An alternative view of Iran-US relations

Professor Ali Ansari

Thank you and welcome to this – oh, I do apologise, we’ve got a – have we got our music? Sorry.

I might as well unmute myself. Welcome to this panel on Alternative Views of US-Iran Relations with Dr Ray Takeyh from the – a Senior Fellow at the Middle East Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations, who’s just recently published a book on The Last Shah, which we’ll be discussing with our very own Dr Sanam Vakil at Chatham House, and we’re also joined by Dr Julie Norman at – from UCL, my own alma mater, it has to be said, so a very good place, and I’m very pleased she’s here, who’s a Lecturer in Politics and International Relations with interest – a strong interest in the Middle East, of course.

Ray is going to talk for about ten to 15 minutes, followed by responses from Sanam and Julie for about five minutes each after that, and then we’ll open up to questions. For those of you who do have questions, please put your questions in the question and answer section that you can see on the bottom of your screen, and I will then pick and read out, hopefully, those questions for Ray and our discussions to tackle with. Unfortunately, I regret to say that Sanam will have to depart a little bit earlier than planned, because she has another, unfortunately, conflicting engagement she has to run off to, but I’m sure we’ll get a lot of good engaging conversation before she has to depart.

Now, a couple of housekeeping things that I have to remind people of. First of all, just to remind everyone that this is on the record, so please bear that in mind, when you’re making your comments. I also am – have been asked to let you know that you may tweet, because we are very much in the modern age, you may tweet using the #CHEvents, I think I’ve got that right, CHEvents. So, you’re very welcome to do that, and the ‘Chat’ function will be open to share ideas, comments, among the group. But just to remind you again that for questions, please use the ‘Q&A’ section on the bottom of your screen.

So, without further ado – I’m acutely aware, of course, that I haven’t mentioned who I am, but I think you saw that on the front panel, so my name’s Ali Ansari, just in case those of you weren’t aware, but I’m the least important person of this session, so do not worry about me at all. So, without further ado, Ray, I very much enjoyed reading your book, and I’m looking forward to seeing what sort of key themes and highlights you want to flag up for us today, and then I may even use Chairman’s prerogative actually and ask you a question of my own at some stage, but let’s get on with that. Over to you, Ray. Welcome your thoughts.

Dr Ray Takeyh

Thank you. Thank you very much for having me today. One of the benefits of the pandemic age is I can sit here and have a conversation with people in London, so that has to be considered the more optimal aspect of the pandemic.

I’ll be brief, given the – all the people on the panel who have very important things to say and have done very important reviews, written very important things on this issue. What I tried to do in this book and the overarching theme of it is, I have tried to, to the extent that I have succeeded, I made the Iranians the principal drivers of their history. Because I do think, when you look at this period between 1941 and 1980, most of the events that took place in Iran, for good or otherwise, were driven by the Iranian actors themselves. They were largely commissioned in their own history as they have, I would argue, in the post-revolutionary period, [inaudible – 05:23].

And it is a time when the Iranian local class, which does change during this period, undergoes some extraordinary changes, but has extraordinary set of accomplishments. Most people who deal with this timeframe with the Shah’s monarchy tend to focus on 53 and 1979, but if you look at the 1940s, there’s some extraordinary things were happening in Iran in the 1940s. It was a political class; a traditional class of aristocracy ran the gentry who managed to do a number of things. They preserved their country’s territorial sovereignty when it was occupied by the British and the Russians, they negotiated an agreement, whereby the allied forces would lead their territory after termination of the war, they had no obligation to do so. They had just evicted the elder Pahlavi monarch because of his pro-Nazi sentiments. They preserved the Pahlavi dynasty, that was not a given in 1941.

The British were thinking of restoring the [inaudible – 06:40] dynasty, the Soviets wanted a republic, yet coming out of this, the Pahlavi dynasty’s preserves in the agency of the Iranian political class and political leadership itself, not so much the Shah. And in 1946, when the Soviets lingered in Iran longer than they should have in violation of their obligations, it was in co-operation with the United States, the Iranians that negotiated extraction of stone from Iran. As far as I can tell, and others can correct me if I’m wrong, that is the only time that Joseph Stalin, with this forced territory that his military forces occupied. And that came through genius guile of the Iranians, with some support and muscle from the United States.

When we get into the 1950s, the event that stands out, of course, is 1953, and that is a – kind of a bright lit place in our emotional geography. But I don’t want to talk too much about the mechanics of the who, who did what to who? That’s an argument without an end, and for six people that really, really care about that, they will continue to really, really care about it. I am not one of them, although I am often, as I’ve mentioned, conscripted into that conversation.

But I want to talk about the implications of the 1953 coup. True to often, too many people draw a straight line between 53 and 79, as if the intervening quarter of a century didn’t happen, that people didn’t make decisions and choices. If you look at the Iranian political system after 1953, really between 53 and the 1960s, it changes, but the dramatic changes don’t happen until, in my opinion, you get to the 1960s. What I’m trying to suggest is that the hinged years of Iranian politics and transformation of the Pahlavi dynasty from a monarch who shared power with other institutions to an absolutist monarchy, really takes place in the early 60s. And the political system does change, their doors do begin to close, their windows do begin to shut, but for the remainder of 1950s, Iran still has Prime Ministers who are capable of taking an independent initiative, a parliament that is still assertive, and in my opinion, the last consequential Prime Minister of the Pahlavi dynasty, the Pahlavi Irani, was Ali Amini as opposed to Dr Mousavi. So, it’s really in the early 1960s that I think you see the eviction of one political class, with its traditional sensibilities and arrival of a new political class, whose principal currency of exchange was mastery of western paradigms, in various American and British universities.

