Despite clear authoritarianism, for many years Belarus maintained an image of a united, homogeneous country – territorially, ethnically, religiously, and economically. Unlike many of its neighbours such as Russia and Ukraine, it kept economic stratification to a minimum and – unlike other Eastern Partnership countries – Belarus suffered no territorial dispute.
But the political crisis unfolding since 2020 has begun to split Belarusians more fundamentally, revealing a societal rift which is deeper than simply between supporters and detractors of the country’s president Aliaksandr Lukashenka. The demarcation line polarizing Belarusian society concerns its people’s core values.
The division is uneven because new sociological research on Belarusian society conducted by the Chatham House Belarus Initiative shows those who support Lukashenka make up only one-quarter of the population, while the rest is evenly divided between supporters of the protest movement and more passive ‘observers’.
When asked why they believe opposition leader Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya received considerably more or less than 50 per cent of the vote in the 2020 election, both those who see themselves as her supporters and detractors responded that they were sure they represent the majority view in the country.
Disinformation grows as dialogue reduces
Both groups cannot be right, and they are becoming less likely to encounter each other in public dialogue to resolve the issue. Shock events such as that of 28 September when an IT manager supporting the protests and a KGB officer were both killed in a shoot-out make any kind of reconciliation increasingly difficult.
Because of the use of violent and repressive measures resulting in hundreds of political prisoners and tens of thousands temporarily detained, political opposition groups in Belarusian society are becoming increasingly antagonistic. And as various groups are managing to foster an intra-group solidarity, they are also cementing a social divide as Belarusians begin to live in increasingly different worlds from each other.
This difference is strongly evidenced by the survey data highlighting the wide range of information sources used by Belarusians society, not only differing hugely but also rarely overlapping. Whereas supporters of the protest movement tend to consume independent – and often in exile – Belarusian or international media, Lukashenka proponents often rely on Belarusian and Russian state media.
And although representatives of both these ‘echo chambers’ are convinced an absolute majority of the country’s residents share their political position, the survey shows this belief is erroneous for those who are pro-regime, or exaggerated for those who are pro-protests.
Institutions are also failing to play a unifying role in Belarusian society, with the survey showing none are trusted by a majority of Belarusians any longer. Even structures which have traditionally enjoyed a high level of legitimacy such as the Orthodox Church or the military are now trusted by only one-third of the population.
Facts often matter less and less as a society begins to polarize. For example, Lukashenka’s supporters deny many accusations of flagrant torture against protesters and, even when they do admit such crimes took place, they are justified as being necessary. To encourage this line of reasoning, Lukashenka’s base is being fed propaganda which depicts advocates of change as being ‘fascists’ or ‘Judases’ who deserve severe punishment – one propagandist even regularly appears on air with a noose.
Russia and longer-term problems
If the growing rift is not healed, it will have a long-term impact on the future of Belarus. Even in a post-Lukashenka government, Belarus will need to innovate a model of social reconciliation and transitional justice. This will not be easy as, although Lukashenka supporters constitute a minority and are less socially and economically active than the protests supporters, they remain significant element in society which cannot be ignored.
Another threat from the current polarization is more supporters of Lukashenka are turning towards Russia. Before the 2020 elections, many perceived their eastern neighbour as Belarus’s primary ally but now the survey data shows there is growing support for further integration – possibly even incorporation – with Russia. The survey shows around one-tenth of Belarusian urban citizens currently support this approach. probably thinking it will bring Belarus the supposed stability of Russia’s political system.
It also seems many employees of security agencies understand that, if Lukashenka loses power, ‘the Russia option’ is probably their best chance of avoiding court sentences and prison. In contrast, supporters of the protest movement are increasingly warming to the West, as they see this as the most effective support in terms of solidarity and resources.
No matter how unified Belarus once appeared, it is now becoming a country with deep-rooted societal problems which extend beyond the supposed simple matter of removing its dictator.