as on ‘hyperdrive’, and I know you’ve just met Secretary Rubio in Munich on the sidelines of the Security Conference. So, what’s – a lot of other US allies in Europe extremely anxious about our alliances with the US, under the Trump 2.0 administration. How are you feeling about the US-Philippines alliance for the next four years?
Enrique A. Manalo
Well, I have had a meeting already with Secretary Rubio, face-to-face, and also on the phone, and the – if we were on hyperdrive with the previous administration, I think we’re still on hyperdrive and may even try and aim for even a more enhanced level of co-operation. So, I think my conversations with Secretary Rubio were very productive, and it’s quite clear that the US-Philippine relationship is going well and that we have even discussed ways of enhancing co-operation, not only on defence or security – defence, security or military co-operation, but really a lot on more economic co-operation. Especially new areas, such as, more co-operation on energy and even on critical minerals, etc. So, these are things that we will – we are ready to explore with the United States, at least insofar as our bilateral relationship is concerned.
Ben Bland
And have you got any advice for other US allies on how to keep the alliances ticking along nicely under this new US administration?
Enrique A. Manalo
Well, you know, I – when I talked with Secretary Rubio, I think we both agreed that the – at least the Philippine-US relationship is essentially 100 years, hundreds of years old. We have mutual interests, essentially promoting peace, economic prosperity and peace and stability in the region. And these are, we agreed, are interests that go beyond any particular administration. These are enduring interests, and they go beyond any particular administration, any particular official or officials. These are interests, and they’re common and they’re shared mutually, and our intention is to build on them. And it’s – and I think that’s the basis of our co-operation. I’m sure other countries may have similar interests as the United States, but in our case, it’s completely based on the mutual compatibility of our interests.
Ben Bland
And what about the other challenging side of it, you know, the unilateralism, the fact that, you know, the Trump administration has withdrawn from the Paris Agreement, the fact that they’ve said they’re going to withdraw from the WHO? I mean, the Philippines is one of the world’s most exposed countries to climate change, a lot of health challenges, as well, and as you said, you want to, sort of, reinforce the global system. So, do you think you could have any influence in trying to persuade the US Government to, sort of, reverse some of those steps, or what can the Philippines and other countries do to, kind of, fill the gaps as the Trump administration withdraws from, you know, various of its other international commitments, even while you need to keep them on side in security terms?
Enrique A. Manalo
Well, naturally, we’d have preferred that no country leaves an international organisation, but we do respect the decisions of any country. It’s their own sovereign right. But at the same time, other countries who still members, I think have now, even, as I said earlier, more of an incentive to co-operate and address these issues which those organisations are dealing with. This includes on the World Health Organization, which the Philippines attaches great importance to, and we see the role of the World Health in addressing, you know, new and emerging issues, such as, global pandemics and health security. And the Philippines will be fully committed to working with our other countries in the organisation. So, I think that if one country leaves an organisation, doesn’t mean the other countries cannot continue with the objectives of that organisation and work together.
Ben Bland
Okay. I want to shift to talk about ASEAN and some regional issues now, and maybe we can start with Myanmar. I mean, it’s now nearly just over four years since the coup there, and ASEAN, sort of, did move quickly to set up this Five-Point Consensus for trying to engage. And I think on some of the points, like humanitarian assistance, there’s been some progress, but I guess on the core challenge of trying to promote some sort of meaningful constructive dialogue as a way of out of the intensifying civil wars, there hasn’t really been any progress. Things have been getting worse and worse on the ground. Does ASEAN need a different approach on Myanmar from what it’s tried in the last four years? Do you need to do something different? And how – especially thinking about the Philippines chairmanship next year, but in general as a neighbour, a near neighbour and a fellow ASEAN member, what do you think ASEAN can do to try and, you know, shift the dial on Myanmar?