The Pahlavi dynasty becomes younger. These are men in their late 30s and 40s. It begins to move at speed, and speed often kills the process of modernisation, urbanisation, and dictatorship, that, of course. Now, some of this has to do with the Shah’s peculiar personality. I don’t claim to understand the Shah. I think the best book on his personality was written by the late Marvin Zonis. He was a – to say the least, a person of contradiction and complexity. He believed that only great men and Dictators could do great things, and a memorable phrase of the British legendary [inaudible – 10:29], he was a Dictator who couldn’t dictate, he couldn’t rule Iran, and he wouldn’t let anybody else do it.

And Why did Iran have a revolution? Honestly, I – having looked at this as closely as I can, a revolution is an impossible phenomenon to predict ahead of time. I don’t think you can fully understand it by reading through it. I know, I didn’t, and as I have found out, it is very difficult to retrospectively chronicle. I do think, and others can comment on this, Ali and others, the best work of Iranian – Iran’s Revolution is done by Sociologists, because they, sort of, understand social protest movements. It has, thus far, in my opinion, escaped the Historians’ grasp. It’s certainly escaped mine. And the usual explanations for Iran’s Revolution are disparity in income, loss of confidence of civic institutions, religious revival. That happens in a lot of countries. A loss of confidence in civil institution and economic disparity and economic decline, that’s happening in the United States today, yet it happened in a lot of places in the 1970s.

But Iran was the only one that had not just an Islamist’s Revolution, but a successful one. It didn’t happen in Turkey, it didn’t happen elsewhere. And the only explanation I have is that the Shah had immiserated Iran’s institutions so much that when he needed those institution as a buffer between him and the rest of the populists, he no longer had access to that. He wants to say he was home alone, and the Shah was a lot of things. He was cynical, he was arrogant, but he wasn’t cruel, and, ultimately, I don’t think he was willing to forcefully repress the Revolution.

I argue in the book, and this is a point of agreement for that point of contention for some people, that had the Shah been willing to forcefully repress the Revolution, he didn’t have the army to do it. It is my opinion that the royal military was incapable of discharging social obligations. That’s something that people will argue about. I think that Officer Corp resembled the Shah in his tentativeness. I do think if the Officers had ordered, the conscripts would have discharged their obligations. But that’s something that people will argue about.

Let me touch on a little bit about the role of the United States, because in the United States, a lot of people’s imagination plays an outsized role in this, and in my opinion, it actually does not. Every American President, with the exception of Richard Nixon, advised the Shah to reform his politics and broaden his governing coalition and focus on his economy, some more strenuously than others. Dwight Eisenhower advised the Shah to do that. And at the end of his tenure, there’s a famous – in 1961, there’s a famous note that Eisenhower writes that the Shah is very frustrating to deal with, “God, I wish the Liberals were in power.” The history of US-Iran relations is not without its ironies.

All American Presidents, as I said, with the exception of Richard Nixon, advised the Shah to focus on his domestic discontents. During the Shah’s reckless military Bilbo, which siphoned off so much of the national treasure, every American Secretary of Defense, starting with Bilbo, Robert McNamara, Melvin Laird, James Schlesinger, Don Rumsfield, advised the Shah not to build his military with sophisticated weaponry that his army couldn’t use and his nature didn’t. Reach out to that advice.

Finally, I want to touch on two things because they come up. The Jimmy Carter losing rank. Could Jimmy Carter have [inaudible – 14:39], but every Iranian believes that? And the answer is no. I always say, and I will repeat myself, no American tried harder to thwart the Iranian Revolution than Jimmy Carter. He advised the Shah to use force, which the Shah rejected. He tried to instigate some kind of a military coup in February 1979, which nobody could discharge. And after the Revolution in December 1979, he is issued a Presidential finding, which is an official Presidential order, for what can only be described as a regime change in Iran. He essentially advised the United States Government, the CIA and others, to overthrow the Khomeini regime, and I have that noted in an article that I recently wrote.

As far as I know, he is the only President to formally and officially commit the United States to a policy of regime change in Iran. Formally, that’s what Presidential finding is. When things go wrong in Iran, Americans blame themselves. So, when the Revolution happened, the Republicans blame Carter, Carter blames the intelligence services, and they all united to blame Ambassador Bill Sullivan, and that was a, sort of, a consensus point. And it was none of their faults. Carter could not have prevented it.

Let me talk about the notion of intelligence failure that has gained much currency. The American intelligence services, and that may be true of the British, as well, but certainly the record that I have seen, a rather incomplete one, the American intelligence services got three things right about Iran.

Number one, they chronicled the level of discontent in Iran in the 1970s. That was hard to miss. Number two, they noticed the rise of religion as an ideology of descent. And number three, they eventually arrive at the judgment the Shah was incapable of handling the situation and perhaps they arrive at that judgment late. There’s one thing that they missed, which informs all their other mistakes. They thought no matter what the Shah did, the Iranian military was still restored, and that perception informed your other misperceptions, regarding the longevity of the Pahlavi dynasty. But they all did the best they could, under extraordinary circumstances.

I want to say a little bit about Bill Sullivan, William Sullivan, the Ambassador, who’s been castigated by everybody, unwisely and unnecessarily. Bill Sullivan was a very good Diplomat. In a sense, he had a proper appreciation and a right estimate of those whom he encountered, and he encountered the Shah and his Generals, and he arrived at the judgment that they’re worthless. He did not encounter their exiles in Paris, so he didn’t have a sound view of them, but, you know, I will say he did the best he could, under extraordinary circumstances.

