With the second presidency of Donald Trump, European governments have been forced to urgently rethink their security and defence policies.
Seismic shifts are underway, with long-held beliefs about debt brakes and fiscal rules being questioned: The German Bundestag approved a previously unimaginable reform of the country’s debt-brake to enable more spending on defence on 18 March.
A shift towards a ‘Europe-alone’ perspective is taking place, from both EU and non-EU European countries, with steps being taken to recalibrate Europe to become a global power that can defend itself without US support.
The European Commission published a white paper on European defence on 19 March to help address the many challenges involved – the next step in the ReArm Europe Plan announced by European Commission President von der Leyen, in which she enabled the mobilization of €800 billion for European defence.
The problems involved in EU defence cooperation are not new. Indeed, the European Commission and experts alike have been trying to improve defence cooperation for several decades with little success. But the context has now drastically changed, opening up new avenues for potential solutions.
Strengthen a European NATO
The White Paper stresses that NATO should remain the organization that ensures the collective defence of Europe. That means EU efforts should be directed towards sustaining NATO and the individual member states’ capability requirements.
It is clear the Trump administration wants to shift the burden within NATO away from the US toward European countries – but this must be done in a coordinated way.
Rather than wait for The Hague Summit in June, military planning for an increase of European troops and capabilities can already begin. So too can large scale investments in the critical enablers like transport aircraft and ISTAR capabilities needed for a transition to European responsibility. With crisis scenarios worryingly realistic – including a bad ending to the Russian war in Ukraine – all this needs to be fast forwarded.
Equally pressing is the need to establish information sharing between NATO and the EU – which is currently not possible, hindering cooperation. A more in-depth assessment on how to enhance EU and NATO collaboration should be a priority, including regular meetings on all levels and intensified cooperation on joint procurement, strategic enablers and intel-sharing.
Assess dependencies on US defence software and capabilities
Various European defence ministries are already reassessing their dependencies on the US. A known issue is that key data points from American weapon systems are automatically sent to the US, crucial software updates depend on US manufacturers, and many weapons systems are sourced from the US. These are problematic dependencies at a time when Europe is considering going it alone.
Europe also relies on the US for use of their capabilities. This has been oversimplified in the media, to discussions about the US being able to flick a ‘kill switch’ and disable American-made systems – but it raises important questions.
The F-35 5th generation fighter jet is a good example. More European countries have purchased the aircraft since the large-scale invasion of Ukraine began. All rely heavily on the US government and US defence company Lockheed Martin for software updates.
The F-35 is designed to use US-made weapons. Changing that would require US approval. Adapting the aircraft to rely on European software and weapons is not realistic in the short-term, leading to serious questions about these massive procurement commitments.
In the military intelligence sphere, databases for targeting and threat detection are usually US controlled, although some countries are creating their own. Depending on the currency of the data systems used, in some cases data is still sent automatically to the US, raising sovereignty concerns.
Across all these areas, defence ministries need to carefully evaluate the implications of these dependencies at a time when an unpredictable presidency is overturning some fundamental assumptions about the nature of US alliances.
Closing defence capability gaps
The White Paper names the seven areas in which European defence capabilities gaps need closing. These areas are very broad – ‘air and missile defence’ or ‘ AI, quantum, Cyber and electronic warfare’ – and need to be translated to more specific (but aggregated) demand that can be turned to development and procurement.
For example, when talking about ‘air and missile defence’, this means combining and integrating different capabilities from close range drone detection to radars, ground-to-air missile systems and air born surveillance. Fine tuning this is crucial.
Part of the problem that leads to gaps seems to be limited understanding by the European Commission of end-users, namely European armed forces. Rather than defence industry figures, it should be European defence chiefs who are asked to define the enabling capabilities they prioritize when assessing gaps.
Equally, industries should come up with the best technical, collaborative proposals to meet those needs. The iterative approach taken in the White Paper is better than a highly centralized five-year plan.