Enrique A. Manalo
Well, as you mentioned, the – all the ASEAN countries are committed to the Five-Point Consensus, and as you said, it’s been a real challenge. Perhaps except with the humanitarian aspect, all the other points of the Five-Point Consensus still remain to be achieved. But I think we have to first realise a couple of points. The first is that any solution to the issue in Myanmar has to be Myanmar-led and it has to the me – the people of Myanmar who will have to finally resolve the situation.
The Five-Point Consensus should be viewed perhaps as a – more as a mechanism for trying to bring about dialogue and, let’s say, the meeting of the different factions. And perhaps what is needed now, since the situation today is certainly much different, in many ways, from the situation when the Five-Point Consensus was adopted, we may need to find approaches to achieve some of the points in the consensus. For example, ha – it calls for a dialogue, what do we have to do to promote dialogue among the different stakeholders, or at least amongst most of the stakeholders and the government?
So, these are areas which we are trying to explore in the Philippines, and in fact, it’s – we have already, as you know, we do have the ASEAN Troika, we have a Special Envoy. But at the same time, ASEAN also recognises that some ASEAN countries may – for example, who may be – who may have a more direct stake in the outcome, like the countries on the borders, might wish to take the lead in undertaking certain initiatives, as long as they are consistent with the Five-Point Consensus. And that’s something that at least we in the Philippines would encourage, and we’re willing to work with them. Because in the end, unless the stake – all the stakeholders can dialogue, or at least meet each other, the pro – it’ll be very difficult really to solve the problem. All we can really do is hope that we can get them together, but it’s really up to the people in Myanmar to finally resolve the issues themselves.
Ben Bland
And as we know, ASEAN’s a consensus-based organisation and Myanmar is right now in a strange position, where obviously, the government is battling with lots of groups for control of the country. It’s still formally – the military formally controls the machinery of government and they have, you know, the seat in ASEAN, but I think leader level contact is suspended for now, but other contacts are ongoing. I mean, how much is the Myanmar issue holding up ASEAN’s ability to progress on the many other economic, social, security objectives that the organisation has?
Enrique A. Manalo
Well, obviously, the Myanmar is a challenge for the ASEAN, the issue of Myanmar, but that really hasn’t prevented our efforts in ASEAN to move forward on other key issues. Whether it’s strengthening the ASEAN community, trying to build closer economic integration, I think amongst the ASEAN countries. Even relations with our dialogue partners have been growing. And the – and on the Treaty of Amity and Co-operation, we now have over 50 countries which should have already acceded, despite the challenges we’re facing in Myanmar.
So, we’re – ASEAN is determined to continue, the – what – its main – try to achieve its main objectives in creating more prosperity. We’re trying to deal with Myanmar at the same time, and so, I think that it’s a, kind of, multifaceted approach to the issues in our region.
Ben Bland
And obviously the UK has, you know, historic, you know, colonial links to Myanmar, but obviously, you know, even since then, before the coup, you know, there was quite a strong relationship with Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD Government. I think the UK Government spent nearly a billion US dollars of ODA in Myanmar before the coup. What role do you think the UK, maybe the EU, other actors from outside in the region, could we play to try and be more helpful? Rather than just saying, “Why isn’t ASEAN doing more?” is there more that the UK, the EU, could do to try and help, do you think?
Enrique A. Manalo
Well, you know, any help is welcome, I – but I think we can work together. At least as far as ASEAN is concerned, we think the mechanism should really be the Five-Point Consensus. And again, I – you really need to get the Myanmar people involved in the issue. Without them, I don’t think any peace can be imposed by any other outside country or any outside power. So, any help in trying to bring about a dialogue among all of the – or at least as many of the factions as possible, stakeholders, including the government, I think would have to be the way forward. And, you know, we’re the incoming Chairman for ASEAN next year, and certainly, we would appreciate any advice that could be given to see how we can move the process forward, because we are really very concerned with the humanitarian situation now, and Myanmar is a member of ASEAN, and we need to see how we can help.