What is the legacy of the revolution briefly for Iran and for the United States? And one says there is none. The Iranian regime today is making a lot of the same mistake that the Pahlavi dynasty did. They sense the urgency of the reform, but they don’t seem to – you can’t go off relaxing your reform agenda. They are engaged in foreign policy activities, whose burdens are more obvious than its advantages, and they face the rest of the population. That doesn’t mean the outcome will be the same.

In case of the United States, the things that people say about the Islamic Republic today almost are exactly what they said about the Shah’s regime in November 1978. It faces a lot of problems; it has faced a lot of problems in the 40 years and has managed to navigate its way through. It has reliable, repressive organs, and will somehow muddle its way through.

Now, both of those perceptions may be correct, but they’re untouched by the experience and lessons of the Revolution. The only lesson of the Revolution I would offer is everybody should always question their assumptions, or at least turn their assumptions into questions. I’m not suggesting that Iran will have another revolution, because they’ve had another one before, and I’m not suggesting that the resemblance between the two dynasties today, the Islamic Republic and Iran and late naysayers are similar, these are two countries, with wholly different contexts.

And for the United States, those who suggest that the Islamic Republic has figured out the key to permanent autocratic rule, I will only state that similar people – a lot of people made a similar judgment with the same measure of smug certainty. So, I will leave that conversation as with science, because in one sense, what is unusual about the Revolution is how little impact it has on how people, both in Iran and the United States, think about Iran today. And I – maybe I have run out of time, but I’ll open it for my colleagues, who have probably a more informed view of this than I do.

Professor Ali Ansari

Not at all. Thank you so much, Ray, and I was going to say, it’s a bold man indeed that comes to the defence of Bill Sullivan, so there is something to discuss. Sanam, over to you.

Dr Sanam Vakil

Thank you, Ali, and above all, thank you, Ray, that was, I think, an amazing overview of your book, which I want to congratulate you on, because it’s a really compelling read. I enjoyed it, read it cover-to-cover, over the past few days, and I think it’s solid, it’s balanced. I think it presents a really clear understanding of events, the role of events, individuals, and institutions, as you, sort of, laid out in your discussion, and I think that oftentimes, as you rightly sa – pointed to, people tend to explain Iranian history through – from 1906 to 1953 to 1979, and we’re lurching for whatever is supposed to come next.

So, I was struck by a few things, and I think you’ve mentioned most of them in your opening remarks, but I think foremost, what I really enjoyed is the issue of agency. You give the Shah agency in this book, very clear agency, and I think that this adds to, sort of, the growing list of books on the Shah that make him the centrepiece of the challenges that unfold from 1941 to 1979. And I think that agency is really important to understand for Americans who continue to struggle with Iran, and the Iran question, the Persia and the Persian question continues to haunt the US, and it will continue, I suspect, for at least another administration.

I think it’s also critically important for Iranians to accept and acknowledge that agency because we all know that it’s much easier to assign blame to an outsider or an external force, rather than to accept that there is internal responsibility here, and I think that’s one of the principal messages. There was agency in 1953, there is agency in the Shah’s actions, I think that’s important, and so I think that’s one of the most important takeaways I think that Iranians need to read, and I’ve given it to many of my family members, who continue to blame Jimmy Carter for losing Iran. And, you know, frankly speaking, I think they were all responsible for losing Iran in some way, collectively and individually.

Secondly, I would also say that I really enjoyed the transition and your focus on the institutions and specific leads, like Ahmad Qavam, who was so instrumental in managing the Azerbaijan crisis, and highlighting other individuals from that early political class that you mentioned in your introductory remarks. And I find it extraordinary that these individuals managed such really difficult circumstances at that time, and I think, you know, there’s much more writing and, sort of, exploration to be done about those individuals. So, I very much enjoyed that.

And then, as you transition to the period of the Shah’s growing assertiveness, I was also very much struck by the Shah’s quashing of institutions and individuals, so that transition was very uniquely apparent, and I think very clear. And you make this remark in your book that I think is important to stress, that the Shah was not an obedient client. And I think that was a really interesting, perfectly written sentence, again, to be processed by the American policy establishment, and again by Iranians. Because here was a leader who was ambitious, who wanted a lot for his country, a lot for himself, you, sort of, laid out Marvin Zonis’ analysis of the Shah, a very leader-centric, ambitious, young monarch at the time, and I think that by stressing that he wasn’t obedient and, you know, this, sort of, reaffirms this point of his agency, and that he’s responsible for, you know, many of the decisions that were made, and he was wasn’t just a yes man, to the United States. And I think that this could also challenge a lot of the individuals who went into the Revolution support – challenging the Shah for being the yes man that Khomeini claimed him to be, for example, so I think that’s also important.

And, finally, I thought your conclusi – concluding chapter was just fantastic. By weaving together – and, I mean, I found it almost heartbreaking, but by weaving together the two dynasties as you’ve, you know, just referred to them, you know, saying that the Islamic Republic has been in power longer today than that of the Shah, and drawing out some of the commonalities, both have had imperial ambitions, the Islamic Republic and the Shah, perhaps expressed in different ways, but that those imperial ambitions, I think, are important to compare. Of course, they’re not similar, they are not exact, but I think those imperial ambitions are important. They both have commonalities in what you say, purging the best and the brightest, so, you know, that, of course, raises questions as to where the Islamic Republic is going, having purged so many of its best and brightest, having such a huge diaspora abroad. So, I felt that was also quite interesting.

