Hameed Hakimi
Good afternoon everyone. Welcome to Chatham House. My name is Hameed Hakimi and I’m a Research Associate here. I’m very happy that you’re here because given the rain, we were expecting that would affect the turnout. Very delighted to welcome you all.
A few logistical issues, just before I kick off the event. This event is on the record. It’s also being livestreamed, which means the video would be available on our website later on, on the link to the website, to this event on our website.
If I can kindly request you to put your phones on silent, and you are more than welcome to tweet about this event, which we encourage. The hashtag is CHEvents and details are on the screen. You will have an opportunity to ask questions of the panel in the Q&A session, but we would have the order, in the way we are sitting, so the colleagues will go from Sana to Suddaf and to Amil and we’ll come back to a couple of questions before we open the floor.
I’m very delighted to be moderating the session because it’s been something that we have thought about for a long time to do at Chatham House, the idea of Pakistan-Afghanistan narratives, based on our work in the two countries. We thought it would be very useful to have a conversation that’s from a fresher angle. As you all know, we are in a world of mobilised public. What people think of others has a direct impact on policies. Conflict is often preceded by polarisation, but equally, political leaders looking to provoke conflict for short-term gain, will find it difficult to get traction, if the audiences don’t perceive a threat. So, this is – Afghanistan-Pakistan actually, is a classic example. They find themselves in a strange predicament, with strong historical, cultural and religious ties, the countries often officially profess friendship with each other, but also, people to people. However, both see the other, to some degree, at least at state level, as a threat and as a factor of instability, and this has informed constantly the state centric narratives in both countries.
Can the new Government of Imran Kahn, present Pakistan and Afghanistan an opportunity to move beyond the present cold friendship? Will the Afghan Government, driven by considerations for regional connectivity, economic connectivity, become a partner with Pakistan to build confidence, based on economic, political and social ties? And lastly, with the rise of political populism globally, are the roots of negative narratives, getting deeper among the social media savvy Afghans and Pakistanis, particularly the young people?
We have a very able panel today. I’m delighted to welcome them. We have Sana Safi here to discuss, as a panel, all of these issues we have just kind of, briefly outlined. Sana is a Journalist and she’s a Senior Presenter for Afghanistan – a BBC Afghanistan Service. She’s got a BBC Pashto programme, Naray Da Wakht, which means the world right now. She’s also contributing regularly to BBC World Service productions generally. You recently covered a very important story on the plight of Afghan migrants in Bosnia. I’m not going to go through your entire CV and you have a distinguished CV.
We also have Suddaf, sitting next to you, Suddaf Chaudry you are a Freelance Investigative Journalist, covering extremism, security, politics and human rights, primarily focusing on the Middle East and Pakistan. You have a portfolio of work, some of which I have seen on your wonderful website. And then we have Amil Khan, who’s our Associate Fellow here at Chatham House, and he examines the Gulf, South Asia, issues for Asia-Pacific Programme, but he also has extensive experience of reporting with Reuters and the BBC, across the Middle East, South Asia and Africa. You have also worked with the UK Government focusing on counter-extremism and in Pakistan and Afghanistan.
So, that’s the panel. I’d like to kick off with Suddaf, you have up to six to seven minutes, if you can make the initial remarks and then we move to Suddaf and then to Amil. Thank you
Sana Safi
Okay. Thank you, Hameed, and thank you everyone for coming. If you ask Afghans what they think of Pakistan, the answer will most likely be negative, and if you ask them further, why they think that and what makes them think that? The answer will depend on their personal experiences, how they see their situation, in relation to the rest of the country, and what they see on media and on social media.
So, the first category of Afghans, who have nothing good to say about their neighbour, are those Afghans who were forced to become refugees in Pakistan, after the Soviet Union invasion of Afghanistan, and the subsequent years that people left. Some of their memories are still fresh from that time and some of them are negative memories, be it Police brutality or exploitation or discrimination.
The second category of Afghans are those who live under the Taliban, controlled or influenced areas. Those Afghans, when they compare the situation in their own localities with the rest of Afghanistan, they automatically blame the Taliban for that, because predictably, their areas are behind when it comes to a development, be it economic, social, human or political. So, they think that the reason for their “backwardness”, is because of the Taliban and by extension. Pakistan.
For instance, I was chatting to a woman in Helmand, who had recently moved to Lashkargāh, the capital of the province, from one of the districts where the Taliban have control, and I was asking her about schools and I said, “Did you have schools?” She said, “Yes, there was something for boys, it was a Madrassa, but there was nothing for girls.” So – and then she went on to say that the Taliban were there to make our lives hell. It doesn’t affect them because their own families are not here, they’re in Pakistan. And so, this a woman who is a housewife; she has never gone to school, but she understands what’s happening in her locality, and also, she has heard the macro narrative that Pakistan is forging the Taliban.
So, the third category of Afghans are those who are mobile, urban, connected, media savvy, tech savvy, they are – they get all their information from the media, and the media in Afghanistan, it would be fair to say, is one of the biggest achievement of the Afghan Government, but it has been at the service of the political elite, and the political elite has used it in a way that has driven this anti-Pakistan narrative. So, the political class have blamed Pakistan for anything that’s happening in Afghanistan.
One example would be, that there is a major attack in Kabul for example, and as soon as you put the television on, you see commentators, experts, or sort of – or Politicians, they blame Pakistan prematurely, without waiting for any investigation or any sort of fact finding. So, the urban young Afghans get the information from their political elite, and at the same time, they take that on social media, they debate it with themselves, with their friends, in their localities, in their communities, as well as on social media, in their own groups, where no-one else is allowed. The voices of dissent are silent because those are likeminded groups, that only likeminded people can attend, so they reinforce those views with each other.
