Dr Andrew Payne
Okay, welcome, everyone, welcome to Chatham House. It’s great to see so many of you, both in the room and online. My name is Andrew Payne. I’m the Research Director for Europe, Russia and the Americas here at Chatham House, and I’m delighted to be chairing tonight’s panel discussion on “US-Russia Rapprochement.” It is an entirely home team panel, as you will have observed, but before I introduce my esteemed colleagues, I just want to say a couple of words to frame tonight’s discussion.
And I’ll – the fact that we are even having this discussion, not even 100 days into the new administration, I think itself is an indicator of the scale and the speed at which Donald Trump is transforming America’s role in the world. And there have been some zigs and there have been some zags and we’ve seen some of that literally in the last 24 hours, but on this specific issue, I think we do, sort of, seem to be headed towards a general direction of travel, which is towards a thaw in relations between US and Russia.
In his recent call with Vladimir Putin, Donald Trump talked about the enormous economic deals that could be struck in the event of a normalisation of relations. And Marco Rubio, of course, has openly talked about the world as a ‘multipolar world’, one in which the US must engage and deal constructively with other great powers, including China, but also, to some extent, Russia, and to do so on the basis of hard geopolitical realities. All of this talk about shared values and the liberal international order seems to have fallen pretty much by the wayside. And all of this is, of course, taking place in the backdrop of the ongoing War in Ukraine, which has been the primary irritant in US-Russia relations in recent years and, of course, remains the single biggest obstacle to any form of reset. It’s also something which has profound implications for the security architecture in Europe.
So, what we wanted to do today was to step back a little bit and think through what the possible end games might look like and what those might mean for the US, for its allies and partners, and also for its adversaries and competitors, if, indeed, those labels carry meaning anymore. And to help us unpack all of that, I am honoured to be joined, as I said, by three Chatham House experts, each of whom have phenomenal backgrounds and experience to bring to bear on tonight’s topic, but since we are an all Chatham House affair, I’m going to keep the introductions relatively brief, so we can dive straight into the discussion. So, joining us online is Heather Hurlburt, who’s an Associate Fellow of our US and the Americas Programme. To my left is Orysia Lutsevych, Deputy Director of our Russia and Eurasia Programme and also Head of the Ukraine Forum. And at the end, we have Dr Yu Jie, Senior Research Fellow on China, with our Asia-Pacific Programme.
Before we begin, a couple of points of housekeeping. This event is not under the Chatham House Rule. It is on the record, it is being recorded and in fact, it is being livestreamed, so please do bear that in mind when we come to the Q&A section. And we do really want to include you in the discussion, so do be thinking of your questions, both in the room and also, online. You should have a function at the bottom to pop your questions in there. Please do, do that. If you’d like to tweet about the event, you can also do that using the #CH_Events and the handle @ChathamHouse.
Okay, so Heather, let me turn to you first to kick things off, with a very simple question, of course. Do we actually know what the Trump administration wants out of its long-term relationship with Russia?
Heather Hurlburt
Thanks, Andrew, thanks so much for having me and thank you for making it possible for me to join you virtually. When talking about what the Trump administration wants, I find it very useful to think about it like any American administration, as a coalition of interests. And so, I answer that question by going through a set of things that different important figures or important segments of the Trump coalition want.
And first of all, frankly, is the geopolitical point that you already made in your introduction, that President Trump’s return to The White House represents the re-ascendency of a much more realist view of America’s role in the world, which says the US is a great power, there are other great powers. The first order of business is to have at least practical working relationships with all the other great powers and to figure out how the world is best divided up among them. And that line of thinking, Russia is not just any great power, it’s also, along with the US, the world’s other great nuclear power. Although China coming up fast behind.
And you will – in addition to, you know, President Trump’s interest in being the individual who brings an end to the War in Ukraine, you’ve also heard him express interest at Davos right at the beginning of this term, in being the man who re-ushers in a new era of nuclear arms control. So, I think there’s a fascination in doing big deals with big leaders that Russia – and given, sort of, how Russia and the Soviet Union figure historically in the American imagination. There’s – so there’s that chunk of interest.
Then second, there’s what I would call an energy and economics set of interests. Obviously, the US and Russia are both energy superpowers. Therefore, according to this line of thinking, we have a lot more interest in being able to work co-operatively with Russia to manage global energy markets. Certainly, Trump personally and people close to him, have had great economic success in partnership with Russia or with Russian business in the past, and there’s a great interest in opening that up again.
Last, I think something that often gets left out of these conversations, but that is enormously important, in thinking again of Steve Bannon and a swath of Trump’s coalition, is a, kind of, moral or ethical kinship. This idea that Russia and the United States are both great Christian nations and that there’s a kinship, a perceived kinship, of cultural conservatism that has been much harped on in the Russian media. And that, again, some members of Trump’s coalition perceive those forces in Russia as a better allies for the kinds of things that they want to accomplish in the world than maybe US traditional allies who got the berating from Vice President Vance that most of you will have heard, what is it, six weeks ago now, at Munich. So, ideological kinship, energy economic kinship, security and geopolitical kinship.
Dr Andrew Payne
Great, thank you, and I mean, there’s so much I could pick up on. Let me just go to your second bucket there, the, kind of, economic and energy one, and I really – I wonder what level of ambition there do you think is actually realistic? Because, you know, Rubio talk of these ru – talked of these extraordinary opportunities when he met with the Russian officials back in, I think it was February. And there were eyes raised last week when Russia was left off the list of countries to be subject to reciprocal tariffs. But Russia has always been a pretty challenging place to do business, right? Most companies have now left as well, and I think we’re on our 16th, if not more, round of European sanctions. So, is it realistic to expect that we’re going to have this flood of US companies, or global companies, re-engaging with Russia?
