An illusion of mercy: Decoding Russia's prisoner swap strategy

The prisoner exchange is a victory for diplomacy, but we should not assume that justice has prevailed.

Expert comment Published 6 August 2024 3 minute READ

On 1 August, Western countries and Russia conducted the largest prisoner swap since the Cold War. Through unprecedented international cooperation involving Germany, the US, Norway, Slovenia, Poland, and Turkey, it was possible to extract four Americans, five Germans, and seven Russians from Russian prisons, who were convicted on trumped-up charges in Russia and Belarus.

These were not only difficult negotiations but also a tough moral and ethical choice, which Russia deliberately imposed on the West. Although the prisoner exchange can rightly be considered a victory for diplomacy, we should not hastily declare that justice has prevailed. The Russian side held hostages to free their hitmen, spies, and hackers, while the West made a tough decision in favour of the freedom and lives of innocent people, not only their citizens but Russian nationals as well.

Why the exchange became possible

Negotiations  for the deal had been ongoing since the end of 2022. The Russian opposition rightly calls it ‘The Navalny Exchange’, as the Russian opposition leader was initially one of the key bargaining chips along with journalist Evan Gershkovich and marine Paul Whelan.

The negotiations proved the existence of some substantial diplomatic channels between Russia and the West, but not that Russia could be a trusted partner for future negotiations.

However, after Navalny’s sudden death in a Russian prison in February 2024, the negotiations slowed down. Germany found it difficult to decide on the exchange of Vadim Krasikov, an FSB officer and reportedly an acquaintance of Putin who killed a Chechen field commander in central Berlin. As far as we know, Krasikov was the most desirable bargaining chip for Russia. The final agreement among the Western countries was only reached in July, thanks in part to Turkey’s mediation and the Biden administration’s ability to persuade Slovenia and Norway to participate in the swap.

The negotiations proved the existence of some substantial diplomatic channels between Russia and the West, but not that Russia could be a trusted partner for future negotiations. While Russia may be interested in using such contacts to discuss the easing of sanctions or concessions on the Ukrainian issue, we do not know whether the Ukrainian agenda was included in the discussion of the current exchange.

It is more likely that the Kremlin considers it necessary to conduct serious negotiations only with the future boss of the White House, and is unlikely to be inclined towards real rapprochement before the American elections.

Freedom at a cost

The biggest misconception would be to think that the exchange happened because Moscow has become more merciful to Russian political prisoners. The Kremlin sends a completely different message inside Russia  – namely that Putin has returned true patriots who worked for the good of the Motherland, while simultaneously getting rid of undesirable elements, and expelling ‘Western agents’ from the country.

While in reality, the Kremlin might not explicitly care about specific individuals, it uses exchanged spies to amplify the popular propaganda slogan ‘svoikh ne brosayem’ (no man left behind) to encourage other Russian agents to continue sabotage attacks in Western countries. After being welcomed back to Moscow with a military orchestra and a red carpet stretched over the tarmac, Russian agents can rest assured that back home they will be decorated, climb up the career ladder, and might even receive positions in parliament.

The biggest misconception would be to think that the exchange happened because Moscow has become more merciful to Russian political prisoners.

While exchanged Russian political prisoners might have been given a bigger opportunity – the freedom to fight the regime from exile and make an impact by advocating for fellow Russians – it also comes with a threat from back home. The deputy chairman of the Security Council of Russia and former president Dmitry Medvedev has already stated that ‘traitors’ should start coming up with new names and disguising themselves under witness protection programmes, hinting that the Kremlin has all the resources to eliminate its opponents abroad.

Bittersweet moment

The release of political prisoners was undoubtedly a joyous moment for anti-war Russians, who had not received ‘good news’ from Russia for a long time. However, few of them consider the exchange a complete and unconditional victory. There are still about 1,200 political prisoners in Russian prisons – equally brave and honest people convicted for their views but with slightly less media support.

Some of the exchanged Russian political prisoners caused additional controversy in the West having stated that although they appreciate their freedom, they did not want to be released if it meant going into exile. While their return to Russia would close the door for any swaps of Russian political prisoners in the future, their commitment to remain in the country did not surprise their compatriots. Such a stance ensures that in the future no one can accuse non-systemic opposition politicians of fleeing like ‘rats from a sinking ship’ or ‘being puppets of the West’.

Russian ambassador cont.

The Russian ambassador to the US Anatoly Antonov has already stated that Moscow will continue to work on the release of compatriots from American prisons. However, besides the reasonable hopes of anti-war Russians for the exchange of more Russian political prisoners, such opportunity also gives the Kremlin further confirmation that taking foreign citizens hostage is a successful element of its broader geopolitical game.

Unlike other countries, the question of whether the damage to diplomatic relations, global standing, or tourist revenue exceeds the value of a narrow concession gained is no longer of importance for Russia. Hostage-taking tactics work for Russia as it now has little to lose.