And, speaking of the media, the media in Pakistan has not helped, and when it comes to the anti-Pakistan narrative, and that – what I mean by that is, there was an attack in Kandahar that killed the Provincial Police Chief and General Abdul Raziq, a few weeks ago, and soon after that attack there was a newspaper article in Urdu that was circulating on social media, and Afghans were distributing it, and crazy. And they – that article read that – Kandahar [mother tongue – 09:15] if you translate it into English, that would read as spectacular blood bath in Afghanistan. And Afghans saw that as a direct attack on their – not just on their country, but it was sort of insensitive. Whether that article was authentic or not, we don’t know. So, that’s another dimension that will come in to the debate and we will cover it.
And another element that I would like to mention in widening this gap, would be the lack of people-to-people contact between both countries. So, in the last few years, in particular, the interaction between Afghanistan and Pakistan, or the people-to-people interaction has reduced dramatically, especially after the closure of the Torkham Gate, that has affected trade, as well as other interactions, in other aspects of life. So, there is an interplay between all these factors. They’re not exclusive of each other.
Hameed Hakimi
Thank you very much, and extremely on time, I must say. Suddaf, you’ve got a challenge of six minutes.
Suddaf Chaudry
Thank you. Hello everybody. I have to say, it’s always been a difficult time to understand when is it a good time for regional dialogue between the two nations? But from covering the recent election in Pakistan, I spoke to a lot of young people and the young electorate were like – the common sentiment was, “We live in a very difficult society. We have to move in line with that society, but we really want to move on now.” We want to talk about the common challenges, I mean both countries are facing a significant water crisis, high unemployment, but we don’t have an opportunity to talk about that. The young people were like, “I would love to know more about the Afghans, about the people my age, across the pond, but we can’t facilitate a effective dialogue because there is nobody to bridge that gap.”
And I think the main issue surrounding that, is how these countries are represented, especially in the news. I mean, there isn’t even an Afghan base in Pakistan. There was a Reporter from TOLO in Peshawar, but he was expelled. It’s the same on the other side, Afghanistan does not have a Pakistan bureau. So, if you don’t have a vibrant representation of what is taking place on the ground, how can these two countries, which are extremely similar, have an effective dialogue? And especially, just I think a month ago, I was speaking to the Government and the local populations in Peshawar, it’s amazing how the situation was the same, but it’s amazing there was no real indication of an effective viable strategy by the Government, but locals in Peshawar, they were thinking about maybe getting involved in the grassroots initiatives, maybe increasing a dialogue that way.
So, I think the real issue is, we need to move away from the historical discourse, into a current day political dialogue, because from what I’ve heard with young people, the only experiences and information outlets they get are always from the Soviet times and the Mujahidin examples, that does not represent what is taking place now. It doesn’t really affect a viable change in the trajectory of where these two very similar nations are going. So, one example is, if you take the recent proposal by Imran Khan, to affect the nationality for Afghan refugees in the country, it was controversial. The likelihood of it actually being engineered in an effective policy was limited, but what it did do was it triggered a much-needed debate on security and the humanitarian aspects, because for so long, Pakistan hasn’t had a real policy on the situation. They aren’t even, after 14 years, knowing how many Afghan refugees are actually in the country, if there’s no real viable data.
There’s a significant strong objection in Sindh and Balochistan provinces, especially in Balochistan. It’s a very large province and the Politicians there, specifically Akhtar Mengal, who recently joined the PTI Government with Imran Khan, stated he would only join the PTI Government if there was a significant objection to the forward moving of this policy. He said, “If there are more Afghan refugees in Balochistan, it would completely change the ethnic demography of Balochistan.” The numbers don’t quite stand up for this stance, but you can understand the significant objection for this move to be carried forward, and we really have to understand why that is, in a far more wider context.
If you look at the Pashtun Tahafuz Movement, which is the social movement for the rights of the Pashtun people in Peshawar and KP and beyond, you would think, with Imran Kahn belonging to a Pashtun tribe, the Niazi tribe, there would be a significant best representation. But there isn’t. They feel far more marginalised. They’d feel they are on the fringes. They are not having a viable dialogue, in order to really ascertain the concerns that are affecting these people, I mean, they are constantly barraged by the issue of enforced disappearances, extra judicial killings. But now, the Pashtun Tahafuz Movement has become an extension of the Afghan issue in the country.
So, how can we solve these problems? A couple of years ago, I was – I came across a report by the World Project in – based in DC. What they did was, they went to 2,000 households in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and asked ordinary citizens about various themes, such as bribery, corruption, crime, the access to justice. This study took two years and the results were amazing. There were similarities on both sides, whether it was crime, justice, access to justice, Government accountability, the results were the same. What that created was a dialogue, which amplified how similar these two nations were, and then if you could take the study and basically scale it out, there could be a scope for maybe, regional greater co-operation, and in order to, as this subject is titled, Frosty Nations, we could facilitate some kind of thaw. Because, with Imran Khan, it’s a relatively short time in governance, how much he can introduce a warming of neighbourly tie, is a bit, I think, in a limbo stage, at the moment. But what Pakistan really has to understand is, without a stable Afghanistan, they won’t be able to create a society that isn’t significantly more militarised and radicalised.
So, I think, though, both of the countries have to move away from a trajectory of the ‘blame game’. They have to bring the right actors onto the negotiating table, and the only way that is possible is to create a vibrant representation of these nations, because if we don’t understand that the stakes are possibly at their highest, as we are all aware in this room, the security situation in the last few years, has significantly declined, and the perceptions have become far more focused in this deep rooted acrimony.
So, the media could be one way we could really broaden this conversation. We could allow significant resources to be providing a base for Afghan Journalists and Pakistan Journalists, in order to way – to move away from this negative trajectory, and offer social media and the conventional news cycle to represent an informed dialogue, because we have to move away from the past, because the population, as I said, is significantly young and they are what we can galvanise through a more, I think, appealing and vibrant conversation, because if we focus on crisis points, we will not be able to move forwards.
Hameed Hakimi
Thank you very much. Amil, over to you.