Heather Hurlburt
So, do I think that opportunities in the Russian economy are going to transform the US economy? No, I most certainly do not, and as you say, we’ve had, since the 90s, or even the 80s, really, cycles of boom and bust, where you have Americans infatuated with the possibilities of the Russian market and then find out the hard way that it’s quite challenging to do business there. That being said, I do think there are certain industries and certain companies that had figured out very successfully how to make money in Russia and with Russians, and I do think there are individuals and companies that would be poised to go back in, were it more legal to do so. And I think some of those companies and individuals may be quite close to President Trump and his circle.
So, while it’s not – there’s not going to be a broad-based investment move and – that’ll add a point to US economic growth, will we seize – and particularly, frankly, I would suspect, or there is a certain thought that if Europe wants to keep its sanctions on, that would create competitive opportunities for US companies, if you will.
Dr Andrew Payne
Hmmm hmm, great. I mean, let me turn now to you, Orysia. Similar sort of question. I mean, that’s what the US wants. What does Russia want? And if we’re thinking in terms of, sort of, Venn diagrams, is there any possible overlap there?
Orysia Lutsevych OBE
I think, Andrew, and as Heather described, there are, indeed, some similarities of interests. I think Putin personally wants to get out of the cold; he wants to be at the high table. The policy of Tru – of Biden’s administration clearly framed Russia as a pariah state for its war crimes in Ukraine, for crime against peace, and Putin wants all of that scratched out. He also needs a validation of his worldview, where, you know, indeed, the world is divided by these spheres of influence, or even control. This is beyond just the sphere of influence. Spheres of entitlement, if you want, and where all the tools are acceptable to subjugate and exhort from these spheres of proximity or neighbourhoods, whatever economic or other benefits these superpowers choose to do.
I think there is a very clear and perhaps a much stronger impetus on doing business with the United States, but let’s remember that both Trump and Putin are also deeply personalistic regimes, where the family, or in Putin’s term, literal and also the, kind of, security services family, and Trump, his family, his son, they want to make business together among these two clans. And that means, basically, Russia as the petrostate, would like to offer America a deal on trying to actually bring back its energy resources into Europe through American intermediaries. And of course, they need sanctions regime, because the Russian economy is ser – taking a serious hit on that. And there could be an interesting offer over Russian sovereign assets that could be reinvested into adjoined projects. And what could be appealing, for example, well, Putin could say, “Look, we are paying you back for all those expenses you had in Ukraine,” by Putin to – could use these Russian sovereign assets.
So, I think this business compact is quite significant. There’s also a possible common goal of the two, which is to undermine the European project, to undermine European Union. None of them likes the collective power of bargaining of the European market. Trump believes that European Union was set up to profit from America. Putin believes European Union was set up to undermine Russia. They – both of them want Eur – a weaker or destroyed European Union, and that actually would make Ukraine’s future, and the future of other countries in between that are trying so much to jump on this bandwagon, very, very problematic.
Dr Andrew Payne
So, let me push you on that final point. I mean, let’s assume that there is a deal here, right, that there is some kind of rapprochement, some kind of patching up of relations on the bilateral level. What does that mean for countries like Ukraine and what could we expect the response of Europe to be, in terms of, you know, you’ve described it as this attempt to “undermine the European Union”? What would the response look like?
Orysia Lutsevych OBE
Well, I mean, I think it doesn’t come as a surprise to say that the treatment Zelenskyy received in The White House came as a huge shock and humiliation to millions of Ukrainians. I think they under – there is a cold shower understanding that United Steps – States stopped being a partner or ally of Ukraine and at best, became a mediator, at worst, somebody who actually pushes Putin’s line at the negotiating table. That means that Ukraine feels maximum pressure from the United States, and we’ve already seen it in a tangible way when intelligence support was disconnected.
To be honest, this is reflected immediately in the public opinion in Ukraine, where in December, Trump was seen as relatively positive for Ukraine. You know, I would say 18% thought so. Now 70% of Ukrainians believe that Trump has a negative effect on Ukraine, and that means that Ukrainian leaders, especially, you know, President, speaks like a European leader, basically says that “It’s time for all of us to grow up.” That “There is – of course, we’ll try as much as possible to maintain US engagement, but that is not going to last for too long, and we need to get our house in order to defend from Russia, that is considered an imminent threat for Europe and a partner for United States.”
In those circumstances, almost, Ukraine and Europe are attacked on both sides and that puts an extra pressure. So, there’s a – I think Ukraine, in a way, is in the more advantageous position, because its society and its military and industrial complex is already mobilised. It’s unpleasant situation, but I think it comes as a much bigger shock for Europe than to Ukraine. And that Vance speech in Munich Security Conference I think was quite useful, because it dispelled the delusion that United States can be a partner, and actually demonstrated point blank that United States has changed and Europe must change as well.
Dr Andrew Payne
I want to bring in Yu Jie in one second, but let me just pick up one thing there. Do you think Europe is actually prepared to get its own house in order and to step up to that challenge? I mean, there are different ways you could take that, but let me just focus on the, kind of, political will. I wonder if Europe actually has the political will to finance the kind of commitment that we would be talking about here, to articulate what the commitment looks like to its own domestic public and to sustain that support over the long-term. I think you made a good case on Ukraine. Poland, for example, is another case where the proximity to the conflict is clearly a motivating factor, but you’ve also got spoilers like Hungary and even in the Coalition of the Willing, and what’s to say that in a couple of years we might have the similar kind of electoral shift in France, in Germany, that we saw in the US, triggering some kind of U-turn on that?
So, how prepared do you think Europe actually is?
Orysia Lutsevych OBE
I think Europe has honestly wasted quite a lot of time since the beginning of invasion in 2022. I think Ukraine was always making a case that this is the war in Ukraine against the West. I mean, we do know that this war is not about the territory. That is why negotiations about, you know, what concessions, what territorial concessions Ukraine is willing to make, is missing the great point that this war is about exactly, you know, pushing America out of Europe, which Putin may achieve with Trump. Trump may actually offer it to Putin on the silver platter, such a gift. But it’s also about imposing Russia’s worldview on Europe, splitting Europe from within and restoring this control in much broader sense. As we all recall, this document, ultimatum that was sent in December of 2021 to Washington, that included backtracking on NATO’s infrastructure in Eastern Europe, so the borders of 1997.
