On 17 November, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and French President Emmanuel Macron signed a letter of intent (not a binding contract) outlining Ukraine’s potential acquisition of French defence equipment over the next decade.
The headline-grabbing part of the deal is Ukraine’s purchase of up to 100 Rafale F4 multirole fighter jets. This is the biggest order ever for the French high-tech fighter plane, a major (and cheaper) competitor of the US F35 fighter jet.
The deal also includes eight next-generation Franco-Italian SAMP/T (Mamba) air defence systems, advanced air-to-air missiles, AASM Hammer glided bombs and 55 new electric locomotives. There are also potential co-production agreements, including joint production of interceptor drones (with critical components integrable into Ukrainian systems, starting as early as late 2025) and future assembly of Rafales in Ukraine.
Speaking at the signing, at Villacoublay airbase near Paris, President Zelenskyy hailed it as a truly historic agreement that would seriously enhance Ukraine’s air defence capabilities. President Macron, meanwhile, emphasized France’s long-term commitment to Ukraine’s sovereignty and European strategic autonomy.
The deal sends a clear political message: France expects Ukraine to be free and sovereign to take delivery of these weapons when they are ready, which could take up to a decade in some cases.
Very few immediate changes on the ground
Unfortunately, behind the grand political gesture, the deal changes nothing on the ground for Ukraine in the short term.
Although the promise of Rafale jets have dominated coverage of the deal, they take four to six years to produce. Their manufacturer, Dassault, is already behind on deliveries promised to India and Indonesia. No jets will come from existing French Air Force stocks.
The Mamba SAMP/T air defence systems are exactly what Ukraine needs right now to defend its skies, energy infrastructure and civilians against the almost daily pounding by Russian missiles and drones. France has already transferred one battery to Ukraine but with a national stock of between seven and eight it cannot send more without risking domestic and NATO coverage. Ukraine could receive further units from late 2026 to early 2027 onwards, but production will take 24-36 months to ramp up for additional deliveries.
The quickest – and arguably only – tangible and immediate boost to Ukraine could come from the joint production of drones and anti-drone systems, which could start by the end of the year.
But the deal will not provide the critical air defence that Ukraine desperately needs to protect its power systems and cities. Patriot missile stocks have dwindled in both Europe and the US, with many European allies citing their own air defence needs.
This begs the question: what kind of Ukraine will be left standing when these new weapons are ready?
Who will foot the bill?
There is also the question of who will pay. The deal’s total bill comes to roughly €25–35 billion over ten years. Ukraine has no budget for this.
France could potentially offer to pay via export credits or loans. However, with a budget deficit of 6 per cent, a parliament unable to agree on a new budget, and the looming 2027 presidential election that could usher in a less Ukraine-friendly government, French financing of the deal is unlikely.
The European Union could step in, either by using the European Peace Facility (EPF) or through new joint borrowing. This would provide a tremendous boost to the concept of European strategic autonomy. But Germany and other EU/NATO allies may be reluctant to finance French industry, particularly as they have their own competing weapons systems.
The Rafale’s main European competitors are the Typhoon Eurofighter (UK Germany, Italy and Spain) and the Swedish Gripen (which Ukraine has also signed a letter of intent to purchase). Competing national defence industries and differing national preferences continue to plague initiatives to build a united European defence industrial base – and will likely scupper EU funding of this deal.
Another source of finance could come from frozen Russian assets. An EU decision on using the principal or the profits of these assets to help Ukraine could come as early as mid-December. But this would also be contingent on Kyiv being free to use this money as it wants. Belgium (where most of the assets under discussion are held in the Euroclear system) is hoping that the US will join the scheme in a G7 framework, but President Trump could link any asset use to Ukraine buying American weapons.
The lack of visibility on possible financing of the deal highlights the limitations of France’s gesture, although Ukraine and the world are right to welcome the long-term reassurances that this deal represents.
But for there to be a long-term future for Ukraine, it needs weapons today. NATO has set up a Prioritised Ukraine Requirement List (PURL), under which European allies buy the US made weapons that Ukraine needs now. So far it only has $2.8 billion in commitments, leaving a huge gap compared with the $60 billion in aid that the US was providing previously – one that Europe struggles to fill.
France has resisted contributing to PURL arguing that it cannot justify using French taxpayers’ money to buy American weapons while also pushing for European strategic autonomy. This hesitation is understandable, with Washington showing clear signs of disengaging from Europe, and imposing limits on how European countries can use US weapons in Ukraine. Would similar restrictions be put in place should Europeans want to use US weapons to defend their own territory?