Ben Bland
I’m going to come to audience questions in one sec, so please put your thinking caps on, but I just have one last question for you about the UK’s role in the region, more generally. There’s been a, kind of, a step up, I think the previous government called it a ‘tilt’ to the Indo-Pacific. The UK became a dialogue partner of ASEAN, also joined the CPTPP, a broader, you know, regional trade agreement, as well. What do you think the UK could be doing to be useful to South East Asia, more generally? Do you have a sense of where the UK can play a useful role in the region?
Enrique A. Manalo
Well, I – the UK has a very important role to play, we think, I think, and that’s why we’re very supportive of the Indo-Pacific policy of the UK. From the point of view of the Philippines, for example, we are in regular talks, of course, with the UK to see how we can enhance our partnership, not only in, for example, the economic area, but in the newer areas of co-operation, on climate change and, of course, on joint security. In fact, we have recently – we will, I think, hopefully, formally adopt next month, with the visit of Foreign Secretary Lammy to Manila, signing a joint framework for enhanced partic – partnership between the Philippines and the UK. And that will cover, really, a broad spectrum of co-operative activities, ranging from military co-operation to greater economic interaction, and even people to people exchanges. I think the UK is very familiar with our region, and therefore could – has great potential in helping the countries of the region address challenges.
Ben Bland
Yeah, and then, just to editorialise from the Chair, I definitely think it’s good for the UK, as, you know, we think about our relationship with the US, to be networking much more with US allies in Asia. Obviously we have NATO, but I think, you know, our informal relationships and formal relationships in Asia, with the other US allies, like the Philippines, are going to be really important in the coming years. I think that’s a positive step.
Yeah, so questions, just put your hand up and I will come to you and try and get round the room fairly as I can. We’ve got one right at the back there, the person in glasses. And just tell us, please, your name and any affiliation and make it a question, a brief one, not a statement, thank you.
Cathy
So, I’m a Chatham House member. I’m also a undergraduate student at UCL currently, and my question is focusing on, like, the partnership between Philippine and Taiwan. So, obviously, like, Philippine is par – is one of the member of the New Southbound Policy, designed by Taiwan. And I really want to ask how does, kind of, the New Southbound Policy has – the socioeconomic impacts of the New Southbound Policy in Philippine, and Philippine’s goals through participating in this policy, and, also, its overall geopolitical impact in the Indo-Pacific region? Thank you so much.
Ben Bland
And what’s your name, by the way?
Cathy
My name is Cathy.
Ben Bland
Okay, thank you, Cathy.
Enrique A. Manalo
Well, thank you, well, I – as I understand the question, I – well, the Philippines has a One China policy, of course. But we do have extensive relations, economic relations with Taiwan, and in fact, not only that, we have over 150,000 Filipinos living and working in Taiwan. So, we are – have always been open to great econ – greater economic co-operation with Taiwan, and even there has been – and a private sector co-operation has also been quite extensive with Taiwan.
Our only – from the political angle, as I mentioned earlier, our main concern is that conflict does not erupt in Taiwan, because it would have dire implications for the region, if not for the world, from our point of view. So, we have always urged, from the political viewpoint, to urge all the parties concerned to maintain lines of communication, open lines of communication, in order to prevent any rise in the tensions. Because there’s always been tension, but any rise in the tensions, from erupting into something even more, and we have always urged that. But in terms of economic co-operation, we have co-operation – we have co-operated with Taiwan for many years now.
Ben Bland
And a question here at the front, and can you wait for the microphone, please?
Nopporn Wong-Anan
Hi, my name is Nopporn Wong-Anan. I’m a Freelance Journalist from Thailand. I have a question regarding this ASEAN that you mentioned, on how to strengthen this co-operation among ASEAN members regarding transnational crime and cybercrime. Just last week, there was a big release of this over 250 people from the scam centres in Myanmar, and 16 of them were the Philippines people. And I believe today, they have been – the officials from the Embassy in Bangkok have already been taken them back to the Philippines. Just wondering how serious is this problem to the Philippine people? I – how many people do you estimate that to be victims of the scam in Myanmar and Cambodia, and also Laos? And with the country with – that share the neighbour with Myanmar and Laos and Cambodia, what should Thailand be doing to help the Philippines, and help other countries, in preventing and tackling this problem, and, also, for ASEAN as a whole? Thank you.