So, I think Europe has wasted time, but Europe is waking up. I think there is an understanding and the Coalition of the Willing now, it consists of 30 countries, not just European countries. I think we should be speaking of a broader coalition, and not just Europe, but it includes Canada, it includes Australia, it includes other countries that actually want to stand on the principles of international law and that want – that see how the outcome in Ukraine is fundamental for the global order we will be living in.
So – and I think this is why both Putin and Trump want Zelenskyy out, because if you look at the public grouping and polling in Europe, Zelenskyy is trusted and very popular Politician, in some places more popular than their national Politicians. He is able to master this unity and sustain it and explain, and people trust him. Even common people all, you know, admire him, and I think this is one of the strongest assets that Ukraine offers to Europe. That’s why honestly, I think right now, at this moment, Ukraine is a security guarantee for Europe, not the other way around.
Dr Andrew Payne
Hmmm hmm. Okay, let’s pick that up in a moment, but I want to bring Yu Jie in, who’s been waiting patiently. China, of course, is itself in the middle of a full-blown trade war right now, I mean. But of course, Beijing has been watching this, kind of, trajectory of a thaw with Russia quite closely, as well. So, from your perspective, what does China stand to gain or lose from any thaw, if we are indeed…
Dr Yu Jie
Sure.
Dr Andrew Payne
…to see one?
Dr Yu Jie
Sure. Well, good evening, everyone, and thank you so much for my colleagues for putting this event together. And let’s talking about basketball game later, about tariff, 145 now is – vis-à-vis 84, whatever that – it is, later.
Regarding on China watching this very carefully on this rapprochement between Moscow and Washington, I think that two words come into my mind. Now, the first word is that sense about uneasinesses. The uneasinesses, that’s to say that Beijing has invested in this bilateral relationship with Moscow for quite some time, near – even nearly two decades. And suddenly realise Putin is not someone that should – seems to be quite reliable, firstly.
Now, secondly, I think it’s also remain that sense of necessity to get along well with Russia. So, I think we’re now seeing the island of the UK, that we seems not really get the understanding that sense of the share borders with the different countries. So, China’s a country that share borders with 14 different neighbours and within those 14 different countries, and Russia share the longest border with China, which is 4,300km long and is equivalent the width of entire European continent. So, if China can’t handle Russia well, then surely, given Russia’s nuclear capability, even though compounded by China’s nuclear capability, and surely what will happen is Russia may serve as a source of a national security threat with China.
So, I think that’s a part of the reason why, over the last two decades or so, I think really up until early 2000, you take both Beijing and Moscow over nearly 1,000 meetings in different locations together, to finally to manage with settle down with a border between Beijing and Moscow. So, Beijing found it extremely difficult in dealing with neighbours, but nevertheless, what really bounded these two together, even though we have seen a initial, quite really short rapprochement between Beijing – sorry, between Moscow and Washington. But Beijing and Moscow have that really deeply entrenched sense of alignment by having this common understanding that is to say the US hegemony has been serving as a hindrance for – both for China, as well as for Russia, when it come to their own spheres of influence, when it come to their own play of the book for the international affairs.
So, I think this is actually bounded these two together, even if we did have a Putin getting very close with Donald Trump. Although I don’t really know how much the so-called personal ties between Trump and Putin would actually serve us any purpose, even though Donald Trump speak very warmly about his friends Putin, or even speaking even more warmly about his friend in Xi Jinping, and you have – as what you have seen the result of today on the trade war and you’re imposing nearly no [inaudible – 22:27] tariff towards your friend. So, obviously, I think both Putin and Xi Jinping were not taking Trump’s word very seriously.
So, instead, and what they would have is they would have some very cold calculation on how are they going to make this alignment it’s going to work. So, I think for China, it’s really – they have no any other options, apart from just accept the geographical condition as it is and then serve – and then observe, obviously, very carefully, what Putin is really after. I think the end game for China in here is that for Russia, as long as it is has a leader that is not pro-Western and that would serve China’s security interest within the region. And that is something that China is able to withstand.
Dr Andrew Payne
Hmmm. So, what do you make of this idea, which is gaining a lot of traction, a lot of currency, at least in Republican foreign policy circles, that Trump’s strategy is one of doing ‘a reverse Nixon’?
Dr Yu Jie
Sure.
Dr Andrew Payne
That the idea here is that, you know, Trump can drive a wedge between China and Russia? And maybe, Heather, I’ll come to you after Yu Jie. It’d be great to get both your perspectives on that.
Dr Yu Jie
Well, it’s a fantasy idea, firstly. Secondly, I think what you would really need in here is not just the Nixon and Mao. You would also need a Jon Leyne and Kissinger equivalent, both within United States, as well as within Moscow. And it’s nowhere to be found for those two Diplomats and to be able to have that two to play together. It really take two to tango. I think really, what Trump administration really underestimate is how much Russia is actually relying on China in terms – both in economic terms, but also in political terms. That can’t be just been overthrown overnight as being only some nice and friendly words traded by Donald Trump. So, I think reverse Nixon, it is existing within fantasy, and it will continue to be existing in fantasy.
Dr Andrew Payne
Do you agree, Heather?
Heather Hurlburt
I do agree with a lot of what Yu Jie has said, and starting with, though, I think the way you laid out the history of relations between Russia and China helps understand why some Americans find this possibility really appealing and see – perceive that there’s a possibility to split Russia and China. And this actually – this idea has been percolating for a number of years. It’s not just a Republican point of view, but it rests on the idea that actually, the US can’t compete successfully against China if we are also having to put so much effort into competing against Russia and if China has the full benefit of Russia’s energy resources and military technology. So, there is this very appealing argument, among a certain set of Conservatives, so that’s, kind of, factor number one.