And I think, finally, the book leaves you, you know, very – in a very, sort of, solemn place, where – considering the fate and fortune of the Pahlavi monarchy and, of course, the current politics and state of the economy and political life in Iran today, that Iranian people are still struggling over the same issues, and they’re still lacking that again what you call popular emancipation that they were seeking in 1979.

So, taken together, you know, these are my takeaways and my findings. I really, really enjoyed the book, and it’s one that I’m going to ask my students to read, put it on my syllabus for next year, but thanks for doing it, and I look forward to the next one. I have a thousand questions and I’m sorry that I have to leave, and I get to miss also the fun part of the conversation, but I’ll be sure to watch the rest of the recording, so thank you so much, Ray.

Dr Ray Takeyh

Thank you. Thank you.

Professor Ali Ansari

Thank you, Sanam. Sanam, I know you have to disappear. Ray, did you want to make – did you want to have any, sort of, short response to that or shall we move straight onto…?

Dr Ray Takeyh

I will say I agree to everything that was said. I’m doing another book on the Revolution itself. A friend of mine, Kai Bird has a biography of Jimmy Carter coming out, and I think it was Kai that told me, he goes, “If you keep writing about the Revolution, it won’t be the outcome that’s different,” ‘til we show up.

Professor Ali Ansari

Well, I think that’s going to be a very, very interesting book because there’s so much yet to be written actually with – you know, with the sources and the archives that have yet to be released on the Revolution, and it’s going to be fascinating, particularly, as you say, if the – some of the American archives haven’t yet really been opened.

Julie, without further ado, if I can go over to you.

Julie Norman

Great, thank you so much, Ali, and would like to just echo Sanam in giving a very big congratulations to Ray on an excellent book. As someone who works on Middle East politics, US foreign policy, and also social movements, this book was a great fit for all of those three areas, and we’d recommend to students and scholars of all.

Starting with US foreign policy, you know, Ray rightly, I think, mentioned how, when we study the Revolution from a US perspective, there’s this sentiment overstated role of the US, and I think the way you wove that through the whole history, and especially 1953, was just excellent. And so, I feel like the chapter just on 1953 is such a fantastic, historical deep dive for anyone interested in Iran or US foreign policy and the overstated sense that the US has had about that time period, just really, really excellent work there.

And looking more at the social movement perspective, I love this deep dive into Iranian domestic politics that you took, Ray, and when we study social movements, I think typically, people often are thinking mostly about the regime or the state, the protesters or the main population, and maybe at best, civil society. But you really go to that level where, as you pointed out in sociology or social movement theory, is really where we see the crux of whether a social movement or a revolution works or not, and that’s that sub top level of elites and institutions and aristocrats, and that level being the one that can either facilitate a revolution in some ways or at least not quash it.

And so, in social movement there, we often look at this idea of, like, power and consent and what – and parts of those pillars of elites can be seen as vulnerable, if not completely taken away, at least, kind of, chipped away at. And I think you make that point excellent – in an excellent way, in terms of the military, that this was part of – seen as a very impenetrable part of the regime, but one that you, I think, rightly point out was not going to be in a position to completely quash the Revolution. And so, that fact of trying to look at that, kind of that second-tier level of elites and institutions, and where the fracturing, where the weakness is there in the leadup, as well as in the dynamics and the outplaying of a revolution, is just so crucial, and one that is often overlooked.

And I would echo also Sanam in saying, I really like how, even while looking at that level, you also maintained this respect for the agency of citizens and of people, and from – you know, from early on in the 20th Century up through 2009, up through the last several years, and pointing that out, all the way up through the conclusion. And I think that was just a way to, kind of, hold this history, kind of, across these different levels in a really nice way.

I’d be interested – and you, kind of, said how this story has been told with these pinpoints of 1953, 1979, and you just masterfully gave us much more insight into what was happening in-between. I would be curious to know what you see as standing out in the in-between, but between the Revolution and now, that maybe Americans in particular have, kind of, missed some key signs. And I’d also be interested in your sense of how regional actors and regional dynamics have played into the time period you’re writing on, as well as around today.

And it was interwoven in your book, but you really, kind of, end on that note. I think you, kind of, use the term ‘Iran is meddling everywhere in the Middle East’, and you go through some of these different points, and we’ve obviously seen Iran itself change in the way it’s engaged in the region, we’ve seen the region itself change significantly, and we’ve also seen the US footprint change in the region, and it’s still obviously adapting today with this new administration. So, I’m wondering how you see those regional dynamics playing in with the pieces that you focused on.

But an absolutely brilliant work, thank you so much for the book and for your comments today.

Dr Ray Takeyh

Yeah, thank you.

Professor Ali Ansari

Thank you, Julie.

Dr Ray Takeyh

Thank you very much.

Professor Ali Ansari

Ray, before I let you pile in for a minute, I just want to have a quick call out to our audience that if you do have questions, please do get them in now, so I can start to collate and get Ray ready for the next stage, but while those questions come in, Ray, over to you to respond to Julie there.

Dr Ray Takeyh

Well, the inflexion pass between 1980 to today, I would say that there is a level of continuity between the pre- and post-revolutionary period in one sense. There has been, throughout the 20th Century, and well into 21st Century, the desire of the Iranian people for a more representative, accountable government, and that struggle has gone on and has persisted, and it persists today. So that, in a sense, is the continuity aspect of it. And I think the mistake that the Shah made, he thought the transactional bargain with the emerging and enlarging middleclass, economic rewards for the local has to be with work. And even if he was capable of offering economic rewards, I don’t think that population would settle for political passivity. So, I think the compact was unworkable, even if all elements of it succeed.

