Trump’s 100 days have been like no other

But the scale and shock of the president’s policymaking threatens to undermine his primary foreign policy objective: maintaining an advantage over China.

Expert comment Published 29 April 2025 4 minute READ

It has become routine to pronounce Donald Trump one of the ‘most consequential’ US presidents. But that understates his impact: no president has conducted a first 100 days in office like this.

At home, he has defied constitutional limits on executive power, using executive orders not legislation to enact policy (seeking to end birthright citizenship in one). Trump has also mounted an assault on institutions of ‘elite’ culture, education and science while cultivating fear among those who oppose him.

In foreign policy, he has ripped up global trade arrangements, taken the US out of climate accords, and cast doubt on Washington’s commitment to NATO. Indeed, he has threatened to take over allies by force, whether by making Canada the 51st state or by seizing Greenland. With such actions he has withdrawn the US from much of its accustomed role in the world – and may well have surrendered his country’s prime advantages to China.

He has been able to do all this because of an emphatic election victory and widespread support for his main campaign promises. Any judgement on his first 100 days has to acknowledge the popularity of some of what he is doing – whether seeking to reduce illegal migration, tackle China’s role in world trade, insist that Europe pay for its own defence, or slim down the federal government.

Yet there is a growing question about how much of the president’s actions will stick, given the chaos caused by his rapid decisions and forced U-turns. It may be no consolation to those grappling with the sharp end of his policies – in Lesotho, Kyiv, Gaza or Harvard – but he is running into constraints on what he can do.

Abroad, shock at the intensity of activity has turned to incredulity, even contempt.

Reactions by the bond markets have forced abrupt reversals on some tariffs, and on his threat to sack the head of the Federal Reserve for not lowering interest rates. US courts are beginning to contest his policy on deportation. And abroad, shock at the intensity of activity has turned to incredulity, even contempt. It is increasingly hard for other countries to see a ‘grand plan’ at work. Some ask whether we have seen ‘peak Trump’.

The answer will depend on those who elected him: will they register their disapproval in midterm elections, frustrated by a rising cost of living? Or does Trump represent something historic – a wave of change in the American political psyche? Could the past 100 days, in fact, prove to be the authentic flavour of years to come?

Ripping up alliances – and principles

European allies may not have enjoyed the language that Trump and Vice-President JD Vance have used about them. But the point the new administration makes is an old one: the US is fed up with carrying the burden of Europe’s defence.

European countries are now scrambling to boost their security budgets, even if it will take many years to make good the US contribution, where that is possible. That sense of ‘Europe alone’ will endure beyond Trump. He has shattered the assumptions underpinning the post-war alliance and convinced Europe it can no longer count on the US as an ally.

It is his declared interest in taking over Canada and Greenland that has proved more shocking. The president’s statements display no interest whatsoever in a near-universal principle of global governance: that taking over territory by force is wrong and the aggressor should expect retribution.

The one-sided deal Trump is trying to impose on Ukraine, blaming it for starting the conflict by provoking Russia, offends the same principle. Even when Trump leaves office, the spectacle of a US president shrugging off these norms as an irritation will have reduced Washington’s ability to lead in the way it has for the last 80 years.

The defining contribution of Trump’s first 100 days has been the injection of uncertainty.

Given this upheaval, it is surprising that the Trump team are apparently making progress on one objective: pressuring Iran to restrain its nuclear programme. That success, however, may well stem more from regional events than US skill in ‘dealmaking’. The fall of Syria’s Assad regime and the colossal damage inflicted on Hezbollah and Hamas by Israel have been severe setbacks for Tehran’s policy.

Signs of pushback?

The defining contribution of Trump’s first 100 days has been the injection of uncertainty: into international relations, into trade – and at home, into whether the famed checks and balances of the US constitution can constrain a president. Much of what he does fulfils campaign pledges. Yet it is impossible to know what he will do next, as the improvised tariffs have shown.

But the markets have served as a real constraint on Trump, most directly by threatening to push up interest rates or the cost of government borrowing, forcing the president to back down.

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As a result of climbdowns on tariffs and the independence of the Federal Reserve, the annual spring meetings of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) last week were less downbeat than they might have been, despite sharp downgrades to world growth projections from the Fund.

US Courts have also begun to challenge some of Trump’s executive orders and deportations. A federal judge this month ordered a hearing into the case of a deported two-year-old US citizen, warning she may have been denied due process; while the Supreme Court released a speedy ruling ordering a temporary halt on the deportation of two Venezuelan men. Meanwhile, Harvard university is suing the federal government for using the threat of withholding funds to exert influence over student admissions and faculty appointments.

The next 100 days – and beyond

Congress is the most important test of whether constraints on the president’s powers will hold. But sustained opposition is yet to emerge. Democrats still lack a coherent voice. Republicans, though divided on some issues, are bound by loyalty.

Republicans have a tiny majority in the House of Representatives – the narrowest for almost a century. Without a majority, the president will not get budget bills through. This has led to speculation that Trump may be a ‘half-term president’ – effective only for the first two years.

The midterms will be the test of whether conventional economic concerns win votes or whether Trump’s radicalism prevails.

This is a real vulnerability, particularly as the cost of living remains a top concern for voters. But it is also clear that some of Trump’s policies enjoy widespread support. Top is the near closing of the southern border to immigrants. Elon Musk’s attack on the size of the federal government also has an obvious constituency. Both policies have been followed by a similar toughening on these issues in the UK and Europe. That suggests that Trump’s actions provide cover for controversial policies where other leaders discern more than a kernel of truth.

The midterms will be the test of whether conventional economic concerns win votes or whether Trump’s radicalism prevails. It would be surprising if voters chose to be poorer, but the test of Trump’s revolution is whether their approval for his radicalism outstrips the price of eggs.

Beyond the president’s domestic position, the danger is that his policies – above all, a trade war with China – make the US significantly weaker in the long term. 

Trump believes his actions will consolidate US power and put an end to America being ‘ripped off’ by an outdated international system. 

The danger is that by unpicking the alliances and institutions that have underpinned US power at such breakneck speed, Trump ends up handing the US’s many advantages – in innovation, commercial strength and global influence – to Beijing.