Amil Khan
Thank you very much. Shortly after Imran Khan’s election earlier this year, there was a really good article by Jason Burke, and a Writer whose work you might see in The Observer and The Guardian, and he made a point that really stuck with me. He said, “When we, in western countries, think about places like Afghanistan, Pakistan, the Middle East more generally and Africa, we think of the past.” So, we think, even if we love those places, we love what we’re talking about, those great things we’ve forgotten, it’s the past. If we hate it, its backward. It comes from a terrible time, savages, we were like that in the 1300s and we’ve moved on. Everything is always in the past.
I think actually, there’s a good argument to be made for the fact that we are looking at something in places like India and Pakistan, when it comes to the interception of politics, media narratives, and actually how things are done, how business is conducted on an international stage, on the international stage, in this day and age, that actually says a lot about our future. It’s very much our present and it very much does look like the direction that we’re going in.
Now why did I say that? Pakistan and Afghanistan, for different reasons, but linked, went from very tightly controlled state-run media in around 2000 and after 9/11, well, Musharraf, I think before, slightly before 9/11, in the case of Pakistan and then after the American invasion in Afghanistan, went to a really sort of freewheeling set up. I’m not going to use the word ‘freer’ necessarily, for reasons that I think all of us will kind of understand, it’s a bit more complicated than that. But definitely way more freewheeling, and what does that mean? So, okay, you’re freer to say certain things, but you’re less free to say some things.
You will find that there is a bigger business interest in the media, the intersection between business elites, Government elites, new elites that come through the media itself, is something that we’ve seen elsewhere across the word as well. And a certain increase in crude Government control. So, we like the idea that in western countries, we have a free media, I think it’s widely accepted that nowhere has a truly free media, for different reasons good and bad, but where there was Government control, it’s much more subtle, it’s legalised in, other places it’s way more crude, the Government will come and take your stuff away and put you in prison etc, etc.
So, if we go from that to the issue of narratives, this is talked about a lot, so narratives, we talk about narratives, we confuse them with stories, but there’s some really good work on this issue. And he talks about narratives essentially being about four or five questions. What’s the problem? What’s the – who’s to blame, and what’s the solution? What’s the end state? That’s really what we’re talking about. Now if you add the ability to work in that framework, with a freewheeling media environment that can reach a mass load of the population, you have a combustible mix, and if you don’t have legalised set ups, such as, kind of, like, oil, you know, oil’s great if you’re in Norway and you’ve got great ways of controlling it and you’ve got lots of stakeholders. It’s kind of, more of a problem if you are kind of a country that didn’t have a functioning state to begin with. It’s pretty much the same with media, and Pakistan and Afghanistan were on levels of that.
So, how does that actually play out? Well, you – then you have a scenario where different elites, to kind of use a cliched phrase, different interest groups, let’s say, have different reasons for manipulating it, and having their own issues their own fight, sort of, play out on that stage. We’ve seen – and I lived in Pakistan from around 2009 to 20011, you could definitely see it. There were 70 something channels when I was in Pakistan. There were some things that you clearly would get in trouble for saying, but there was a lot of stuff that you could say. Add to that now, we’re talking about the world of social media.
So, if you’re thinking about this sort of context, as something that’s only come about because of Donald Trump or Brexit or any of those things, I would very much urge you to look back to the past, but actually not look at it as the past, and think of places like Pakistan, think of places like Egypt, think of places like Lebanon, very much, and think about how their media set ups look? And who has influence in those set ups? How they exert that influence? And what that actually means for stability and conflict. I’m a member of the Stabilisation Unit in the British Government, so that stabilisation is something that we think about a lot, and the idea of how media and politics play into that, is something that’s very – that we’ve been – that’s been looked at very recently. Basically, it’s we think about the physical aspects, thinking about the narratives that underpin conflict, or promotes stability is something that we’ve only recently gone around thinking about, and perhaps in Governments, different Governments and the academic world itself.
So, if I could use an example. Imran khan said some not very helpful things about Asia Bibi and blasphemy, in general, before he was Prime Minister. So, clearly, this was something that he thought he could jump on the bandwagon of, get some support, but hey, it’s all politics at the end of the day. When he came into power, he decided to do what a lot of people thought was the right thing, and allowed the judicial system to run its course, and basically, got to – what’s the best way to say it? Basically, allow the courts to run its way through, so that she was eventually released and is no longer at risk of death.
He pretty much immediately faced pushback, from essentially, mobilised publics in Pakistan, and Imran Khan, I think, suddenly had a realisation that you can’t actually just turn the key on, and then turn the key off. That these forces are enormously powerful, and they might even be bigger than somebody, hey, who’s the most famous Pakistani sportsman and Politician, ever to grace the dance floors of London nightclubs. But that I think was maybe a rude awakening for him, but I think something that also that people have been grappling with, whether we’re talking about the western countries or we’re talking about here in the UK, or we’re talking about Europe, European politics and definitely, politics back in the US.
So, last point, and I think I’m roughly on time.
Hameed Hakimi
You’ve got less than a minute.
Amil Khan
Less than a minute, okay. So, the questions really are, if we stop looking at these places as the past and siloed, and we start looking at dynamics in Pakistan and Afghanistan and that intersection of politics and media and perceptions, narratives, what can we actually take from that? Instead of just looking at it in a petri dish. The – I think there’s a lot to be said around the idea of leapfrogging, about media regulation, about short-term political gains, as opposed to long-term stability. What does that mean for outside actors? What does that mean for local actors? Are outside actors really the right people to come in and spend a lot of money, when they perhaps don’t understand the powerbrokers in the area, and the people with money, and the people who might want power, or is it something that could be done on the ground?