I would say one of the most important thing that has happened in the post-Revolution of Iran was the emergence of a remarkable reform movement in mid-1990s, that Ali Ansari has written about. It was a great opportunity for Iran to articulate a new type of government that would somehow, and I think it could have succeeded, amalgamate political representation with cultural traditions. Sort of provide a novel form of government, which was anchored on both religious conviction and democratic representation. I think that was possible. I think supreme leader Ali Khamenei’s greatest triumph has been Iran’s latest tragedy. His greatest triumph, I think, was repression of the reform, and that, in some way, has made the regime less reliable as it moves forward. So, I do think that when we look at the history of the Islamic Republic and many do, the rise and current fall of the reform movement has to be taken into consideration.

I would say what we’re missing about the Islamic Republic today, and the Iranian society today, is enormous degree of some activism. I mean, people like Musaffah [inaudible – 35:50], I mean, these people are saying remarkable things, and it – the future of Iran I think belongs still to Iranians inside the country who are suggested, and the conversation about Iran in Tehran is so much more sophisticated than in Washington. In the past couple of years [inaudible – 36:10], they shaft the newspaper, they have had discussions about the viability of the Revolution after 40 years. Is the Islamic Republic a system that still works for us, how do we essentially improve this society and this governing structure? And for mostly Americans, Iran is a country that centrifuges and rich in uranium and 85 million people sort of hanging around. It’s a real country with real institution, with real debates. And I do think those debates matter, and one of the problem has been, even if those individuals are excised from party politic, they still drive the intellectual conversation within Iran, and a civil society discussion, and a change is going to come and for as long – and probably it’s going to come from those people in that country and the impact of the brawl is going to be more limited than we think.

The great powers and the region itself, I would actually say, and maybe others can – Ali and others can comment on this, the Shah’s foreign policy ambitions were more limited than the Islamic Republic. I think he was more focused on the politics of the Gulf. He mucked around in Lebanon a little bit, but the policies of Lebanon are always elusive. Unlike the Islamic Republic, he had forged good relationship with, all the regional stakeholders: Turkey, Israel, Saudi Arabia, not so much Iran. He had a good relationship with both the great power, the United States and the Soviet Union, and the emerging great power of China.

His management of foreign relations was actually quite skilful, and all those skills were absent in his management of internal affairs. The Islamic Republic today finds itself in a different region, in a region where many of the state’s structures have collapsed, so it has allied itself with many non-state actors in the re – in the civil wars and so on. But I think, in both cases, if the Shah was exhumed today and he would be shown Islamic Republic’s foreign policy, in my opinion, he would be both impressed and appalled. He would be impressed at how far the Islamic Republic has implanted its influence in Baghdad and Yemen, in Syria, in Lebanon. And he would be appalled by the costs that it has encountered because of that foreign policy activism.

Honestly, I don’t know what the Iranian regime got out of being so intimately involved in the Syrian Civil War. I don’t know all the money they spent in Lebanon to refashion the politics of Lebanon, how that affects the security and stability of the Iranian nation and the viability of the Islamic Republic. So, the only way I can explain it is, the Shah was a national and his successors are more ideologically pitched.

Finally, and to all those great powers, I think the great – the United States in particular has had an impact on Iranian politics by simply debilitating its economy. Whether that will produce the strategic concerns that they have, it certainly has not been over-staged, that’s indisputable, and I go back to a quote by Robert McIntyre, in a different context, in a very different context, and Vietnam is how much damage do you want to do for a cause that you believe is right? And the balance of power is not obvious.

I will say one thing about the American political establishment, at least around Europe and British as well, we tend to always do economic penalties imposed on a country as a more humane form of actually bombing them, but actually, the costs that are imposed on the population are quite extraordinary. And whether that will, in some way, deform Iranian politics moving forward, I am not sure. I do believe that the embargo imposed on Iran in 1950 to 1963 by Britain, had an extraordinary impact on the politics of Iran at that time, and it, sort of, underlies certain pillars of that regime and doctrine centred regime.

The United States today has a policy that it does. It has supported the region, largely. Whether it will succeed or not, I – is – I’m not certain, but, again, as with the foreign policy of the Islamic Republics, the costs are quite obvious. Whether the benefits will – the core, I think, remains to be seen as a policy that’s moving forward, whose conclusions I have to say are [inaudible – 41:06].

Professor Ali Ansari

Thanks so much, Ray. So, we do have a set of questions coming in now, so I’m going to go through as many as we can get through in the time, as it happens, and, Julie, do feel free obviously to chip in, if you want, on the particular – obviously the American policy ones. So, we do have a question on – someone would like to ask about your appreciation of Stuart Eizenstat’s book on President Carter and his overall analysis of the Iranian Revolution. What’s your assessment, Ray?

Dr Ray Takeyh

Yes, and now that I’m steeped in Carter historiography, there is this emerging Carter revision of school, which, as far as I can say, has four people in it, and Carter’s not one of them. Stu Eizenstat is one. I would say the following thing about Stu, that I know, and I speak with. There has been a lot of criticism of Carter administration, and I think Stu echoes this, is that it was a house divided. You know, the State Department had a certain view, and the White House had a different view.

I would say three things about the divisions within the Carter administration. Number one, all administrations are so divided. The Reagan administration was profoundly divided, I mean, you know, he wouldn’t talk to anybody, Weinberger, Renshaw, I mean, you can go through the divisions within the Reagan administration.

Number two, the Carter administration was dealing with a revolution in Iran. That is a subject that people should disagree on. They should have strong views. If not this, then what? So, they should have been strong, pronounced disagreements and debates.