Factor number two is we have also gone through a period in American foreign policy where there was, kind of, a return of Kissinger envy or Kissinger wannabe and for a while, everyone was writing a, sort of, “Who’s the new Kissinger?” or “What’s the new Kissinger on this?” And it’s an – think it’s an interesting commentary on, sort of, the world we’re living in that the idea that anything Kissinger did is something good that we should be attempting to emulate in this moment.
And the third thing, which I’ll just flag again, is this idea that the US and Russia have fundamental cultural commonalities which China doesn’t share. And this you can point, again, both to the supposed shared Conservative Christian values. Orysia, you touched on this a little bit. Again, I’m not claiming that Putin actually personally adheres to any of these things, but he’s certainly been very willing to make use of them. And second, the idea that Russia is now an anti-Communist country and China is a Communist country, and we could have a very long conversation about the realities of that, but it is a perception.
Having said all of that, though, what I find interesting in going back and reading some of the more thoughtful Conservative scholarship on what a reverse Kissinger would look like is, and I’ll quote a 2021 paper that the Atlantic Council published anonymously. And the author was very clear that “You can’t do this without our allies.” So, the interesting thing is the US can’t rebuild relations with Russia while Europe is still hostile in between. And so that – you know, ultimately, I think for that reason, plus all the reasons Yu Jie laid out, this is not going anywhere in the near-term.
Dr Andrew Payne
Hmmm.
Orysia Lutsevych OBE
And this also – if I may just jump in, when the fantasy hits the reality, a side effect which I think Trump and his team is not really thinking about, and that is, you know, the price of oil, for example, what it means to Russian economy. And the slowdown in Chinese economy, the decreasing demand for the Russian oil, would actually do a disfavour to Putin, rather than help, as Trump – as Rubio actually said, set up this geopolitical co-operation. So, I think this hectic strategizing, if you even call it this way, will have a lot of collateral damage, will not lead from Point A to Point B, and I think the countries, like in Ukraine in the middle, will have to really stay focused on the principles.
And, you know, it was striking when I was in Kyiv meeting Senior Officials who are dealing with US administration, saying, “We cannot talk about the values anymore.” So, it’s all about transaction, but that is even one-way street, because in transaction, you usually have a bil – mutual interest. America is very extortionist in that way right now. It will backfire, because obviously, the world is a bigger place, and I think this is where the, kind of, Coalition of Nations throughout the world that stand on the values, and especially Europe, European continent was built on values. We – Europe should not abandon what it is because of the – who is in The White House or who is in the Kremlin. It will cost more, it will be a tougher battle, but I think it’s the one that Europe can still win.
Dr Andrew Payne
Hmmm hmm.
Dr Yu Jie
It’s interesting you mention the word on ‘values’ and ‘pragmatism’ and ‘transactional’. I mean, that’s actually – pragmatism and transactional is actually two of the key features for the Chinese foreign policy, and I think that’s the way how they manage Russia. And I think that’s cunningly, going to be the way how they manage United States as well. So, in a way, I think for most the Asian economies, they found managing the partner that do not necessarily share the common value, that seems to be something quite in common. And however, I think in this part of world, if you’re talking without share value, how you going to even to build a alliance? So, I think that’s the differences in here, hmmm.
Heather Hurlburt
Andrew…
Dr Andrew Payne
And…
Heather Hurlburt
…if I may jump in super quickly.
Dr Andrew Payne
Go ahead.
Heather Hurlburt
I think that’s a very smart observation and in some ways, I think it’s just as likely that Trump ends up striking a big deal with Xi as with Putin. In some ways, especially now that we’re in this and ridiculous trade war, which I really like the basketball metaphor, that hasn’t gained currency in the US yet, but I’m going to steal it and popularise it. But I – there’s this core pragmatism of where can I create circumstances that will allow me to create deals? It strikes me that at the end of the day, Xi will have more flexibility to respond to Trump in that way than Putin will, for some of the reasons that Orysia has just laid out.
Dr Andrew Payne
So, is there some kind of grand bargain here, not on the economic front, but actually on the security front, when it comes to resolving the War in Ukraine? You know, if the US and Russia want to focus on other things, the US wants to disengage to some degree from European security, it – do you think there’s any appetite for China to step in here and play a role, whether that’s guaranteeing the terms of a ceasefire or playing a role in Ukraine’s, you know, post-war reconstruction? I think the last estimates I saw of that was that, you know, I think $½ trillion that it’s going to cost. I mean, maybe Yu Jie, you want to pick up that and…
Dr Yu Jie
Sure.
Dr Andrew Payne
…Orysia might want to in a moment, as well.
Dr Yu Jie
Because I laid out this very clearly in the Financial Times recently what I wrote. Essentially, I think what China’s doing there is it’s doing a very light lifting, taking low-hanging fruit. Beijing want to wait for the position from Ukraine, the position from Russia, from United States and from Europe is cleared, and then Beijing later decided to jump in. I think so far, what we hear so far is that Beijing is making the right noise within the various international occasions, but not necessarily to provide any sense of the so-called – or any intention to providing any sense of a security guarantee. Because overall, as the Chinese led – the spokeperson from Foreign Ministry made it very clear by saying, “War in Ukraine, Russia’s invasion towards Ukraine, is a matter of European archi – security architecture that is essentially broken. This has nothing to do with China.” I think that line has been quite revealing to a lot of people, to show that China’s position is actually taking this a very low-cost approach.
Now, secondly, regarding to the discussion and the possibility that China want to get involved in the reconstruction towards Ukraine, again, I would put some – my serious doubt in here. If we can only draw the analogy, not far back, on the United States’ retreat towards Afghanistan, which has already happened within China’s nearer neighbourhood and China did not really even get involved at all. And Chinese sense in here is that in the very basic accounting sense, by the way, I’m a former Management Consultant, so I’m speaking in a accounting term in here, what is the return on investment, okay? So, investing in Ukraine, fine, but who will provide a security guarantee? If without security guarantee, would any companies, even including the state-owned enterprises, to go in there and into wasting all the state resources, which essentially, those precious state resources will have to be now concentrated to deal with a much larger issue of the trade war?