Enrique A. Manalo
Well, first, we certainly wish to thank the Government of Thailand for its help in securing the release of Filipinos who were victims of scams or ‘cyber scams’, we call it, trafficking. And this was not the only case, we had other cases before, and the Thai Government and other countries in the region, have also helped, including the government – even Myanmar. The complicating factor is some of these Filipino nationals who were trafficked were working in areas beyond the control of the junta. So, it’s been a delicate way of trying to deal with the situation. But this is one of the ways that we have had contacts, too, with the junta, ‘cause they also have helped in some ways, but the bordering countries have certainly been a great help.
But I just want to add that this is not only an issue affecting the Philippines. It’s now affecting also many countries in ASEAN. That’s why last year, the ASEAN Heads of State adopted a memorandum, or an understanding, on co-operation among the countries of ASEAN in dealing with this new and emerging problem of cybercrime and trafficking. And so, we are hoping, especially perhaps during our chairmanship, to build further on that agreement, to see how ASEAN now as a group, can co-operate in dealing with this relatively new, but worrisome, issue.
Ben Bland
There’s a good question I’m going to take from William Yang online, who asks, “Are there any concrete plans for the Philippines to pursue the initiation of another South China Sea arbitration against China?”
Enrique A. Manalo
No plans.
Ben Bland
Very quick answer.
Enrique A. Manalo
Not yet.
Ben Bland
Yeah, there’s a question here, third row from the front.
Tan Tianxing
Yeah, thank you. I’m Tan Tianxing, a student from the London School of Economics. I think…
Ben Bland
And can you – but I think you probably need to tell us about your other affiliation.
Tan Tianxing
Yeah, oh, of course. My previous position is a Chinese Diplomat, yeah, a focus on – with a special focus on ASEAN issues. I think in 1991, that – when Philippine first grounded your vessel in the UN Shoal, you also call the Second Thomas Shoal, and that Philippine officials promised to China, several times, said that the vessel will be removed soon. Saying that Philippine were – won’t be the first country to violate the DOC, which is the Declaration of the Parties of the – declaration in the South China Sea, and – but nowadays, it’s more than 25 years, the vessel is still there.
And also the sit – same situation, too, the middle-range missile. That – I think last year in July, the spokesperson of the Defence of Min – of the Ministry of Defence publicly said that the missiles will be removed after the joint exercise with the United States. But recently, you change the position and saying that it would be importantly employed in Philippine. So…
Ben Bland
Okay, get to the question. What’s your question?
Tan Tianxing
…so the question is, why such things have, again – again, why Philippine play such game again and again, and – yeah.
Enrique A. Manalo
Well, they’re not games. First, we never made a promise. People say there was a promise, but there’s no record of the promise. And, you know, as far as – if the concern is with the DOC, I think China has already reclaimed at least four areas within our EEZ, which have been transformed into more than just reclamation activities. They are actually used for other purposes and certainly well developed. So, I think before we talk about violations of DOC, let’s see what’s – we have to see what’s been going on in the region, and I don’t think at any rate, the one ship which is there, there was never any promise for that.
As for the launches, the launches, you said, on the Typhon launches, these are purely for defence. They’re not aimed at any country, and as for missiles, I don’t know which country has more missiles, China or the Philippines? I mean – and other countries too in the region have missiles. So, I think that’s how we should look at this, these are purely for defence, and we’ve already said that, essentially, they’re not necessarily there on a permanent basis.
Ben Bland
And there’s a very good follow-up actually from Tibo Spille online. He says, “How confident are you that the Philippines has the required military capabilities to counter China in the South China Sea and defend its jurisdictions? And which military capabilities is the Philippines seeking to acquire to counter China?”