Essentially, the point that I’d like to end on, an observation. If interested positive actors don’t want to do that, interested negative actors will do that, and we know that to be the case. We know that to be the case on an international level. They could be hostile non-state actors, they could be state actors, but they could also be, what’s the best word to use? A sort of confluence of interested groups, lots of them who eventually end up being a large amount of people. We know that social media has the ability, to generate income for individuals and the big difference between the discussion about dis-information, what’s different between now and the Cold War? Well, one of the things, this is an ongoing discussion, so I won’t get in to that now, but one of the things is, social media makes money. If you want to be out there and saying distasteful things, you will become more popular, and you’ll earn more money out of it, and that is a problem and true, if you are in the UK, or if you are in Pakistan and Afghanistan.
Hameed Hakimi
Thank you very much. Just before I open the floor, I wanted to maybe ask some exploratory questions, so we delve into this, unpacking of narratives, a little bit further.
I mean, this question’s, for all of you, and perhaps I can invite Suddaf and Sana first, to tell us about – maybe highlight, through your experiences, about the level of information, or the level of awareness that exists on both sides, especially among young people about the other side? I mean, you have spoke about how the narratives in Pakistan, predominantly, is stuck in a Soviet era of Afghan refugees that we hosted here, and that that’s the prism that is prevalent. I know you spoke about the impact of conflict and how people immediately translate that as, “Pakistan being the reason,” because that’s what they hear or that’s what they perceive. But how have you experienced this lack of connectivity, or let’s say, lack of awareness of the young people on both sides, through your work? If you can maybe reflect on that through any examples you’ve had, and maybe I can ask Amil a follow-up question after that.
Sana Safi
I don’t mind, you can go first.
Suddaf Chaudry
Okay. In terms of the lack of connectivity between young people on both sides, last summer, in 2017, I covered the water crisis in South Asia, and I fundamentally started in Pakistan because I was working there at the time, and we started mapping the crisis and then I was like, “We need to extend this, what’s going on next door in Afghanistan?” And I was speaking to a group of students in the hall at Lund University, and they were incredibly excited, in order to bring their small scalable litmus test study in order, to Afghanistan. But they instantly just stopped because they were like, “We would never ever be able to have the access to Kabul. They just wouldn’t give us the reception, the positivity, so we don’t really think there would be an – really, a need for this project to be sent over, because we will basically have a roadblock, an initial hurdle.” And I was quite alarmed by this. I was like this was a very young group, very educated, but they still feel Afghanistan is just far too far away, for any real opportunity or strategic development, and it really depends where you go in the country, as well.
I worked a lot in Karachi and I found the Afghan refugees there have established a life. They’ve, you know, created a business, they have an extended family, it’s a real life for them. But if you go to Peshawar, the situation is very bleak. The young people would really only understand Afghanistan, from what their parents have told them, and because they haven’t been there for a significant amount of time, they’ve lost interest and it’s actually quite a shame because they will not understand the par – the homeland of their parents. They won’t understand if there’s scope for maybe one day we can go back, create some kind of future, and I find that quite saddening I mean, as a Reporter in the field, you know, you know you’re going to come across this, but it was remarkable how, throughout the country, this very negative, unhopeful, you know, perception of the future in Afghanistan.
But what I was amazed by was local grassroots situation in Karachi. They were trying to create some, kind of, like, a film club online, to talk about similarities, and Bollywood, so, you know, if we can create a dialogue from that, and I found maybe small initiatives like that can create some, kind of connectivity. But one thing I do, and feel it’s very important, it’s the stakeholders, such as the Government, there was a positive peak, I think, during the, I think, Sana, was it the cricket?
Sana Safi
Yes.
Suddaf Chaudry
Yes, and the I society from the ISPR, Asif Ghafoor, tweeted his support, didn’t he? Which I think is a real step forward. If you can get people in, you know, where the control is held really, to create a real positive meaningful dialogue of peace, even like a, as they say, through ‘cricket diplomacy’. Maybe there could be a step forward.
Hameed Hakimi
Thank you, did you want to comment on that?
Sani Safi
Yeah, so, if you ask young Afghans, the post 9/11 generation and mostly urban, mobile and who predominantly drive the social media narrative, if you mention India and ask them what comes to mind, they would say, “Well, Bollywood, Imran Kahn, Sheryl Kahn, and all the rest of them, or their Indian Space Station, or the female Politicians or democracy,” or, you know, positive things. But if you ask them what comes to mind when you mention Pakistan, they’ll say, “Well, corrupt Police,” and that’s the only thing they will tell you. So, it gives you the idea that people have no information about what Pakistan is beyond this militarised, this, you know, in their eyes, corrupt image. And that really, in a way, answers this whole problem, and – or – and we can find a solution in that as well. So, if we just introduce Pakistan to Afghans, you know, the real Pakistan, Punjab, the beautiful palaces, the history, the shared language, the food, and the pre-historic or pre-Islamic history of the [mother tongue – 32:17], they would be fascinated by it, and I think most of their views come from whatever they’re told. They don’t go and research it because, well, it’s too much work and it’s easier to just believe what you already think it. So, their information about Pakistan, I would say, on the Afghan side, is zero.
Hameed Hakimi
And Amil if, in two minutes, if you can kindly help me with this? So, one of the key challenges we all face, as people who work on the policy advise side if I say, I mean, was in Geneva, just last week, or you know, we were talking about various issues, including Afghanistan’s regional connectivity, and I had an opportunity to speak to Afghanistan’s neighbouring countries’ representatives, and it was immediately, the minute you start talking about the kind of conversations that we’re trying to have here, the Government representatives cannot, for whatever reason, see beyond the very engraved, dated, and stuck in a time bubble narrative about the other, and so how do you go about engaging, let’s say a Government representative, on some of these issues? Because that’s essentially what it comes down to, isn’t it? So, how would you actually have an entry point into a conversation like that?
Amil Khan
Two minutes I’m allowed.
Hameed Hakimi
One minute on each point.
Amil Khan
I would say two answers, a broad answer and a more specific answer. The broad answer is, I’ll tell you how, in Pakistan, how to broach that conversation, and this was a conversation I’ve had.