Dr Andrew Payne
Hmmm, but is the investment not the security guarantee itself, insofar as there is then a deterrent on Putin, who wants to maintain a healthy relationship with Beijing?
Dr Yu Jie
Because Beijing would even need a much – even bigger security guarantee, apart from just what China can do. I think if you want to have a security guarantee, and that security guarantee has come from the, kind of – in the shape or form of a G2, nothing else.
Dr Andrew Payne
Hmmm. Orysia?
Orysia Lutsevych OBE
Oh, but I think it’s also important to remember that Russia is not at – not considering such factors as investors’ companies when it decides to go to war. If Russia will decide to re-invade Ukraine, it will make no difference whether it’s John Deere or it’s a Chinese company managing the port. The – oh, most companies already took heavy losses, including Chinese companies who lost long-term contracts for corn and other supply, and Chinese already took losses in this war.
Dr Yu Jie
Hmmm.
Orysia Lutsevych OBE
American companies are speaking, also, of restitution of the assets that were seized by Russian State before they resume any kind of business.
Dr Yu Jie
Hmmm.
Orysia Lutsevych OBE
So, I think that argument that foreign direct investment can, you know, serve as a security guarantee, is a hoax…
Dr Andrew Payne
Hmmm.
Dr Yu Jie
Hmmm.
Orysia Lutsevych OBE
…personally. I think also that right now, what’s interesting with China, on one hand, I agree that they are giving light touch, also benefit to Ukraine, especially around the last disgraceful US behaviour in the UN Security Council and UN General Assembly, where actually, China played well with Kyiv in the way of sequencing of these, this may seem like small diplomatic victories, but China was willing to help Ukraine and not supported Russia.
Dr Yu Jie
Hmmm hmm.
Orysia Lutsevych OBE
But overall, I think China benefits from Russia’s weakening itself economically by fighting a war in Ukraine and also, it’s a lifeline for Russia’s military reconstitution, with machinery which is 70% and semiconductors which is 90%. So, Russ – China has the leverage it’s not using to bel – to put – to dampen the scale and the damage that Russia causes with this war on Ukraine. And we know horrific recent attacks on civilians that actually, after everything that Trump offers to Putin, including this vote, disgraceful vote at the UN Security Council, including withdrawing from their international prosecution mechanism of the war crimes in The Hague, US withdrew from it, including this long phone call, Putin did nothing. All he does, he just increases his list of demands on America to deliver.
Dr Andrew Payne
So, if Putin is difficult to deter and it’s not – cannot – China cannot, or will not, and the US clearly doesn’t want to, you’ve talked about values and you’ve talked about, you know, the popularity of Zelenskyy as a figurehead, as a galvanising force, but when the rubber hits the road, I mean, if Europe ha – actually has to step up in the context of the US-Russia rapprochement, I mean, do we have time for that? I mean, what are the steps that will be required to actually get there?
Orysia Lutsevych OBE
That’s a very important question and I think today there is a meeting in Brussels of this Coalition of the Willing, discussing what must happen. I think Ukraine offers quite a good answer and that answer is actually, we need to arm to have a deterrence, not by punishment, but by denial, meaning Russians are willing to kill as many millions of their own people as necessary. So, what we need to do is to build schematic capabilities to deny Russia any success on the battlefield, and Ukraine is leading in this military defence revolution right now. We have more than 500 companies throughout Ukraine and abroad, joint ventures, building drones. We have the – Ukraine’s own internal defence industrial capability, which right now, you know, it’s only half funded. If we want quickly to rearm, we can, pumping more money into Ukrainian production.
I think there is an interesting idea that is being discussed about the sky shield, whether part of Ukrainian territory can be covered by the air defence that takes down Russian missiles flying over, especially nuclear power stations. And of course, I think it’s about integrating Ukraine into European rearmament programmes, because Europe has technology, also Europe has collective borrowing capacity. Their ideas about this European Defence Mechanism could be set up, that is actually promoted by Poland, that will take off the veto of such countries as Hungary, Slovakia, or whoever next may fall off the grid.
I think it’s all about hard power right now and it’s about creating contingencies for Putin, not the other way around. And it’s also demonstrating to America that Europe is prepared to – is serious about its defence and it will invest in it. And there’s opportunity also for American companies, because we do know that there are red states where there is a big industrial production. Zelenskyy said, “We are ready to buy 30-50 billion of American military equipment if America will sell it.” So, this is what we have to do. There is a plan, it’s just putting resources and commanding political will.
Dr Andrew Payne
Which is the key question, of course.
Orysia Lutsevych OBE
Yes.
Dr Andrew Payne
Okay, thank you. Alright, so I think in the interests of time, let’s open this up now for some audience questions. If you’re in the room, please raise your hand and a team member at the back will come to you with a microphone. If you’re online, all you need to do is pop your question in the Q&A box there, and I’ll keep an eye on those and try and wrap as many as I can through. Please do state your name and affiliation. Please ensure that your question is indeed a question, something with a question mark at the end of it.
Orysia Lutsevych OBE
Inspired.
Dr Andrew Payne
Yeah, exactly.
Orysia Lutsevych OBE
Yes, as we know, what happened in the…
Dr Andrew Payne
And…
Orysia Lutsevych OBE
…[inaudible - 39:31].
Dr Andrew Payne
…there are risks. This is a risky thing, but – and as concise as possible. Okay, I’ll go for the lady over there and maybe let’s take two for the first round, gentleman over here, as well.