Enrique A. Manalo
We are seeking to enhance our defence capabilities. We’ve always said that our capabilities are not aimed at any particular country. We’re a country which is aiming to ensure our defence – our security from the defence angle, our economic security, and that’s all we’re doing. We’re not intending or aiming to, say, challenge any country. We’re open for co-operation with all countries. All we ask, really, is that countries observe international law, at least as far as South China Sea is concerned, and, also, we’re open to all kinds of co-operation with countries. In no way are we intending to enhance capabilities and aim them at any particular country.
Ben Bland
Okay. Yeah, here, in the middle, at the front. Yeah, just here, thanks.
Daniel Peterson
Thank you, Mr Secretary. I’m Daniel Peterson, former Lecturer of South East Asian Politics at Queen Mary. I just wanted to get your thoughts. President Prabowo went to Beijing in November, and a joint statement was released, where for the first time, it seems Indonesia acknowledged overlapping claims. As the largest country in the region, as a fellow archipelago to the Philippines, are you in any way concerned about what appears to be a shift in longstanding Indonesian policy?
Enrique A. Manalo
Well, I can’t speak on behalf of Indonesia, especially as the Ambassador is here, but I think that’s the sovereign right of Indonesia to do that. Obviously we – in terms of claims, we have at least six claimant states in our region, in the South China Sea. So, that’s why the Philippines has always been supportive of any effort to try and resolve these claims, or at least resolve them peacefully, if possible, or at least always have open dialogue. And one of the factors that are behind our efforts to achieve a code of conduct, South China Sea, as a way of hopefully addressing these claims. Naturally, if there are more claims, then the more urgent need for such a code.
Ben Bland
Right, we’ve got a question here, in the third row from the front.
Latika Bourke
Thank you. Hi, Foreign Minister, my name’s Latika Bourke, I’m a Reporter with The Nightly in Australia. I want to ask you about the Squad and deterring China. So far, the actions aren’t stopping the harassments of your boats. What show of force do you believe could stop China, and is there anything that you think the Squad could do and provide? And are you confident that the United States would be contributing to that under the new Trump administration?
Ben Bland
And for those who don’t know, I think the Squad is the informal collaboration between Australia, the Philippines, US and Japan.
Enrique A. Manalo
Well, I think the basic purpose of Squad is just to basically, improve operational capabilities and learning to – for our assets to work together. And I think the whole idea is when they have operations, is in many ways, to assert, basically, the adherence to international law. The fact that we all favour a free and open Indo-Pacific, and it’s important that countries assert that right, and to travel and to navigate along the Indo-Pacific, in order to indicate their adherence to international law, and that’s how we view the operations of Squad.
Latika Bourke
Would you like it to do more? Is there anything more you want from it?
Enrique A. Manalo
I’ll have to talk to my Defence Minister.
Ben Bland
And there’s a good question online from Syed Muhammad Mehdi Ali. He asks, “Do you believe that China’s ambition would expand with its wider strategic goals, including not only annexing Taiwan, but also countries like the Philippines, in order to gain control of the South China Sea to prevent US influence?”
Enrique A. Manalo
Oh. Maybe you should ask the United States, but I certainly hope that, you know – our position, as I said earlier, is that we try and settle these disputes and differences through negotiation and through diplomacy, and not through the use of force. ‘Cause ultimately, in the end, any conflict in our region, whether it’s in the South China Sea or somewhere in the Indo-Pacific, will really lead to dire consequences. And I think it’s in the interests of all countries to respect each other’s positions, but really to try and resolve differences through diplomatic means.
Ben Bland
Okay, we’ve got a question at the front here [pause].
Jim Begusa
Minister, the question is straight to…
Ben Bland
Sorry, can you tell us who you are?