So, Pakistan for, I think, a couple of years, had a YouTube ban, and I was trying to explain to somebody that this was a terrible idea, Pakistan wanted to present itself to the outside world. Pakistan, like Afghanistan, sort of, a massive population of young people, and it’s a phenomenon across the world that young people make videos on YouTube and those massive channels. I think the biggest is an Indian channel, the second biggest is a Swedish guy, and they get millions of viewers and they are actually more popular often than Hollywood stars, so you get Hollywood stars trying to get on their channels. This is a phenomenon of the world that we live in and it’s an amazing opportunity for nation branding. But it’s the kind of nation branding that often makes Governments, across the board, kind of a little bit nervous, because you don’t control it. You’re not giving money to somebody, and you’re telling them, and they sign off every month on what you’re producing. You’re actually trusting young people to just go off and do stuff, and I’ve got kids, so I know that that’s normally a terrible idea, like just trusting kids to go off and do stuff.
The second issue, I would say, is, if you are an outside actor and you’re coming in, you have to know the nitty gritty of the setup of the environment that you’re in, because you could well be having that same conversation with a Government official, without knowing that they actually, their family owns the media monopoly in the country. So that conversation is going to go down badly, for reasons that you might not be aware off at all, while you’re sitting there in that meeting. So, knowing how to interact in this more, sort of, traditional situation, you need to know the power dynamics in the scenario that you have then gone and put yourself in, so that you can press the levers that actually need to be pressed, without, kind of, their being two conversations going on in the room, and one, you’re talking about something that’s in general a good idea, and a different conversation going on, sort of, behind the scenes.
Hameed Hakimi
Thank you, so I will open the floor now, if you’ll kindly introduce yourself. If you’re a Chatham House Member and you can tell us beyond that, that’d be great. If you are making a contribution, and not a question; please keep it succinct and very brief, and also, if you’d like to ask a specific question as well.
I’d like to invite, if I can be a little bit pushy, the women in the audience first, if I can convince somebody to take charge. Yes, please, could she kindly have the microphone? And I’ll come back to the other questions.
Hilde Rapp
Hilde Rapp, a Member of Chatham House and Centre of International Peacebuilding. I have a sort of leftfield question for you, which is to ask you about the actual network coverage of mobile phones in the whole of Afghanistan and Pakistan? Because I think we’ve been hearing, a little bit of the kind of, you know the more ‘urban bubble’ and what is possible within that, but what I’m aware of is that certainly in the mountain areas, often there is no coverage, and also, there is a long history of poetry and stories that people really identify their community by, and that has also been very much manipulated by the Taliban. So, what are the facts behind this? Thank you.
Hameed Hakimi
Would you like to take that, and we’ll come back to the audience?
Sana Safi
Yes. So, mobile penetration, in Afghanistan, has been really positive, in the last 17 years, and with that, internet connectivity as well. So, at the moment, around, between five and six million Afghans are connected to the internet, and around 20 – between 22 – about 20 million of them are connected to mobiles, so they have mobile connectivity, and they’re registered subscribers. But internet is an issue, they probably can’t play a video that’s 30 minutes, but they are able to communicate via social media. There are companies who have packages, and Facebook only packages, so it’s easy for them to communicate on social media.
Hameed Hakimi
And did you want to talk about this programme that you present? Naray Da Wakht on BBC Pashtu Service, what’s the penetration rates you have currently? You also reach out to KP, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, right?
Sana Safi
Yeah, so our programme is 30 minutes a day, seven days, and it’s daily, seven days a week and it talks – obviously, touches about – it’s not the top the down news agenda, it’s the bottom up news agenda, and what I mean by that is that any story that’s neither newsworthy for local Afghan media, for us it will be a top story. So, we usually start with suicide rate, for example, or maternal mortality, or drug addiction, things like that, and it has between eight – seven to eight million weekly audience in Afghanistan and Pakistan. We are live on two partner stations, one is the Shamshad in Afghanistan, and the other is Mashriq in Pakistan. So, Pakistan is the new partnership, in that I think it has only been less than two years that we have had that, but the audience share is increasing daily. But on social media, our traffic mainly comes from Pakistan, from Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, from the Pashtun areas of Pakistan.
Hilde Rapp
Dari Urdu?
Sana Safi
So, Dari – so, Urdu is – the BBC has an Urdu channel, which is separate, so we are Pashtu for Afghanistan and Pakistan, and the Urdu – BBC Urdu has programmes for the rest of Pakistan.
Hameed Hakimi
Okay, can I get some more questions, please? Gentleman over there, and I’ll cluster these questions together just to save time, so, if you’d kindly introduce yourself and a question.
Mark Lyall Grant
I’m Mark Lyall Grant. I was the British High Commissioner to Pakistan ten or 15 years ago. It always struck me then, that certainly at the official level and particularly, of course, the military level, that Pakistan never had an Afghan policy. It had an India policy and Afghanistan was a subset of its India policy. Given that that is still the prevailing sentiment at the governmental level in Pakistan, do you think it is possible to change the dynamic of the Pakistan-Afghan narrative, without first changing the India-Pakistan narrative?
Hameed Hakimi
Okay and a question, here, please, and then I’ll come to you.
Shazar
Hi, my name’s Shazar. I’m the Southeast Journalist and SRM and my question’s for…
Hameed Hakimi
What is SRM, sorry?
Shazar
SRM?
Hameed Hakimi
Yeah, okay, perfect.
Shazar
So, what I wanted to ask, obviously, we’re talking about a lack of information that people in Afghanistan get, in terms of Pakistan, but do you think that there is the information that is available, do you think that also comes from a certain vantage point, and maybe that information coming from the West or coming from maybe India, do you think that sort of affects the Afghan population, as well, and are there any ways to filter out those, kind of – and that – those – that information, as well? Thank you.
Hameed Hakimi
Okay and the gentleman over there, in the front, please. We’ll take these three questions and then we’ll move to the set.