Mary Dejevsky
Thank you, I’m Mary Dejevsky. I’m a Journalist, and despite my name, I’m not Russian. I mean absolutely no disrespect to Orysia, but I came here to – for a discussion about the US-Russia rapprochement and it was framed as such in the very first introduction. What we’ve had is a discussion from the American perspective, which is absolutely fine, and we’ve had no Russian perspective except through a very strong Ukrainian prism. I think that is a huge omission and a wasted opportunity and I think it reflects not very well on Chatham House, I’m sorry.
Dr Andrew Payne
Okay, but we did talk about Russia today, but that was the second question, but, you know, your point is taken. Let me head over here.
Mikhail Ramos
Mikhail Ramos, member of Chatham House. Do we give the Trump administration far too much credit for having a strategy? Because most of the people working in the administration seem to be sycophants who justifications for the – for whatever is said after the fact. And even somebody like Bridge Colby has changed his positions from not dealing in the Middle East to now this. Well, of course, everything clearly hangs together, with North Korean troops, with everything. So, aren’t we just giving them far too much credit?
Dr Andrew Payne
Thank you. Heather, do you want to take that? Is there really a strategy here?
Heather Hurlburt
Sure. So, viewers who checked my bio will note that my background is not one that I start out inclined to give the Trump administration lots of extra credit for things. But I think both in the US and abroad, we make a huge mistake in underestimating not so much is there a clear strategy, but is there a set of shift tendencies and an enormous determination to act and keep acting on them? Are there people in the Trump administration who have clear strategy and a much clearer set of ideas on how to act on that strategy than they did in Trump 1? So, that’d be my first point.
My second point, as you will recall, I started out my remarks by saying that I think it’s useful to think about different tendencies or schools within the administration. And so, you have one group of folks, and Bridge Colby is one representation of it, but there are many others, who are very sophisticated thinkers who see the only threat of any importance facing the United States as China. And so, they look at everything else that the ad – that any administration does in the light of how does this help or hurt the US confront an ideally contained China militarily? And that leads them to push for a bunch of options in other areas, including as I said, this rapprochement with Russia.
Now, are they very willing to make compromises along the way and shift views in order to – and have they maybe been willing to throw completely overboard the idea that China is best countered with allies rather than alone, in order to get on with the other tendency in this administration, which says the whole idea of alliances is a drag on American power? Yes, but one can observe that this is a somewhat contradictory group of people with a somewhat contradictory group of ideas, without saying, oh, they have no ideas and it’s all just day-to-day. And if you do that, I really think you underestimate what we’re seeing.
Orysia Lutsevych OBE
If I may just add, I see a clear red line throughout this ideology, which is a payback time. It’s applied to Ukraine, it’s applied to European Union, it’s applied to other partners, and I think Witkoff’s name is quite interesting, right? As a trusted Envoy of Trump, he seems to be a messenger on all negotiations, including this bilateral Russian track with Kirill Dmitriyev. You know, there are clearly some deals that are being made that are not made public. So, it’s an eclectic group, but I think the profit-making motive is very, very strong in this group.
Dr Andrew Payne
Okay, let’s take another couple of questions. Gentleman at the back there and over here, as well.
Anthony Borden
Hi, thanks, Tony Borden from the Institute for War and Peace Reporting. Thanks very much for a great discussion. Two questions, in explaining the climbdown or the change of stance on the terrorists, Trump administration officials have said, “Nobody creates leverage dike – like Donald Trump for himself in negotiations.” But if you look at the global strategy, Russia is the one country in which he has not sought to create any leverage. How do we explain this? This is partly the thing we talk about in pubs, but analytically, what really is the answer to this question, because it – we have leverage against Canada, leveraging in Denmark, leverage against I don’t know who, but no leverage against Russia?
Second question is, in the withdrawal from soft power cancellation of USAID, much of the discussion has been how China, especially, has filled the gap and we think especially also of Moldova at the moment, where the disbalance of information landscape is shifted, then, entirely in Russia’s favour. So, what is the impact for China, in particular, and how does it intersect with Russia’s interest in the Eastern region? Thank you.
Dr Andrew Payne
And we’ll take this one here, as well, thank you.
Dara McDougall
Hi, thank you, Dara McDougall, Deutsche Bank. We were talking about the, kind of, reverse Nixon strategy earlier, but I was hoping we could flip that on our head a little bit and ask, you know, what is the possibility or capacity for China to look at decoupling the US from its allies? And one of the ways of looking at this, I’m Irish-Canadian, despite my accent, you know, during the Biden administration you saw Europe largely aligned with American strategy in the Indo-Pacific and also on derisking economically. Whereas now, again as an Irish-Canadian, I’m seeing, you know, the territorial integrity of one of my nations being directly threatened by the US and the economy of another one threatened, and saying, well, I don’t necessarily have a quarrel with Beijing, even if I disagree with its political system. So, would you see any capacity for Beijing to go that way, or is that just not on the agenda?
Dr Andrew Payne
Okay, so Yu Jie, I think let’s start with you on the reverse, reverse Nixon…
Dr Yu Jie
And rev…
Dr Andrew Payne
…if you like.
Dr Yu Jie
Reverse, reverse, that means nothing change, in maths terms.
Dr Andrew Payne
I get that.
Dr Yu Jie
Anyway, let’s put in this term. I would not necessarily consider that the allies that United States has been – is long-time established within the region would be that easily been peeling off. However, given the implications on the economy, given the implications on – in regional trade, I do think what Trump has done, as of last weekend, has been extremely damaging to his allies and particularly within the region, that’s firstly.
Now, secondly, remember what I’ve said earlier about how the regions – the way how they conduct diplomacy. It’s that sense of pragmatism and transaction. If I cannot choose United States, if I cannot consider United States as being trustful of the trade partner, and where do I go for? Of course, I have to go to the second largest economy in the world, I go to China. So, I think that’s actually inadvertently pushed the regional alliances within Indo-Pacific region, I think with the exception of Philippines, much closer to China than with United States. I think that’s what Trump has managed to do, and that is something that Beijing found very gleeful, let’s put in this way.