Number three, did the divisions in the Carter administration commission the outcome in Iran? And the answer, in my opinion, is no. So, in that sense, I would say I remember once talking to David Aaron, who was the Speaker for [inaudible – 43:15] Deputy, and I said, “What was it like to be in the White House at that time? What was the atmospherics like?” He said it was like Groundhog Day. Every day he came with the same set of questions and the same sort of unresolved situation in Iran. And, in my opinion, had the Carter administration not held a single meeting about Iran, the outcome wouldn’t be different. And I will say one more thing, as Stansfield Turner walked in, Director of CIA, walked into Jimmy Carter’s office in January 1977, an hour after inauguration, and told him, “Look, boss, in about a year or so, you’re going to confront a populist revolution in Iran, a monarch who will be unable to deal with it, a military that’s likely to be tampered with. Otherwise, perfect intelligence.” The outcome wouldn’t be different.

It’s like the dinosaur getting hit by a meteor, right? The dinosaur knows the meteor is coming, what’s he going to do about it? And even if the dinosaur knows meteor is coming, the Ice Age is not going to exempt it. So, I do think that, in one way, I – when Stu talks about the divisions within the administration that are – were quite pronounced, but in my opinion, the deliberations in Washington did not affect the outcome in the same way. That’s what I would say.

Professor Ali Ansari

Julie, do you have any thoughts on that?

Julie Norman

I’ll leave that one to Ray, I think.

Professor Ali Ansari

Okay.

Julie Norman

But…

Professor Ali Ansari

Well, I was going to follow on, actually, there’s another question there that actually follows on quite good with what you were saying about the role of the army during the Revolution, actually, and whether you think actually that the – you know, if the political will had been there and the Shah had, you know, given the instructions, whether the army could have basically stopped the Revolution in its tracks, or whether you think actually, the army would have been resistant to such a policy itself. I mean, bearing in mind that there were desertions obviously from the army in the leadup to the Revolution, although I’m not sure how many before the Shah left, I have to say. But, you know, it’s interesting, it’s – you know, what would your – what’s your take and analysis on that?

Dr Ray Takeyh

Well, I would say that Iranian military changes in a number of ways in the late 60s and early 70s. Number one, it becomes less about internal police than about external aggression. The Shah invested enormous amount of money in his Navy and in the air force. Two branches of the army that aren’t going to help me on the streets. I mean, you can’t bring an aircraft carrier in the middle of a street.

Number two, given how suspicious he was of all people incapable of taking initiative and had strong will, he had populated this military with people who couldn’t make decisions. I remember General [inaudible – 46:08] says to General Huyser, who was sent by Carter, to kind of work something out, that, “We don’t have any plans because only the Shah makes plans.” How much of the army was left? I don’t think we know the answer to that. People always say 1,000 defections a day. Maybe that’s from Speaker [inaudible – 46:24] memoires, I have no idea how Speaker [inaudible – 46:26] arrived at that decision. What we do know is in the book that the Islamic Republic published, because the military deliberations, as you know, were recorded. The Supreme Military Council recorded its deliberation, and the Islamic Republic has published those deliberations in a book called Melting White Snow, and in one of soliloquy, the head of the Iranian military, General [inaudible – 46:47] says, you know, there was only 50% of the militaries left, which, out of an army of 500,000, that makes 250,000 people.

It is – so, going back to your question, it is my estimation, and it’s completely conjectural and speculative, that the military would not have been able to discharge that order should it come. Because at some point, the order does come. It comes from Carter. He calls up Robert Huyser and – who was the General sent to Iran in January 1979 to, kind of, get these guys moving, and he – in February 11, he calls Huyser and said, “Can you go back and do a coup?” And Huyser said, “I don’t think it can happen.” And actually, people always misunderstand, one thing that the new documentary evidence is revealing is Bill Sullivan is also contacted by the State Department to see if he can find somebody to execute a coup. And Bill Sullivan does approach people, he disagrees with that instruction, he didn’t think it was workable, and he approached, I think, General [Inaudible – 48:09], which was the wrong person to approach. Says, you know, “Can you guys do something?” and he says, “No, no, we’re too busy trying to lead.” So, the military leadership, in my opinion, was not capable of discharging that order.

The conscripts, that’s a different thing. I do think that – again, it’s conjectural, that if the order had come down, I think the conscript would have discharged their obligations. All the Islamic Republic psychological warfare, which it was quite pronounced, I think may have led to defections and so forth, but I think the military that was ordered, a capable – led by a capable Officer Corp would have discharged this obligation.

Now whether that would have succeeded or not, and I will say one more thing about this. We talk about the collapse of the military. Between February 9th, 10th, 11th, there was a lot of fighting in Iran, and the battle of Tehran was actually lost by the military. That doesn’t necessarily mean that the situation could not have been retrieved, a more capable army would have reorganised itself, brought in reinforcements, and take control of the situation. But the revolutionaries have developed a skilled guerrilla force and had a cluster event and had raided military depots and so on. So, there was more violence at the end than I think we give credit for, but this is a very tentative answer to a very, very important question, which, in my opinion, will always remain inconclusive.

Professor Ali Ansari

Do you think that if the Shah had given the order, say, earlier, before December, I mean, you know, while – if there’d been the political will there, that the army would have responded then, in that case? I mean, you’re basically saying they would have, in a sense, responded, or at least the consequences.

Dr Ray Takeyh

And no, I’m saying that I don’t believe they would have.

Professor Ali Ansari

Oh, you don’t…

Dr Ray Takeyh

I don’t believe that General…

Professor Ali Ansari

…believe, okay.

