Since returning to the White House, Donald Trump has made a point of rupturing many of the foreign policy positions of his predecessor. The belief that China is the major threat to American economic and national security interests is a rare point of continuity.
Efforts to contain Beijing economically and thwart its possible invasion of Taiwan have been a common concern for both the Biden and Trump administrations. A central pillar of this strategy is a longstanding assumption that India will play an essential role. In the past few years, as the United States’ relationship with Beijing has deteriorated, the perception that India could act as a bulwark against China has taken root in Washington.
A joint statement issued by the US and India when Prime Minister Narendra Modi visited the White House in February noted that their partnership is ‘central to a free, open, peaceful and prosperous Indo-Pacific region’. Fostering this partnership remains a priority for the Trump administration. It is also true that on certain positions, Modi has become more open to cooperating with US-led initiatives. For instance, border clashes with China in 2020 reinvigorated India’s engagement with the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, a grouping of Asia’s four major maritime democracies – Australia, India, Japan and the US.
Modi and Trump also appear to get along, a personal affinity that is underpinned by a common taste for economic nationalism and the belief that radical Islam is an existential threat to society. Yet significant factors make India a less reliable partner for Washington and other western capitals than is often recognized – notably New Delhi’s commitment to strategic autonomy in foreign policy, its economic reliance on Chinese supply chains and the two countries’ overlapping worldviews. Such an insight is important because the dynamic between India and China is already a defining relationship of the 21st century. Misunderstanding it comes at a cost for the US and its interests across the region.
Strategic autonomy
Central to this challenge is India’s determination to decide its own foreign policy. This stems from its position of non-alignment during the Cold War, and its resistance to any formal alliances that would entangle it in superpower rivalries. Since the end of the Cold War, non-alignment has become ‘multi-alignment’ with all major poles of influence in the international system, including Russia, Iran and China. This, in turn, limits co-operation between India and the West in sensitive areas such as intelligence sharing and technology transfers.
Today, the Modi government is reluctant to be part of any initiative that resembles a US-dominated military alliance, and has rejected the idea that it must align with either an American or Chinese-led geopolitical axis. ‘India is entitled to have its own side,’ said foreign minister S Jaishankar in 2022, emphasizing its own status as the world’s most populous country and fourth – and soon to be third – largest economy.
At the same time, New Delhi is wary about the US playing too large a role in South Asia, and intervening in matters it considers internal. During the recent escalation of hostilities between India and Pakistan in April for example, Modi was at pains to play down Washington’s mediation offer, citing Kashmir as a bilateral dispute.
Economic dependence on China
On the economic front too, Washington increasingly expects that India could challenge Beijing’s primacy and help diversify global supply chains. The world’s dependence on Chinese suppliers was laid bare during the Covid-19 pandemic, when manufacturing in Chinese cities ground to a halt. Since then, the US has increasingly tried to relocate production of key supplies to ‘like-minded countries’. India’s credentials as the world’s largest democracy, coupled with its large IT-educated workforce and strong digital ecosystem, have made it a preferred partner.
In April, Apple announced that it is shifting production of its US-market iPhones from China to India. The comparatively low tariff the Trump administration has levied on India has raised some expectations of a US trade diversion in New Delhi’s favour. Reports suggest an interim trade deal may be agreed this month.
But for all the signs of closer ties between Washington and New Delhi, India remains heavily reliant on China, its leading trade partner. The imbalance in this relationship is stark: India provides only a 3 per cent share of global manufacturing production, compared with China’s 30 per cent. This has meant that across key sectors including solar power and pharmaceuticals, India requires raw materials and components from China. In the near term, as Modi pursues his ambition to turn India into global manufacturing powerhouse, it’s likely that the Indian economy will become more, rather than less reliant on Chinese supply chains.
This dependence has broader strategic implications, and may have contributed to the recent de-escalation of border tensions between Beijing and New Delhi, which included the resumption of patrols and grazing rights in contested areas along the border. China’s leverage over core areas of India’s economy may force New Delhi’s hand in some cases, including its decision to align with Washington during periods of Sino-US hostility. This could cast doubt over what, if any, role India would play in a potential US–China conflict over Taiwan.
Shared world views
Ideologically, China and India converge in important ways often overlooked by the West. While both countries challenge each other’s bid to lead the global order, they largely agree on the need to reform that order. Crucially, they support a more equitable distribution of power in a multi-polar international system. ‘For all their issues with each other’, says Jaishankar, ‘ India or China have at the back of their mind a feeling that they are also contesting an established western order.’
Although India says it supports principles of state sovereignty, international law and an open international economy, it also seeks to scale back emphasis in areas such as human rights, liberalism and interventionism – much like China. India’s voting patterns at the UN for example, indicate a much closer alignment with China than the US.
On a practical level, both countries also participate and hold common stakes in initiatives such as the BRICS – the grouping of 10 emerging markets – and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, which seek to challenge western-led institutions.
Underpinning it all is China and India’s shared self-perception as ‘civilization states’. In the extreme, this may fuel a belief that their special status exempts Beijing and New Delhi from certain global norms and rules. While China has come under greater scrutiny from the international community for such behaviour – particularly its militarization of islands in the South China Sea, for example – India has shown a similar tendency on occasion, including allegations of Indian complicity in assassination plots in the US and Canada.
Recognizing the nuances
But it would be a mistake to see China and India through the same prism or ignore the opportunities that their differences present. For now, India’s worldview is non-western, rather than explicitly anti-western, a stance that is not being promoted in collaboration with Beijing. The sight of Chinese-made fighter jets, missiles and anti-aircraft systems being employed by Pakistan in its recent conflict with India in Kashmir is a visible reminder that the two countries aren’t always on the same side.