Duncan Bartlett
Thank you very much. My name’s Duncan Bartlett. I’m the Editor of Asian Affairs magazine. So, I’m picking up themes from the three panellists that they’re in favour of more dialogue, more exchange of information and ideas of freer media. My question really is, who can help you achieve those goals? I mean, in an audience of Chatham House of academics and students and so on, you’ll find a lot of people who share those values, but who do you have to get to change their mind in Afghanistan and Pakistan, in order to get more dialogue and more – move towards a more effective exchange of ideas, as you’ve put it?
Hameed Hakimi
Okay, thank you. So, question one, could you have a Pakistan-Afghanistan narrative, without first tackling Pakistan-India narrative and that’s how Pakistan views Afghanistan? The second one is, you know, can the Afghans filter the information that they receive through other channels as well? And who can help you bridge all of these? So, three questions. Amil, did you want to kick off with the first one, and then, Suddaf, if you want to comment on that as well.
Amil Khan
In short I’d say yes, you can, though I would say that because I think it’s possi – I think particularly with India – sorry, with Pakistan and Afghanistan, the potential for, ‘cause of the linguistic and cultural ties, the potential for leapfrogging all of, sort of, the India and everything, sort of, narrative, I mean, basically, I guess what I want to say is, that if you – it depends on how you see the world. Do you see the world as men in suits talking to men in suits, and that is still the impetus of how we do business in the world that we live in today, or do you think that there’s more of a ground up sort of swell? If there is a more of a ground up swell and that can drive policy, then India and Pakistan – Pakistan and Afghanistan are really, well placed to do a lot in that direction. And it could well be tweaks that come from, for example, to answer the second question, the IMF, for example.
If we have a more holistic view, we get very stuck talking about how do you make individual Governments act in a more unified manner? But how do you make international organisations act in a unified manner? So, how do you make several Governments and the IMF and somebody else say – I just can’t and I sound – I feel, sort of ridiculous even mentioning – even suggesting it, but if you could do that then you could actually, for example, change – if you could change – if you could said – if you could convince funders and people like the IMF to enact change, whereby to import or export between Pakistan and Afghanistan, you didn’t have to go via Dubai, which is frankly, kind of, really weird, you could – you would – and automatically increase in people-to-people contact, and you could, kind of, not have to deal with the Pakistan-India issue on that level, while people-to-people contact, while trade, media, travel increases.
So, I think there is a longstanding theory, in international relations, that you kind of build it and they will come, can work, at times, if people – if there are ties, despite official hostility and frostiness or whatever, then you can overcome - you can come to a point where a solution is easier to reach, and that actually was probably, also relevant when I was talking about Pakistan and India as well.
Suddaf Chaudry
Sorry, can I add to that? I agree with your point there because especially this year earlier in June, there were bilateral discussions between Afghanistan and Pakistan, which were far more successful, in terms of creating a regional, I would say timeline towards stability, because the stakes have never been higher. Pakistan needs to curb the increased militarisation and they know the ball is in their court, so they have to bring the right actors, to the negotiating table. And I think with Imran Kahn, it’s almost because they are trying to see when there is a window of opportunity, when they feel the Afghans are willing to listen, because that’s a very tricky paradigm, in Pakistan, to really navigate with. Because, from talking to Government officials just recently, as of last month, they are saying, “We are ready,” which is quite an interesting statement by Pakistan to make, because – but they are looking for the right time, and I think they know the stakes are higher than ever, but what is relay crucial is, if Afghanistan can really agree to the terms set, because placing the onus on Pakistan constantly, really, that blame game doesn’t work, in terms of the long-term. Because I’ve seen, you know, some documents, off the record, and there is significant negotiation and objectives that would really make a really valid partnership. But at this point in time, the Afghans aren’t willing, so I think it’s just about timing. More than the international framework of, you know, how we can just pull it altogether. It’s really about timing, and I don’t think the Indian factor is as crucial as it was before.
Hameed Hakimi
Yeah, if I can maybe just make a 30 second intervention. Just being in Geneva, and just, as I mentioned already, last week, I managed to speak to a diverse group of Afghan neighbours and also, having worked in Afghanistan as an International Advisor, I was privy to the skills and capacity that exists within the Pakistan Foreign Ministry. They have dedicated desks. They have dedicated skills, people with skills that are focused only on Afghanistan, while the broader security narrative, again to what extent that is really what the Pakistan, you know, establishment think, versus what they really want to do.
There’s an India, you know, somehow it always comes into the conversation, but it was very interesting for me to see, you know, having been in this space for a while, that actually, Pakistanis, at least at the Foreign Ministry level, they were trying to do a bilateral with Afghanistan, rather than to constantly be allowing the Indian dimension to overshadow. And in terms of what could others do? And one of the things I am always struck by is, how we get, you know, NGOs and various people, in Kabul, for instance, trying to connect Afghan students to universities in Missouri or somewhere. And I always put the argument out that, you know, the actors who go in and try and do capacity building in Afghanistan, why can’t they facilitate dialogue between Afghan young people and Pakistani young people, through their education institutions? They don’t even have to travel. They can just use Skype and speak to each other. It’s half an hour time difference, versus hours of time difference, with the western world. So that kind of small level, low key, bottom up connectivity can be encouraged by even people like ourselves.
And yes, yeah, yeah.
Sana Safi
I’ll just answer the lady’s question over there. I don’t think it’s the question of information coming from abroad or Americans or Indians that distort, so to speak, the views of the Afghans. I think the problem is within Afghanistan. If you have a media landscape that’s very dominated anti-Pakistan narrative, what you do is, you diversify. You bring voices that are objective, critical, sound and sane voices that can balance the debate. And on the Pakistani side, what they could is, to reach out to the Afghans, on the people-to-people level, you know, the civil society, the women, the media, they could encourage or initiate that conversation that will bring that diversity into the debate. So, I think diversity and objectivity is really important for both countries, for them to think about. And the question that Hameed answered was – I would slightly disagree. I think it would be – it would not be sustainable if someone else encouraged Afghans to behave in a certain way or to increase their relations with their neighbour. I would say Afghan media, women, young people, and women’s societies, civil society, and there are groups, who work, but they just need to think, I think, a little creatively to reach out to Pakistan on that level. So that would be more sustainable and more productive, in my view.