Dr Ray Takeyh

I don’t believe…

Professor Ali Ansari

But General Corp.

Dr Ray Takeyh

…the General Officer Corp would have. I think the conscripts would have.

Professor Ali Ansari

Okay, yeah. Right, so – and by the way, Julie, if you do want to just, sort of, raise your hand and I can – I’m going to – unless there’s something specific on the US, although there is another one on the US here, which is basically someone’s asking, “To what extent are US attitudes to Iran have, sort of, mirrored that of Israel’s attitudes to Iran?” which I suppose would come up. But really, reflecting that, the closeness of the Shah to Israel prior to the Revolution, I mean, how do you see that, in actual fact? I mean, how do you see that sort of, trilateral relationship, actually, Ray?

Dr Ray Takeyh

Honestly, in all the American archives that I have seen, and I have seen – I have not seen Israeli archives, I should say, in the American archives that I have seen, I see very little impact of Israel. I mean, this is not to suggest it wasn’t there, it might have been that I didn’t see it. I see greater degree of collaboration between United States and Britain, but I don’t see that level of exchange and intimacy that existed between United States and Britain, as having existed at that time between United States and Israel.

Again, that might just be the poverty of my research, I don’t – I can’t say to you that it didn’t happen. I would say of the shoals of information that the Islamic Republic has released, there is one [inaudible – 51:27] collaboration with [inaudible – 51:31]. I don’t know how reliable it is but seems to have been most of the collaboration was about recruiting the Arab students abroad. Now there may have been a greater degree of collaboration between the two intelligence services that I’m unaware of.

Julie Norman

Yeah, and, Ali, I’ll just…

Professor Ali Ansari

Yeah.

Julie Norman

…jump in too

Professor Ali Ansari

Do, yeah, do. Hop in.

Julie Norman

Yeah, I mean, I would just – I would agree with Ray that, right, I think we often think of US-Israel relations as going back to the founding of Israel, but they were really just becoming strengthened at that time. And, you know, again, we have to remember other things that were happening in the region, parallel to the Revolution, and it was just in that same time period that we had the first Camp David Accords, that was the first major agreement between the US, Israel and Egypt, and really started that close relationship that then just built from that. And, again, simultaneously, in terms of the US’s attitudes towards Iran, again, at that time, I think was shaped much more by first the Revolution, but then, of course, the hostage crises, and that was the real thing for US relations, rather than Israel at that time, and that’s become much more of a more recent dynamic to feel that pressure and synergy.

Professor Ali Ansari

Thank you, Julie, thank you. I’m going to now move – I’m just having a look here. Let’s move to something a little bit more contemporary, actually, given what’s going on between China and Iran, if you’re willing to, sort of, like, take on some things. I mean, there’s a coup – there’s a – sort of a two-part question here, but actually, one of it’s obviously related to the view of, you know, what the political consequences of the recent, sort of, China-Iran agreement might be for overall policy? But also, what steps – what practical steps do you think the US could take to normalise relations, that dreaded term, but to normalise relations between Iran and the United States?

Dr Ray Takeyh

On the China-UN – Iran, I read the initial VTP track that was released in the summer, and it seemed to me it was an extraordinary document that was expansive in its ambition, but there was a little detailed. That agreement is real only if money changes hands. And if it becomes real, then that’s a very interesting thing for the Islamic Republic, because one of the core aspects of the Islamic Republic has been self-determination and not yielding to foreign intervention in the country.

If that agreement is actualised and consummated, then essentially, Iran yields to China, in terms of its economic penetration of Iran, resembling the British in the earlier 20th Century. So, a regime that came into power arguing for self-determination, self-reliance, and not essentially limiting the monarchy’s capitulation agreements with foreign powers is sort of walking down the same road. But that agreement will become real only if money changes hands, and I suspect there will be more hesitations on the Chinese part moving forward.

In terms of normalising US-Iran relations, I don’t anticipate that because, at the end of the day, this is a contest between two regimes, both, sort of, profoundly ideological. So, this is, in a way, a clash of two ideological regimes, both of whom believe that the region, in some way, should be reflective of their self-image. I think at some level, this is not about bickering over the level of Iranian interference in Iraq, or Iranian concerns about the American Presidents just here or there.

At some point, this is an ideological clash, and ideological clashes are awfully difficult to untangle, especially if there’s no existential imperative, and I think, in some ways, I suspect, and this may be true about the Biden administration that has pulled back from more expansive Obama imagination, is that both regimes, to a certain extent, are comfortable with their images. And that’s going to be awfully difficult to transcend because, if I digress, the Biden administration is opposed to Iran today, where the lesson being learned from the fights of 2015, is to be very mindful of domestic constituencies. And it was probably a similar calculation has taken place in the Islamic Republic itself, and that essentially makes the resolution of this conflict into the level of normalisation, honestly, I don’t see the runway on this one.

Now, that doesn’t necessarily mean conflict is inevitable, but some degree of tension between the two states seem endemic in their relationship, I think.

Julie Norman

Yeah, if I can just jump in there, Ali, as well, I would just completely agree with Ray on the US politics side, just it’s – lessons have been learned, maybe overlearned from the Obama administration, but this sense of not wanting to over-engage is even more politically fraught for the administration to do that now. We’ve obviously seen some goodwill rhetoric, in terms of the nuclear agreement, the JCPOA, but even that is – they’re not rushing to do that, that has not been a priority for the first 100 days in any way, shape or form.

With that thought, I’ll just add that, you know, China and Iran’s daytime, so to speak, will give China more leverage if the P5+1 does reconvene around the GC – JCPOA, and so that would be an interesting piece to consider there moving forward.