Jim Begusa
[Jim Begusa – 56:03], member of Chatham House. The question I have for you is in relation to Trump, no mention of Trump tonight at all, is he more dangerous than Xi for the world peace, or more peaceful?
Ben Bland
We did talk about Trump earlier.
Enrique A. Manalo
Yeah, I thought – well, from the perspective of the Philippines, as I mentioned, we’ve had – since the advent of the new administration of President Trump, we’ve had very productive discussions with the officials that we have met. And they have been wholly centred on co-operation, and no mention of any activities other than that. So, I think that’s the only way I can address that particular issue from the perspective of the Philippines.
Jim Begusa
Very diplomatic.
Ben Bland
Hmmm. There’s a reason he’s the Minister of Foreign Affairs. Yeah, we’ve got a question there.
Tom Smith
Thanks very much. My name’s Tom Smith, I’m from the Royal Airforce College, and I write about the Philippines. I think there’s a little contradiction in what you’re presenting to us, I’m afraid, Secretary Manalo. You’ve presented that the Philippines is an international law abiding nation when it comes to UNCLOS and the territorial disputes in the South China Sea, and you’re getting lots of nods of heads in a very international and cosmopolitan crowd here in London, as I would expect.
But there’s another element of international law in which the Philippines has turned its back on, and I’m referring to the International Criminal Court’s investigation into the Duterte drug war. And how the Philippines seems, on a Monday, wants to avail itself of International Court of Arbitration’s rulings, where it suits them, and then on a Tuesday, wants to turn its back when it comes to the ICC’s investigation there to the drug war, in which it is not co-operating. Do you recognise that as a contradiction, and actually, as a hypocrisy which is undermining your course in international affairs?
Enrique A. Manalo
Well, it’s neither a contradiction or hypocrisy. We left the ICC. It’s not as if we we’re a member of the ICC and are refusing to co-operate. We left the ICC because we found its objectives not commensurate with our policies and that the ICC was not following the proper way that it should have followed, in terms of complementarity with domestic laws, and allowing domestic laws to take – to operate first before the ICC gets involved. Now, that being said, we have already made recent pronouncements that the Philippines, despite not being a member of the ICC, it’s not – in the case of UNCLOS, we didn’t leave UNCLOS. Other countries who don’t abide by UNCLOS haven’t left UNCLOS…
Tom Smith
You…
Enrique A. Manalo
…either – well, I’m not finished. So, the – we have already announced that if the ICC were to request for co-operation through the Interpol, we would be in a position to consider that request, but we left the ICC. It’s not as if we are members of the ICC and refuse to co-operate.
Tom Smith
It’s still surprising that the Duterte regime…
Ben Bland
Okay, that – I think we’ll have to leave it there, ‘cause we’re almost out of time, but I’m sure you can carry on the conversation later. And we’ve only got a couple of minutes left, and I just wanted to ask one more question, ‘cause we started by asking, sort of, how dangerous the world was. But, you know, in your current job, you know, what actually keeps you up at night, other than the questions you might get asked at Chatham House? What do you worry about in the world, you know, that really, yeah, gives you nightmares or makes it hard for you to sleep?
Enrique A. Manalo
Gosh, there’s so many things. No, I think it’s the hope that, you know, all the efforts that we’re trying to do to build up the country, to improve our relations with other countries, would not be possible because of certain events, and there’s so many possibilities. So, we’re always – I’m always concerned that it’s important that we try and undertake actions and increase co-operation with countries, precisely to allow greater peace and stability in the world. So, these are thoughts that operate constantly, aside from the usual problems of running a Foreign Ministry.
Ben Bland
Great. Well, you’ve been really generous with your time. I’m told that the Secretary has a few more minutes to hang around, if you want to come and say hi, or continue your conversation. So, thank you for agreeing to stick around for a few minutes, but before we close, please finally join me in giving a round of applause to Secretary Manalo. It’s been great talking to you today.
Enrique A. Manalo
Thank you.
Ben Bland
Thank you. Thank you to everyone.