Hameed Hakimi
Can I get another round of questions? And then, I think, we’ll have to wrap it up. Okay, the gentleman over there, you’ve tried to ask me a question for a while, sorry, and then I’ll come back to this side, yeah.
Michael Burns
Hello, my name’s Michael Burns, and I’m a visiting guest, so I just wanted to thank the panel for your very insightful comments, and for Chatham House for facilitating it. I was wondering what the relationship between the frosty neighbours will be when, so to speak, the permafrost begins to melt and global warming increases? What will happen to energy and water relations between the two countries, migrational patterns and how those two things, and others, might affect interpersonal relationships between Afghans and Pakistanis?
Hameed Hakimi
So, how does – how would the future of environmental problems affect the two countries? Okay. Aftab, yourself, and then, I’ll come to you.
Aftab Siddiqui
Aftab Siddiqui, I’m a Member of Chatham House, who work in the city. Would that be enough for me?
Hameed Hakimi
Well, yeah, and what’s your couple of comments?
Aftab Siddiqui
No, I think the question is, in terms of the narrative, what we found, kind of, you know, looking at the Afghanistan-Pakistan situation is that, the organic development of the narrative seems like a big challenge in Afghanistan, in terms of mostly, it’s influenced by the external forces. And you cannot deny the fact say that the US presence, it affects everything what happens in Afghanistan, and sometime it is felt that, that kind of, you know, is Afghanistan becomes a bit of, you know, delivery of the US policies to the region. So how do you sort of, you know, in terms of developing the narrative, how can you minimise that, in fact, in terms of Afghanistan’s own organic narrative development, so that, sort of, you know, it does not become a conduit to the US larger policy in the region? Thank you very much.
Hameed Hakimi
Yourself, sir, right.
Peter Willetts
Thank you, and Peter Willetts Emeritus Professor of Global Politics. Is there any connection at all between civil society in Afghanistan or Pakistan and civil society in Syria? And if, as I suspect not, but I don’t know, on what basis would the two Governments be deciding their policy toward Syria and the involvement of Iran and Saudi Arabia in Syria? Is there a sort of regional dynamics that they’re part of, or are they cut off from that great divide of the developing world?
Hameed Hakimi
Okay, can I get another question from women in the audience? Okay, I’ll go – you had your hand first, sorry. Yes, please. Yeah, go ahead.
Member
I’m [inaudible – 52:34], a guest, Chatham House, from [inaudible – 52:35] Women’s Society. I just wanted to make a very short and small contribution. As you are aware, Hameed, that I have spent a few years recently in Afghanistan, and I am aware that are some contacts happening between the civil society and Afghanistan and Pakistan, and on TOLO TV there are some programmes, that two hosts went from Pakistan, and one from Afghanistan, they are making some programmes. They go to Pakistan and Afghanistan, and it’s very helpful programme, also. But Suddaf mentioned the point that, don’t you think it’s just the border issue mainly? Because there are some cross-border firing recently also, the fencing of the border, these are the main issues and I think than all those contacts, because these are the policymakers who decide about. Thankyou.
Hameed Hakimi
I think this has been our attempt to look at it from a bottom up approach, and I think you pointed broadly to Suddaf’s point. I think it’s more to do with a top down, you know when you look at the world, do you see, as Amil said, do you see men in suits and maybe some women, or do you see a grassroots, you know, bottom up? So, anyway, I’ll shut up, but you know, did you want to take the question of environmental issues? I think you’ve done work on that, Suddaf, so if you kindly tell us a bit more, and how would this affect the future of the two countries relations?
Suddaf Chaudry
The environmental issues in South Asia are significant. I mean if you take Pakistan, for example, it’s reported that it may run dry by 2025, which isn’t very far away and the Pakistani Government, unfortunately, hasn’t really put the environment at the forefront. The policy and the direction and attitudes are always related to terrorism and security apparatus. There is no effective policy, I’m afraid, on the environment. There’s only grassroot initiatives, trying to locally scale out some initiatives to conserve water. The real issue with Pakistan is not that it doesn’t have enough water, it’s mismanagement, and that will create really forward and very difficult problems in the long-term, because India has always been very unstable in trying to create a water policy dialogue, because of the other, you know, issues on the fringes, and with Afghanistan, there is no discussion on this, from my experience. So, I think, at this point in time, until both Governments really appreciate how dire the situation is, I’m afraid it’s really going to be, I hate to use the word, an Armageddon situation, but it could be, because there is no effective dialogue on the environment at all.
And I found that alarming after digitally mapping, in Pakistan for a whole year, it was basically instrumental for us to realise, this is the situation, far greater than terrorism in the country, far greater than like unemployment or anything, the water issue is significant. But even with Imran Khan, I don’t think it’s really been touted in the news cycle, his reel. Even in his speech, when he was elected, I think there was a mere mention of environment, but no real, like, major forward-thinking policy. So, I have to say it’s a wait and see game, but I hope for not too long, because the long-term impact was significant, and I think Sana can tell you it’s probably similar in Afghanistan.
Sana Safi
Yes.
Hameed Hakimi
Yeah. I’m keen to finish at five past, so I’m sorry to push you.
Sana Safi
Okay, So, at the moment, three million Afghans are threatened by very severe drought, in 30 – 22 provinces out of 34. So, drought, environmental issues is a huge challenge for both countries, but Afghanistan has been on this – the damn building project that has sort of strange relations with Pakistan. Because Pakistan thinks that the damn building in Afghanistan will reduce the water to Pakistan, and it is the same story with Iran, so it, sort of has affected relations, but we’ll see what happens.
Hameed Hakimi
And the displacements as well, isn’t it?