Professor Ali Ansari

It’s reminded me, of course, of those heroic attempts back in I think 1998 when Khatami did his interview on CNN and started talking about [inaudible – 57:49] democracy in America, and how really, you know, Iran’s religious democracy was exactly the same as America’s religious democracy, which obviously didn’t quite hit the nerve that he wanted, but, you know, it was an interesting attempt to try and bridge that divide.

I’ve got a couple – I’m going to take two questions, slightly relate – well, not that closely related, but I’ll take them together anyway, so you can have a go. “To what extent do you agree with the claim that the Revolution in 1979 was more due to the dissatisfaction with the Shah than any desire for a – sort of, an Islamic Republic?” That’s one, you know, whether it was against the Shah rather than for the Islamic Republic. And then in terms of future developments, I mean – and this is obviously a very relevant question and a very pertinent one, of course, is that in terms of charting a different course perhaps with the Islamic Republic requires an organised opposition of sorts. I mean, you mentioned a number of very key individuals, of course, who are very active on – in the press and certainly on social media, but in the absence of, sort of, an organised movement, how do you see – you know, where do you think that, sort of, push towards any form of change of anything – you know, if you see that as at all realistic, where’s that going to come from?

Dr Ray Takeyh

Yeah, I just – and the first question was about whether it was a rejection of the Shah or the embrace of the Islamic Republic.

Professor Ali Ansari

Yeah.

Dr Ray Takeyh

And here I want to [inaudible– 59:17] Iranians, so the Iranian public, because it is almost suggested that the revolution was hijacked by the Kurds or maybe somehow misled, and if you read through any statement throughout, they become more ambiguous, to be fair. But it is clear that he favours an Islamic Republic, and it is clear that the Islamic Republic that features externally on democratic features. I do believe that the Iranian people revolted against the Shah and for the Islamic Republic. Now they may not have understood all the dimensions of the regime as it unfolded, but they did want greater role for religion, tradition, and even the religious sector in their party politics. So, I tend to be sceptical of the argument that we were lied to and our liberal revolution was hijacked because that, again, is an attempt to deny agency, this time by suggesting a perfidious cleric did it to us as opposed to British or somebody else. So, I think they have buyer’s remorse today, and – but I do think that, you know, [inaudible – 60:41] was the real thing, independence, freedom, Islamic quote.

How does this change? I have learned one thing and one thing about the future over the past year, namely I cannot predict the future. On March 10th, I would have never guessed that I would be locked out of my office for a year and a half. I was locked out of my office on March 13th, three days later. So, how does the Islamic Republic change? I do think this is a very important question and it’s one that everybody wrestles with.

I – but here’s how it’s not going to change. I don’t believe it will change to resolve internal processes and constitutional provisions as the reform movement at all costs. I do think that has passed. Whether it will change to populist pressure, a succession crisis going astray, I think those are possibilities. The only thing I can say to this question, with some measure of confidence and not much confidence, is there is nothing permanent, in my opinion, about the Islamic Republic moving this population. There is nothing – the business model just doesn’t work.

Now, things don’t happen in history just because they should. The regime may endure, and prolong itself, it has greater resources, maybe greater willingness, maybe we’re just misunderstanding its resilience. I would say two things about the American debate on the Islamic Republic, both for my friends to the right and my friends to the left. Let me begin at the sector that I know better, my friends on the right. Their argument is, if you just push a little harder, that the regime will collapse. I think there’s reasons to be sceptical of that. And I think those on the left who suggest that the regime can now evolve and essentially embrace a reformist character, are also misguided.

So, where that leaves us, it leaves us? It leaves [inaudible – 63:02] in some kind of intellectual impasse, and as McGeorge Bundy used to say, “The colour of truth is grey.” It’s never white and it’s never black, it’ll take place in the middle. But I do think the struggle of the Iranian people of their half century, for some measure of gover – and government that is responsive and accountable to them and the means of accountability and responsibility is to elect it for holistic institutions, I think that dream is alive, and I think so long as it’s alive, no dictatorship and no Dictator can sleep easy.

Professor Ali Ansari

Great, Ray. Well, on that happy note, it just leaves me to thank you, Ray, for an excellent presentation, and can I just encourage people to go out and buy his book, it’s a great read. Thank you to Julie for stepping in there, and it’s really, really good to have your thoughts. Obviously, Sanam, who’s had to disappear, but I’ll thank her in her absence. And thank you to all of you for participating, I’m so sorry if we didn’t get to all your questions, there were a whole series, as always with these seminars. Ray, as you know, as we reach the end of the session, the questions pile in, which is always a great pity, but at the same time, I’m hoping then that people may be able to contact you separately via email because, as we know, we’re not going anywhere, so we can – we know where to find you, and you’ll be able to maybe get some further questions and enquiries as to your views. So, I think this is a topic that’s not going to go away, it keeps us all in business, and for a good while longer, and I very much hope, all I can say is that once this pandemic is over, that I shall be able to come and visit you, Ray, in Washington, or New York, I think you’re in Washington, aren’t you? No.

Dr Ray Takeyh

Washington.

Professor Ali Ansari

So, you are in Washington, and we’ll be able to have more discussions. So, thank you once again, thanks to everyone, thanks to Lauren and all the team at Chatham House for setting this all up. As usual, the Chair is only as good as the behind-the-scenes direction he or she receives, and I got some excellent direction, so I’m very pleased with that. So, thank you once again, and see you at the next event.

Dr Ray Takeyh

Thank you very much for having me.