Now, I think on the other hand, what we also have seen so far is that what China has already begin, that process or that sense of charm offensive, from late last year, with countries like India, countries like Japan and countries like South Korea, begin to softing the tones towards China as well. So, it actually take two to tango. So, I think Beijing’s now rightly capitalised the opportunity Donald Trump has been left over for now in terms of trade disruption towards the region and then capitalising it and try to make sure those neighbours could be friendlier towards China. Even may – this may not fundamentally change the calculation on the US-China competition, but for China, I think in that sense, every little help, and then just to have the more countries that slightly friendlier towards China, the better. I think that’s Beijing’s calculation.
Now, in terms of the fill the void of the internat – global leadership of certain element, is China interested in doing that? I know this has been the conventional wisdom within certain policy circles. I don’t know, perhaps the facts may disappoint you, because we also going to remember that where now the country’s now in the deep period of the Cold – of the trade war, that what you have is you have a extremely fragile economic recovery which has not been substantiated, and how we going to divert your resources? Perhaps Beijing will have to utilise all its resources to fighting this trade war, which is absolutely necessary for them as a matter of death and survive. So, I think really for Beijing, instead of filling the void of the international leadership left by United States, I think Beijing will come across as being that very reticent self-centred superpower and that perhaps the rest of the world do not want to see.
Orysia Lutsevych OBE
No.
Dr Andrew Payne
Any comments from Heather or Orysia on the lack of leverage, the detractor…
Orysia Lutsevych OBE
Yeah.
Dr Andrew Payne
…that was missing in the art of the deal, perhaps?
Orysia Lutsevych OBE
Maybe just…
Heather Hurlburt
Yeah, I will – no worries, yeah, you go ahead. You go ahead.
Orysia Lutsevych OBE
Just quickly, I think it’s fascinating question, but I think the ans – my answer would be that it’s not intended. It’s – the peace through strengths appeal to Trump failed. I don’t think – he wants to fundamentally sort the irritation of Russia involved in this war in Ukraine in order to make money with Russia. I honestly think that it’s attractive opportunity, and I think that fundamentally, his experience dealing with Russia was profitable, personally, by, you know, selling his dilapidated villa in Florida too and being bailed out by some of the Russian banks. And also, politically, when everybody was accusing him of Russia interference in US elections helping him, he felt really insulted about it and he trusted Putin that this was not the case.
I think there’s a special comfort zone between the two, so he doesn’t feel like he wants to impose leverage. Of course, it exists, it exists in US holding Russian sovereign assets that could be put to a very good use, oil sanctions. You know, the armament of Ukraine is one of the best leverage that Trump has, and this is what Ukraine is trying to demonstrate convincingly, that this return on investment where Ukraine literally, with, you know, 60 billion of US direct military assistance, has destroyed two thirds of Russian ground forces, for what Russia gained, compared to 2022, a negligible percentage of Ukrainian territory, and actually saves Europe from further invasion. My only explanation is, as I said, Trump does not want to pressure Putin into anything.
Dr Andrew Payne
Heather?
Heather Hurlburt
Yeah, I will make a slightly different observation, which is I think Trump does think he has leverage. Orysia, I think you named off several things. I think he may also think that Putin needs the business relationships that he has to offer and I think he thinks that Russia is weakened by the war in Ukraine and I think he has drawn the conclusion that it would be to Russia’s benefit to end the war. And he tells himself, possibly not correctly, that he will be doing Moscow a favour by delivering them a deal. So, I do think he thinks that he has leverage, and I think he may even overstate to himself the kind of leverage that he has.
I also wanted to say it gives me no great pleasure as an American, but as a fellow Chatham House Analyst, I agree entirely with what Yu Jie has said about the effects of the trade war. So, as a Chatham House colleague, I think her analysis is spot on. I will say, though, that this question of does China “fill the gap”? The problem is where the US withdraws, both security-wise and economic-wise. It doesn’t leave a gap of a perfect shape that Beijing can just plug, even if Beijing wanted to, which as you heard, Beijing doesn’t want to. So, we’ve, basically, drawn a bucket of water out of a tub and then, the question is, what gets dumped in instead? But it isn’t – you know, we’ve now changed the system by withdrawing from it in the way that we did.
Dr Andrew Payne
Okay, a couple more questions. Gosh, the gentleman over there has been waiting a long time, so we’ll go there and the lady next to him, as well, please.
Member
Thank you. I’m old enough to remember the invasion of Czechoslovakia as a result of which, in 1968, I came to this country. There are some similarities in what’s going on at the moment, but what I remember at that time is that Soviet Union was economically very weak and advantage was taken of that in a very skilful way by the US, Britain and others. I mean, aren’t the Politicians missing a point? And I would like to hear some more analysis on that. You know, we talk about the direction in which things are going and maybe inevitably, but there are other things that I think could be done because Russia is similarly extremely weak, and was. Why isn’t the world doing something about that?
Dr Andrew Payne
So, what’s the specific question there?
Member
Well, more analysis, I think a little bit sharing view of the Journalist lady, more analysis of what could be done.
Dr Andrew Payne
Okay, fine. Thank you.
Member
Yeah, because…
Dr Andrew Payne
And…
Member
…the economic point is very powerful.
Dr Andrew Payne
Okay, and the lady row – one row ahead.
Jade Osamwonyi
Jade Osamwonyi[inaudible – 54:47] from Jones Day. Thank you for the talk. As you’ve noted, the US has been making a lot of accommodations for Russia, but do you feel that there is going to be a breaking point whereby Trump decides this is not viable, he needs to stop with this, kind of, accommodations and with Russia always giving new demands and more requests, as we had previously seen in his last term with North Korea, for instance?
Dr Andrew Payne
And it’s a great question, right, and there is a – there’s a premise behind our discussion today that Trump won’t do a 180. He has spoken from time-to-time, periodically, at his frustration with Putin and so, I think it’s a great question. I also want to bring in a couple of points that were raised online which get us, I think, into that question of other domains, other, kind of, prospects for potential co-operation beyond those we’ve discussed. One of them is from Hugo Blewett-Mundy, who says, “How should Europe respond to potential US-Russia co-operation in the Arctic?”