Sana Safi
The displacements.
Hameed Hakimi
So, that’s why it’s getting some attention, I think, the issue of water in Afghanistan and the environmental, because it’s causing a huge amount of internal displacement.
Sana Safi
Absolutely, and on the civil society, well, the Afghan and the Syrian civil society is probably different, but the only way that Afghanistan is sort of involved in the Syrian Conflict, would be, that many Afghans were sent to Syria to fight for Bashar Assad, on behalf of Iran, and that is something that worries the Afghan Government and it was – there were reports that some Sunni Afghans went to Yemen to fight on behalf of Saudi, so those are the issues that connects Afghanistan with the wider region and the conflict, and they are trying to find a solution for that.
Hameed Hakimi
And did you want to maybe, kindly express your last comment on, how do the Afghans view the role of the United States in their country and how that impacts their view of Pakistan.
Sana Safi
I would argue that there is no connection between how – between the American policy in Afghanistan and how Afghans view Pakistan, because the issues for Afghans are really close to home. So, it’s, you know, “Pakistan closed the gate and that affects my livelihood,” if I am a person in Torkham in Jalalabad, that caused me not to have food on the table. It’s not because America told me how to view Pakistan. It’s the same with, you know, the border fencing. If you are an Afghan in Paktika province and you have always believed that the international border, the Durand Line, well, the international border that Afghanistan doesn’t recognise, and Pakistan does, the Durand Line is affecting, you know, the core identity, because you have families on both sides of the border. So, it’s mostly how the relation affects my livelihood rather than what America’s policy is in Afghanistan.
Hameed Hakimi
Thank you, and Suddaf, did you want to briefly say something on that and I’ll come to you Amil, at the end.
Suddaf Chaudry
I wanted to add something to the foreign policy question and regarding Syria. I recently covered Iran’s – and Pakistan’s foreign policy, how they tried to establish a foreign policy and, in regards to Syria, they are very Saudi-centric, but they were leaning towards Iran, because at this point, the economy is crucial for Pakistan, just to get over that leap. But I recently covered a report and how Iran has been galvanising Shia forces in Balochistan, to go and fight in Karbala and in Iraq. So, I think Pakistan has to be aware if it does not get involved in a very, I would say, cohesive foreign policy, they will not be able to control these foreign militias that have been backed by Iran, which are increasing in numbers, and if you ask the Government officials in Pakistan, they will underplay it significantly, but being on the field and talking to the number of bases and recruits in Balochistan, it’s significant. So, I think you’ll be able to see it in the news cycle in the next year or so, the numbers will increase. You will see, and especially in Syria, manipulation of using Iranian Shia forces that are based in Afghanistan and Pakistan. I really think it’s a point that’s not being focused on, but the numbers are increasing. So, I think it’s a point that people should be focusing on the point, at this point and especially in Balochistan, it’s a vast province with not much legal infrastructure. So, you really have to wait and see what’s going to come next.
Hameed Hakimi
Thank you. Amil, if you wanted to comment on any of those questions?
Amil Khan
Yeah, on the Syria point, then, I might just touch the second question about organic narratives. So, I was in Pakistan when the Arab Spring, sort of, kicked off and then, right after that, I was the FCO’s Advisor to the Syrian Opposition. So – and I speak Arabic and I speak Urdu, so it was an interesting take on that and I would say, what I found, two points. First was the ability of the – of narratives to filter what people are seeing and the reality. So, the existing narratives, as I’m sure a lot of people here are aware, and then Pakistan is like pretty much everything that happens in the Muslim world is some sort of western manipulation. So, I was at a dinner party and there were Pakistani academics and I think a Palestinian academic, and the Pakistani view, straight away was well, this whole Arab Spring thing is like some western plot, and the Palestinian academic just hit the roof. So, that was events being very much filtered through the existing Pakistani lens, and which was very powerful.
I then saw, on the flipside of that working with the Syrian Opposition, that their level of knowledge of Pakistan and Afghanistan was very, very low. There was this idea, you know, that all these places are, kind of, in the same geographical area and have the same culture. The only link between the Paki –between the world of Pakistan, in say 203/14, and Syria was probably me, by some, you know, osmosis of being British Pakistani. And I would get hilarious questions from them, which often confused the idea of Afghans and Pakistanis. So, they’d often be like, “Well we’ve got all these Pakistanis who are fighting,” and at that point they weren’t, it was Afghans. I said, “Do you mean Afghans?” They said, “Yeah, same thing, you know, over there.” So, not a lot of knowledge, but at the same time, a few months after that they could see when the Iranian – that the push to recruit in Pakistan and Afghanistan happened, and the Syrians were picking up on that, and the manipulation on particularly religious narratives, “We’re going to defend Karbala, we’re going to” – and this was very much to pick up on the point about organically, how narratives are formed. You have to ve – you have to be – something I see in my everyday work quite a lot, you have to have a really granular knowledge of people’s views and perceptions and audiences, and for a long time, we thought that was just not possible, if you were an outside actor. But we do know now, from what Russia does, that you can do that as an outside actor, and I definitely saw the Iranians doing that in Pakistan and Afghanistan, and that directly affected what the Syrian perception of Afghans and Pakistanis was.
Hameed Hakimi
Thank you very much. Some very, very brief points to try and conclude what I thought was a fascinating conversation, and we can certainly – [inaudible – 63:00] there pointing at the clock. So, we had the objective, by organising this event, to hopefully help all of us in the room to see the Afghanistan-Pakistan narratives of conflict from a bottom up way and as opposed to a top down state-centric prism. Also, a couple of key takeaways from me, is that the region is not necessarily the past, as we might sometimes see it, and it may actually, tell us something about our future in the West as well. And I think, for me, the key takeaway is to go and think what are the key entry points that we can all think about? And hopefully, be contributing too, and facilitating a youth-to-youth, people-to-people contact in the two countries. And if I can ask you to please give a round of applause to our panel, and to yourselves [applause].