And the other one is Adrienne DeLeon, who talks about Iran. “How crucial is Iran in the relationship between the US and Russia? Can one influence their relationship with Iran, who continues to threaten US interests in the Middle East?” And maybe I will just add to that and pick up on a theme that Heather mentioned, non-proliferation, right? This is an area of traditional co-operation between the US and Russia. We do have talks happening this weekend in Oman and I wonder, you know, is there actually possible co-operation on those kinds of issues?
Heather, do you want to kick us off on any of those questions?
Heather Hurlburt
Sure, and I’ll start with – I’ll say one thing that actually tries to address both of the questions that came from the room. And I simply think we currently have, in the United States, an administration and a way of thinking about the world that is not particularly interested in taking advantage of Russia’s weakness, or rather, that sees the way of taking advantage of Russia’s weakness to be to partner with it, get closer to it, make deals with it. So, I think – you know, I don’t have a lot of analysis to offer of how the US can exploit Russia’s weakness, because I simply don’t think that’s what my government is interested in doing. Again, my personal views quite aside. So, I would make that as a first observation
And then I think I would just also add, and this may be a little bit at odds with what I’ve just said, I’m mildly sceptical that you’re going to see large-scale co-operation between US and Russia in the Arctic any time soon. I think there are obvious reasons. I mean, it would be great to have scientific co-operation, frankly. It would be great to have something that looked like arms control or confidence building measures, as the ice melts and we have much more navigation issues. But, you know, the interesting thing is under the, kind of, realist spheres of influence model that Trump and his team are bringing, the Arctic is one of very few areas where the US and Russian spheres of influence actually collide. And, you know, this is where you see Putin’s enthusiasm for Trump’s ambitions toward Greenland is a little less ardent than his enthusiasm towards Trump’s other ambitions.
So, I’m not holding – I mean, one could always be proven wrong, and maybe that’s how he’ll get his Nobel Peace Prize, but I’m a little bit of a sceptic about Arctic co-operation.
Dr Andrew Payne
Okay. I’m going to take two final questions and then, invite my panellists to answer whichever of those they like and any final closing comments, so two more questions. Yes, gentleman at the front, any others? Back row.
Sevak Juss
[Pause] Hi, Sevak Juss, student at King’s College London and Chatham House member. Obviously, we’ve spoken a lot about Europe as a whole, but the UK in particular, obviously, no longer a member of the EU, which can prevent some obstacles, but at the end of the day, we still have a responsibility to protect Eastern Europe and Ukraine from Russian aggression. And obviously, Keir Starmer has, throughout all of this, attempted to, effectively you could say, maybe keep the peace with – by, sort of, trying to appeal to Trump, whilst also appealing to Ukraine and Eastern European leaders. But at the end of the day, what do you see as the UK’s role in – amidst all of this and how do you think we can achieve that?
Dr Andrew Payne
Okay, and very, very quickly, if we can, at the back.
Robert Willis
Yeah, I’d like to come back to where we started with the first question. My name is Robert Willis. I work for the NHS. The Russian view has not been put forward at a Russia-US rapprochement meeting. We hear that President Zelenskyy’s immensely popular at home, however, he has suspended the democratic process. When are we going to hear that that is not the case anymore?
Dr Andrew Payne
Okay, great. In reverse order, Yu Jie, I’m going to begin with you, 30 seconds please, any closing thoughts?
Dr Yu Jie
30 seconds on UK. I think UK will do – will have loads to do, because essentially, by getting involved in Ukraine and that is actually inviting themselves back to the European security architecture, which it won’t be able to do that under the Brexit referendum. So, that’s my 30 cents.
Dr Andrew Payne
Perfect. Orysia.
Dr Yu Jie
Yeah.
Orysia Lutsevych OBE
I’ll be very brief. I am convinced that Russian view can be presented by non-Russians. There’s an expert – global expert community that studies Russia very carefully for decades, reads Russian press, reads Russian communications and understands the nature of current regime. And if you understand the nature of current regime, this is where everything flows. I think we are in a pre-war situation, to be honest, in Europe, where Russia clearly communicates its aggressive intention vis-à-vis the rest of Europe and whatever Trump’s ambition is, we should not be misled by what is at stake for the continent.
And that is why, with the regards to the question of analysis and what could be or should be done, I think everything must stem from that. That Russian’s fundamental intention did not change vis-à-vis Europe. That we are in a more dangerous world, where American, European, transatlantic alliance is adrift. We may be able to salvage parts of it, but not all of it. We need to spend more on defence. We need to inform our population about, you know, civilian security, human security, how to prepare. And I think one way we have to understand that we have the economic power and resources to defend ourselves, and part of Russia’s goal is actually reflective control, where we will take actions against our own national interests, and they will do everything to split the unity of the union and to subjugate Ukraine. And this is something we should not allow, because we do know, way back, that only with Ukraine, Russia can project power of Europe. And this is not what you want, because if Ukraine is subjugated, Putin will militarise Ukrainians and they will be fighting in Poland.
Heather Hurlburt
A very short last comment from me, which is that as I observe Russian press and Russian debates, it is very interesting to note that while Russian well-placed observers and Analysts and people close to the government are delighted with what they see coming out of Washington, they’re also a bit bewildered by it and don’t quite know how to incorporate it into their own strategic planning. So, like, what that says to me is that in some ways, the – we’re still fundamentally mismatched, even between the efforts of the Trump administration and how Moscow sees its own goals. And with that, since I seem to have lost my light, I’ll perhaps stop.
Dr Andrew Payne
Okay. Yeah, I mean, they are at risk at turning the lights off here, ‘cause we’re two and a half minutes over, as well. So, I think with that, let’s bring this to a close, but please join me in a round of applause to thank our speakers for their excellent insights today.
